

PROF. M. HIRIYANNA COMMEMORATION VOLUME

Editors :

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PROF. M. HIRIYANNA COMMEMORATION
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Prof M HIRIYANNA (1934)

P R E F A C E

About seven years ago some of us felt that though gold medals and a scholarship in the University had been endowed in the name of Prof Hiriyanna, and also a portrait of his had been unveiled, sufficient honour had not been done to his name, nor adequate recognition given to his work. We decided therefore to publish at least a Commemoration Volume. We formed a Committee, with Sri G Hanumantha Rao, Sri T N Sreekantaiya and myself as Secretaries and Sri K Chidambaram as Treasurer. Prof S Radhakrishnan very kindly consented to be Honorary President and lend us his high prestige, for which generous act I take this opportunity of offering him our grateful thanks. As we planned to complete the work within a year we decided to confine our invitation to write to the volume, to scholars in India as in those difficult times it was not easy to contact scholars abroad—a decision which is still one of our regrets. Even in India I have a fear that some of our invitations did not reach their destination. Anyhow contributions came soon enough. Prof Radhakrishnan said he would only be able, busy as he was with his professorial duties at Oxford, to contribute a Foreword which he sent promptly. The articles were now arranged in the alphabetical order of names of contributors and the MSS were prepared for the press.

Now began our troubles. What would have been in normal times the easiest part of the work proved to be the most troublesome. It was difficult to find a press which could undertake this kind of technical work. Many presses pleaded inability, some accepted the MS, but after varying periods of time returned it with apologies for not being able to print it owing to pressure of work. Much time was lost in correspondence and negotiations and waiting in all these cases. At this stage Sri G Hanumantha Rao came to our rescue by asking his son Sri G H Rama Rao of the Mysore Printing and Publishing House, to take up the printing, though such work was not being done by that house. This however entailed his resignation from the Secretaryship, as he felt it delicate now to be an office bearer.

Naturally printing was slow in the beginning. But as the work proceeded, progress became quicker. And the volume was more than three fourths complete, when the blow came. Prof Hiriyanna, who was slowly recovering from an operation unexpectedly passed away.

Now we felt that we could no longer publish the Volume in the form in which we originally intended to do it. We should now add a full Bibliography of Prof Hiriyanna's writings and a biographical sketch—particularly the latter. For his writings before he came to the Maharaja's College—both in English and in Kannada—the help available to me was so inadequate and imperfect that after a great deal of trouble I could only collect a small number of references. I had therefore to give up this attempt in the end. I confined myself generally to his writings after he came to the Maharaja's College and I omitted the reviews. As for the biographical sketch, I tapped many sources, but was surprised to find that even elderly persons knew no more about his personal life than I did. All was admiration and reverence and practically nothing more. I have referred to this remarkable feature in my sketch. I did however get some very important personal details from his grandson, Sri M Jayaram, a former pupil of mine, but they were of so intimate a character that I did not think it right to record them. The impressions left on me by those details have however coloured my picture.

A few words about the editing before I close. Obvious and minor errors have been corrected, the transliteration has been made uniform, and all Indian words and passages have been romanised, except in one article where *devanagari* has been used. Otherwise the articles appear exactly as they came to us—except in two cases. Only the longer of the two articles of a certain contributor has been included—to include both would have appeared exceptional—and the length has been reduced by the omission of a section. In another case about half a dozen lines have been omitted—without injury to the argument however—as they appeared quite unnecessary. I am thankful to three or four friends who took the suggestions I made, in good part. I received some help from my colleagues, and a few other friends, but the greatest of all came from Sri G Hanumantha Rao who was my constant companion through all this work.

We are greatly indebted to all the scholars who very readily responded to our request. And we apologise to them as well as to the public for the delay in publication, while thanking them all for their patience.

We are deeply grateful to His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore for the kind interest he showed in our enterprise by graciously making a donation. Our thanks are due to some private gentlemen who gave donations or became advance subscribers. We discontinued however such collection very soon, as the work did not progress.

We cannot close without expressing our deep thanks to the Mysore Printing and Publishing House and its Printer, Sri G. H. Rama Rao, for the excellent way in which they have done their work.

Vani Vilas Mohalla,
Mysore, 27th October, 1951.

N. SIVARAMA SASTRY
Secretary

Note : Add under " Bibliography " the following .

64 A. Philosophy of Values Cultural Heritage of India,
Second Revised Edition In course of publication.

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N. S. S.

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FOREWORD

By PROF. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

It is a special pleasure to me to be invited to write a few lines for the Hiriyanna Commemoration Volume. I have known Professor Hiriyanna ever since I joined the Mysore University in July 1919 and though I left the University early in 1921, my relations with Professor Hiriyanna have not been interrupted and I have continued to regard him all these years as my friend and guide. He is one of the finely touched spirits of contemporary Indian thought. Beginning with few advantages, satisfied with modest rewards, without worldly ambition, he has persisted in the way he has chosen and become one of the significant figures of our time in Indian thought. Generations of pupils have profited from his learning and been won by his gentleness and integrity. Even a casual visitor to him will be struck by his grace, courtesy and distinction of manner. His view of philosophy is brought out in his paper on the *Indian Conception of Values*.¹ A study of philosophy is to be undertaken, not merely in the interests of speculative thought but mainly for the light it throws on the ultimate significance of life. Philosophy is not history of philosophy, an exposition of past and present systems of thought. It is not dialectical thinking about thinking itself. It is the reasoned adoption of a way of life, which includes the contemplative urge to the knowledge of reality and the practical impulse to weave that knowledge into life. Philosophy assumes a living character only when there is this striving to invest life with significance. Every human life should become a poem.

When Plato said that philosophers should be Kings, he did not mean that the main task of philosophy was to make laws and solve political problems. For him the philosophic temper of mind, the exalted, calm, noble, dispassionate attitude unmoved by motives of personal gain, ambition or power is the only temper of mind which can solve these problems. In these days of increasing specialisation and party strife, when we are unable to see the wood for the trees,

¹ *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* Vol. XIX Pt. I

when the effort of genuine thinking has yielded to the acceptance of slogans, the need for philosophic reflection on life's problems is most urgent. Philosophy is not a speciality but the integration of specialities. It is this spirit of philosophy that Hiriyanna illustrates in his reflection and life. He has spent a life time in the study of Indian Sanskrit classics especially the philosophical ones. His writings display scholarship which is not so much brilliant or spectacular as sound and sane. They possess a clarity and sense of form which we miss in the works of many others. They are as stimulating to the scholar as they are informative to the beginner. Hiriyanna's prose style in English is simple, clear and free from all superfluous adornment and is a reflection of his unruffled temperament and calm judgment.

While he adopts the scientific and liberal attitude of the modern critical student, he adheres to the old ways of life. In Indian literature humanity is presented as a gigantic tree whose roots plunge into the far off past and whose branches stretch out into the unseen future. The true, the beautiful and the good are the ideals towards which life is aspiring. The spiritual life of man is inconceivable apart from the society which forms and sustains him. So while trying to refine society and exceed its forms, we must adhere to its habits. Indian classics stir in us memory and hope of the interlocked life of many generations. If the Indian forsakes his traditions he will cease to be able to fulfil his own tasks in the world. While it is essential for us to assimilate everything of value which modern life offers us, we must not surrender the master plan of our life.

Hiriyanna's urbanity of temper, his solid and accurate learning have won for him universal friendship and this is evident from the varied list of contributors to this volume. The contributors to this volume and many others besides, students, friends and admirers bow to him as one travelling in truth and protected by honest thought, ever alive in mind to the ways of spirit.

PROFESSOR M. HIRIYANNA
(1871-1950)

BY
N. SIVARAMA SASTRY

Sri-gurubhya namah

Prof M. Hiriyanra was born on 7th May, 1871, as the second son of Mysore Nanjundaiya. He received his early education at Mysore and derived his early inspiration in Sanskrit from his Guru, Sri Penaswamy Tirumalachariar. He took his B A and M A degrees from the Madras Christian College. In 1891 he was appointed Librarian, Government Oriental Library, Mysore. The next year he was Head Clerk in the Office of the Education Secretary, Bangalore. In 1895 he went as Government scholar for a year to the 'Teachers' College, Saidapet, where he took his L.T. From 1896 to 1907 he was Assistant Master, and from 1907 to 1912 Head Master of the Government Normal School, Mysore. In September 1912 he was appointed Lecturer in Sanskrit in the Maharaja's College, Mysore; Assistant Professor in 1914 and Officiating Professor in 1917. And from July 1918 to his retirement in 1927 he was Professor of Sanskrit in the Mysore University. In 1921 for a brief period he was also Curator of the Oriental Library.

He was connected with several Universities in India besides Mysore as Examiner and Member of Boards of Studies. He delivered the Miller Lectures at the University of Madras. He was President of the Indian Philosophy section of the All-India Oriental Conference held at Mysore in 1935. He was General President of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Hyderabad, 1959. He was elected General President of the Lucknow Session of the All-India Oriental Conference to be held in 1951, but declined the honour owing to ill health. The Madras Sanskrit Academy conferred on him the title of *Sanskṛta-Sevā Dhurina*. The University of Mysore decided to award him the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters, but he passed away on 19th September 1950, before it could actually do so. He

has left behind him in manuscript his *magnum opus*—*The Indian Philosophy of Values* (See appended Bibliography)

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Asked for more personal details about Prof Hiriyanna, one of his nearest relatives remarked “ Why, you as his students know really more about him, than we do ! ” Though such an answer was quite unexpected, it was true in a kind of way and throws a flood of light on Prof Hiriyanna’s character. By nature modest and probably also as a result of early experiences in life, he withdrew into himself so completely that he lived a life to which he gave his all, but from which he would himself ask for nothing. Devoted almost entirely to his studies and shunning publicity, he lived a life of seclusion in a strange world of spiritual hush and always spoke in a soft subdued voice as if noise would break the charm of it. He worked always, *ohne Hast, aber ohne Rast* silently and alone, *khaggarsanakappo*. He did not seek recognition and felt embarrassed when it came. He actually thanked me for not insisting on his presence when his portrait was unveiled by Prof S Radhakrishnan in the Maharaja’s College, in 1932. A title awarded to him by the Madras Sanskrit Academy in recognition of his services for Sanskrit could only be conferred on him *in absentia*.

He had a very high sense of his duty as a teacher. He never came late nor unprepared to his class and never took leave for more than two days in the year. He wore himself out for the sake of his students. He taught them a variety of subjects like Veda and Comparative Philology, Sāhitya, Alamkāra and Vyākaraṇa, and the several Darśanas. Though called Professor of Sanskrit, he was also Professor of Indian Philosophy, and the Darśanas were his favourite subject. On all these however he prepared for his own use full notes — based on an intimate and continuous study of the originals — fuller than were actually necessary for class work. His notes on the texts — philosophical as well as literary — were for the most part in Sanskrit and constituted virtually short commentaries on them. Sometimes he prepared also full translations. He was thus probably the earliest person to write a commentary upon the *Śaṅkaradṛṣṭānta* and make a translation of it which he intended to call ‘ The Dream Queen ’. He sometimes

dictated his notes to his students in subjects which had no suitable text-books. His notes on the History of the Sanskrit Language and Literature, Comparative Philology and Indian Philosophy were actually short treatises at a time when, e.g., Keith's volumes on Sanskrit Literature and the works of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan on Indian Philosophy had not appeared. All these notes he revised and rewrote every year. He was so conscientious in the discharge of his duties as a Professor that it left him hardly any time to think of publishing his work. It was only after he retired and was relieved of teaching duties that he took seriously to publishing his writings. As can be seen from the Bibliography I have added to this sketch much of his published work dates after his retirement. Besides he was so fastidious that he was never quite satisfied with what he had written till he had revised it many times and allowed also some time to lapse. He strove after perfection in everything he did. He wrote and rewrote and ruthlessly suppressed his work when it did not come up to his standard of perfection. And he was thorough in everything he did. He once laboriously waded through the *Travels* of Apollonius of Tyana in order to verify a point in connection with the date of Śaṅkara—though the result was disappointing. He would never allow anything to leave his hands till he was thoroughly convinced about every aspect of it. He would never rush to print. And if he found that someone had written on the subject in the meantime he did not feel in the least sorry. And then he compressed his matter so much that the small bulk of his work is really misleading. He did not wish to duplicate work already done. Only when he felt he could add something distinctive of his own did he care to print his work. Otherwise he was content with publishing an article on some aspect of the subject, neglected or untouched by others.

In Indian Philosophy however—though the works of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan had appeared—he felt he had still something to say and ventured to publish his 'Outlines' which he modestly described as primarily intended to serve as "a text book for use in colleges where Indian philosophy is taught". This description was highly deceptive and in fact did deceive some scholars and reviewers. But as a matter of fact the world of scholars is eternally grateful to him for his wonderfully clear and simple, yet authoritative, account of

the history of Indian philosophy written in a most charming style. How we wish he had not set himself such a high standard and allowed also his other works to be published soon after he wrote them! They would have helped a larger circle of readers than his immediate students and quickened the growth of scholarship in those branches of learning. Particularly his lectures on the History of the Sanskrit Language and Literature would have been a valuable addition to his all too few articles on Indian Aesthetics in which he did pioneer work. For Prof. Hiriyanna combined with his profound scholarship, a delicate taste and a love of clear and precise expression. Alas he has willed, I learn, that all his notes should be destroyed! Luckily however he published editions at least, of the *Naiskarmya-Siddhi* and the *Vedanta-sara* in which he incorporated some of his philosophical notes. These constitute ideal text-books in Advaita for the student even as his critical edition of the *Ista-Siddhi* is meant for the expert.

Prof. Hiriyanna lived a perfectly ordered and disciplined life. He often reminded me of Kant and the Philosopher's Walk. He was simple to the verge of austerity. He dressed simply and everything about him was scrupulously neat and clean. He was correct and punctual. He promptly answered communications, kept all his engagements and never made a promise which he could not fulfil. He was fastidious to a degree and a perfect artist in everything he did—from mending a pencil to writing a work. Though he did not spare himself he was tolerant of those who could not come up to his exacting standards. He was in fact noted for his kindness and consideration and unfailing courtesy. He never denied help to any student or scholar. He gave suggestions, read and revised manuscripts and wrote out opinions of books at great sacrifice of his time and energy. He was equally well known for his honesty and uprightness. I shall not say that such a kind and good man as this did not have enemies—though he forgave them all—but he could never compromise with evil. He was exceedingly modest and his learning did not sit heavily on him. But beneath his modesty and humility he had a keenly sensitive nature. It is rumoured that when a Vice-Chancellor well known for his erudition—extensive in many branches though not equally deep in as many—spoke slightly of his opinions, he left

him abruptly refusing to have anything to do with such a man and at once sent in his resignation, and that Sri N S Subba Rao who was then the Principal interceded and it was with the greatest difficulty that he could prevail upon him to withdraw his resignation.

A teacher of such learning coupled with such a high sense of duty and rectitude naturally commanded the confidence, the love and reverence of his students the moment they came into contact with him—not to speak of his colleagues among whom he was known as “the Sage of the College.” In fact he was already a legend when we entered the Maharaja's College. His reputation for scholarship, moral uprightness, modesty and quiet reserve had spread through generations of his students in the Normal School and the Maharaja's College. When we called for donations to endow a scholarship in his name after his retirement, it was a pleasant surprise to find that one of the earliest to subscribe was a Kannada Pandit who was formerly his student in the Normal School. His quiet and kindly smile would put everyone at his ease. His tranquil face would immediately resolve all conflict. His soft voice, his deep earnestness, the occasional glint in his eye as inspiration took possession of him, would soon hold his students in thrall. Whatever the subject he might be lecturing about, he would make it equally interesting and throw always fresh light on it and take new standpoints. When he addressed the Sanskrit Association or the Philosophical Society, he never said a word more than what was necessary, nor ever uttered anything banal. He always astonished us by his penetrative insight and unsuspected inferences. His comments on the Sanskrit poets, his comparative estimates of Indian and European literature, classical as well as modern, were most suggestive. He always warned us against too hasty a criticism of the opponent's point of view. Though you may feel it your duty to tear a philosopher to pieces and thus show your admiration for him, still it must always be preceded by thorough understanding. There need be no hurry about showing such appreciation—even if it is necessary for you to do so. This was in the best Indian philosophic tradition. No great classical writer indulges in vituperation for its own sake—though the exercise is invigorating in itself. The fullest exposition of the opponent always precedes criticism and *siddhanta*. Himself a great exponent of

Śaṅkara he always faithfully represented his opponents' points of view. In this connection he also warned us against the tendency to see broad similarities even if non significant, overlooking the minute differences which probably were vital. He once found fault with a student for sweeping generalisations in which he identified Bradley with Śaṅkara—incidentally showing the admiration he himself had for Bradley, who is not a mere replica of Śaṅkara.

He was fond of telling us that the true aim of ancient Indian education was not to inform the mind but to form it. Śaṅkara says in one of his minor works (*Satasloki*, v. 1) that there is nothing on earth or in heaven to compare with a teacher in this respect. The philosopher's stone, it is said, can transform anything it touches into gold, but it cannot make of it another philosopher's stone. Whereas a teacher fashions out of his pupil another person like himself. Prof Hiriyanna used often to mention two of his old teachers—Prof M. Rangacharya and Sri Periaswamy Tirumalachariar. The latter seems to have been a pandit of remarkable ability. In addition to being a great teacher of Saṁhitā he was a great organiser and was a pioneer of Sanskrit studies in Mysore and founded a college known as the Sadvidyapaṭhaśāla. Prof Hiriyanna used to relate to us an anecdote about him. He was a great admirer of the *Veni saṁhara* and, while teaching it, would never like to stop in the middle of Act III. It must be read at a single session, even if it should last three hours. During one such session the Inspector of Sanskrit Schools happened to come into the room. He was so fascinated by the dramatic recitation and exposition that he quietly sat down with the students till the very end. He came to inspect but remained to listen. Prof Hiriyanna has endowed a prize in the name of this teacher for the best Saṁhitā Vidyāvan of the year from the Sanskrit College. None knew of this gift—not even his own family—until it was whispered into their ear by someone in the know of it. *Pradānam pracchannam* (Bhartṛhari) *Dattva na kīrtayet* (*Mahābhārata*). Such were also all his gifts to students and pandits who sought his aid. They did not humble the receiver. Himself regarded with profound respect by Pandits. Prof Hiriyanna had equal regard and reverence for them. His sympathy for them smacked nothing of the condescension characteristic of those in authority. It was he

that was responsible for introducing the system of appointing Visiting Pandits for post-Graduate classes in Sanskrit in our University. The system continued till very recently. It has now become impracticable for various reasons, not the least important of them being unfortunately that the generation which gave us men like the late MM Panditaratnam Laxmipuram Srinivasachar is gone never to return. Prof Hiriyanna had the greatest regard for this encyclopaedic scholar and consulted him frequently. His regard for this Pandit was equalled only by his regard for the late MM Prof S Kuppuswami Sastri, in the accuracy of whose learning he had profound faith. He and Prof Sastri were like *dvā suparna*, knit to each other in bonds of friendship and regard.

The impression left on the mind of the reader by the foregoing may be one of a world renouncing recluse interested solely in learning and study. But this was far from the truth. In private conversation Prof Hiriyanna was very genial, sometimes even jovial and could laugh at himself. He took the keenest interest in the rapid changes overtaking us from all around. Though he belonged to the old order by habit, his mind remained flexible to the end. He once remarked with reference to the all round awakening in our times thus: 'The procession that went forth in the age of the *Mahābhārata* and later passed out of sight, is now returning.' He felt real joy in the Indian Awakening and the Renaissance.

In the early years of his service in the Normal School—later styled the Training College—he did pioneer work for Kannada in his own silent way before such work became fashionable and spectacular—by teaching in Kannada technical subjects like Science, Mathematics, Psychology and Education by writing articles and even books in Kannada on these subjects—thus disproving as early as four decades ago a nevertheless still persisting myth that the provincial languages are incapable of adoption as educational media for science. Though later in the University he could not find time for this kind of work, he was still sought after by workers in the Kannada movement for help and inspiration. Poets read their work to him, he accepted a dedication or wrote a foreword. His opinion was sought after by the very best of them and he reviewed privately in letters all books sent to him.

The secret of the charm of Prof Hiriyanna's personality seems to me to lie in the ideal of life he set before himself very early in life and the honest and truthful way in which he strove for ever afterwards to live up to it. There was no dichotomy in his life between precept and practice. He was a philosopher in the true Indian tradition to whom philosophy was not only true thinking but also right living. He was convinced that truth would ultimately triumph and never took upon himself to judge—much less attack—those who misjudged or proved false to him. He would not proceed against a man who cheated him. He would not even answer an unfair criticism. He would simply ignore it. His conviction was that untruth would destroy itself. The late Mrs Rhys Davids wrote a very unfair review—if it can be called a review at all—of his "Outlines", in which she loudly complained that her views which she no longer held had been quoted. This was unfair because she had allowed her standard work containing her old views to continue to circulate. Prof Hiriyanna felt a bit annoyed but he did not write a rejoinder. Years later in his 'Essentials' he merely gave currency also to her changed opinions as deserving of notice—coming as they did from an expert.

akkodhena jine kodham asadhun sadhuna jine |

jine kadariyam danena saccenalikavadinam ||

was his rule of life

In his 'Outlines' he omitted a consideration of Dvaita as his plan was to give only one example each of the Absolutistic and the Theistic Vedanta, and he had chosen Advaita and Viśiṣṭadvaita. This procedure was quoted by some misguided admirers as showing that there was no philosophy in Dvaita in Prof Hiriyanna's opinion. Dvaitins resented the omission as deliberate, declaring that Dvaita could stand on its own legs irrespective of the opinions of this or that writer. Neither group seemed to have read Prof Hiriyanna's preface where he explains the plan of his work. He was silent throughout the controversy. Nevertheless when he wrote his 'Essentials' years later, without explanation or apology he amplified the treatment of the Vedanta by including Dvaita in it. He thus silenced all unfair criticism and unintelligent justification by yielding to the sentiments of Dvaitins. A noble answer to a mis conceived accusation!—and it proved very awkward for both the parties!

He was very fond of referring to Kalidasa's ideal of life as exemplified in Śiva himself—the poet's favourite deity. This was the theme of his address as President of the Indian Philosophy Section of the Mysore Oriental Conference. He refers many times in his writings to the superiority of this ideal of a balanced though full life—of a life in this world though not of it. *Aśaktas sukham anrabhūt* was ever on his lips. He also refers to this as the distinctive contribution of the *Bhagavad Gītā*—this harmonising of the ways of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. Though fond of this ideal in his own life, he seems to have had a partiality for renunciation. For he vaguely hinted at *saṁnyasa* at one stage in his life—fifteen years ago—and gave us a shock. It is significant also that the last thing he wrote deals with *nivṛtti*. He had in him the makings of a poet, an artist, a mystic and a sage. He seems to have practised painting early in life and always took great interest in Art. I do not know if he practised Yoga. But certainly he was a sage and a mystic—a *ṛṣi*, a *karmayogin* in the line of *Yana-kādayali*. He lived an active life balanced and useful, and felt the spiritual joy of it. I never saw him despondent—except for a brief moment in the last months of his life, during a protracted illness. “Nature cares little for individual life, though life itself is precious to her, life preys upon life,” he remarked. I am confident he was glad to have lived this life and that he was thankful for it. Like one who had done his part he would pray—tired but not unhappy—

mamapi ca ksapayatu nilalohitah
punarbhavam parigataśaktir atmabhuh ||

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PROF HIRIYANNA'S WRITINGS

By N SIVARAMA SASTRY

[N B —This bibliography does not include the many articles on educational topics that Prof Hiriyantha wrote in the early part of his career, nor one or two books he published on educational psychology — all in Kannada. It leaves out also the innumerable reviews he wrote later for the papers and periodicals. These were mostly of books on Sanskrit Literature and Indian Philosophy, and used to appear formerly in the "Servant of India" and latterly in the "Hindu" in particular. Some 'Forewords' have been included. The two lists of books and articles are in chronological order as far as it could be ascertained from the dates of publication, as well as from an incomplete list of his articles in Prof Hiriyantha's own handwriting.]

BOOKS

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2. Kenopanishad, do 1912
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Caturvarṇadinam svartha upasamkhyanam

As given in the *Kaṣikā vṛtti* of Jayaditya-Vamana the same *Varttika* reads

Caturvarṇyādinam svartha upasamkhyanam ,

whereas, as given by Patanjali, the Bhaṣyakara, who is of these three the oldest and the greatest authority, the words simply are (Vol II, p 370)

Brahmanadisu caturvarṇyadinām upasamkhyanam kartavyam

The word svarthe (in its own sense, without any additional significance), it will be noticed, is absent from this most ancient wording of the rule, which can imply that the termination syan in caturvarṇyam conveys the same sense as the same termination in the word Brahmanyam (= duty of a Brahmana). The only correct conclusion from the above facts can be that, while Katyayana emends Panini's *Sutra V 1 124* teaching the application of the abstract noun making syaṅ termination to words included in the list beginning with the word Brahmana, so as to make the rule applicable *in the same sense* to words included in the list headed by caturvarṇya, the authors of the *Kaṣika* desire to further modify that emendatory rule by saying that the termination as applied to the caturvarṇya list is svarthe. Does the *Kaṣika* mean "svarthe only" or "svarthe also"? Now Panini himself contemplates the svarthe application of the syan termination, in the case of 'sarvaveda' and other words which make up a subsidiary group (antargana) within the large 'Brahmanadi' group. So, could not the Varttikakara have more naturally said—Sarvavedadisu caturvarṇyadinam (or caturvarṇadinam) upasamkhyanam" if he had really intended to prescribe a svarthe application of that termination in caturvarṇya and other instances assuming that for some reason he did not want to use the word svarthe in the *Varttika* itself. His not having done so implies that, up to the time of the *Vyākaranamahābhāṣya* (which is our earliest authority for the exact wording of the *Varttika*), people were familiar with the use of words like caturvarṇya in the sense of "the duties and functions of the four social orders". This use may have ceased to be current, and so the authors of the *Kaṣika* may have wished to restrict its use to svarthe only. But that cannot disprove the possibility of the word being, in earlier literature, used at times as an ordinary abstract noun making termination.

It has been argued on the other side that the word *caturvarnya* never could have meant anything more than just the *catvaro varnah*, the four social orders. Even Katyayana, the argument continues, meant to teach the *svārthe* use of the termination, but instead of directly putting the word *svārthe* in the *Varṭtika* itself, he gains his end very cleverly, almost cryptically, by referring to the list of words as “*Caturvarṇyadinam*” and not as “*Caturvarṇadinam*”. We owe this ingenious explanation to Kaiyyata, the author of the *Pradīpa* on the *Mahābhāṣya*. His words are *Pratyayantoccaranam bhāvakarṇasambandha-nivṛttyartham iti svārtha eva syaṅ bhavati*. This is not quite convincing. If instead of designating the list with the initial word in its primitive form of *caturvarṇa*, there was any purpose in using the word in the form it is to assume after the application of the termination (i.e., the form *caturvarṇya*) as the designation, that purpose could conceivably be to ward off any difficulties that might stand in the way of the application of the termination, or to determine the exact change that the word was to assume after the application of the termination. Any *jñāpaka* implication as to the sense of the resulting word is not warranted by the context. The most telling argument against such a *jñāpaka* inference is the fact (which could not have been unknown to the author of the *Pradīpa*) that the *Kaśikā*, which first inserts the word ‘*svārthe*’ in the emendatory rule, also itself designates the list by the *pratyayanta* form of the word, and not by the primitive base! Obviously, the *jñāpaka* device had not yet entered the mind of the *Kaśikakara*. The *Siddhāntakaumudī* of course avoids all difficulties by using the word *caturvarṇadinam*.

One would ask, why all this fanfaronade about an apparently very simple matter? What should it matter whether the word *caturvarṇyam* is just the four social orders, or the duties and functions of these orders, or, optionally, both these senses according to the context, the latter sense, presumably, being found only in the more ancient usage? But no—the matter is of special significance for the orthodox views about the interchangeability of the social orders (or castes). If *caturvarṇyam* always meant the four social orders, then in the *Bhagavadgītā* passage under discussion, God would be declared to have created the four *Varnas*, to have, in other words, directed

that certain souls, because they possessed certain qualities suited to the discharge of specific functions, *be born as* Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vaiśyas or Śūdras, as the case may be. The obvious implication of the above is that Varna is intrinsically a matter of birth, so that, in times when evil prevails and the Varnas are found unsuited for, or incapable of, the discharge of their respective karmans, there cannot be effected a transfer of the individuals of one Varna, *in the self same life period*, to some other Varna and its karmans, because, according to the above interpretation of the *Gītā* stanza, birth in specific Varnas is God made and God regulated. This, it is easy to see, is a conclusion agreeable to the views of an average “orthodox” Hindu, and, as already mentioned, it is the explanation of the B. G. commentators, and writers are not wanting who have praised to the skies this sociological principle of birth regulated social orders on account of the manifold economical and cultural advantages that it is believed to be capable of securing to mankind. Per contra, there are writers to whom the fourfold birth regulated Varna classification is an anathema, the parent of all the ills under which the present Hindu Society is groaning, and they heartily blame the *Bhagavadgītā* “for having bolstered up the Varna system which would have otherwise petered away, by making sense of a thing which is absolute nonsense.” Scholarship need not of course bother about mere commendation or vituperation, but where Scriptures are quoted in support of the one or the other alternative we have to pause and investigate.

If therefore, for reasons already indicated, we can legitimately assume an earlier use of the word *caturvarṇyam* in the sense of the “duties and functions of the four social orders,” it would follow that in the passage before us Kṛṣṇa would be saying, not that He created the Varnas as such, but that, in conformity with the *guṇakarmavibhaga* principle, He merely created and apportioned, *post facto*, specific jobs for persons who claimed to belong to specific Varnas. When this original distribution took place, the candidates were, presumably, worthy of the jobs assigned, but should any question of their own or their successors’ worth be raised at any subsequent period, the persons concerned would have to prove their credentials. The jobs, good or bad, would not necessarily be theirs because they happened to be

born in a specific family and of specific parents. When, in the interest of the Dharmasamsthapana (B G iv 8), such a social reorganisation becomes imperative, what machinery should be devised to work out the details, it would be very difficult to say. The task will naturally belong to those who, by reason of their intrinsic merits, can be regarded as the *Vibhūtis* of the Lord for the time being, and it goes without saying that such a reorganisation and reapportionment of duties and functions will have to be carried out in that selfless and equanimous mood in which Kṛṣṇa himself, we are told (B G iii 22), first undertook the task. How far birth and heredity are to weigh in such a readjustment of functions can only be settled by an appeal to the *vox populi*, which, in the last analysis, is the *vox Dei*. This would not be an easy job by any means. It would demand a moral elevation far beyond the reach of the average demagogue. There would be many heart rending and even head clashing difficulties in the way. But the first important step in the process will have been gained if once it is conceded that the *Bhagavadgītā* distinctly aligns itself on the side of a steady, cautious and well regulated progress in sociological matters. In fact, things could hardly have been otherwise, seeing that Kṛṣṇa declares the ensurance of an all round social well being as the very purpose of His descent time and again, into this world of mortals.

The use of the root *srj* in the sense of creation and apportionment need not cause any difficulty, as such explicit use is again found in B G v 14. Nor need the repeated declaration in the *Bhagavadgītā* that the *gunas* or qualities which are to regulate one's *karmans* or actions are innate or *svabhāvaja* involve further difficulty, because the *Bhagavadgītā* has also more than once and plainly declared that every man or woman is granted the freedom to work out his or her own advancement or downfall despite birth heredity and other controls. This theoretically implies that a candidate from the four *varnas* can, under given circumstances develop qualities either higher or lower than those normally expected of his order, and so can achieve his own self elevation or self degradation. The *Bhagavadgītā* doctrine of *Avataras* and *Vibhūtis* necessarily implies that there are, under the guidance of Providence, forces of reform and renovation steadily at work in human society, and that, *ipso facto*, there

are the other forces brought into existence by a mis exercise of human freedom, which are (of course with the knowledge of Providence) working in the opposite direction. There arise in society recurrent waves of progress and regress. One must accordingly first gain a critical and historical understanding of one's own position and bearings, and then fearlessly fashion his own code of conduct.

It must also be remembered that in the age of the *Bhagavadgita* and of the contemporary sections of the Epic, the status of the individual Varnas in the Caturvarnya system of Hinduism had formed a very live issue to which the texts return more than once. Thus there is the dialogue between Nahusa and Yudhishthira in the *Āranyakaparvan* chapter 180, between Bhṛgu and Bharadvaja in the *Śantiparvan*, chapters 188-189, between Janaka and Parasara in the same parvan, chapter 296, and between Umā and Mahesvara in the *Anuśasanaparvan*, chapter 143. The *Bhagavadgita*, so to say, laying down the philosophical premises of the teaching. It would take us too far afield to quote and explain all these texts, which do not all belong to the same evolutionary stage of the Great Epic. 'Who is a Brahmana?' the question is asked in one place. The reply given is, not "one who is born of Brahmana parents," but "one who possesses truth, charity, forbearance, character, non wickedness, self restraint, commiseration." "Suppose one commonly passing for a Śūdra has these qualities and one passing for a Brahmana has them not?" The prompt reply is, 'Then is the Śūdra so called no Śūdra, and the Brahmana, no Brahmana.' The argument does not end there. If thus the character is to determine everything, what about parentage? Is not birth the determining factor? The reply is involved but honest. The very fact that an individual possesses qualities inconsistent with his alleged parentage, should make us question his parentage. Society being what it is, the parentage is likely to have been, at some one or more antecedent stages, of a lower, or a higher order than what ordinarily passes current. Should this explanation, however, appear to be too crude, the texts offer another. In the case of the first three social orders, the so-called Dvijas or twice-borns, the real Varna is determined only at the *second* birth. Prior to that all alike are to be regarded as Śūdras. This second birth takes place at the time of the Upani-

yana or the Initiation Ceremony, at which the function of the father is exercised by the "Teacher" and of the mother by the "Knowledge" into which the boy is to be initiated. Of course "birth" as ordinarily understood will normally exercise no small influence in determining the nature of the second birth, but some of the outstanding exceptions both ways that we always come across are enough to warn us that the first birth is not always the all-in-all. In the latest of these texts, that from the *Anusasanaparvan*, it is distinctly said that the transfer from the one Varna to the other takes place only after death in the next birth, and yet, inconsistently enough, we are also told.

Na yonir nāpi samskāro na śrutam na ca samtatih |
Karanāni dvijatvasya, vṛttam eva tu kāraṇam ||

[Neither source-of-origin, nor refined-upbringing, nor learning, nor issue is the cause of one's being a 'Twice-born'
It is character alone that is the cause]

Now, what about the actual literary usage of the word "Caturvarṇya"? Passages enough can be cited to establish the svārthe use of the word cāturvarṇyam in the sense of just "the four social orders", but can we point out any ancient use of the word in the sense of "work belonging, assigned, or beneficial to the respective social orders"? Yes. Such a text is found in the Yudhiṣṭhira-Nahusa dialogue in the *Āranyakaparvan*, 180-23.

Caturvarṇyam pramāṇam ca (v l cet) satyam ca Brahma caiva hi |
Śūdreṣvāpi ca satyam ca danam akrodha eva ca |
Aṅśamsyam ahimsā ca gṛha caiva Yudhiṣṭhira ||

It is impossible to construe the first line in this stanza in any intelligible manner if we take the word caturvarṇyam to denote the four social orders, and not their duties. The commentator Nīlakaṇṭha himself understands it to mean "whatever is beneficial to the four orders" (caturṇam varṇānam hitam). It is not therefore, as may be supposed, some modern interpreter burning with a zeal for "reform" that is responsible for this interpretation. Other passages where context precludes svārthe use of the word caturvarṇya are Mbh., Śāntiparvan, chapter 66 st 43, 67-1, 98-6, etc.

(ii) *B G vii 7-11. their Position and Purpose*

The above five stanzas come in the following context

Etadyoninī bhūtāni sarvanityupadharaya	
Aham kṛtsnasya jagataḥ prabhavaḥ pralayas tathā	6
Mattah parataram nanyat kimcid asti Dhanamjaya	
Mayi sarvaṁ idam protam sūtre maṇigaṇa iva	7
Raso'ham apsu Kaunteya prabhasmi saśisūryayoh	
Pranavaḥ sarvavedesu śabdah khe pauruṣam nṛsu	8
Punyo gandhaḥ pṛthivyam ca tejaś cāsmi vibhavaṣau	
Jivanam sarvabhutesu tapaś cāsmi tapasviṣu	9
Bijam mam sarvabhūtānam viddhi Partha sanātanam	
Buddhir buddhimatam aśmi tejaś tejasvinam aham	10
Balam balavatam caham kāmaragavivarjitaṁ	
Dharmaviruddho bhutesu kāmo smi Bharatarsabha	11
Ye caiva sattvika bhāva rajasas tamasaś ca ve	
Matta eveti tan viddhi na tvaham tesu te mayi	12

Now, regarding this passage, Garbe argues that the cosmological discussion *ā la Samkhya* in vii 6 is interrupted by the five stanzas 7-11, and is resumed once more in vii 12, so that the intervening stanzas 7-11 constitute a clear later interpolation. Agreeing with Garbe in this conclusion of his, R. Otto goes on to say that these added stanzas were probably the original nucleus of which the *Vibhūti* enumeration in chapter ten constitutes a still later *Purāna*-wise elaboration, and that the circumstance that the Poem should find room for the original nucleus as well as its elaboration is proof positive that our present *Bhagavadgītā* is a composite product. The fact that vii 10ab = (var) x 39ab, and vii 10d = x 36b are held to be further unmistakable pointers to the same conclusion. This is, *prima facie*, a very strong case, so that the determination of the exact position and purpose of the above stanzas becomes a matter of considerable importance in determining the textual evolution of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

My reading of the passage is totally different from that of Garbe and Otto, but as these two scholars are not agreed as to st. vii 7, Otto arguing, against Garbe, that it does fit in with the cosmo-

logical context, let us consider the remaining four stanzas vii 8 11

The first two of these stanzas enumerate nine instances, which, we are told, are the Vibhutis in miniature They are nothing of the kind In my own view, they are so many instances cited to illustrate the cosmological conclusion of vii 6cd, viz, that the One Lord is the source of all this manifold world, which, at Dissolution, is funded back into Him Here is my own explanation of the illustrations one by one (1) Raso ham apsu The self same rain water is sucked up by the roots of different trees yielding fruits of different tastes The tastes are so many vikaras or modifications of the rain water which is one yatha abyonayo rasah, tatha Madyoniniṣsarvabhutanī That God constitutes the rasas in the different herbs is also stated in B G xv 13cd (2) Prabha smi śaśisuryayoh The scorching light of the sun and the mild light of the moon are mutually different, but their essence and origin is one and the same Compare B G xv 12 (3) Pranavah sarvavedesu The Pranava or the Omkara is the first syllable to issue forth from the throat of the Creator, and the Creator's next utterances, the Vedas are just the evolved forms of that original articulation Compare for this B G ix 17cd, where the Omkara is cited as the "ekatva" view of which the Three Vedas are the "bahutva" view (4) Śabdah khe The Ākāśa or Ether reverberates with diverse sounds, but the Proto sound—known as the Sphota—is one and unique and eternal and the source of the other sounds (5) Paurusam nṛṣu Diverse are the manly qualities and excellences (the so called Purusarthas) to be attained by man 'The History of the world,' as Carlyle says is but the Biography of great men', the Heroes who can appear in all conceivable walks of life On an ultimate analysis however, the Purusarthas are so many exhibitions of the workings of the self same Divine Essence, the Godlike Form that is immanent in man Compare B G xv 14 (6) Puṇyo gandhah pṛthivyam ca On the analogy of the original rain water turning into all kinds of juices, we have in the Earth one basic smell, pure and holy, manifesting itself into so many varieties of good, bad and indifferent smells that we cognise and differentiate (7) Tejaś casmī Vibhavasau The tejas or lustre in the Fire is outwardly one, but the tongues of the Fire which in their totality constitute its lustre are the seven—

Kali, Karali, Manojava, Sulohita, Sudhumra, Sphulingini,
and Viśvaruci—

as enumerated in the Mundaka Upaniṣad (I ii 4) (8) Jīvanam sarvabhūtesu The biological principle of life in all the varied types of living creatures high and low is one and unique Its outward manifestations, the various species of living organisms, are countless and divergent (9) Tapas caśmi tapasvitu The mystic impulse towards God realisation that leads men to put forth diverse forms of penance is at bottom one and unique Thus from all these illustrations, understood in the way indicated above, the conclusion of st 10, viz that God is the seed and origin of all beings becomes fully established With the above interpretation of these illustrations, which is nothing out of the way and which is even supported by other passages in the *Bhagavadgītā* itself, it is easy to see that so far there has been no interruption in the prevailing cosmological trend of the passage, no intrusion of an extraneous 'Vibhūti' theme in miniature

The latter half of stanza vii 10 and st 11 introduce a slightly different topic, not altogether unconnected with cosmology While, in what had gone before, it was stated and clearly demonstrated how God has created all this diversified creation, the point now to be made is that there are certain happenings in the Creation for which God does not wish to hold himself primarily responsible Since God has granted man the freedom of the will, God is not, for instance, expected to assume primary responsibility for such aspects and happenings in the Creation as are the results of the perverse exercise by the individuals of their own God given freedom of the will This perverseness which man at times exhibits is the consequence of man's own unbridled cravings and passions, which lead him to acts which cannot be said to be God inspired It is the sane and self-controlled acts illumined by the dry light of reason that can be legitimately attributed to God The adjective *kamaragavarjita* at the end of st 11 ab is generally associated with the noun *balam* alone after which it is placed It seems to me legitimate to take it also with *tejas* and *buddhi* (in the latter case with the permissible change of gender) The *kamaragavarjita* exercise of the three powers rational, spiritual and physical emanates from God and is approved

by Him Passion (kama) itself, in so far as it serves as a handmaid to Dharma, is God inspired, is Godhood itself. From this point of the cosmological argument reached at the end of st 11, which st 12 in effect summarises—mark its concluding words “natvaham tesu, te mayi”—the transition is easy to the introduction of the theme of sin and wickedness in the world in st 15. The identity of vii 10d with λ 36b and the similarity between vii 10ab and λ 39ab can of course prove nothing, as the object of the two statements is different. The qualification kamaragavivarjitam in the present passage (which is not present in the later context) precludes the possibility of there being any anticipation here of the Vibhuti motif as contended by R Otto.

JAGANNĀTHA'S CLASSIFICATION OF KĀVYA

By S K DE

Jagannatha does not accept Mammata's threefold classification of Kavya into Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama, nor his criterion of the division based on the relative position which the Vyangya sense occupies therein with regard to the expressed sense. Mammata's three kinds of poetry are Dhvani, Guṇibhūtavyangya and Avyangya (which last, however, is interpreted negatively and anomalously sphuṭa vyangya rahita, i. e., Asphuṭa vyangya sahita !). The classification implies that every kind of poetry must have a suggested sense, whether distinct as in Uttama and Madhyama, or indistinct as in Adhama, although this division does not arise logically out of Mammata's own definition of poetry, in which there is no mention of the suggested sense. Mammata's explanation of the Adhama Kavya, again, as sphuṭa vyangya rahita cannot, as Visvanatha points out, be theoretically justifiable. If it is meant to be entirely devoid of Vyangya sense, it is hardly Kavya, but an imitation thereof (as Ānandavardhana had already explained), if the Vyangya is not sphuṭa, it should be classed properly as Guṇibhūta vyangya.

Jagannatha attempts to avoid these inconsistencies. Like Mammata, he does not mention Dhvani and Rasa in his definition of the Kavya, but two things are noticeable in his definition. (1) he does not believe in the parity of word and sense (śabdārthau), but considers that the expression in poetry (Śabda) is essential, and (2) that this expression must convey a charming sense (Ramanīyārtha). But he also explains (3) that this Ramanīyata or Camatkara depends entirely on Kavi pratibha, and that this charmingness of sense and expression comprehends all previous ideas of Dhvani, Rasa, Guṇa and Alamkara in varying degrees.

The degrees of variation lead him to classify Kavya into four, instead of three divisions, but he insists in all these on the element of charmingness or Camatkara which (and not Dhvani or Rasa alone) is his *fundamentum divisionis*. Thus, he would have Kavya as (1) Uttamottama, a class by itself, which includes all genuine types of

Dhvanī and Rasa, and which corresponds to Mammata's Uttama. In this, Śabda and Artha being entirely subordinated suggest an extraordinarily charming sense, the ground of this charm (Camatkāra bhūmi) being admittedly the suggestion of Dhvanī and Rasa far surpassing the mere expressed sense. But Jagannātha splits up Mammata's Madhyama Kāvya into Uttama and Madhyama. In Jagannātha's (2) Uttama Kāvya, the suggested sense is indeed not principal (aprādhanam eva), but it is still charming and causes Camatkāra (Camatkāra kārana), while in his (3) Madhyama Kāvya, the Camatkāra of the suggested sense has an equal prominence with the Camatkāra of the expressed sense. Under this class of the Uttama and Madhyama varieties are grouped the Guṇibhūta-vyāngya Kāvya and poems with important Arthalamkaras like Samasokti or Aprastutaprasamsa. On the other hand, in accordance with his view of the importance of Śabda, Jagannātha's (4) Adhama includes Śabdacamatkāra alone, but since Śabda in his definition includes charmingness of sense, the Artha camatkāra, we are told, is merged in it (ātrārtha camatkṛtiḥ śabda camatkṛtau lina), and Jagannātha is careful to explain that he does not include in it the verbal display of Citra-bandha which is devoid of all Ramanīyata of sense.

This classification is ingenious and attempts to follow up the starting definition but it is hardly an improvement. The main reasons of Jagannātha's splitting up of Mammata's Madhyama into Uttama and Madhyama appear to be (1) his unwillingness to take charming varieties of Guṇibhūtavāngya as mere Madhyama, as they are often fine specimens of poetry, he finds no reason why they should not be termed Uttama. The Uttama would also include Alamkāra dhvanī and Vastu dhvanī Kāvya, while the very best Rasa-dhvanī Kāvya is called Uttamottama and varieties of Guṇibhūta-vāngya, *not sufficiently charming*, should be called Madhyama, and (2) his ~~wisdom~~ *wisdom* to include Artha citra as a middling variety (Madhyama), as distinguished from Śabda-citra in which Arthacamatkāra is implicit but not prominent, and which is therefore Adhama Kāvya. He objects to the Artha citra being included in the Adhama variety along with Śabda citra, because he thinks that the two have distinct values of charmingness. But his view is not convincing. It is true that the Artha-citra and Śabda-citra appear

as distinct, but this is due to the essential difference between Śabda-lamkāra and Arthalamkāra. Mammata's characterisation of the Adhama Kavya is undoubtedly faulty, but this is hardly the solution. If an Adhama variety is to be admitted, and if it is to be entirely devoid of Vyangya, the reason of Camatkara adduced is not sufficient to debar classifying both Śabda-citra and Artha-citra under this one head. The Camatkara or charmingness is also perhaps a too vague criterion for distinguishing charming and uncharming varieties of the Guṇabhūta-vyangya, or for equalising the latter as Madhyama Kavya with the Artha-citra which may be devoid of all Vyangya.

THE USE OF CLOTH FOR LETTER-WRITING AT THE COURT OF HARSA (A D 606 647)

By P K GODE

Recently I published some papers¹ on paleography dealing with the history of paper and other writing materials used by our forefathers during the last two thousand years. A volume of correspondence has come in from the readers of these papers. Leaving aside the appreciations of the studies contained in this correspondence, I must deal with certain pertinent queries about these studies as they lead to further investigation in the fields of my study. In the present paper I propose to deal with one of such queries received from my learned friend M M Principal V V Mirashi of the Morris College, Nagpur, who wrote to me on 20 3-1944 as follows —

“ It seems quite clear from the references collected by you that paper was not in common use before the 11th Century A D. This seems to be corroborated by the comment of Viśvarupa, a predecessor of Viṇṇaneśvara that ‘ paṭe ’ in Yajñavalkya I, 139 excludes bhurjapatra (patavacanam bhurjanivṛttyartham), otherwise he would have said ‘ kaṭajanivṛtthyartham ’. Of what kind was the letter carried by a messenger in his turban to Harsa (Harsacarita, Uchvasa V)? Could a bhurjapatra have been carried like that without being broken into bits? Was pāper used for the purpose? You may consider this point ’

For answering the above query convincingly I have collected the following evidence from contemporary sources both literary and epigraphic —

(1) Poet Baṇa the author of the Harsacarita refers to the use

1 These papers are —(1) *Migration of Paper from China to India* (pages 205 242 of *Paper Making* by K B Joshi Wardha 1944) (2) *Studies in the Regional History of Indian Paper Industry—Paper Manufacture in A D 1790* (*Bharatiya Vidya* Bombay Vol V pp 87—95) (3) *Saint Lamadasa's Discourse on the Writing and Preservation of Manuscripts etc.* (*New Indian Antiquary* Vol VII pp 126—128)

of Valkala pattikā¹ for writing purposes in the following extract from his Kādambarī:—

“Evamuktaśca mayā.....nikṣavartinaḥ *tamāla*-pādapātpallava-
mādāya nispīdya taṭasūlātale tena gandhagajamadasurabhiparimalena
rasena uttariya-*valkala*ikadeśādvipāṭya *pāttikām* svahastakamala-kañi-
ṣṭhikānakhaśikhareṇa *abhilikhya* iyaṁ *patrikā* tvayā tasyai *lanyakāyāi*
pracchannam ekākinyai deya itī abhidhāya arpitavān | Ityuktā ca sā
tāmbūla-bhājanādākṛṣya tāmadaśayāt | Aham tu tasyāḥ karatalādādāya
valkala-pāttikām unāmāryām *abhilikhitāmapaśyam*.

dūram muktālatayā bisatayā vipralobhyamāno me |

hamsa iva darśitāśo mānasajanmā tvayā nītaḥ || ”

The foregoing extract gives us the use of *valkalapāttikā* or a strip of bark-garment for writing romantic letters with the aid of finger-nails but we cannot conclude therefrom that this method was normally current in Bana's time *i. e.* 7th Century A. D. It appears that cotton cloth as material for writing upon was in use in India before the Christian Era and its use was continued to very late times. My friend Dr. S. M. Katre has referred to this fact in his book on *Indian Textual Criticism*² published sometime ago. We must,

1. Q. Curtius Rufus in his History of Alexander the Great refers to the writing material used by the people of India as follows —

“The tender side of the *bark of trees* received written characters like paper” (vide p. 186 of *Ancient India* by J. W. Mcrinde 1896). According to one view this author lived under Claudius (A.D. 45–54).

2 Vide p 5 of *Indian Textual Criticism* (Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay, 1941)—“Cotton Cloth mentioned by Nearchos is also referred to by some metrical *Smṛtis* and several inscriptions of the Sātavahana period, as material on which official and private documents were written and which is called *paṭa*, *paṭila* or *Karpasila paṭa*. According to Burnell and Rice, Kanarese traders still use a kind of cloth called *Kaḍalam* which is covered with a paste of tamarind seed and afterwards blackened with charcoal. The letters are written with chalk or steatite pencil and the writing is white or black.” “Peterson discovered a MS written on cloth dated *Fikrama Samat* 1418 (=A D 1351–52) ”

Alberuni (C. A. D. 1030) speaking of writing material used by Hindu children states —

Page 182 of *Alberuni's India* (Sachau; London. 1888)—“They (Hindus) use *black tablets* for the children in the schools and write upon them along the long side, not the broad side, writing with a *white material* from the left to the right. One would think that the author of the following verses had meant the

however, record specific contemporary evidence to prove the use of cotton cloth for writing purposes in Harsa's time (7th Century A.D.) with a view to answering Principal Mirashi's query referred to above.

(2) The Chinese invented paper as early as 105 A. D. but in spite of the sino-Indian contact which increased in subsequent centuries Indians don't appear to have adopted the use of *paper* for writing purposes. I-tsing, the Chinese traveller in India, had to order *paper* and *cakes of ink* for writing Sanskrit MSS, from China (A. D. 671).¹ At present no Sanskrit lexicon is found to contain any Sanskrit word for paper though paper was known in India in the 7th century A.D. In two Sanskrit-Chinese lexicons of the 8th century A. D. edited by Dr. P. C. Bagchi, we find a Sanskrit word *śayaḥ* : recorded as equivalent for paper but in spite of this record the Indian languages as also Sanskrit ignored the word and consequently it was permanently lost to India.²

Hindus —" How many a writer uses *paper* as black as charcoal
 Whilst his pen writes on it with white colour
 By writing he places a bright day in a dark night;
 Weaving like a weaver, but without adding a wool".

They write the title of the book at the end of it, not at the beginning."

1. Vide p. 210 of my paper on "Migration of Paper from China to India"

2 I am indebted to my esteemed friend Dr Sunilkumar Chatterji of the Calcutta University for this information I reproduce Dr Chatterji's remarks on my paper as communicated by him in his letter dated 22 6 1944 —

" After receiving your notable monograph on *Paper in India*, I wanted to write to you to draw your attention to a *very early reference to paper in India found from Chinese sources* In Dr Prabodh Chandra Bagchi's edition of two Sanskrit-Chinese lexicons of the 8th century A. D. a Sanskrit word *śayaḥ* is given as the equivalent of the Chinese for 'paper' This *Śaya* is evidently an Indianisation of the Chinese word itself, which is pronounced in modern times as *Chē* (ca), but an older pronunciation was *tsie*. Evidently it was current in Sanskrit and in other Indian languages and that is why it found a place in the Sanskrit-Chinese lexicon, but Indian scholars somehow ignored the word, and it became later on lost to India The word *Kāghaz* also occurs in the Sanskrit-Chinese lexicons as *Kakak*, *Kakari*, and the late M. M. Haraprasad Sastri noted a very old form in Nepal, *Kāyagali*, as a Sanskritization of a foreign word "

Many scholars in this country are ignorant of the Sino Indian sources of Indian history. We, therefore, welcome with a joyous heart Dr. P. C. Bagchi's Quarterly Journal of "Sino-Indian Studies" now started at Calcutta and wish it a successful career.

(3) In the sanskrit Buddhist work *Āryamañjuśrīmūla kalpa* which belongs to about the 2nd Century A D according to Dr Benoytosh Bhattacharya there is a section called "paṭavidhanapaṭala" in which the use of paṭa or piece of cloth for writing or painting purposes is clearly indicated by the expressions "tam paṭam likha-payet" and "tam paṭam citrapayet" with reference to the painting of the Buddhist god Āryamañjuśrī on a *paṭa*¹

(4) Recently Dr Hiranand Sastri, Director of Archaeology, Baroda, delivered some lectures on "*Archæology and Ancient Indian History*" (Published at Ahmedabad, 1944) In his lecture on "*Nalanda*" Dr Sastri describes some seals found at Nalanda and states that *no document has yet been found at Nalanda* with any of these seals to show how they were fastened He then quotes a passage from Bapa's *Harṣacarita* (Trans by Thomas and Cowell, pp 40 41) to prove that such seals or tokens were tied to letters by means of a thick and strong *Sutra* or string This passage describes the lekhaḥara or courier from Kṛṣṇa, the brother of Śrī Harsa as follows — "atha tenaniyamanam atinibidasutrabandhanumnitantaralakṣṭavyavacchedaya lekhamalikaya parikalitamurdhanam praviśantam lekhaḥarakam adrakṣit" (Then he beheld the messenger entering as he was brought before him—his legs tired and heavy with the long journey, with his tunic girt up rightly by a mud stained strip of cloth, the knot hanging loose and fastened up by a rugged clout swinging behind him and having his head wrapped with a bundle of letters, which had a deep division pressed into it by a very thick thread that bound it

Dr Sastri further observes — 'Such seals as were found in their entirety like the one of *Paṭupatistūmha*, were probably fastened to strings, whose ends were secured on the documents themselves, either by being sealed with the same seal, or by another seal or token The *string* might have been of *hemp* or *cotton* In the absence of any specimen it cannot be determined whether these documents were written on wood, leather, palm leaves, paper or any other material"

Speaking of the material for sealing used in those days, Dr

1 Vide pp 75-76 of *Āryamañjuśrīmūlakalpa* (C.O Baroda 19).

Sastri observes —“ For the sealing wax of to day *clay* was probably used in those days A piece of *white Khadi* was found in the hole of one seal ”¹

It will be seen from the above remarks that even an archaeologist like Dr Sastri is unable to determine the nature of the material used for writing at Nalanda in the 7th Century A D or thereabout Possibly the piece of *Khadi* found in the hole of one seal is a relic of such material as will be seen from the evidence I shall record in the following lines

(5) Nearchos was the admiral of Alexander's fleet during his Indian expedition Strabo, the Greek geographer (B C 64 to A D 24) writes on the authority of Nearchos that the Indians wrote *upon cloth*, which was well pressed to make it smooth² This evidence clearly shows that the practice of writing letters on cloth was in vogue in India 900 years, if not more, before Harsa's time and even King Harsa, followed it himself in his official correspondence as will be seen from the following extract from the *Life of Hiuen Tsiang* (A D 629 645) by his pupil *Hsueh Li* (Trubner 1911, p 190) —

“Three days after separation the King (Śīladitya or Harsa) in company with Kumara raja and Dhruvabhattacharaja, took several hundred light horsemen and again came to accompany him (*Hiuen Tsiang*) for a time and to take final leave, so kindly disposed were the kings to the Master Then he commissioned four Ta kwan (*official guides*) to accompany the escort they call such officers Mo ho ta lo (Mahataras ?) The King also wrote some *letters on fine white cotton stuff* and sealed them with red wax (or composition), which he ordered the *Ta kwan* officers to present in all the countries through which they conducted the Master to the end that the princes of these countries might provide carriages or modes of conveyance to escort the Master even to the borders of China ”²

The foregoing extract clearly shows that in the 7th Century

1 Vide pp 79 80 of *Archaeology and Ancient Indian History* (4 lectures) by Dr H. Sastri Pub by Gujarat Vernacular Society Ahmedabad 1944

2 Vide p 186 of *Ancient India* by M Crundlo (1896)

A D the use of “*fine white cotton stuff*” for writing official letters was in common use and that these letters were sealed with *red composition* which was possibly some kind of clay as Dr Sastri has stated after examining a number of Nalanda seals

(6) I am now in a position to consider Principal Murashi's query about the material of which was made the letter sent to Harṣa containing the bad news of his father's illness. The passage from the *Harṣa Carita* (5th Ucchvasa) which refers to this letter reads as follows — ‘*atha duradeva ca lekha garbhaya nītiragamecaka-ruca caulacirikaya racitamundamalikam adhvagam kuranganama-namayantam adraksit*’ (Vide p 133 of Eng trans of *Harṣa Carita* by Cowell and Thomas, London, 1929—“Anon he (Harṣa) beheld afar off a certain Kurangaka approaching with a *bullet* tied in a forehead wrap of rags of deep indigo hue”, etc.)

If Harṣa got his letters written on ‘*fine white cotton stuff*’ as stated in the *Life of Hiuen-Tsang*, it is reasonable to infer that the above letter brought to Harṣa by a messenger wrapped up in his turban must have been written on a piece of *cloth* and consequently there was no danger of its being broken into bits. I hope the evidence recorded above warrants us to draw this inference

1 I may note here a curious use of cloth referred to by Ahobala in his *Mīmāṃsā* work *Vakṣārtharatna* with his own commentary (Vide p 51 of Ed by R. R. Sastri in Mysore Sanskrit Series 1943). In some province there appears to have been current the custom of communicating the good news of the birth of a son to his father by sending with a messenger a *pata* or piece of cloth with the footprint of the newly born son as will be seen from the following extract —

kraciddese ōtoipattian goṇam sutapadāṅkitaṃ |
preṣayanti jana vartaharena janakāntikaṃ || 2 ||

kasmimściddese putrajanmasamanantaram alaktadina putrapadāṅkitaṃ goṇam tatpitre kumārajananasucanārtham kenacidvartahareṇa svasuradayaḥ preṣayanti | sa ca vartahareḥ tam patam gṛhītvā janakabhyāśam prapya prataraśmā putrapadāṅkitaṃ patam pradarsya dīṣṭya vardhaso putraste jataḥ iti vadati | etc.

I shall feel thankful if any scholar reports to me any additional references to this custom from literature. Is this custom now current in any part of the world?

(7) The above inference has been further supported by inscrip-
tional evidence of C 700 A D Mr Priyatosh Banerjee in his article
Jour of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, June, 1944, pp 198 202,
on "Patna Museum Inscription dated in the year 17 of the reign of
Viṣṇugupta (C 700 A D)" translates the last portion of this
inscription as follows — "The short *cloth* of the deed of purchase
was written on by Devadatta and was inscribed by the wise artisan
Kuladitya" ("likhita devadattena samkṣipta kraya *cirika* | utkṛta
sutradharena kuladityena dharmata ||")

Mr Banerjee adds — "This is my translation of *krayacirika*
Cloth as writing material was very common in ancient times See
Chapter VIII, para XXXVII, *B Ind Anti* Vol XXIII, 1904
(Appendix)" — The above inscription is on a *stone* piece (1 ft 3
inches x 9 inches) Evidently the deed was drafted on a piece of
cloth (*cirika*) and then inscribed on a stone I believe in the
light of the above evidence that the letter brought to King Harṣa
by a messenger must have been written on a *cirika* and inserted in
the *catlacirika* of his turban'

WHAT IS HINDUISM ?

By G HANUMANTHA RAO

The question what is Hinduism has proved to be a perplexing problem for many. The difficulty in understanding it has chiefly been due to the fact that Hinduism as a whole does not answer to the conceptions of religion derived from Christianity or Islam, according to which religion is a belief in a definite conception of God revealed by a definite scripture and declared by a definite prophet. In order to understand a religion one should try to know it as it was, is and has tended to be, without bringing one's own preconceptions to bear upon it. Studied from this genetic and comparative point of view, the question what is Hinduism yields an intelligible answer and it is from this point of view that an answer is essayed here.

Before proceeding to know what Hinduism is it is necessary to understand what it is not, since that would help to clear our enquiry of misconceptions which might otherwise cloud it.

Negatively speaking Hinduism does not stand for any one definite conception of God. It comprises monism, pantheism, monotheism, polytheism, animism and even atheism (*nirīśvaravāda*) of the Sāṃkhya type. Even those who are monotheists do not believe in the same God. There are Śaivites, Vaiṣṇavites, Śākteyas who worship God in the form of Śiva, Viṣṇu or Śakti and each of these Gods is known by a thousand names. To be called a Hindu it is not necessary to call oneself a believer in any one God as the only God even as it is necessary for a Muslim or Christian to believe in Allah or the Father in Heaven as the only true God and in no other.

Nor does Hinduism prescribe any common prayer for all Hindus. One may pray to God through Vedic hymns or non Vedic hymns, or one may even choose to compose one's own prayer or prayers. It is not even necessary to pray to God. One may choose to contemplate on God. There are the three well known paths to God realisation—*bhakti*, *jñāna* and *karma* and even within these there are diversities. *Bhakti* may manifest itself through prayer, song or dance or idol worship. *Karma* may be *kāmya* or *niskāma*,

ritualistic or non-ritualistic. Even the rituals practised are not the same. Again, there are those who do not consider bhakti, jñāna and karma to be mutually exclusive but look upon them as complementary to one another. There is the conservative view by the side of the liberal view and there is the onesided view alongside the manysided view.

Nor is there a common scripture for all Hindus. Though the Vedas hold a high place in the Hindu mind, yet they are by no means considered to be the only or even a necessary source of religious inspiration. There are some Vaidiks who, on account of the favourable religious environment in which they are born and bred up, have been enabled to study the Vedas but their number is small and it is becoming smaller from century to century. It is inevitable that their number should dwindle since the language of the Vedas is an extinct form of Sanskrit and Sanskrit itself has ceased to be a spoken language and its study has gradually declined¹. It is not even possible for a large number of Brahmins nowadays to adopt the Vaidic way of religious life. To the mass of the Hindus, the Vedas will remain a sealed book and the number of persons deriving their religious inspiration and guidance from sources other than the Vedas and through Vernacular media is increasing from century to century. Today attempts are being made to translate the Vedas into the Vernaculars. To many Hindus the Puranas have been the principal sources of religious teaching while to the millions even these are inaccessible. They depend for their religious instruction mainly on custom, tradition and popular songs.

Apart from and over and above these are those who have sought God independently of the Vedas and Puranas by their own methods of devotion, contemplation and service. Experimenting with God has been a passion with the Hindu even as experimenting with matter has been a passion with the Modern European. The Vedas are themselves a most remarkable record of religious experi-

¹ Brahmanism has been equated with Hinduism. But this is a mistake. Brahmanism is only a part of Hinduism and Hinduism is the wider and more inclusive term.

mentation In the Vedic religious laboratory God succeeds God in quick succession No sooner a God is raised to the pedestal than he is dethroned Bloomfield has very aptly compared the Vedic experiments in religion with experiments in chemical precipitates. Just as each new chemical test has revealed a new precipitate each new religious enquiry has lead to a new conception of God

Even after the Vedic times religious experimentation has gone on and new religious movements have sprung up from time to time within the fold of Hinduism There have been successive efforts made by religious teachers to free Hinduism from the shackles of caste and the disabilities of untouchability Veerasaivism and Vaisnavism represent two such religious movements which have still a great vogue The Hindus have always tried to learn from other religions when they came into contact with them and there have been even significant attempts like those of Kabir and Nanak at reforming Hinduism in the light of Islam The Hindu masses have taken a lively interest in Islamic festivals Even an Upanishad has been composed in praise of Allah ¹ In more recent times when the Hindus came into contact with the Christians they have not hesitated to criticise their own religion in the light of Christianity The Arya Samaj, the Brahma Samaj and the Sri Ramakrishna Mission have been among the principal reforming movements of this century "In India, religion is hardly a dogma but a working hypothesis of human conduct, adapted to different stages of development and different conditions of life" ²

But the greatest reforming movement of modern times is the religious movement initiated by Mahatma Gandhi He is³ making Himalayan efforts at purifying and elevating Hinduism As taught and practised by him it is open to all without distinction of caste, colour or creed To his prayer meetings all may come and the prayers that are said there are Hindu, Islamic and Christian There

1. It is regrettable that this healthy tendency should have been impeded and that the gulf between the two Communities should be wider today than before.

2 Havell—Aryan Rule in India p 170

3 This was written in 1945

have been some orthodox Hindus who have been trying to frustrate the efforts of Mahatma Gandhi. But there can be no doubt that the masses are on the side of the Mahatma and the heart of the Hindus is on the right side.

Though our characterisation of Hinduism has so far, been negative, yet it has given an inkling into its positive character and we shall now proceed to the elucidation of it.

Hinduism is not a single religion like Islam or Christianity. It is a universe of religions. It represents the religious responses of different races and classes at various stages of cultural evolution. It is like a huge peepal tree with age old branches groaning under their own weight but still sending up new shoots, shining and sparkling. It includes the religious response of the aborigines, of persons who are bound down by custom and superstition no less than that of persons who have transcended them. In it there is a place for every type of religious response—moral, aesthetic and intellectual, personal and institutional, ritualistic and non ritualistic, normal and supernormal. It is worship of man fettered by caste, it is also the free man's worship. As Betty Heiman has remarked with the right insight into Hinduism: "Uniting all divergent shades of civilization, religions and languages in its vast melting pot, it represents the most complete expression of a Nature like cultural organisation. As Nature admits of all kinds of species of forms, ancient and recent ones and lets them all grow and develop according to their innate law of productivity or survival of the fittest, just so India—the country of an imposing and mainly tropical landscape—can embrace all these different manifestations of thoughts and creeds and social activities without losing but just so emphasising her immanent law taken from Nature itself. Each single shape is but one symbol among indefinite others of the ever productive vital forces behind them all. 'India's wide framework of thought embraces all imaginable possibilities and even contradictions, yet thereby it does not annihilate but rather completes each of them.'¹

Hinduism is a dynamic religion. It has been a growing

¹ Betty Heiman. Introduction to Hinduism in *Eleven Religions* Edited by Selwyn Gurney Champion page 143

religion ever since its inception. It has a history of at least four thousand years and, for better or worse, it has changed continuously. The religion of the Vedas represents the unbroken evolution of races in mutual conflict and adaptation for at least two thousand years. Though the religion of the Puranas emerged out of the Vedic religion yet it is different from it. The conception of avatar and humanistic monotheism are characteristic features of it. Though Hinduism is predominantly Vedic or Puranic yet it has not been exclusively so. Independent progressive movements have sprung up in quick succession. As we have already seen Veerasaivism, Vaisnavism, Sikhism are examples of movements which inveighed against caste and institutional religion and which laid stress on salvation achieved through inward devotion and purity of conduct. The religion of Ramanuja is an attempt at founding religion on the basis of the orthodox upanishads as well as the unorthodox psalms of the Tamil Saints. He raised the teaching of persons who were considered to be socially low to the dignity of a Dravida Veda. Kabir, Ramanand, Kanaka Das, Tukaram, Swami Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi have been upholders of a Hindu protestantism which is gradually gaining ground. More clearly than at any previous period the Hindus have, at the present time, become acutely conscious of the evil of hide bound caste distinctions and the disabilities under which the weak and ignorant are labouring and have realised that service of *Daridranarayana* is the best way of worshipping *Narayana*. Whether the ills of Hindu Society will be cured as quickly as one may wish or not, there can be no doubt that strenuous and genuine efforts are being made and will continue to be made to combat them. The task which Hinduism has had to shoulder has been stupendous and exceedingly difficult and consequently the progress it has made has been rather slow. It has had to tackle with millions spread over a vast country whose peace and liberty have been continually threatened for more than a thousand years. To-day, the Hindus are more definitely dependent politically than at any other time in their history. Their very dependence has come to be looked upon as a blot against their religion. Hence striving for political freedom has, at present, become a supreme religious duty of the Hindu. The method of performing

this duty is essentially a religious method which is the glory of Hinduism to have given to the world ¹ Here again the task undertaken by the Hindu is as difficult as it is spiritually elevated

This leads us to another very important and abiding characteristic of Hinduism, its spirit of tolerance By virtue of its being a universe of religions, tolerance has become a necessity of its nature As a Hindi proverb enjoins "Live so as to be claimed after death to be burnt by the Hindus and to be buried by the Muslims". Its tolerance has been at once its strength as well as its weakness While on the one hand, it has rendered possible the emergence of newer and more elevated forms of Hinduism, it has, on other hand, been responsible for the continuance of undeveloped and even undesirable forms of it While, tolerance has made it possible for some to exercise the greatest possible religious freedom and to rise to great religious heights, it has also allowed large masses to remain sunk in ignorance and superstition To many an European critic of Hinduism, not to have struck a swift and devastating blow against the lesser forms, has appeared to be the greatest crime of Hinduism But the Hindu does not believe in sudden transformations and forcible conversions He is a believer in Karma Whatever exists, whether it is good or bad, has been built up by means of a long course of conduct and it has to be broken down also by means of a long course of discipline There is no short road to spiritual elevation Patience and perseverance are the real means There is no elevation except through evolution, there is no salvation except through one's own striving ² One has to raise oneself through one's self others can only guide if the urge comes from within Therefore, the Hindu has tried persuasion rather than persecution as the method of religious reform This may be a slow and difficult method which tries one's patience but it is spiritually a sound

¹ He introduced into political struggle a new factor which raises resistance to evil to a plane hitherto unknown it is even possible that one day in the not distant future a distracted world will find the true solution of its difficulties in the principles enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi Rawlinson, *Makers of India* p 81

² Uddharēd atmanatmanam —Bhagavadgita

the modern method of historical criticism of the Bible originated in Europe

For the Hindu, God is God by whatever name he may be called ("Ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti") "Even as the water dropping from the sky reaches finally the ocean, the worship offered to all Gods finally reaches Keshava" This same sentiment is more poetically expressed by Vemana "Kine are of various colours: but all milk is alike, the kinds of flowers vary, yet all worship is one, systems of faith are different, but the Deity is one" An old Indian proverb brings out the social implications of this position beautifully "I met a hundred men on the road to Delhi and they are all my brothers"

There is also an ethical idea which is a part and parcel of Hinduism. It is the law of conservation of values, the law of Karma. According to it, nothing is lost, every thought, word and deed will have its fruit and will return in a new and increased form. When an action good or bad has been committed its fruit must be eaten. "A man is born into the world he has made" "The Lord neither creates the works of the world nor the stage of the doer, nor the joining of the works to the fruit, nature works out these things" (Bhagvadgita 5-14) You cannot sow strife and yet reap love, you cannot sow hatred and yet raise peace. This is the latest teaching of Hinduism and its roots stretch back to Dhammapada and Mahabharata. 'Not by hatred are hatreds quenched in this world. But by love rather are they quenched. This is an eternal law' (Dhammapada 5). Not by hatred is strife stilled, by hatred, hatred increases like sacrificial fire when fed by ghee (Udyogaparva lxxii, 64) By love is hatred conquered, evil by good, miserliness by charity, error by truth (Udyogaparva xxxvii, 73)

fundamentalism all its fundamentals are in a constant state of flux which means they are not fundamentals. Hindus have idols to which they pray. But when I asked Hindus who pray and dance before their idols whether they really believed in them they replied they believed in One God. Hinduism is broad enough to embrace agnosticism, monotheism and idolatry. Nehru said to me once. If the Niagara Falls were in India they would be regarded a God. They would be regarded as manifestations of God and the idol of Niagara would be a children's toy as well as divinity. p 25

War is not the method of ending wars. Peace is not won by victory. One may evade this truth by means of subtle subterfuges and delude oneself by devious arguments and imagine that he has cheated the law from operating. A simpleton deludes himself with the thought that victory is sweet until its results ripen, but when they do ripen he finds them all bitter. This is a simple and yet a sublime truth, easy to understand but difficult to act upon. It can thrive only through long and strenuous discipline of one's desires. Our methods of organising for war have been advanced while our methods of organising for peace have been rather primitive.

One may ask: Has Hinduism a message to the world? Hinduism has no objection if others find that the message Hinduism has given to its own adherents is acceptable to themselves also and there have indeed been many who have found a message in Hinduism which is beneficial. Hinduism is far too humble and far too sensitive of the sins that have accumulated among its own followers and far too appreciative of the influence of other religions in reforming itself to assume the role of a prophet. It is at present engaged in the task of working out its own load of lethargy, and free itself from the shackles of bondage and it would be presumptuous on its part to pose as a preacher. It does not believe that God has been so partial as to make the Hindus His chosen people and others merely two-legged creatures to be taught by the Hindus. The great God is the guru of all humanity and his grace falls on all alike without partiality even as the moon's soothing beams fall on the prince's mansion as well as on the poor man's hut. These are days when it is taught that religion must rise above religions and realise the fundamental unity of all religions. For a truly religious man there is truth that he can learn from all religions and any one religion setting itself up as the highest¹ is a sign of extreme bad manners.

¹ "Never think or say that your own religion is the best. Never denounce the religion of others." Asoka's Edicts.

THE RGVEDIC WORD *PARVATA*

By H. L. HARIYAPPA

In the *Nighaṇṭu* which is appended to Yāska's *Nirukta* and which is illustrative of our first attempts at lexicography, the word *parvata* is given as one of thirty names of cloud¹ (Nir. I. 10), along with other words like *adri*, *giri* etc. which are current in the later language in the sense of mountain only. And Yāska adds² (Nigh. II. 21) that in the *Nighaṇṭu* list of cloud-names, the first nineteen refer to mountain also while the remaining eleven exclusively mean cloud. The semasiology of the word *parvata* promises, indeed, an interesting study. Reserving this, however, for another occasion, the present paper purports to discuss the morphology and accent of the word in question with particular reference to Sāyaṇa's commentary which, incidentally, gives rise to certain problems of textual criticism.

The derivation and accent of *Parvata* are discussed in 6 contexts³ in Sāyaṇa's commentary. Two ways of deriving are suggested :

- (i) following the rule “bhṛmṛdṛśiyajiparvīpacyamitamunāmi haryebhyo'tac,”⁴ the word is formed with the help of the suffix *atac* i.e. √parv + *atac* = *parvatā* ;

1. *adriḥ*, *grāvā*, *gotraḥ*, *valah*, *aśnah*, *purubhoḥaḥ*, *valis'anah*, *aśmā*, *parvataḥ*, *giriḥ*, *vajraḥ*, *caruḥ*, *varābhaḥ*, *s'ambarah*, *rauhīṇaḥ*, *raivataḥ*, *phaligaḥ*, *uparaḥ*, *upalaḥ*, *camaśaḥ*, *ahīḥ*, *abhram*, *balahalaḥ*, *meghaḥ*, *ḍṛtiḥ*, *odanaḥ*, *vṛsandhiḥ*, *vṛtraḥ*, *asuraḥ*, *krośaḥ* | iti trims'at meghanamāni ||

(Nigh I. 10)

2. *Meghanāmānyuttarāṇi trims'at* | ā uparaupala ityetābhyam sādharapāni parvatānāmāni ||—Nir II. 21. Commententator Durga explains *teṣām meghanāmānām ā upara upala ityetābhyām prāgupara upala ityetābhyām yāni nāmāni tāni sādharapāni parvatānāmābhiḥ* | *tadeṣām prakaraṇopapadābhyam viśeṣo'vadbhāryah* | *uparaśabdādārabhya meghanāmānyeva na parvatānamāni* || cf. *Śān-
daswāmī* and *Maheshvara* (on the same passage) Ed. L. Sarup—(1931.) p. 103.

3. RV I 19.7, I 37.7, I 51.4; I 155.1; III 26.4, and V 56.4

4. Upādi 3 110

(u) according to *vartika* tapparvamarudbhyam¹, tap is a possessive suffix added to the word parva, parvavan parvatah ;
parva + tap = *parvata*

Yaska adopts the latter explanation consistently. But Sayana twice derives *parvata* from √parv with the *unadī* suffix *atac*. The difference lies in the fact that according to the one derivation, the word acquires accent on the last syllable i.e. becomes antodatta² (*parvata*), while according to the other the accent lies on the first syllable i.e. the word becomes adyudatta³ (*parvata*). The accent given in the vedic text happens to be adyudatta throughout, except of course when the word is used as a vocative, in which case it becomes sarvanudatta⁴.

In the light of the above facts, it must be admitted that the commentator definitely went wrong when he gave the antodatta derivation. But if we examine the comment on the word in RV I 19 7, fresh difficulties beset our understanding. According to Max Muller's 2nd edition of RV with Sayana's commentary (1890), the *bhasya* states

parvatan | purvaparvamarva purane | aunadiko tan | pratyayasvarah ||

There is no suffix at all like *atan*, in the first place, for roots *purva-parva* etc. in the *Unadī* chapter. On the other hand the aphorism already quoted (*bhṛmṛdṛśityadi*) definitely prescribes *atac* for √parv etc. Therefore, it is clear that the above reading *aunadiko tan* is a misquotation. Further scrutiny, however, reveals a discrepancy of a more serious nature. In the 1st edition of the RV with Sayana's commentary, Max Muller has adopted a reading which is grammatically correct

parvatan | aunadiko bhṛmṛdṛśityadinatacpratyayah |
pratyayasvarah |

1 SK 3493 *vart* 10. The *Sutra* is bahulam chandasī (Paṇ nī V 2 122). According to NS edition with com. *Tattvabodhini* and *Subodhini* it is a *vartika* under SK 1928 (Pā V 2 121).

2 C tah | anta udāttaḥ syat | SK 3 07

3. See further for detailed explanation.

4 amanritasya ca | SK 3654. RV \ 94 1 parvatah

But, as stated above, this explanation does not support the accent given in the Samhitā. It looks as if the Editor, while bringing about a 2nd edition, thought it best to select a different reading which apparently would bear out the ādyudātta of the word as indicated in the Samhitā. So when he found in some other manuscripts the reading auṇādiko'tan, he readily adopted it; for atan being a nit suffix would fix the accent on the first syllable of the word.¹ Now that the atan reading is proved to be a misquotation, shall we conclude that the learned Editor slipped unawares? Or shall we think that the learned author of the *bhāṣya*, Sāyaṇācārya, at a loss to prove the ādyudātta, misread the aphorism?

The first inference is not unreasonable. For, in the huge *varietas lectionis* appended to the 2nd edition,² Max Muller records as follows :

“(P. 108) l. 30 auṇādiko'tan A₁, A₂ B. Ca pr. m. auṇādiko'tac Ca sec. m. G. A₂ the latter adding in the margine bhṛmṛdṛśīyajiparvīpacyamitaminamiharyibhyo'tac | parvataḥ | C₁ has auṇādiko bhṛmṛdṛśītyādinā ra vṛṣādītvāt ādyudāttaḥ atac. cf. Un. III 110.”³

Now this last reading is really interesting. The commentator, or perhaps more likely the intelligent scribe, has taken the liberty to square up the inconsistency. He realised the erroneousousness of the atan reading and the inapplicablity of the atac aphorism as well. In this dilemma he invoked the usual expediency of including the word under the vṛṣādigaṇa. The rule vṛādinām ca⁴ ordains ādyudātta for all the words that belong to the vṛṣādī group. The word parvata indeed doesn't find a place in the known group of vṛṣādī; but as it is an ākṛtigaṇa one has the liberty of assigning any word to it in a difficult circumstance such as the present one | Why, then, was this reading, reasonable as it is, not accepted by Max Muller?

1. Ānityādirnityam | S.K 3683.

2. Note that in the 1st edition Max Muller didn't at all give the variant readings for the first aṣṭaka. He felt it unnecessary | See his preface to the 2nd volume for an explanation.

3. M M's 2nd edition Vol. I, Varietas Lectionis p. 20

4. SK. 3688

Only one Ms. gives this reading while the majority of Mss. give the reading finally adopted. But how can the majority principle justify a manifestly wrong reading? Furthermore, it is somewhat bewildering to note that the Poona Vaidika-Samsodhana-Mandal Edition of the RV. with Sāyaṇa's commentary has perpetrated the mistake.¹

We shall now compare what the *bhāṣya* states in the other context (RV III 26.4) where the same derivation is given. It runs:

Parvatān | parvapūrana ityasmāt bhṛmṛdṛśītyādīnā atac |
parvatī pūrayati bhūmimudakeneti parvato meghaḥ | vya-
tyayenādyudāttaḥ |²

Here is plain-speaking. Though the rules in force, viz. the Unādisūtras, do not warrant the ādyudātta, there it is, a transgression. One perceives a more straightforward solution here than in "vṛṣādīvāt". With this explanation it is not possible to grant the other inference that the redoubtable author of the *bhāṣya* misread the aphorism. The blame must therefore lie at the door of the scribe who, with his half-knowledge or sometimes for want of even that, is known to place the editor in precarious positions.

Now let us consider the other derivation:

Parvavān parvataḥ | matvarthiyastapratyayaḥ³

Parva + tap = *parvata*. The word parva is further analysed as √pr(long) + vanip⁴ = par + vanip = parvan. Both *vanip* and *tap* are *pīl*

1. Peterson repeats the mistake. cf. Selections from the R̥gveda ed. P. Peterson (Bombay Sanskrit Series XXXVI) There was a long controversy over this passage between Max Muller and Peterson. Despite such close attention bestowed, it is strange that neither of them noticed the error. Nay, Max Muller did subject the sentence bhṛmṛdṛśītyādīnā to examination, but thought that the reading aupādīko'tan was genuine which is a clear mistake. One is struck by the irony of his further assertion 'The only possible explanation of *parvata* with the accent on the first syllable is *aupādīko'tan pratyayasvarah*, which is also supported by the best Mss.' 1—p. clxxxi of his preface to the 2nd edn. Vol. IV.

2. Max Muller's 2nd edition Vol. II, p. 202.

3. Here again the reading adopted is wrong. It ought to be *tappratyayaḥ*. Max Muller records the variant readings as follows (p. 25 Vol. I 2nd Edn.)—*tapratyayaḥ* A₃ B. Ca.; *tanpra* A₁ *tappra* V₁. The Poona Edition repeats the mistake!

4. Snāmādīpadyartipṛakibhyo vanip | √pr(long) Upādī IV, 112.

suffixes and therefore are unaccented ;¹ hence, the remaining portion of the word, i.e. the root takes the accent.² Thus parva and parvata become ādyudāta. This derivation is in absolute conformity with the accent given in the Vedic text.

The question now is, why did Sāyaṇa not adhere to the correct derivation all through ? Why did he suggest the wrong *prakriyā* and thereby cast a slur on the original text ? Answer to these questions can only be a matter of conjecture. There can be nothing wrong of course with the Vedic text ! Nor is it the fault of the grammarian who only suggests the possibility of deriving parvata by means of the suffix *atac* as well.³ In the case of such alternatives, the commentator is responsible to direct the proper understanding. But is it not impudence to doubt the veracity of Sāyaṇa's learning ? The fact must be that the huge vedic commentaries were written by a band of scholars under the general supervision of the great savant.⁴ Here and there, as is common to attempts of that magnitude, differences and discrepancies escaped the learned editor's revision. Different portions were assigned to different scholars and the exposition of the texts both in form and content naturally varied according to the various traditional schools of learning that congregated for the pur-

1. Anudāttau suppitau | BK 3709.

2. Dhātoḥ | anta udāttah syāt | BK 3668.

3. The St. Petersburg Lexicon records both explanations with due accentuation.

4. Cf. Macdonell's History of Sanskrit Literature (1900) p. 275. Also the late Dr. P. D. Gune's article, ' Sāyaṇa's commentary—its composition ' in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes Vol. III *Orientalia* pt. 3. Dr. R. N. Dandekar in his digest of 25 years of vedic studies, has pointed out that Prof. D. Sharma has arrived at a similar conclusion re. the authorship of the *Vedābhāṣya* in his article in the Calcutta Oriental Journal II (see p. 22 Progress of Indian Studies 1942 BORI Publication) I understand from Dr. S. M. Katre that Mr. G. R. Reddy in his thesis " Sāyapabbhāṣya on Rgvēda 2nd Maṇḍala " (for the M.A. Degree, London University) has adduced further proof supporting the multiple authorship. The thesis is yet to be published, but finds mention in Dr. R. N. Dandekar's Vedic Bibliography which is in the Press. I am obliged to Profs. Katre and Dandekar for this unpublished information. Dr. Dandekar's Vedic Bibliography has since been published (New Indian Antiquary—Extra Series VII—1946) Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay 2

Ref. to RV.	The Prakriya	The Pratya-
1. I 19.7.	Pūrvaparvamarvapūrane aunadiko'tan	atan (atac ?)
2. I 37.7.	Parvavān parvataḥ matvarthuyastappratyayah	tap
3. I 51.4.	Parvavān parvataḥ parvapunaḥ pṛṇateḥ pṛṇatervā iti Yāskaḥ	tap
4.I 155.1.	Parvataśabdo Yaskenaivam niruktaḥ parvavān parvataḥ parva punaḥ pṛṇāteḥ pṛṇāterveti	tap
5.III 26 4.	Parvatān parva pūrana ity asmat bhṛmṛdṛśityādinā atac parvati pūrayati bhūmimudakeneti parvato meghaḥ Vyatyayenadyudāttaḥ	atac
6.V 56. 4.	Parvatam jagatpūrakodakavantam parvavān parvataḥ parva punaḥ pṛṇāteḥ pṛṇatervā (Nir. 1. 20) iti niruktaṁ	tap

It is not unlikely that the commentators of (1) and (5) in the above passages are of one school and those of the rest belong to another. Among them also there should be different batches. Because at the very outset, it is stated that the first *aahyāya* should be heard according to established tradition and having acquired knowledge with that much, the intelligent scholar will be able to understand all.¹ And further it is pointed out—"The morphology of words has been extensively treated in the first book; beyond that it has to be understood; but here and there however it will just be hinted."² Therefore (1) and (5) are possibly from different hands; otherwise, there is no need to repeat the explanation and that so fully. The latter is marked with a cogency which is absent in the former.

1 Itasmin prathamamedhyāyah śrotāyah sampradāyataḥ | Vyutpannas
 āraḥ saṃsaṃ boddhau śaknoti boddhumeṣaḥ.

2. Prakṛiḥ prathame lapṛe sakalyenopavarṇitā | ata urdhvantani jñeya
amaryate ca kvacit kvacit —Introductory verses, II Aṣṭaka or RV I 122. This
resolution however is not strictly adhered to. The 2nd aṣṭaka which is prefaced
by the above declaration gives less or almost nothing of grammatical and
accentual notes; but the 3rd aṣṭaka is replete with them.

The foregoing discussion points to the following conclusions :

1. That the *prakṛyā* of the word parvata as given in the commentary on RV I 19 7 is wrong
2. The learned editors of the Veda could have selected the correct reading from the available MSS
3. The voluminous commentary was written by a band of scholars under the direction of Sāyana, this fact being responsible for occasional differences and discrepancies

‘FEELING’ IN BRADLEY AND WHITEHEAD

By R N KAUL

I Introductory

The aim of this paper is to show, by an analysis of ‘Immediacy’ in two leading philosophers of the West, that the spirit and tradition of Philosophy is essentially one and the same, both in the East and West the Quest for Truth and Reality has no Eastern or Western point of view. In spite of diversities in treatment and technique, the aim of Philosophy, wherever it has touched celestial heights, has always been that mastery over the mysteries of the Universe which helps us truly to ennoble our life and realize the very best in us. In short, Philosophy is a spiritual endeavour, not a mere intellectual gymnastic though by sheer accident, our intelligence is the only *tool* with which we have to carry on the crusade against ignorance, “Avidya” and Darkness of narrow Egoism. “Know Thyself”, —the watchword of Socrates, is still the key-word of all philosophical endeavours, ancient or modern, Eastern or Western. As Dr Whitehead says in the preface to his great work ‘Process and Reality’, “it must be one of the motives of a complete Cosmology, to construct a system of ideas which bring the æsthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science.” (Page vii)

II Feeling versus Intellect

It is a common place of many popular philosophical works that Intellect is contrasted with Feeling or Intuition. Even a philosopher of the eminence of Bradley gave a somewhat popular currency to the idea that thought in its highest efforts to understand Reality *fails to rise to the level of Immediate Experience or Feeling*. Bergson, with his characteristic French emotional make up, completed the “Irrationalist” picture by discarding ‘Intellect’ as a mere practical instrument and voting freely and boldly for ‘Intuition’, which alone is competent to grasp the ever emergent flow of the living Reality.

The ' concepts ' of science are static intellectual constructions which are of no philosophical merit or value the ' intuitions ' of the poet or the sage alone have philosophical worth in the Quest for Truth Some contemporary Indian philosophers have also contrasted ' Reason ' with ' Feeling ', ' Experience ' or "*Anubhuti*," and some have gone so far as to suggest that the spirit of Indian Philosophy is different from that of European Philosophy, exactly on this point, viz, that while the latter is analytical, scientific and intellectual, the former is synthetic, practical and ethical Without going into the intricacies of these problems, we may venture to suggest that much controversy would be stopped for good, if we asked ourselves the question, ' What is Feeling or Immediate Experience ? '

III Feeling or Immediate Experience

We can answer the question ' What is Feeling ? ' by referring to Bradley, whose position among British Idealists is obviously at the top According to him, Thought must commit suicide in order to attain Reality, that is to say, it must shed off its duality, the ' that ' and the ' what ', the subject object relation, the contrast between the thinker and the ' reality ' thought about In æsthetic appreciation and in purely religious consciousness alone can the wound, which thought has inflicted by this diversity, be really healed This sounds like mysticism and Irrationalism of Bergson But the question remains, " Can Bradley, the astute logician and the profound metaphysician, ever be so a logical and ' irrational ' as to assume that Reality could be simply ' apprehended ' or grasped directly by a fiat of the will, by refusing to think or by suspending all judgement ? " As serious students of Bradley, we cannot credit Bradley with a negation of Intellect Dr Whitehead, a scientist par excellence and a philosopher who came to Philosophy through Mathematics, pays a rich tribute to the great intellectual calibre of Bradley when he says " though, throughout the main body of the work, I am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different I am particularly indebted to his chapter on ' The Nature of Experience ', which appears in his ' Essays on Truth and Reality ' His insistence on ' Feeling ' is very consonant with my own conclusions This whole metaphysical position is an implicit

repudiation of the doctrine of 'vacuous actuality' " (Ibid, page vii, Preface)

IV Absolute Idealism on a Realistic Basis

As a matter of fact, when we study Whitehead's 'Process and Reality' carefully, it appears that extremes in Philosophy are bound to meet, as Bosanquet pointed out long ago. We come to the conclusion that it is not important what philosophy one holds but it is infinitely more important that one is a serious philosopher. Indeed, Whitehead seems to have grasped the best in Parmenides and Spinoza, as well as in Hegel and Bergson, almost as much as Bradley himself had done. In his 'Final Interpretation', which is the last part of 'Process and Reality', he is concerned with the ultimate way in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers the question, 'What does it all come to?' In this part, "the approximation to Bradley" as Whitehead says, 'is evident. Indeed if this cosmology be deemed successful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis' " (Preface, Page vii)

As Laird says, Philosophy is the quest for reality, and reality in its primary and authentic sense, has to be elicited from the anxious solicitude of each phase or department of existence for every other

nature, and even the dust of nature, is 'concerned' with man's spirit just as truly as man's spirit must be heedful of nature" (Recent Philosophy P 124 25). What Philosophy has, therefore, to learn to do is 'to immerse itself in the time process' and decline to be wholly submerged therein or to be misled by 'specious substitutes'. The Greeks and more especially Parmenides understood the gravity and the overwhelming importance of the problem. The moderns should stand on the shoulders of the Greeks instead of being content either with a pick a back journey or with no journey at all' (Ibid, P 125). When we remember that both Whitehead and Laird are among the foremost Realists in Contemporary Philosophy and still they talk of the Greeks and especially of Parmenides with respect, we get a lesson which a contemporary Idealist may well learn for his benefit and guidance.

V The Nature of Experience

Let us then return to our main theme from this digression. We should directly and pointedly ask the question what is Experience for Bradley, and how is it related to our intellectual endeavours? It is true that, according to Bradley, “the recognition of the fact of immediate experience opens the one road . to the solution of ultimate problems” (Essays on Truth and Reality, P 160) Bradley himself raises a number of difficulties, one of which however, almost leads us to a complicated dilemma. How can Immediate Experience itself become an object? So far as I know of immediate experience, it does not exist, and so, whether it exists or not, I could in neither case know of it. The solution of this difficulty is given by Bradley thus “Immediate experience, however much transcended, both remains and is active. It is not a state which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental. And, further, remaining it contains within itself every development, which in a sense transcends it. Nor does it merely contain all developments, but in its own way it acts to some extent as their judge” (Ibid, P 161)

This passage is one of those constructive statements which make it difficult to understand ‘Thought committing suicide’, a purely destructive and negative position which Bradley takes up on several occasions with equal earnestness. If Immediate Experience is a moment or aspect of all our thinking, feeling and acting, it is not a stage, highest or lowest, it cannot be identified either with (a) the purely sensual ‘feeling’ of toothache, or (b) the purely spiritual ecstatic ‘intuition’ of the mystic. As a matter of fact, when we take up Bradley’s account of Judgment and Inference in logic, it would be hard to believe that logical arguments have no ‘immediacy’ about them. As Bosanquet clearly demonstrated in his brilliant little book ‘Implication and Linear Inference’, the conclusion of every syllogism conveys to the intelligent bearer or reader an immediate inference of ‘new’ knowledge—not a mere ‘linear’ inference from two premises, being put together, but an ‘implication,’ a new ‘fact’ for knowledge. He ‘feels’ all the richer for it and ‘enjoys’ an experience, which is uniquely felt, in spite of the fact that a

discursive process of moving step by step—a linear advance, has preceded this immediate realization, this ‘*feeling*’

VI Bradley and Bosanquet on “Feeling”

It would be relevant here to notice that when Bradley put forward his view of Thought in his *Logic* in 1883, Bosanquet protested against it as “dualistic feeling, aroused by reaction against the fatal facility of monistic views, and criticized Bradley rather severely. In ‘*Knowledge and Reality*’, a work which appeared in 1885 and is not easily available now, Bosanquet says “the author has true and just sympathy for the claims of feeling as contrasted with intellect, or at least not identical with intellect, and therefore cherishes a deep discontent with any effort to resolve reality into an intellectual movement. Only a rich man may wear a bad coat, and only a philosopher of Mr Bradley’s force could escape suspicions of a crude dualistic realism when he writes as follows (Here Bosanquet quotes the well known passage in *Logic*, pp 590 591) “Unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if ‘thinking’ is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational. Our principles may be true, but they are not reality.”

It would have been interesting and valuable, if Bosanquet had taken up that point of view more persistently in his constructive works. But it happens that he was too much influenced by Bradley to strike an independent note in his later works. He confesses in 1911 “It is hardly necessary at this time of day to say that I have now in principle adopted Mr Bradley’s view of the relations of Thought to Reality, with which the ideas of my early work, ‘*Knowledge and Reality*,’ were more or less in conflict (Logic, Second edition, Vol II p 288, footnote). This dualistic tendency of Bradley, which Bosanquet openly adopts in his later work, is responsible for much confusion in British Idealism. It leads Bradley to contrast Philosophy with Religion, Art and Morality, and ultimately involves a surrendering of ‘systematic coherence’ as the nature and criterion of Reality and Truth thus landing us in chaos. Either we have to leave the different sides of our nature uncoordinated

and the satisfaction that we get in philosophical, religious, moral and æsthetic activities un-harmonized, or we have to find an ultimate criterion in some higher form of systematic coherence, *identical, essentially and in principle*, with the work of Thought. It is in this sense alone that the *Real is Rational* or *Thought is Reality*, and we are justified in claiming for Intellect a superior place as compared to Will or Emotion, provided we understand these different Forms of Experience as aspects of the Spirit and not watertight compartments of the Faculty Psychology.

VII *Theoretical and Practical Activity*

In ‘Appearance and Reality’, Bradley regards the contrast between the Theoretical and the Practical sides of our nature as ultimate. According to him, one of the main objections to holding thought as ultimate is that one has to reduce Will and the whole practical activity, Feeling, Emotions and all the rest, into an intellectual movement. “Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into a fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you choose to use this word. But if anyone else prefers another term, such as Feeling or Will, he would be equally justified. For the result is a whole state which both includes and goes beyond each element, and to speak of it as simply *one of them* seems playing with phrases. For (I must repeat it) when thought begins to be more than relational, it ceases to be mere thinking” (P 171). This tendency to regard thought as coordinate with feeling and will results in the “*trifurcation*” of human nature, reflects the common sense view of the tripartite faculties and the three ultimate values, Truth, Beauty and Goodness.

In ‘The Principle of Individuality and Value’ however, Bosanquet strikes a more harmonious note, when he says “All thought, no doubt, has a mediate side, but all concrete thought has become immediate no less than mediate.

For if we admit thought to be in part intuitive, a unity asserted through diversity there is no longer anything to prevent it from reproducing the character of feeling in the sense of immediate apprehension, an immediate apprehension which is the totality of a mediate discourse.

This is the sort of apprehension, which a name, familiar and adored, awakes in us". Here Bosanquet seems to be drawing mainly on Hegel and withdrawing from the mystical tendency of Bradley. Mind, we may say, is essentially two-sided, and may be regarded "either as the internalization of the outward or as the objectification and articulation of the inward". The development of mind is a process, starting from an almost blank immediacy, to a mediating activity, and in and through this mediation, a higher immediacy is attained. The impressions of sense have to be divested of their given-ness, they have to be "resolved into laws and principles which are the substance of mind itself". This is the "*internalization of the outward*". The next step is the "practical activity, when the mind recognizes certain contents as its *own* and proceeds to embody them in the world and gives them effective shape and objectivity. This is the "*objectification of the inward*", the correlative to the first. But it has to be noted that "in the last resort the two aspects are inseparable, and every whole activity of mind manifests both". Again, the 'inward' which is objectified in 'will' is not a real 'inward', it is the substance of the world as truly as any theoretic object and the re-objectification of it is only a process of "transmutation of given objects into an ethical, and therefore spiritual, system". (Cf. Reyburn *Hegel's Ethical Theory*, pp. 102-3) Thus the theoretical and the practical attitudes of mind are two moments, constantly involving each other and constituting a *concrete unity of opposites* in their mutual implication.

With the above results Bradley would be in general agreement, for he lays down "that all activity which is theoretical, or in any sense contemplative, must also be practical, and practical activity on its side contains an element which is theoretical, and, shorn of that necessary aspect, is in fact reduced to nothing". (Cf. *Principles of Logic*, II Edn., pp. 714-15) But sometimes Bradley emphasizes the separation between "existence" and "the ideal world" which cannot be justified by his own teaching, and if we start by opposing 'thought' to existence, the way to the '*suicide doctrine of thought*' is clear. Because if thought and existence are different in nature, both must transcend their special natures in the Absolute, and 'commit suicide' in this transformation. Bosanquet on the other hand, beauti-

fully sums up the position thus “In short, then, all logical activity is a world of content reshaping itself by its own spirit and laws in presence of new suggestions, a syllogism is in principle nothing less, and a Parthenon or ‘Paradise Lost’ is in principle nothing more” (Individuality and Value, p 333) Here Bosanquet finally restores to thought its due, long held back by Bradley, when he confines it to mere mediation. In this sense, there does not remain any ultimate duality between thought and feeling, nor between Truth and Beauty. Considered thus, the facts of feeling and of the æsthetic consciousness’ are not so formidable to encounter as Bradley supposes them to be. At any rate they do not justify Bradley in his ‘suicide doctrine of thought’

VIII *Morality and Religion*

Let us next turn to the contrast between Truth and Goodness because in Morality and Religion we find another realm where ‘Feeling’ or ‘Immediate Experience’ is invoked by those who find ‘mere’ thought unsatisfactory. In the concluding remarks of his first great work ‘Ethical Studies,’ Bradley says “Morality is an endless process, and therefore a self contradiction, it is a demand for what cannot be. Neither in me nor in the world, is what ought to be what is, and the claim remains in the end a mere claim. The reason of this contradiction is the fact that man is a contradiction. But man is more, he feels or knows himself as such and this makes a vital difference, for to feel a contradiction is *ipso facto* to be above it (p 313, Second Edn 1927)

Thus Bradley comes to the conclusion that the moral point of view, which leaves us in a sphere with which we are not satisfied, could not be final and ultimate. Reflection on morality leads us beyond it,—we come to the conclusion that ‘morality is imperfect, and imperfect in such a way as implies a higher, which is religion’ (Ibid, p 314). That there is an intimate connection between true religion and morality, Bradley never denies. A man who is ‘religious’ and does not act morally, according to him, is “an impostor, or his religion is a false one.” For “religion is not the mere knowing or contemplating of any object, however high. It is not mere philosophy nor art.” “Religion is essentially a doing and a doing which

is moral. It implies a realising, and a realising of the good self". (Ibid, p 315) Again, " Religion is more than morality "

IX. The Nature of God in Whitehead

What, then, is the essence of the religious consciousness, according to Bradley? In what way have we to transcend Philosophy, Art and Morality, in order to attain true spirituality? And finally, once we attain this height, how are we to correlate our scientific and logical studies with our spiritual conquests? These are some of those ultimate questions which Whitehead is interested in answering, in spite of his scientific and empirical leanings. As Whitehead says " Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity, it is just as much one immediate fact as it is an unresting advance beyond itself " (Process & Reality, p 495) Thus Immanence has been vindicated once more by Whitehead on a scientific basis, without losing touch with Immediacy of Religion and Spirituality. " Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever present fact " (Ibid, p 496) He, however, differs from traditional Idealism in maintaining " the principle of universal relativity " even in the nature of God. There are, according to him, *four* creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its actuality. There is *first* the phase of conceptual origination deficient in actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation. *Secondly*, there is the temporal phase of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities. In this phase full actuality is attained, but there is deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with each other.

Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In ever-lastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality. In the *fourth* phase, the creative action completes itself. For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact or relevant experience. *For the kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action*

of the fourth phase is the love of God for the world By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world In this sense, God is the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands" (Ibid, pp 496-97, Italics ours)

X Concluding Remarks

With the above passage, no spiritual seeker would or should have any quarrel And the Immanence of Hegel as well as Bradley is preserved without losing the Transcendence of Parmenides or Spinoza The Modern Realist or Positivist, however, does feel uncomfortable in the company of a mystic scientist like Whitehead It is no wonder that the late Professor Stebbing, in her critical review of '*Process and Reality*' gave vent to feelings of doubt and helplessness, when she said, "If one attempts to consider the book as a whole one is faced with the problem of its significance That it is obscure no one can doubt That it is worth pondering I am convinced Whether it is the product of thinking that is essentially unclear but capable of brief flashes of penetrating insight, or whether it is too profound in its thought to be judged by this generation, I do not know Reluctantly I am inclined to accept the first alternative" (P 475, *Mind*, 1930) Equally reluctantly we are forced to accept the second alternative, with the remark that contemporary philosophers in the West cannot possibly understand the profundity of Whitehead's work even after a generation or two, if these persons stentily refuse, as they have been doing for the last 50 years or more, to study Hegel with the care and attention he deserves For it seems that Bradley, in spite of his greatness, gave a wrong turn to British Philosophy, when he rejected the Monism of Hegel in his '*Suicide doctrine of Thought*', and it is in this sense that Whitehead has done a great service to the cause of Truth by emphasizing the Unity of the Cosmic Process, in spite of the multiplicity and diversity of the temporal and actual phases which he never blurs or underrates It is in this highest sense that we venture to suggest that Religion has still the last word, even in the scientific world of today And it is here that '*Thought*' and '*Feeling*' are united in a joint effort to 'understand' Reality, and Science, Philosophy, Art, Morality and Religion have each an essential contribution to make towards the solution of the Eternal Puzzle

THE FALL OF SERINGAPATAM, 1799

By M H KRISHNA

A Great Historical Battle The Battle of Seringapatam which occurred on the 4th of May 1799 is an event of very great interest in the history of Modern India. It was the most brilliant feat of British arms in India in the eighteenth century, it ended the independence of the kingdom of Mysore which had dominated the history of South India for nearly a century and it led to the substitution of the powerful Muslim usurpation set up by Hyder Ali by the old Hindu dynasty of Mysore under the protection of the British power. The campaign was perfectly planned and executed on the British side, while for Mysore it was almost a surprise and ended in a disaster.

Tipu's Diplomacy By the Treaty of Seringapatam, 1792, which resulted in the secession by Tipu of half his territory to his enemies consisting of the British, the Nizam and the Marathas, the payment of three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees as indemnity and the surrender of two of Tipu's sons as hostages to the British until the indemnity could be completely paid, Tipu suffered a humiliation which made him hate the British all the more and determine to drive them out of India. His efforts to get the support of the Nizam and the Marathas against the British were successfully checkmated by the British agents with those Powers. The foreign Muslim allies whose help he sought, namely Zeman Shah of Afghanistan and the Sultan of Turkey, failed him, so that the only ally left to him was France. Tipu believed in France as the inveterate enemy of Britain and begged its Directory for help in the shape of about 8 000 French troops. But the Battle of the Nile and the consequent defeat of Napoleon's Eastern Campaign ruined the chances of serious succour being sent to India. Tipu, however, would not accept the defeat of his plans so easily. He yet hoped that France would send him the promised relief. While on the one side he wrote to Lord Mornington professing friendship for the British, he sent two ambassadors to the Isle of France to collect French soldiers. But France was not in a condition to spare men and a miserable little


contingent of 200 men was collected together and sent in response to a proclamation issued without any caution by Mons Malartic, the Governor

British Diplomacy Very shortly after the receipt of Tipu's friendly letter, Mornington received authentic information in June 1798 of Malartic's proclamation. Mornington enquired into the matter and was convinced of Tipu's hostile intentions. He grasped the opportunity and demanded of Tipu a full understanding in the shape of a discussion with his agent Col Doveton. Tipu delayed receiving the agent. Meanwhile, Mornington secured the alliance of the Nizam and Mahrattas and came over to Madras on the last day of 1798 determined to campaign against Tipu before the rains set in. Some delay was caused in reorganising the Madras army. Mornington formed his plans with absolute thoroughness, gave detailed instructions to General Harris the Commander in Chief and stayed at Madras to attend to all emergencies. The Bombay army consisting of about 8,000 men, the majority of whom were Indians, marched from Cannanore and with the assistance of the Raja of Coorg took its post on the border of Coorg and Mysore near Siddapur and Siddhesvar. The Madras army commanded by General Harris and containing experienced officers like General Baird assembled at Vellore and marched into Mysore through the Salem District by way of Royacottah. It consisted of 30,959 fighting men, a minority of whom were Europeans. The Madras army was joined by the Nizam's contingent of 6,000 men under the general command of Mir Alam, while Col Wellesley was in command of the British subsidiary force from Hyderabad. All the attacking armies were finely equipped and well led.

The British Advance To oppose this conquering force Tipu collected together his troops. From a position of opposition to the Madras army Tipu moved over to Periyapatna, attacked the Bombay army at Siddhesvar on 6th March 1799 but after some initial success, he was beaten back. He retreated to Seringapatam and moving north-east gave battle to the Madras forces at Malavalli on 27th March. Here also he suffered a defeat. Retreating to Arakere near Seringapatam, he took up a position preventing the British from crossing over to Ganjam across the Kaveri on the north east side of the island.

General Harris, however, moved several miles further down, crossed the Kaveri at Sosale on 29th March without opposition and approached the capital from the south-west, camping ultimately within sight of the town on the heights near Palhalli and Sultanpet about two miles from the capital. On 5th April, during the night, a skirmish took place near the Sultanpet tope. Meanwhile, General Floyd from the Madras army marched to Periyapatna, effected a junction with General Stuart and the Bombay army and the latter approached Seringapatam, crossed the Kaveri to its left bank and took up its post a short distance to the north west of the island on the 16th of March.

Battle for the Approaches Until the two British armies took up their positions to the west of the island, Tipu appears to have expected an attack near the north-east angle. To counteract the British forces on the north, about 6,000 of the best of Tipu's horse took up its position on the left bank to the north of the island under Kamruddin Khan, while about 8,000 more men, mostly infantry, stationed themselves near Karighatta under the command of Purniah assisted by Tipu's eldest son, Fateh Hyder. As Agrahara, a village on the left bank to the north-west of the island commanded enfilade of the western fort wall, Tipu's men commenced the construction of a redoubt (known as Lally's redoubt) at that place. The Bombay army attacked the redoubt and took it. With some effort the neighbourhood was cleared by the British and complete command of the enfilade was obtained. (See Map.) Three batteries consisting of six eighteen-pounders and two Howitzers and four field pieces (A) were constructed directly in a position to enfilade the north-west corner of the fort and the straight length of the west wall. The Madras army, on the other hand, moved from near Palhalli and Sultanpet, occupied the high banks of the little Kaveri (called Macdonald's Post) which afforded excellent protection, and fought its way forward so as to get possession of the irrigation channel known as the Bangaradodd: nala, which runs between little Kaveri and the southern branch of big Kaveri. A powder mill on the way was taken and a zigzag trench was dug to give protected access from the little Cauvery to the river bank. Now more British batteries were erected. (B) a battery of six Howitzers for shelling and clearing the western wall, a battery of six eighteen-pounders for damaging the north-



east battery, (A) another battery of four guns to command and feint on the Round Bastion and Great Mud Cavalier (E,E) close to the river bank and two more batteries consisting of eighteen and sixteen pounders for breaching the weaker and lower first wall and its fosse braye (B & C)

The Plan of Attack The British attack was planned to perfection but was absolutely secret. Tipu was kept uncertain about the part of the fort which would be seriously attacked. A feint was made towards the round bastion in the south west corner. Here Tipu thought the attack would be delivered and he further strengthened the bastion (N) Cavalier (O) and the fort wall and repairs actively proceeded. But the British decided to attack the north west corner because of its inherent weakness. The north half of the western fort wall which really ran south east was narrow and straight (M) and was defended by only three bastions, one at each end and one more near the south end. On the north west end stood the north-western corner battery. The enfilading fire from the Bombay batteries was designed to keep this straight wall clear of defenders and to damage its batteries seriously. The north west battery stood at the corner of the wall which consisted of stone work for only ten feet from the bottom, above which there was brick work of about 8 feet high. This was the second and the stronger of the fort walls (K). The first wall (J) built in the Hindu times was low and weak and offered no protection to the brick portion of the second wall. Further, the stone glacis which runs throughout the north face of the fort ended as soon as it turned the north west corner. Thus the straight west wall did not have the protection of even a glacis. Though the fosse or outer wall of the ditch (H) was about 7 feet high, water inside it was only one foot deep, since the river was at its lowest. Stone slabs built into the walls formed a flight of steps for crossing the ditch. By those who knew the ford, the river could be crossed by moving from rock to rock (F). It was on this portion of the west wall, a few yards to the south of north west battery, that the British attention was fixed. It was decided to breach the walls here, keep them enfiladed by the Bombay and powder mill batteries while crossing the river during midday when the Mysore troops would be resting, mount the walls and take possession of them by means of two columns, one moving from the breach to the right and the other to

the left and both meeting over the east fort gate (G) After the walls were taken, the city would be entered and Tipu would be besieged in his palace (Y), captured, and forced to accept a subsidiary treaty Immediate action was necessary, as the British Camp was very short of provisions

British Prepare for the Assault According to plan all the thirty five guns and mortars opened fire at sunrise on the second of May, with tremendous effect One of the shells burst in one of the magazines in the fort and a great explosion took place By evening the first fort wall marked for breaching (J) was almost battered down and the brick top of the second wall converted into a stepped slope During the night Tipu's men repaired the breach with stone and earth and palisaded the high mound just behind the breached walls and next to the flagstaff pavilion (S) Next morning the defenders kept up a heavy fire of round and grape and killed several men and officers in the British batteries But the latter continued their fire till midday and by evening the breach was pronounced to be quite practicable By close observation, the British discovered at the foot of the glacis, the inlet through which water was supplied to the ditch and it was found to be empty Men had been seen crossing the river at its west angle During the night of the third, Lt Lalor or Lawler and Lt Farquhar examined the passage, crossed the river and measured the height of the outer wall of the ditch and it was they who discovered it to be 7 feet including about a foot in water During the afternoon, scaling ladders and fascines or bundles of firewood were collected and arranged to be sent to the trenches after sunset The zigzag trench was extended to the river bank General Baird, who had known the fort as a prisoner for four years and Col Arthur Wellesley, the Governor-General's brother had both applied for commanding the assault In the afternoon, the senior of the two, Gen Baird was appointed to command the assault on the next day and given full instructions as to the movements Under the cover of night, part of the Bombay army crossed to the right bank and the assaulting troops were collected in the trenches They were all stationed in their positions by daybreak on the 4th morning without being visible from the fort They consisted of 2494 European infantry and 1882 Indian infantry divided into two columns under the command of Col Dunlop

for the left column and Col Sherbrooke for the right column. The left column consisted of six European flank companies from the Bombay army, His Majesty's 12th and 13th regiments, ten flank companies of Bengal sepoy and fifty artillery men led by a forlorn hope consisting of a sergeant (Graham) and 12 Europeans, commanded by Col Hill of the 74th regiment. The right column consisted of the flank companies of the Scotch brigade and regiments of De Meuron, the grenadier companies of His Majesty's 73rd and 74th regiments, fourteen flank companies of sepoy and fifty artillery men led by a forlorn hope consisting of a sergeant and twelve Europeans under Lt Lawrence of the 77th regiment followed by a party of subalterns. Lt Lalor had pitched sticks in the bed of the river overnight to mark the safest passage and the two columns were instructed to keep to either side of the line of sticks. A brigade of engineers accompanied the storming party, the European pioneers carrying ladders and the Indian pioneers fascines. Lt Lalor and Lt Farquhar who had examined the ford during the night were to conduct the columns. A reserve force was kept ready in the trenches under Col Wellesley. All these arrangements were carried out silently and invisible to the enemies. Till one o'clock, the time fixed for assault, all was quiet in the trenches.

Tipu's Last Movements While the British were making ready for the assault, Tipu's movements show that he was in utter ignorance of British intentions and plans. His local army consisted of over 36,000 men, about 6,000 of whom was cavalry stationed to the north of the Kaveri under Kamruddin Khan and about 7,000 under Purniah and Fatch Hyder near Karighatta. About 8,000 were in the trenches and other defensive work outside the fort, so that the fort and city appear to have been defended by about 14,000 men. As stated already, Tipu first thought that the attack would be delivered on the north eastern corner of the fort. When the British settled down in the west and built their batteries he was led to think that the southwest corner near the round bastion would be attacked. It was only on the 2nd of May that the breaching of the north west corner began. But that night, part of the breach was repaired. On the 3rd of May the enfilading fire from the British batteries prevented the Sultan's men from further strengthening the north west wall and Tipu does

not appear to have been informed of the serious nature of the breach. But on the 4th morning, Tipu mounted his horse and inspected the breached walls. Syed Gaffar who was in charge of the west wall and some of the Sultan's spies also observed that the British trenches were unusually full of men and they suggested that the attack was imminent. But Tipu declined to believe them. Though Tipu had much experience of field battles he was new to siege operation. He thought that no assault would be delivered during the day and he just told his men to be very careful and returned to his temporary battle camp in the Kalale Diddi or watergate (V). He believed that Seringapatam fort was impregnable and instead of arranging at once for the defence of the damaged fort wall, he returned to his camp and sent for his astrologers both Hindu and Muslim. They met him in the palace and told him that it being a new moon day and since Saturn was hostile to the Sultan according to his horoscope, it was a bad day for him, he should not leave shelter nor expose himself to any risk or danger for several hours after midday. As advised by them, he tried to avert this planetary danger by making gifts to Brahmins. To the Sanyasi or monk of Channapatna, for whom he had great veneration, he gave an elephant, a bag of til oil seeds and two hundred rupees. He gave other presents to other Brahmins, looked at his own image in oil and returned to Kalale Diddi. At midday, his prime minister, Mir Mohamed Sadak, to whom Mysorean accounts ascribe treacherous intentions, told the troops guarding the fort to go to the branch treasury near Ala Masjid (Z) on the east side of the fort and receive their pay, and as soon as the assault began he tried to flee by the Ganjam gate (R), but was slain by the guardsmen who suspected him. The few men that were left to guard the walls went to take their meals. At about 1 P. M. Tipu commenced his dinner in his camp and had taken one or two mouthfuls only when he heard that the British had commenced the assault. He washed his hands and was arming and collecting his men when he heard that Syed Gaffar, who had been guarding the breach was hit by a cannon ball and killed. The local ballads say that according to Mir Sadak's orders, a red coloured umbrella was held over Gaffar's head and that this helped the British to aim correctly at Gaffar and kill him. The Sultan is reported to have said 'Gaffar was never afraid of death let Khasim

Khan take charge of his post ' and collecting together his gun bearers and personal attendants he climbed the fortwall and rushed on the second north wall towards the breach

The Assault The whole morning the British troops hid themselves in the trenches and the thought that on the result of the day's battle the future of the British power in India largely depended kept them in a state of excitement. A little after one o'clock, the appointed hour, Genl Baird, who had completed his arrangements, stepped out of the trenches, drew his sword and in a most heroic and animated manner said to his men, " Come, my brave fellows, follow me and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers " In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches and entered the bed of the river. The guides and the sergeants were followed by the forlorn hope and the groups of subalterns and the flanking companies forming the columns moved rapidly by the rocky passage in the bed of the river (F) wading in shallow water. In the bed, however, the columns swerved slightly out of the marked course and got in some places into deeper water. Between the two columns, General Baird advanced alone, jumping quickly from rock to rock until he almost reached the leading men. An enfilading fire from the Bombay batteries covered the crossing and kept the fortwalls almost clear of defenders. Ladders and bundles of faggots were used to descend the fossebraye (H) and cross the trench (I). The first fortwall (J) which had been battered down to the length of a hundred feet gave no difficulty and the second one (K), the brick top of which had been knocked down into a slope was climbed by the left column easily by mounting on the fallen bricks which formed a slope. The right column found its portion of the wall a little steeper and used ladders. In about six minutes of leaving the British trenches, the forlorn hope had reached the summit of the breach on the top of the second wall and displayed the British colours. It is said that the first man to gain the top was Sergeant Graham. He got the colours handed up to him, planted it and called out ' Huzah for Lt Graham ', for he thought that he had secured his promotion to the commissioned rank by his gallant act. The next second he was shot and fell down. In a few minutes more the breach was crowded with British soldiers. Tipu's troops discharged one or two rounds of grape shot when the assault began but being a hand-

ful in number they withdrew from the breach and the straight length of the wall. But single officers of Tipu offered brave resistance and one of these fought a personal conflict with Col. Dunlop at the breach and cut his wrist so seriously that he had to withdraw. The left column fought its way forward and gained possession of the north bastion (K). Lt. Farquhar and other officers were killed one after another at the head of the column. Tipu's men gathered behind the traverses of the north-west wall (L) and brought the British left column to a standstill. Here Tipu joined the defenders, shot with his own hands several Europeans and held up the British troops for some time. This action of the left column was invisible from the British trenches.

The South Column. Col. Sherbooke's right column also gained the top of the second wall (K) and met with almost no resistance in the latter's straight and narrow course (M). One or two guardsmen that were there pursued almost singly by Captain Molle of the Scotch grenadiers to a distance of nearly 200 yards until he reached the mud cavalier (B) behind the great mud tower (N) (now to the east of the railway cutting). On the cavalier he planted a flag and displayed his hat on the point of a sword. The stupendous works there were almost abandoned. General Baird joined the right column and was now leading it. When he was a prisoner in Seringapatam, the second wall on which he now stood had been the innermost defence. To the surprise of Baird and the British troops they now found inside the second wall a deep and wide rock cut trench with a partly finished inner wall of earth provided with high mud cavaliers at the corners. Baird exclaimed 'Good God, how shall we get over this.' In the hope of discovering some way, by chance, he moved forward with his men towards the round bastion. Most unexpectedly and luckily for the British they found here a scaffold bridge (P) with its bottom wooden plank little more than a foot wide, which had been put up for the use of the masons and the workmen who crossed over to the second wall for repairing. The defenders had been so taken by surprise that they had forgotten to remove this communication. A small party of eight or ten British first crossed over by means of this bridge (S). The rest of the right column followed. Moving eastward along the third south rampart, over the Somalinga and Mysore Gates, General Baird

and his men reached the eastern or Ganjam gate (R) within about an hour's time leaving small parties to surround the cavaliers which resisted. Small parties of Tipu's officers led by Sjed Sahib, the old general, Mons Chapuy, (Seeboo Sahib) the Frenchman and others, bravely obstructed the invaders but were cut down or captured.

The North Column The north column, however, met with determined opposition offered by Tipu and the few men he could gather behind the traverses (L). He prevented its further progress for some considerable time. Meanwhile more troops from the British trenches entered the breach and one party of His Majesty's 12th regiment led by Captain Goodall and Lt Ingram crossing over to the third wall by the scaffold bridge (P) turned north and moved to the northwest corner of the innerwall. Here they found the north column led by Major Lambton stopped by the resistance of Tipu and his men shooting from behind the traverses on the second wall. Captain Goodall and Lt Ingram and their men opened fire on the resisters from the south on their open left flank and made their position precarious. Thus Tipu was forced to retire and the north column pushed forward on the second wall under Major Lambton with Captain Goodall moving parallel on the third wall. Now the British troops pushed eastward with speed over the Delhi Gate, Tipu Sultan Battery and Tipu gate (U) until Tipu reached the watergate just to the northeast of the palace and descended from the second fortwall. The watergate offered him a good chance of escaping through it and across the rocky river bed to the north bank beyond which Kamruddin's troops were camping. One of Tipu's officers proposed this escape and if Tipu had adopted this suggestion he could have continued the war even after losing Seringapatam or he could have attacked the British camp or carried the war to the northern districts. But in the moment of his defeat, Tipu declined to run away. He was far more brave than wise. He appears to have decided to return to the palace where his family was living and defend it to the last. As one of his legs which had been wounded in early life was paining, he mounted his mare, crossed the inner ditch by a bridge (W) and entered the sally port (X) of the inner or third wall. (The third wall and the gate in which Tipu died were both removed a few months after the battle. They are not shown in the plan prepared by Ross in 1800 A. D.)

But they are seen in the map given in Beatson's book) But Goodall's men fired obliquely into the inside of the gate while the north column followed the Sultan and fired from outside Mir Nadim the killedar, who is also suspected of treachery, delayed opening the gate at Tipu's orders, and the fugitives were thus surrounded on all sides When at last Tipu entered the sally port, the narrow passage was so crowded with men that he could not make his way into the town As he was forcing his way through the gate he received a musket ball on his right side When half through the archway the twelfth infantry fired a volley from within and he received a second ball on the right side close to the other The mare he rode was also wounded and he received a third wound in the left breast His secretary Rajah Khan proposed that the Sultan must discover himself and save his life, when the Sultan replied "Are you mad? Be silent" In attempting to get down from the horse, Tipu fell among the wounded men Immediately his servants placed him in a palanquin which was on one side of the gateway and here he lay for some time, faint and exhausted

Tipu's Death By the double fire from both sides of the gateway most of the defenders were killed or severely wounded and in a short time the battle for the gate ceased Since the British instructions were to take the ramparts before entering the town, most of the British troops moved eastward along the walls until they reached the east or Ganjam gate (R) where the south column under Baird was resting during the heat of the day The British were quite ignorant of Tipu's identity when he fought them on the walls and in the gateway The British believed that Tipu was staying in the palace Instruction had been given that Tipu should be captured alive Except for a green swordbelt of gold thread and a turban with one or two jewels which were lost in the melee, Tipu was so simply dressed that he was taken for one of the officers of the Sultan After the battle in the gateway was over, his presence among the wounded was not noticed But news of his condition must have reached the palace Zenana which was only a hundred yards away and some of his women must have come to search for him, for their bodies were later on found among the wounded and the dead On enquiry, the story of the Sultan's death was discovered, later in the evening A

British grenadier who was collecting his booty from the dead and the dying, came up to Tipu and seized his swordbelt which had also a gold buckle the Sultan who appears to have been conscious, though faint, took up a sword lying within reach and made a stroke at the soldier. The blow fell upon the musket. So he made another stroke upon the Britisher's knee and wounded it. The angry soldier put his musket to Tipu's right temple and shot him, the ball lodging in the left cheek. There lay the Sultan for some hours with his mortally wounded secretary lying at a distance until they were at last discovered towards nightfall. Thus the death of Tipu occurred in ignorance of his identity and his accidental demise had the unexpected consequence of ending Muslim rule of Mysore.

The Palace is Taken After the battle at the sally gate had quieted down, Captain Goodall and Lt Ingram were among those that moved eastward and joined General Baird over the Ganjam gate. By way of the southern wall Col. Beatson, Major Allan, Major Dallas and some batches of reserve troops also joined them. As desired by Gen. Baird, Major Allan, accompanied by Capt. Fraser went to the palace (Y) with a white cloth raised on a sergeant's pike. There he found Major Shee with part of the thirty third regiment already drawn up opposite the gate. Allan sent word to the inmates demanding the surrender of the palace and offering them safety. After a considerable delay, the killedar took Allan and Fraser into the palace and after some further delay the Sultan's sons Moizuddin and Mohiuddin received them. By this time, General Baird accompanied by Col. Close and the main body of the troops, arrived in front of the palace and in spite of his desire for vengeance he received the princes with every mark of regard and sympathy and sent them to the British camp with escort. Tipu's troops were disarmed and the British troops of the 74th regiment entered the palace and proceeded to make a search of it in order to capture the Sultan. At this stage, the Killedar informed Major Allan and General Baird that the Sultan was not in the palace, but lay wounded in the sally gateway. Baird immediately proceeded to the gateway which had already become dark and was covered with many hundreds of slain. The bodies were dragged out and closely examined. During the search Rajah Khan, Tipu's personal atten-

dant, was found lying wounded under his master's palanquin. He was just able to point out where the Sultan had fallen. With some search, Tipu's body was discovered, brought out from under the gateway and identified by means of a talisman worn on the arm. The body was still warm, the face peaceful and the eyes open, but the still pulse and heart showed that Tipu was dead. He had four wounds, two in the right chest, one in the left and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear and lodged in the left cheek. Tipu was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders and a thick neck. His hands and feet were remarkably small, his complexion rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, his eyebrows small and arched and his nose aquiline. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of coloured chints and a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist. A handsome pouch with a red and green silk bell hung across his shoulder, he had an amulet on his arm but no ornaments whatever.

Tipu's Officers Surrender The palace and the town were mercilessly plundered in spite of the efforts of the British leaders to control their troops. Part of Tipu's treasury was made over to the prize committee and his library appropriated. There was terrible slaughter in the streets and houses and the town was strewn with the dead and wounded. The houses of the officers and the rich were looted, the women being violated as in the houses of Kamruddin and Syed Sahib. The next day Tipu's second son Abdul Khalik surrendered and the arrangements for Tipu's funeral were proceeded with under the supervision of Mir Alam and the Kazi of Seringapatam. Meanwhile the plunder proceeded. By order of Gen Harris, Col Wellesley took charge of the fort from General Baird on the 5th morning. He was shocked when the misbehaviour of the British troops was brought to his notice and even got some of them hanged as an example. On the 5th afternoon Tipu's body was taken in procession from the palace to the Gumbaz or Hyder's tomb, accompanied with military honours and followed by Tipu's son Abdul Khalik. The streets were crowded by the inhabitants many of whom prostrated as the procession passed them. Mir Alam and many officers of the conquering army received the corps at the gate of the Gumbaz and were present at its interment by the side of

Hyder Immediately after the ceremony, a violent storm broke out with the loudest peels of thunder, continued flashes of lightening and an exceedingly heavy torrent of rain. Two officers in the British camp were stricken dead by the lightening and several persons were much hurt. It looked as if nature violently mourned the death of so brave a man. Shortly afterwards, Tipu's younger brother Karim Sahib and Kamruddin Khan and a few days later, Purniah and Fateh Hyder all surrendered. Seringapatam had been completely conquered by the allies. The battle had ended triumphantly for the British arms.

The Losses Appendix XXX of Beatson's narrative gives an estimate of Tipu's forces in 1799 at a total of 48,000 men, of whom 13,739 are said to have been within the fort. Of these, the British estimate states, that about 8,000 men were killed during the battle including 24 principal officers of Tipu. The British losses were 22 officers killed and 45 wounded, 181 European soldiers killed, 622 wounded and 22 missing, 119 British Indian sepoy's killed, 420 wounded and 100 missing. The fort was defended in all by 929 pieces of ordnance, of which 287 were mounted on the fortifications. There were 42,400 round shot, 520,000 lbs of gun powder and 99,000 muskets and carbines. The large powder magazines were 11, 72 smaller ones, 11 armouries, 2 foundries for cannon, 4 large arsenals, 17 storehouses for arms and many graneries abundantly stored with provisions of every kind. The treasure and jewels stored in the palace were valued at more than one million sterling. Of the French there were 100 men and 20 officers.

The Mysore Commission To make a settlement of the conquered country, Mornington appointed a commission with General Harris as the president, Col Arthur Wellesley, Hon Henry Wellesley, Col Kirk Patric and Col Close as members and Captain Thomas Munro and another as secretaries. Hyderabad was represented by Mir Alam. The Commission assigned the territories due to the allies and proposed the continuation of Mysore as a subsidiary state. Purniah supported the restoration of the kingdom to Fateh Hyder, but Tirumala Rao, the old Maharani's agent, pleaded for the restoration of the old Hindu dynasty from which Hyder had usurped the state. It was finally decided in favour of the Hindu

dynasty and Maharaja Krishnaraja Wadiyar III, a boy, five years old, was brought out from captivity and enthroned at Mysore on the.....of June 1799, with Purniah as Dewan and Regent, Col. Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) as the officer commanding the British garrison and Col. Barry Close as the British Resident.

The story as told in the narrative is collected and retold as above, since the source books are not easily available to all readers. A map is added to illustrate the narrative.

1. *Beatson : Origin and Conduct of the War with Tipu Sultan*
2. *Allan : An account of the campaign in Mysore, 1799*
3. *Wilker : History of Mysore, Vol. II*
4. *Miles : Kirmani's History of the reign of Tipu Sultan*
5. *Wellesley's Despatches, Vol II*
6. *Kannada : Old Ballad of Tipu Sultan*

GUILD AND STATE IN KAUTILYA'S ARTHAŚĀSTRA

M V KRISHNA RAO

The ancient Indian State was an aggregate of several societies embodying different principles of associations loosely knit together by the military principle and the principle of Dharma. There were Guilds and Corporations and these were primary groups, primary in the sense that they were fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual, in giving him notions of elementary justice and social ideals and obligations and in laying the basis for all later expansion of social contacts and responsibilities. The guild was a society in so far as it embraced the whole range of human relationships. It was a community in the sense that manners, traditions and modes of speech, and the consequences of an effective common life were realized in it¹, it was also an association organised for the pursuit of some common interest or interests. As Viscount Bryce says "In primitive societies the forces other than fear have been extremely powerful, the reverence for ancient lineage, the instinctive deference to any person of marked gifts with a disposition to deem these gifts supernatural and the associative tendency which unites the members of a group or tribe so closely together that the practice of joint action supersedes individual choice"². A guild was a determinate social unity built upon common purpose. The guild organization was built on sound qualities of human nature. It assumed that normal life is quiet, not tumult, an acceptance of what arrives at one's door, rather than the seeking of what is not there, and self government and not domination. The normal man by instinct is a craftsman who likes his work and to whom the deep traditions of the world teach what is worth doing and what is not worth it. There is an instinctive delicacy in the common mind which holds it back from the wish to coerce one's neighbours whether it be for good or for evil. Furthermore, it is an inevitable quality of

1. R. M. Mac Iver *Community: A Sociological Study* p. 22.

2. Viscount Bryce *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* Vol. II p. 21.

human nature that it cannot undergo sudden changes. A system which demands many sudden changes is ruled out, not necessarily because it is illogical in itself, but simply because man is not capable of violent breaks in his traditions. The system accordingly was concerned with root principles of human existence, viz., to look upon the normal man as a producer in particular, and citizen in general, to make him the centre of society and to devise a social machinery which would be good only if it suited the ultimate purposes of life.

The guild was the organization on the basis of function or trade, and it was considered that all other social bonds were most clearly subordinate to the vastly superior organization of mankind by profession and trade. The system implied that function was the central fact in the life of the citizen, and that his relations with his fellowmen should be largely determined by it. It organized the people in the order of trades, whereby the work of the community could be done by those who best knew how to do it. Therefore, when once the guild was constituted, its affairs had to be controlled in the main by the guild members. Deep down the guild idea was the conviction that there is something inherently vicious in all compulsory government and that self control is the key to many of the problems of the community. It was not to be the function of government to interfere as a legislator in men's private affairs which they felt they were quite capable of managing themselves. The system was a reaction against any tendency for centralization either of the political or economic organization. They were to represent the moral force which had banished the crudity of physical force from civilisation, and the persistent continuity of the human tradition of democratic organization as distinguished from central government. The acceptance of central control was an act of voluntary submission and thus the difference between government by coercion and government by voluntary agreement was made clear.

Śreni, *Kula*, *Puga*, *Gana* and *Samgha* are some of the terms employed by Kautilya to indicate guilds representing the different aspects of Hindu social life. A number of corporations for definite economic purposes had arisen with the advance in specialization of crafts and with the manifestation of the associative spirit in territorial and communal groups. The differentiation of occupations

brought about by specialization of crafts and the consequent complex developments in society made it difficult for political writers of the time to determine the exact scope and meaning of the various terms, that were traditionally employed to indicate popular local associations. Kautilya uses the term *Kula* in the usual sense of family and enjoins the soothsayers and court bards to describe heaven as the goal of the brave and hell of the timid, and to extol caste, corporations, family, deeds and character of the King's men (*Jati Samgha Kula Karma Vrttastavam*). He thereby indicates that guild like the family and the caste was the primordial unit of social organization³. Again in pointing out the importance of sovereignty, Kautilya interprets *Kula* as a council of regency or an oligarchy of princes whose rule was to be preferred to that of an incompetent and only son of the ruler⁴. While *Gana* is interpreted by Kulluka as a fraternity of Brahmanas inhabiting a monastery, as a fellowship by Narada, as a political self governing corporation by Vyasa, Kautilya understands the term *Gana* to be a composite confederation of all other associations⁵. *Samgha* and *Gana* are used in the sense of an autonomous kingless clan or as a political corporation⁶. *Puga* is an association of various castes who having no occupation unite in the pursuit of wealth and pleasure as their main aim. It is a confused medley of individuals or an occupationless gathering⁷. Assemblies possessed

3. *Arthashastra* Tr. R. Shama Sastri 2nd Edn 1923 Book V Ch. 3 p. 42⁷ Ed. with com. T. Ganapati Sastri in 3 Vols Vol. III pp. 117-132 Unless otherwise specified all references are to the *Arthashastra* and by Book and Chapter.

4. Book I Ch. 17

Kulasya va bhavedrajyam kulasamgho hi durjayah

(Kautilya)

Kulasya bahuputrasamghasya bhavit

Kulatmakho rajyaneta Samghah

Ganapati Sastri Commentare V I I p. 89

5. II 6. harsa l p gatih.

6. XI 2.

7. I 14. Vol. I p. 63. (G. S.)

Nandajitaya. -- Arthakamapradhoshah samghah pugah

Karmakaravrodishu nandajitayanamasamghesu—pugah

of military force and function are referred to by Kauṭilya as *Āyudhajīva Samghah*,⁸ and the leader of the Assembly as *gana-mukhya*. The term *sreni* is applied to corporations that subsist by agriculture, trade and military service such as Kambhojas, Saurasṭras and Ksatriyas.⁹ *Śreni* is a corporate body of troops as distinguished from *Maula* and *Bhṛtya* (hired troops).¹⁰ *Śreni* was a source of recruitment for the army, and the army thus formed was called *Śrenibalam* and its commander *Śrenimukhya*.¹¹ The enlistment of corporations of soldiers was to take place when the enemy was desirous of carrying on a treacherous fight with his own army recruited from the *Śreni* of his own territory.¹² Confronted with the question Which is better—the land with scattered people or with corporations of people?—Kauṭilya says the former is better inasmuch as it can be kept under control and is not susceptible to the intrigues of enemies, while the latter is intolerant of calamities and susceptible to anger and other passions.¹³ Kauṭilya believed in the strength of personality and considered that the troubles of a corporation could easily be put down by arresting its leader (*śrenimukhya*). But the leader would become invincible if he was backed up by the *sreni* (*Śreni mukhyanga-bhuta purusa*).¹⁴ *Śreni* was known for military strength and Kauṭilya cites the opinion of the previous Ācaryas, that on account of its numerical strength (*bahulyat*), *sreni* is more difficult to be subdued than individual recalcitrant chiefs,¹⁵ it is not clear

8 XI 1 Vol I p 22 (G S)

Sastropajivinam rajavidheyanam samuhah—samghah

9 XI 1

10. II 33

11. IV 2 VIII 4

Śreni Āyudhiya Karṣakanamanyonyasamgatanam samghah

Vol III p. 27 (G S)

Śrenibalam Janapadayudhiyaganarupam balam Vol III p 51

12 IX 2

13 VII 11 Vol II p 309 (G.S)

14 VIII 4 Vol III p 27 (G S)

15 VIII 4

whether this military strength belonged to independent republican communities or to local assemblies whose main function was to protect themselves and secure their own safety against common danger. Kautilya's use of *śreni* is not merely confined to corporations of soldiers. While discussing the planning of a town he mentions that the *śreni* of artisans manufacturing worsted threads, cotton threads, bamboo mats, skins, armours, weapons and gloves shall have their dwellings to the west of the town. From this it is clear that *śreni* is also used in the case of corporations of artisans. To Manu *śreni* is an association of traders or artisans, money lenders, and men proficient in the four sciences of learning¹⁶. Narada and Bṛhaspati speak of these guilds as having an assembly, a president and important rules and regulations for apprenticeship¹⁷.

The law books mention various types of guilds showing how the principle of co-operation had an extensive application in the economic life of ancient India. There were guilds of traders, agriculturists, artisans, and even of priests, soldiers, dancers, and musicians and there is evidence of co-operation in all spheres of life—economic, military, artistic and religious¹⁸. Bṛhaspati speaks of guilds of painters, dancers, religious orders, dyers, and even of robbers¹⁹. Gautama speaks broadly of guilds of cultivators, herdsmen, traders, money lenders and artisans having liberty to lay down their own laws to be respected by the king²⁰ and prescribes the legal procedure that was to be observed by the guild. Nobility, practical ability, diligence and industry were some of the general qualifications required for membership. The work of the village, whether it was the renovating of a tank, the construction of a reservoir or the laying of a road, had to be done collectively by the people who were all to be working partners in the enterprise, and whosoever stayed away from any kind of co-operative construc-

16. Manu VIII 41. Medhātithi's commentary.

17. Nārada, A. 3. Bṛhaspati XVII 11 19.

18. II 4 p. 52.

Vol I p. 129 (G. S.)

Vāstu-śreni-pravahanikanikayā arācyuh

śreni—rajaka tanturāya etc.

19. Bṛhaspati I 26.

20. Gautama XI 2 20, 23.

tion, for example, of a bridge (*sambhūya setubandhat*), had to contribute a share to the general expenditure of the project. The contribution to the common stock was in cash or kind, according to the nature of the guild.²¹ The government was to respect the necessary rules laid down by the guild for their collective welfare, and all political writers enjoin that the king should maintain the customs and the laws of the castes, of districts, of guilds and families, and establish as law the practice of the virtuous, if that was not inconsistent with the customs of the country, families and castes.²² According to Kauṭilya the Superintendent of accounts had to enter into his book the history of customs, professions and transactions of countries, villages, families and corporations.²³ Kauṭilya says 'No company other than the one of local birth—*Sajatadanyassamghah* and no guilds of any kind other than local co operative guilds—*Samutthāyakadanyassamayanu-bandhah*—shall find entrance into the villages of the kingdom'.²⁴

This reference to autonomy of the castes and guilds as it existed in the past has led many writers on Indian polity to attribute an independent political status to local groups and associations and to talk of Hindu society as essentially pluralistic.²⁵ A certain section maintains that groups and guilds in ancient India were independent corporate personalities having their own laws, rights and privileges with a closer community of interests and deeper loyalty among their members than what is generally found in a state, that sovereign power was not really omnipotent and centralised, but divided and distributed over a number of associations and groups which were more competent to decide matters than any state. Ancient India had something of a federal society composed of different social groups and economic organizations exercising a considerable

21 II 7

22 Vasīṣṭha XIX 7 Manu VIII 41 46

23 II 7

24 II 1 Vol I p 114 (G S)

*Samutthayakah Sambhūya setubandhadīpāyāpā anukulakarmaka in dh
teṣam sambandhi samutthayakah*

25 Radhakumud Mukerji *Local Self Government in Ancient India* p 124

measure of control over the members outside The *Samayasana* applied even to members who temporarily lived outside their state

Kautilya does not imply in his *Arthashastra* that groups and associations should be independent or co ordinate with the State He does not think of the State, as the pluralists suggest, as an 'Association of Associations' called upon to adjust and reconcile and synthesise conflicting points of view The state is not one of the many groups ceaselessly striving for progressive expansion and co-operating with social and economic groups in the fulfilment of a common destiny Neither group life nor statehood is a limitation on the sphere of jurisdiction of either, and the nature of relationship between groups and the states is reciprocity The state and associations were never apart and the view of Dr Radhakumud Mookerji that a policy of non interference was recognised as the ideal policy of the state, where functions were ordinarily restricted to an irreducible minimum, as, for example, the protection of life and property and the realisation of revenue, is wholly untenable ^{25a}

The sphere of state activity in the time of Kautilya was not restricted merely to the maintenance of the conditions necessary to the existence of society Besides protective duties, the system of government embraced many duties which may be termed promotive duties The positive relations for the advancement of commerce, trade and agriculture and the promotion of culture were duties of equal weight with the protection of persons and property

That the life of the guilds and corporations was determined and enforced by the king who had full legal powers to limit the respective jurisdictions of guilds, to enforce the laws and punish violations of law and dereliction of duty is borne out by the *Arthashastra* and *Dharmaśāstra* The king according to Manu is mentioned as fixing the law which lays upon the subjects and officers the obligation of obeying whatever Dharma the king imposed by proclamation ²⁶ The king's commands were directed to the officers, and such commands were indispensable for the proper carrying out of

^{25a} Ibid p 3.

Bandyopadhyāya Kautilya p. 59

²⁶ Manu VII 41

the administration of the country. The king had the authority to give general commands apart from administrative rules.²⁷ While Yajñavalkya gives to king-made laws an authority secondary to 'Nyādharmā,' the law of the śāstra, Kauṭilya makes an innovation in legal theory when he speaks of law or the royal command as enforced by sanction and regards the state as the final authority to pronounce what is law and what is not, between individuals, groups or corporations. The sovereign could not only adjudicate in disputes and inflict punishment, but also modify and develop customary law. Kauṭilya says "Sacred law, evidence, history and edicts of kings are the four legs of law, of these four in order the later is superior to the one previously named. *Dharma* is eternal truth holding its sway over the world, *Vyavahara* (evidence) is in witnesses, *Caritra*, (history) is to be found in the traditions (*samgraha*) of the people, and the command of kings is what is called *Śāsana*."²⁸ The numerous royal edicts had the force of law and these laws comprehended a wide range of directives for the regulation of prices, wages and profits and preservation of king's powers and prerogatives. It is manifest in Kauṭilya's legal theory that the king could legislate and exercise authority to direct and regulate the life and conduct of guilds, corporations and other associations. Kauṭilya says "Whenever there is disagreement between history and sacred law or between evidence and sacred law then the matter shall be settled in accordance with sacred law. But whenever sacred law (*Śāstra*) is in conflict with rational law (*Dharmanyaya*) then reason shall be held authoritative, for there the original text on which the sacred law has been based is not available."²⁹ Kauṭilya seems to imply here that vague customary rules and traditional regulations do not become law, until they receive the imprimature of the sovereign whose business it is to formulate customs and rules and prevailing ideas in a precise, uniform

27 Yajñavalkya II 180

28 III 1

Dharmasā vyavaharasa'ca caritram rajasasanam |
Vivadarthaś catuṣpadah paścimāh pūrvabādhakah ||

29 III 1

Śāstram vipratipadyeta Dharmanyayena kenacit |
Nyayastatra pramanam syat tatra patho hi naśjati ||

and authoritative manner. The king demanded conformity on the part of the associations to the rules and regulations devised to keep the integrity of the State. There were agricultural guilds, and craft guilds which were localized in special quarters of the cities, and they were distributed according to a definite plan. Similarly, there was the artificial creation of villages of agriculturists belonging to the Śūdra caste and of Brahman villages with forests for their undisturbed pursuit of learning. Merchant guilds did not attain the same development as the craft guilds, as the merchant was a wanderer while the craftsman was a member of an industrial organisation localised in the cities. Still both were bound by law to observe all the regulations of the state that governed their work and relationships. The employers were required to pay guilds of workmen (*Samghabhrtah*) wages for work done but not for work that was not done though stipulated before, guilds of workmen employed by companies as well as those who carried on any co-operative work were required to divide their wages (*cetanam*) among themselves either equally or as agreed upon.³⁰ Desertion after the work had commenced was punished,³¹ for none could of his own accord leave his company. Kautilya says mercy (*abhayam*) for neglect of work is to be shown for the first time and promise of proportional share of earnings for quantity of work done, is to be made and implemented. But continued neglect and violation of the law of the company should be punished by expulsion (*pravasanam*) and glaring offences (*mahaparadha*) by death. Priestly guilds too co-operating in performance of sacrifices shall divide their earnings either equally or as agreed upon."³² There was to be a special department of the central government consisting of ministers and commissioners (*pradeṣtarah*) to protect the interests of artisans (*karukarakṣana*) in relation to their guilds which entrusted them with deposits. The rule was also laid down that the guilds (*sreni*) might get back their deposits in time of distress.³⁴ Guilds of artisans

30. II. 1. 4

31. III. 14

32. III. 4. Mann, VIII. 2. 15

33. III. 14 p. 186.

34. IV. 1. Mann IX. 253

had to fulfil their engagements in accordance with their agreement as to time, place and form of work, action contrary to orders led to forfeiture of wages and imposition of fines by the government ³⁵ The same rules were to apply to guilds of weavers, workmen, scavengers, musicians and medical practitioners and merchants, for the integrity and solidarity of the state depended on the maintenance of compacts or fundamental agreements formed among themselves and on the meeting out of exemplary punishment for violation of compacts which were always regarded as sacred and inviolable Manu prescribes exile as punishment for violation of a sworn agreement while Bṛhaspati inflicts the highest amercement or fine on those guilds which defrauded the state of its dues ³⁶ The security of the state demanded strict invigilation on the part of officers over profiteering and the resolutions of guilds of an immoral or absurd character likely to cause disaffection among the people Kauṭilya says that the Superintendent of commerce shall fix a profit of five per cent over the fixed price of local commodities and ten per cent on foreign produce and violation of the rule shall be punished with a heavy fine ³⁷ There seems to have been a suitable administrative machinery for the systematic and regular exercise of control over the affairs of the village There was a regular procedure laid down to carry the king's decrees to the remote villages, and for the supervision by the central government of the proper discharge of the duties by the villages as regards the gifts, sales and mortgages of land and other properties ³⁸ A well organized hierarchy of officers, such as superintendents and accountants (*gopas*, *sthānikas* and *anukastha*), were endowed with lands which they could not alienate, and these supervised the working of the rural administrative machinery under the control of the self-governing bodies of the villages There was an elaborate land survey and the taxable capacity of the village was accurately ascertained by the officers of the central government Jolly points out that the chief purpose of legal agreements between guilds and associations and central government, was

35 IV 1 pp 201 207

36 Bṛhaspati XVII 5 7 Narada X 5 6

37 IV 1 p 206

to bring corporations, particularly the religious ones, under a very great measure of state control and protection ³⁸ Life rested on vital modes of association and the group as an intermediate body between the state and the individual was the most characteristic feature of ancient polity There was the promotion of free, spontaneous life of the various social groups that constituted the state which was supreme in the sphere of law The king by his sovereign prerogative of choice gave validity and confirmation to all existing codes, usages and interests Kautilya says the king who administers justice in accordance with sacred law (*Dharma*), evidence (*Vyavahara*), history (*samstha*), enacted law (*Rajasasana*) will be able to conquer the whole world bound by the four quarters (*caturantam mahim*) ⁴⁰ It is manifest by this statement that Kautilya did not mean that the king should remain a mere external mechanism, but should actively enter into a living and organic relationship with *Samghas*, *Srenis* and other corporations and associations, for it was power and power (*danda*) alone which really when exercised by the king with impartiality and in proportion to guilt would sustain both this world and the next

In the light of this principle of Kautilya, it is difficult to accept the statement of Beni Prasad that the monistic theory of sovereignty as applied to the state or government fails completely and that only a pluralistic theory can grasp the Indian phenomenon ⁴¹ The true nature and significance of the Hindu state can be explained more satisfactorily by the monistic approach to the problem than by a pluralistic approach, for Indian theory favours neither anarchy nor the unqualified pluralism of discrete and isolated groups, and it regards the state as the principle of integration and synthesis The concept of the Hindu state is qualified monism which recognises the diversity of various groups and describes the state as a single source of authority that is theoretically comprehensive and unlimited in its exercise of power

38. IV. 2

39. Jolly *Hindu Law and Custom* p. 294

40. III. 1.

41. Beni Prasad *The Theory of Government in Ancient India* p. 9

KĀLIDĀSA'S ŚAKUNTALA (A Study in Contrast and Harmony)

By C KUNHAN RAJA

It is about thirty years since Rabindranath Tagore gave his interpretation of the *Sakuntala* as a condemnation of worldly enjoyments and prescription of renunciation and penance for spiritual happiness. Śakuntala's first love towards the king was purely a physical passion, which defeated its own purpose of union, and it led to misery. Later Śakuntala spent her days in the hermitage of Marica in a life of renunciation and penance which brought about the final union with the king which became a lasting union of the two souls with no physical element in their mutual affinity.

This presentation of the philosophy of life in the *Sakuntala* has made an appeal to many people and its echo has been found in various places. A philosophy of anti-worldliness is receiving favourable response from the thinking people of this age, and this interpretation can be called the present day interpretation of Kalidasa. No one has a right to assert what Kalidasa really had in his mind when he wrote the drama. It is even doubtful if he had any philosophy at all. So the philosophy of Kalidasa is what is interpreted to be his philosophy and is mainly a subjective factor.

Other interpretations are also equally feasible. In such interpretations we must be as objective as may be possible, trying to keep aloof from current notions and personal predilections and also trying to approximate the interpretation to the philosophy of life current at the time when the drama was written. The *Bhagavad Gita* represents a certain philosophy which is accepted as the true representation of the Hindu ideals of life. So, in trying to interpret the philosophy of life in the *Sakuntala* it is not inappropriate to compare the philosophy with what is found in the *Bhagavad Gita*. Even here, there is wider difference of opinion about what is taught in the *Bhagavad Gita* among thinkers, old and modern. I have to attempt to interpret the teaching in as objective a way as is possible.

The teaching is given by the Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa. If renunciation is the central doctrine of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, why did the author of the *Mahābhārata* put the teaching into the mouth of Śrī Kṛṣṇa who lived a full life as the ideal for man to follow? ¹ Why was the teaching imparted to Arjuna at a time when Śrī Kṛṣṇa was helping him to win the war and take possession of the legitimate kingdom? The teaching could have been given by another person and even if the authority of the Lord is wanted, it could have been postponed to the time when the Pandavas were departing from this world after their life in this world.

It will be more in consonance with the situation if the teaching in the *Gītā* is taken as an attempt to harmonise the conflicting ideals preached by different teachers, by showing that there is no antithesis between life with all its implications and detachment from the world. Detachment or renunciation is not a form in life, it is a psychological state. The orthodox Mīmāṃsā teaching found in Prabhakara is what is given in the *Gītā*.

The relation between action and fruit is a physical fact and one's attachment to the fruit will not make the fruit any the easier to attain than if one confined oneself to the action itself, not only this, the action will bear fruit only if the performer's attention is concentrated on the action, without being distracted by the thought of the fruit. What constitutes *Adhikāra* (eligibility) is the conviction that one has to do the work, and one's desire for the fruit is not a factor in such *Adhikāra*.² Thus there is a synthesis of active life and renunciation in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. If the *Bhagavad Gītā* is taken as a background for understanding and interpreting the thoughts of Kalidasa, that is a legitimate process. From this, I do not go to the extent of postulating that Kalidasa knew the

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1. Yad vad ācarati śreṣṭhas tat tadevetaro janah /
 sa yat pramaṇam kurute lokas tad anuvartate ||
 na me pārthasti kartavyam triṣu lokeṣu kincana /
 manorogānāṃ vṛkṣāṇāṃ sarvāṃś ca karmāṇi ||
 yadi hy aham na varteyam jātu karmāṇy atandritah /
 mama vartmanuvartante manuṣyāḥ pārtha sarvaśah ||

III 21 23.

2. Karmāṇyevadhikaras te na phaleṣu lāḍaṇa

III.

text of the *Bhagavad Gītā* and that he was saturated with its teaching when he wrote his works. It can as well be that the notions about a full life current at that time and reflected in the poems of the day were later incorporated into the *Bhagavad Gītā*. I start on a study of the *Śākuntala* with this aspect of the *Gītā* teaching as the background.

Kālidāsa is extremely impersonal. He says little; he only presents the world. Yet everyone making a presentation of certain facts, cannot help producing a favourable or unfavourable impression about the various facts through the manner of his presentation. Thus, when we think of Kālidāsa's philosophy of life, we must see whether Kālidāsa wanted to produce a favourable or unfavourable impression on the readers through the presentation of the various characters and various situations in the *Śākuntala*; and Kālidāsa's philosophy of life must be determined accordingly.

Who are the characters in whom Kālidāsa wanted the readers (rather the spectators) to have a favourable opinion, in the *Śākuntala*? On this point, there can be no scope for a difference of opinion. From the time when the name of the sage Kanva is mentioned in the first Act³ till the end of the fifth Act, his personality dominates the scene, though he appears on the stage only in the fourth Act. And he always produces in the spectators a very deep impression. What Kanva is, is the philosophy of life in the *Śākuntala*. I take this as an axiom.

Kanva was not at the hermitage when the king went there; he had gone on a pilgrimage to Somatīrtha to mitigate some misfortune of Śākuntalā,⁴ whose foster-father he was. Śākuntalā and her two companions were not recluses. they were there only for training. They had to go back and enter normal life.⁵ The two companions knew much about the affairs of worldly life.⁶ Kanva too was pro-

3 Eṣa khalu kaṇvaśya kulaputer anumāhñītiram āśramo dṛśyate

4 idam eva duhītarāṃ śākuntalām atithisatkāre niyujya daivam abhāh
pratīkūlam vārayitum somatīrtham gatah

5 vatsa ime api pradēya.

6. halā saundale anābhāntarā khalu ahme madanagadassa vuttandassa.
kim du jādissī idihāsaṇibandessu kāmaamāṇānam avatthā sunīdī . .

cittakammaparihaena amgesu de āharanavinīoam karchma

Act III. and
Act IV.

ficient in the lore of worldly life.⁷ The life in the hermitage was not one of rigid asceticism. The girls were allowed a rather comfortable life. They conceived the life in the hermitage as a reflection of the life in a city; they talked about marriages and such facts of secular life and they had appropriate pastimes in the gardens treating the trees and creepers as bridegroom and bride.⁸ When Anasūyā and Priyamvadā knew of Śakuntalā's love for the king, it did not come to them as a shock. They knew that the sage Kaṇva had an idea of marrying her to a deserving person,⁹ and encouraged her in her love. They even thought of the plans for communicating her feelings to the king¹⁰.

In the presentation of none of these situations is there any hint that "it was not the right thing." There is consistently an air of approval. When Kaṇva returned from the pilgrimage, he knew about the affair and he was immensely happy¹¹. That was just the purpose for which he had undertaken the pilgrimage, though he was not sure of the particular person who should wed her. If Kālidāsa wanted to convey a philosophy that the events of the first three Acts of the drama took place in a way which he could not approve, there would have been some hint, at least a remote hint of it. But there is none. Kaṇva simply makes arrangements for sending Śakuntalā to the king's palace.

Kālidāsa's disapproval of what took place between the king and Śakuntalā has to be inferred from the incident of the curse of Durvāsas. Immediately prior to the return of Kaṇva and after the departure of the king, Śakuntalā was completely immersed in the thoughts of the king, and when the wrathful sage Durvāsas came to the hermitage as a guest, she did not notice him, enraged at this want of courtesy,

7. vanavāso'pi santo laukikajñā vāyam Act IV.

8. navakusumajovanā vapajosiṇi. aniddhapallavadāe upabhoakkhamo
sahāro Act I.

9. aṇṇa dhammācārāṇe vi paravaṇṇo sam juno guruṇo upa se anuruvava-
rappadāṇe samkappo Act I

10. hāla maṇḍaleho se karīṇu. imam devappasāḍassāvadeteṇa sumanogo-
vidam karaṇa se hatthaṇṇa pavaṇṇam. Act III.

11. tadakaṇṇasaveṇa, evaṇa aṇṇandīdam—ditthiā dhūmāulidatitthino vi
jaṇṇamanassa pāveṇa eva āhudi paditā. vacche aṇṇasapandīṇā
vijjā vi aṇṇapījā samvuttā Act IV.

he sage cursed her that he of whom she was thinking, would not remember her¹² On account of this curse, the king failed to recognise her when she went to the palace She was disowned by the king and discarded by her own people A celestial nymph took her to the hermitage of Marica Later the king remembered all the incidents, but only when it was too late Both the king and Śakuntala spent many years in sorrow Later the king went to heaven to lend assistance to Indra in his fight against the Asuras and on his way he visited the hermitage of Marica to pay his respects to him and there the two were united

Who is responsible for this suffering? Did the king deserve it on account of his actions? Did Śakuntala deserve it on account of her failure to do the right thing? Or was it the result of the wanton interference of an irresponsible, wrathful sage with the normal affairs of life? When the two companions of Śakuntala, her foster father who is the most dominating figure in the whole drama, the elderly Gautamī and such persons of approved character have not a word to say against the conduct of either the king or of Śakuntala, what is our authority to postulate that such conduct deserved suffering as a consequence? If Kalidasa wanted to leave such an impression on the spectators, how is it that there is no such hint in the words of any of these characters?

What I am considering is not the bare theme of the drama I am concerned with the presentation of the theme by Kalidasa There is no question of this person or that person approving or disapproving the conduct of the king and of Śakuntala We are trying to deduce what Kalidasa could have thought of the conduct of the hero and the heroine in the drama, if he had any such opinion at all

In the whole drama there is only one hint of disapproval of the conduct of the hero¹³ Here also the hint is only about the king failing to take Śakuntala to the palace It has nothing to do with the king's conduct during his stay in the hermitage

12 vicintayanti yam ananyamanasa
taponidh m vetṣi n mān upasthitam |
amarīṣyati tvaṁ na sa bodhito pi san
kriyam pramattah prathamam kṛtam iva ||

Act IV

13 teṇa rāṇa saundalye aṇṇjam aaridam
jano supṇahīṇā sabi padam karida.

asaccasandhe

Act IV

The central point is the curse of Durvasas. Did Kalidasa introduce the incident as an appropriate consequence of the conduct of the hero and the heroine? The full Title of the Drama is *Abhijana Śakuntala*. Here it is the *Abhijana* the ring that helps the king to recollect his conduct and recognise Śakuntala as his consort. The importance given to this in the Title must have only one meaning it is to show that the ring helped in correcting a mistake.

Further towards the end when the incident of the curse was divulged to the king and to Śakuntala by Marica there was not even a hint about Śakuntala having failed in her duties to an honoured guest and Marica simply says that neither of them was responsible for any of the intervening misfortunes.¹⁴

There is a real contrast drawn between Kanva and Durvāsa. Kanva was an eternal celibate yet he knew what the world was and what the world needed. He helped humanity to live their full life on earth. He brought happiness to humanity by his understanding and by his sympathy for those who needed help. On the other hand here is the wrathful sage Durvasas who knew nothing about the realities of the world. While Kanva uses the great powers that he has developed for assisting struggling humanity to realise a full life Durvasas uses the same powers for evil. The action of Durvasas was condemned by Śakuntala's companions immediately. In the words of Marica also there is a tone of disapproval of what Durvasas had done.

Is it not Kalidasa's purpose if purpose he had to draw a contrast between the two types of renunciation the type represented by Kanva and Marica in whom renunciation is only a psychological state by the side of the renunciation represented by the wrathful Durvasas? Renunciation has made only a change in the form of his life. It has not brought about real detachment or refinement in his life. There is no spiritual purity in him. In Kanva and Marica we see the harmony of the soul with the world while in Durvasas we see the conflict of a form and the realities of the world. Durvasas deserved honour as a guest only to the extent that he had adopted

14 alam atmaparadhaśamkṛtya.

the form of life of a renounced person. In his renunciation there is only a conflict with his environment, with the normal affairs of the world. The real, the right type of renunciation results in harmony with the affairs of the world.

This latter is the Mīmāṃsā view of renunciation, the view of Tyāga, a mental purification. This is the view of renunciation or Tyāga preached in the *Gītā* also. There is no anti-worldliness, no element of antagonism with the normal life in this Tyāga. On the other hand such a Tyāga results in complete harmony with the world and its needs. The purpose of Saṁnyāsa is to have union with the world, to be in harmony with the realities of the world, without being involved in it. After studying the characters of Kanva and Mārīca on the one side and that of Durvāsas on the other, I feel that if Kālidāsa had any philosophy, it is the philosophy of the need for those who have transcended the fetters of this world to help those who are still involved in this world and its miseries. It is the contrast of these two types of Saṁnyāsas that is presented in the drama, not the contrast of the material world and spiritual purity.

THE NATURE OF MIND IN INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

By B KUPPUSWAMY

It is a familiar fact that each system of philosophy in India has its own theory of the mind. All these theories have some features in common though each school sought to formulate its theory of mind to suit the particular ontological position. An attempt is made in the present paper to make a brief review of the various schools and show the common features. At the outset it must be borne in mind that we are studying systems of thought formulated before and just after the beginning of the Christian era, systems which depended entirely on the methods of introspection and empirical observation. Further, the naturalistic outlook, which we shall presently observe in them, was based not so much on the psycho physiological facts but on the evidence of introspection.

Very early, in the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* itself, a fundamental line of approach was established which more or less influenced the subsequent history of thought. The doctrine of the Kośas¹ unambiguously expressed a unitary view of the cosmos showing that man is made of five sheaths—a physical, a biological, two psychological, and finally a spiritual sheath. It was shown that a man who soared into the spiritual region of *Anandamaya Kośa*, should not forget that his feet of clay were rooted in the *Annamaya Kośa*. The Upaniṣads also analysed the organs involved in mental life as the five *Jñanendriyas* and the five *Karmendriyas*.² Though several faculties of the mind were spoken of in the Upaniṣadic times, the *Bṛhadaraṇyaka* unmistakably declared, “All these are *manas* only.”³ “As the central organ of consciousness, it is one, however widely its functions may differ. It controls both the sensory and motor organs. It co ordiates the impression received from outside through

1. *Taittiriya* II 15

2. Cf. William McDougall's Classification of abilities into the cognitive and executive—*Energies of Men*, p. 47 and p. 99

3. *Bṛhadaraṇyaka* I. v. 3.

the former and also resolves, when necessary, upon acting with the aid of one or the other of the five organs of action "1

We next find that Buddhism repudiated the assumption that the self is an unchanging entity behind the transient sensations and thoughts and looked upon the self, at the best, as an aggregate, a *samghata*, of the various experiences. The doctrine of *Nama-Rupa* and that of the *Skandhas* show that the Upaniṣadic outlook of man as a psycho-physical organism was clearly kept in view by the Buddhistic system also.

The Carvākas with their resolute sense of objectivity went a step further and not only argued that the Soul or *Ātman* was a mythical entity inaccessible to the immediate evidence of the senses but even asserted that the psychological or the spiritual principle was a property of the physical aggregate of the body and disappeared when the latter disintegrated. It is compared to the intoxicating quality that arises by the mingling of certain ingredients, such as yeast, which separately do not possess it " Prof Hiriyanna consequently concludes "The theory may thus be taken as a rough Indian counterpart of the view that mind is a function of matter. His view, as it is sometimes set forth, borders upon modern behaviourism ②

It is now left to us to review how the later systematic schools of India reacted to such frankly naturalistic ancient Indian expositions. To take the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system first, we find that it sought to explain the whole universe in terms of nine *dravyas*, substances, and their various properties and relations. Among these nine *dravyas* are the *Ātman* and the *Manas*. "Though the *dravyas* are not all material, the doctrine treats all *dravyas* alike, and even the self, it regards, as one object among others possessing properties, exhibiting relations and knowable like them "3 Theoretically it admits that an *Ātman* is omnipresent and eternal, but it also asserts that the feelings, thoughts and volitions of a self are confined to the physical organism. An attempt is made to prove that *jñāna* is neither of the essence of the self nor an essential attribute but only an adventitious character on the basis of the fact that in *suṣupti* the

1 Hiriyanna *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* p. 68

2 Ibid p. 191

3 Ibid p. 229

self endures without being characterised by knowledge. As Prof Hiriyanna remarks "The Self thus differs from matter only in that it *may* become conscious and not in that it is itself mental in nature"¹ Jñāna, Icchā and Yatna—knowing, desiring and doing—are the attributes of the self. All these are transient and they are the only mental or spiritual elements in the doctrine. As regards *manas*, the last *dravya*, it is asserted that each self has its own *manas* as an instrument for knowing. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *manas* is really not mental at all. It is only an aid to knowledge. It is the means through which the *Ātman* is related to the external world. "The fact that occasionally, though our eyes and ears are open, we do not see or hear has been made the basis for concluding that there should be a common aid to all knowledge which the system terms *manas*."² It is also the means by which the self gains knowledge of the internal states. As regards the sense organs, they are all derived from the corresponding elements, the *bhūtas*, on the assumption that only like can affect like.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga pushes the analysis to its logical limit. The naturalistic influence of a view like that of the *Svabhāva Vāda* makes *Prakṛti* responsible for the unfoldment of the Universe and renders the idea of God superfluous. According to its fundamental postulate the effect must be in the cause in a latent manner. The system seeks to find out that which is common to all aspects of experience, physical as well as psychical, on the basis of reason alone. This is its distinctive feature. It frankly asserts that the physical objects as well as the psychological apparatus—the psycho physical organism—are all derived from *Prakṛti* which, by hypothesis, is jada—non sentient. Between the *tannātras* and the *bhūtas* on the one side and *manas* and the sensory and motor organs on the other, the difference according to the system is only one of degree and not of essence.

The three *gunas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—are looked upon not as attributes but as components of *Prakṛti*. These *gunas*, though perpetually active, are looked upon as maintaining a perfect

1 Ibid p 290

2 Ibid p 231

equilibrium in the state of dissolution—*Pralaya*. With the presence of the *Puruṣa*, the state of dissolution ceases giving place to evolution—*Sarga*. *Puruṣa*, according to the system, is pure sentience. It represents the affective side of the mind and so is described as an enjoyer—*Bhōtā*, without being a doer—*Kartā*.

In the first modification of *Prakṛti* which is inspired by the presence of *Puruṣa* the *sattva-guna* predominates giving rise to *Mahat*. Next the *Ahaṁkāra* arises. Finally, the *manas*, *jñānendriyas* and *karmendriyas* with the *tanmātras* and the *bhūtas* are evolved. Here the point of interest to us is that by a process of intellectual analysis, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system arrived at the conclusion that the *antahkarana*, constituted by the *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas*, is *jada*, non-spiritual, in origin, a conclusion that is endorsed fully by the modern theories of the mind, based on a study of the evolution of behaviour from the primordial amoeba. The fundamental feature of behaviour is irritability and conductivity. With the specialisation of structures, sensitive to the different forms of energy in nature, there arose the nervous system which not only conducted impulses but also integrated them. In other words, behaviour arises on the basis of structural modifications which are based upon the various types of energy transformations.

The system asserts that the distinction between the psychic evolutes and the physical evolutes is that whereas the psychic aspects 'lend themselves to be lighted up' by the *puruṣa*, the physical elements, whether gross or subtle, are incapable of so lending themselves.

As Prof. Hirianna puts it, according to Sāṁkhya-Yoga, "The functions that we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of physical organs, which assume a psychical character only when illuminated by the spirit"¹

The *Advaita Vedānta* also holds a similar view with respect to the nature of the psychic apparatus. Here also the *antahkarana* is looked upon as *bhautika* and as made up of all the five elements with *tejas* predominating. As Prof. Hirianna remarks, "The explanation that all these organs (the *antahkarana* together with the organs of the sense and action) are *bhautika* is important on account of the

1. Ibid. p. 285

recognition it implies of the indispensableness of physical aids for the manifestation of consciousness ⁽¹⁾ As in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga in the Advaita also the conscious element is something extraneous to the psychical apparatus. The *sakṣin*, the element of consciousness, like the *puruṣa*, is looked upon as wholly inactive. All the activity observed and experienced is due to the association with the *antahkarana* which is *bhautika*. It is this association of the *sakṣin* with the *antahkarana* that gives rise to *jīva*, the empirical self and when this association is rent asunder the *sakṣin* is disentangled from the *antahkarana*.

As is well known, European thought was engaged in determining the relationship between mind and matter for one or two centuries. But since the middle of the nineteenth century attempts have been made to derive mind from matter. In contrast to these attempts in the history of European thought, we have in India an attitude to integrate the two concepts and look upon mind and matter neither as two diametrically opposed entities, nor as one being derived from the other but as being two aspects of the same common Prakṛti—Nature. There is a great need to understand this position with clearness and develop it in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problem of mind. This paper is only an attempt to draw the attention of scholars to this standpoint.

1 Ibid. p 242

THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

By B C LAW

The doctrine of karma is of great antiquity in India. It gradually broke away from Vedic naturalism, mysticism and piety. The Hindu view of karma is based upon the assumption of the existence of a soul. The law of karma has been accepted in all the main systems of Indian philosophy and religion as an article of faith. The result of karma whether good or bad cannot be obviated. It is a force which must produce its own consequence. According to the popular Hindu belief, karma is a sum total of man's action in a previous birth, determining his future destiny which is unalterable. Its effect remains until it is exhausted through suffering or enjoyment¹. In the *Brhadaranyaka Upaniṣad* and in the teachings of Yamaṇvalkya, we meet with a clear formulation of this doctrine and the resemblance between this formulation and that which is found in Buddhist texts is so close that one may be perfectly justified in maintaining that this doctrine is nothing but a further elucidation of the subject in the Upaniṣad. The Buddhists could not adopt the Hindu theory in their own system without modification. Hopkins points out that karma notion begins to appear in the Brahmanas but not in the Samsara shape of transmigration². According to Kern, karma is the link that preserves the identity of a being through all the countless changes which it undergoes in its progress through saṃsāra³.

In Buddhism this doctrine reaches its climax and assumes a unique character. We also find in Buddhism two extreme views of thought bearing upon the doctrine of karma.

(1) all that a being suffers from or experiences is due to the sum total of his deeds in the past, and

(2) all that a being experiences in this life is only a matter of chance.

1. *Matahabhatta Jitaka Jātaka* I pp. 166-167.

2. *The Religions of India* p. 199.

3. Cf. *Milindapañṇā*, 40 ff. *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 49-50.

It is true that for every sin committed here punishment follows in the next existence. The Buddhists approached the problem from a purely mental point of view. It has been pointed out that a man need not be afraid of the vast accumulation of karma through a long cycle of births and re births. The whole of such accumulation may be completely undone by a momentary action of mind. Mind is in its own place and as such can make and unmake all such accumulations of karma¹. When a man dies the *khandhas* of which he is constituted perish, but by the force of his karma a new set of *khandhas*² instantly starts into existence and a new being appears in another world, who though possessing different *khandhas* and a different form is in reality identical with the man just passed away because his karma is the same. It has been asserted that Buddhism does not admit transmigration. When a being dies, a new being is born and inherits his karma. What transmigrates is not a person but his karma. Really speaking there is no agent, there is nothing but the act and its fruit, organs, thoughts and external things are all the fruits of acts, in the same way as pleasant and unpleasant sensations.

There are two kinds of acts pure and impure. The acts which are free from *asravas*³ are pure and those accompanied by them are impure. The act with pleasant retribution is good and that with unpleasant retribution is bad. The acts performed with a view to happiness in this world are bad and those performed with a view to happiness in the world beyond are good. Acts are distinguished as of three kinds (1) good (*kusala*), (2) bad (*akusala*) and indifferent (*avyakata*). They may also be classified as meritorious (*punya*), demeritorious (*apunya*) and fixed (*aninyya*). The fruit of retribution of acts includes not only the sensation but also everything that determines

1 *Mahāniddesa* Vol I, p 203.

2 The sensorial aggregates which condition the appearance of life in any form. They are enumerated as follows: *rūpa* (material quality) *vedanā* (feeling) *saññā* (perception) *samkhārā* (coefficients of consciousness) and *viññāna* (consciousness) Cf. *Sāṃ* : III. 101 *Vibhanga* 1-61.

3 Sins or impurities cf. *Sāṃ* II 29 *Ang* 'I. 107 foll. *Suttanipāṭa* 1105, 1133 *Vibhanga* 426, etc. etc.

the sensation—organs, etc. Acts may be determinate (*niyata*)¹ and indeterminate (*aniyata*). They involve or do not involve a necessary retribution.

Karma is one's own, a man is an inheritor of his Karma, one finds one's birth according to his or her Karma, Karma is one's own kith and Karma is one's own refuge, divides beings into high and low.²

Karma came to be defined as *cetana* or volition. A person cannot be morally or legally held responsible for his or her unintentional act. The Buddhist teachers therefore tried to define Karma on a rational and practical basis. The Abhidhamma philosophy seeks to furnish the psychological data of ethics, conduct or external behaviour of men being regarded as an outward expression of their internal character.

The celebrated Buddhist commentator, Buddhaghosa, defines Karma as volition expressed in action. An action is no action until the will is manifested in conduct. Karma also means consciousness of good and bad, merit and demerit. It is of four kinds —

(1) Karma producing result in this life,³ (2) it producing result in the next life,⁴ (3) it producing result from time to time⁵ and (4) past Karma.⁶ There is another four-fold division of Karma: (1) an act whether it is good or bad produces serious result,⁷ (2) excess of either virtue or vice which produces its respective result,⁸ (3) Karma which is thought of at the time of death⁹ and (4) an act which has been often done by one in his life-time and which in the absence of three previous karmas causes rebirth.¹⁰ We have still another classification of karma: (1) determining the character of rebirth,¹¹ (2) sustaining,¹² (3) oppressive¹³ and (4) hurting.¹⁴ These twelve kinds of acts and consequences are manifested in their true aspect in Buddha's knowledge of the conse-

1 Cf. *Dīgha* II 92, III 107 and *Suttanipata* 70.

2 Cf. *Majjhima* III pp. 202-215.

3 *Diṭṭhadhammavedanīya*. 4 *Upapaccavedanīya*.

5 *Aparāpariyāyavedanīya* (*Visuddhimagga*, II p. 601).

6 *Ahosikamma* 7 *Garuka* 8 *Bahula* 9 *Asanna*. 10 *Kaṭattakamma*.

11 *Janaka* 12 *Upatthambhaka* 13 *Upapīḷaka*. 14 *Upaghataka*.

quences of karma Those endowed with the spiritual insight are acquainted with Kammantara and Vipakantara¹ Karma produces consequence, retribution is born of action, action is the cause of rebirth, in this way the world continues No action passes from the past life to the present nor from the present to the future -

As regards the relation between karma and vipaka Buddhaghosa says there is no karma in vipaka and no vipaka in karma Each of them by itself is void, at the same time there is no vipaka without karma Just as there is no fire in the Sun, nor in lens, nor in the dried cowdung, and likewise fire is not outside them but comes into existence on account of their requisites, in the same way vipaka is not seen within the karma nor outside it A karma is void of its vipaka which comes through karma Vipaka comes into existence on account of karma² In the past the *khandhas* which originated as the consequences of action (volition) ceased In this existence other *khandhas* arise out of the consequences of past deeds, there is no condition which has come to this existence from the past, in this existence the *khandhas* which are originated on account of the consequences of karma are destroyed In another existence others will be produced from this existence, not a single condition will pass on to the next existence³ According to the *Atthasalini* which is a commentary on the *Dhammasangani*, karma is of three kinds (1) *kayakarma*, (2) *vacikarma* and (3) *manokarma* It is *cetana* and the states associated with it. All these three originate in *cetana* Karma under the name of *samkhara* is one of the links of dependent origination (*paticcasamuppada*) Buddhaghosa divides karma into (1) *kammassamutthana* (set up by karma), (2) *kammapaccaya* (caused by karma), (3) *kammapaccayaacittasamutthana* (caused by karma and set up by consciousness), (4) *Kammapaccayaaharasamutthana* (caused by karma and set up by sustenance) and (5) *Kammapaccayaautasamutthana* (caused by karma and set up by temperature) There is a relationship between *citta* and *karma* If mind be distracted, no karma can be performed (*yada cittam bhayamanam hoti, tada kammam bhayamanam hoti attho*)⁴

1 *Visuddhimagga* II p 602. 2 *Ibid* II 603 3. *Ibid* II 603.

4 *Ibid* II 603.

5 J P T S 1859 p 156—*Kathacatthupaharana appahattha*

Karma is ultimately reduced to the psychological factor of volition. Volition is the unique determination of Will. Will-exercise has its power over its co-existent mental properties and physical qualities. All our activities, in deed, word, or thought are due to its influence. The doctrine of karma or the efficacy of good or bad acts is inseparably bound up with that of renewed existence. 'The world exists through karma and people live through karma'.¹

A careful study of the Buddhist books especially those dealing with Heavens and Hells² is enough to show that the inmates of these places are as much subject to the iron law of karma as are the dwellers upon this earth itself. The various heavens make possible greater and more varied reward in the case of those who by meritorious acts have earned it, the different hells greater and more varied measures of retribution. The descriptions of the pleasures of heaven and the sorrows of hell as given in the *Vimana-* and *Peta-vatthus* are interesting as showing the nature of the rewards and punishments which in those early days were considered appropriate to particular acts of piety and particular sins.

In Jainism karma may be worked off by austerity, service rendered to ascetics, or to the poor, the helpless and the suffering by giving them food, water, shelter or clothing. Karma does not mean a deed or some invisible mystical force. It is nothing but a complexity of a very subtle matter which is super-sensuous and which pervades the whole world. The word karma is derived from the verb *Kr* meaning 'to do'. The Jains believe it to be the result of actions arising out of four sources. (1) the first source of karma is attachment to worldly things such as food, raiment, dwelling place, women, etc. (2) Karma is produced by uniting one's body, mind and speech to worldly things, (3) Karma is engendered by giving the rein to anger, pride, deceit or greed, and (4) lastly false belief is a fruitful source of karma. In Hinduism we find that God inflicts punishment for evil karma whereas in Jainism karma accumulates energy and automatically works it off without any outside intervention. The Hindus think of karma as formless while the Jains think of it as

1 *Kammanā vatthā loka kamminā vatthā paṇa*

2 B. C. Law *Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective Buddhist Conception of Spirits Peta-vatthu and Vimana-vatthu* Texts (P. T. S. Ed.)

having form. The Jains divide karma according to its nature, duration, essence and content. Karma is intimately bound up with the soul. According to the Jains there are eight kinds of karma: the first kind hides knowledge from us (*jnanaavaraniya karma*), the second kind prevents us from beholding the true faith (*darsanavaraniya*), the third kind causes us to experience either the sweetness of happiness or the bitterness of misery (*vedaniya karma*), the fourth kind which is known as the *mohanaya karma* bemuses all the human faculties. It results from worldly attachments and indulgence of the passions. The fifth kind determines the length of time which a jiva must spend in the form with which his karma has endowed him (*ayu karma*), the sixth karma known as *nama karma* decides which of the four states or conditions (*gati*) shall be our particular *gati*. There are many divisions of *nama karma*. The seventh kind is *gotra karma*. It is the *gotra* or the caste which determines a man's life, his occupation, the locality in which he may live, his marriage, his religious observances and even his food. There are two chief divisions of this karma. It decides whether a living being shall be born in a high or in a low caste family. The last and the eighth kind is the *Antaraya karma*, the karma which always stands as an obstacle, e.g., *labhantaraya*, *bhogantaraya*, *upabhogantaraya* and *virjantaraya*.¹

The Jains hold that the soul while on the first step (*mithyatva-gunasthanaka*) is completely under the influence of karma and knows nothing of the truth. The soul whirling round and round in the cycle of rebirth loses some of its crudeness and attains to the state which enables it to distinguish between what is false and what is true. A soul remains in an uncertain condition, one moment knowing the truth and the next doubting it. A man either through the influence of his past good deeds or by the teachings of his guru obtains true faith. He then realises the great importance of conduct and can take the twelve vows. The Jains believe that as soon as a man reaches the state of an *Ayogi-kevali-gunasthanaka*, all his karma is purged away and he proceeds at once to *moksa* as a *siddha*.

¹ Mrs. S. Stevenson *The Heart of Jainism* p. 183

According to the Pali Nikayas an ancient householder teacher of India was the first expounder of the doctrine of action¹ The Jaina *Sutrakṛtanga* speaks of various types of Kriyāvada then current in India (I 6 27, I 10 17) Buddhism was promulgated as a form of Kriyāvada or Karmavāda According to Mahavira Kriyavāda of Jainism is shortly distinguished from akriyavada (doctrine of non-action), ajnanavada (scepticism) and vinayavāda (formalism), precisely as in the word of the Buddha, kriyāvada of Buddhism is distinguished from Satkayadrsti involving various types of akriya, vicikitsa (scepticism) and silavrata-paramarsa (silabbataparamasa, formalism)² To arrive at a correct understanding of the doctrinal significance of kriyāvada of Jainism it is necessary not only to see how it has been distinguished from akriyavāda, ajnanavāda and vinayavada but also from other types of kriyavāda

According to the *Sutrakṛtanga* the types of akriyavāda are the following —

(1) On the dissolution of the five elements, e g , earth, water, fire, wind and air, living beings cease to exist On the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be Every body has an individual soul The soul exists as long as the body exists

(2) When a man acts or causes another to act, it is not his soul which acts or causes to act³

(3) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance These six substances are imperishable

(4) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls themselves, but the individual souls experience them

(5) The world has been created or is governed by the gods It is produced from chaos⁴

(6) The world is boundless and eternal

All these views are reduced to four main types that correspond to those associated in the Pali Nikayas with four leading thinkers of the time, e g , Atheism like that of Ajita, eternalism like that of Kātyayana, absolutism like that of Kasyapa and fatalism like that of Gośala

¹ *Majjhima Nikaya* I p 483

² *Khuddakapaṭha* p 5 Cf *Suttanipata* verse 231

³ Cf *Sutrakṛtanga*, I 1 1 13

⁴ *Ibid* I 1 3. 5 8.

The atman is a living individual, a biological entity. The whole self does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. No soul exists apart from the body. The five substances with the soul as the sixth are not created directly or indirectly. They are without beginning and end. They are independent of a directing cause. They are eternal. From nothing comes nothing. All things have the atman, self or ego for their cause and object, they are produced by the self, they are manifested by the self, they are intimately connected with the self, and they are bound up in the self. One man admits action, and another man does not admit action. Both men are alike, their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force i.e., by fate. It is their destiny that all beings come to have a body to undergo the vicissitudes of life and to experience pleasure and pain. Each of these types stands as an example of *akriyavada*, in as much as it fails to inspire moral and pious action, or to make an individual responsible for an action and its consequences.¹

According to the *Uttaradhyayana Sutra* the inefficiency of knowledge is the real upshot of *ajnanavada*. In the *Sutrakṛtāṅga* the upholders of *ajñānavada* are represented as those thinkers who pretending to be clever reason incoherently and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas.² The *Vinayavada* may be supposed to have been the same doctrine as *śīlabbataparamasa* in Buddhism. The *Śīlabbataparamasa* is a view of those who hold that the purity of oneself may be reached through the observance of certain moral precepts or by means of keeping certain prescribed vows. The upholders of *Vinayavada* assert that the goal of religious life is realised by conformation to the rules of discipline.³

The types of *Kriyavada* that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are two in number.

(1) The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bad karma on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hatred.

(2) If a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby he will be guilty of murder. If a man with

1 Cf. *Sutrakṛtāṅga* II. 1. 15. 34.

2 *Ibid* I. 12. 2.

3 *Sutrakṛtāṅga*, I. 12. 4.

the intention of roasting a gourd roasts a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder. According to Mahavira the painful condition of the self is brought about by one's own action and not by any other cause. Pleasure and pain are brought about by one's own action. Individually a man is born, individually he dies, individually he falls and individually he rises. His passions, consciousness, intellect, perceptions, and impressions belong to the individual exclusively. All living beings owe their present form of existences to their own karma. The sinners cannot annihilate works by new works, the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works.¹ The Jaina doctrine of nine terms *naiyatattva* developed from the necessity for a systematic exposition of *kriyavada* which is in its essential feature only a theory of soul and karma. Karma consists of acts, intentional and unintentional, that produce effects on the nature of soul. It must be admitted that soul is susceptible to the influence of karma. The categories of merit and demerit comprehend all acts, pious and sinful which keep the soul bound to the circle of births and deaths. *Nirjarā*² consists in the wearing out of accumulated effects of karma on the soul by the practice of austerities.

In short Mahavira's great message to mankind is that birth is nothing, that caste is nothing, and that karma is everything and on the destruction of karma the future happiness depends. Karma is the deed of the soul. It is a material forming a subtle bond of extremely refined karmic matter which keeps the soul confined to its place of origin, or the natural abode of full knowledge and everlasting peace. There are four kinds of destructive karma (*ghatiya karma*) which retain the soul in mundane existence. They are as follows: (1) knowledge obscuring karma (2) faith obscuring karma (3) karma which obstructs the progress of the soul, and (4) karma which deludes the soul.³ Karma plays an important part in Jaina metaphysics. Jainism as a practical religion teaches us to purge ourselves of impurities arising from karma.

1 *Ibid* I 12 15

2 Cf. *Uttaradhyayana Sutra* XXVIII 11

3 B. O. Law *Mahavira His Life and Teachings* p. 104

THE ĀRYĀVIJNĀPTI AND THE SABHYĀBHARANA OF RĀMACANDRA

By K MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA

Ramacandra, son of Visvanatha, a Mahārastra Brahmin of Ambilala (Amvila Amvilala) village on the bank of Prakasa has not so far received the notice which he deserves as an important grammarian earlier than the middle of the sixteenth century. Aufrecht notices both the *Āryavijnapti* and the *Sabhyabharana* of Rāmacandra (c c I, 511 and 512) but wrongly under different authors, the former under Ramacandra and the latter under Ramacandra Bhargava, author of the *Vagbhusana kavya*. Mitra's notice of the *Sabhyabharana* in his catalogue of the Bikaner Library, p 273, is very brief. In his *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, n 350, Krishnamachariar says, " *Sabhyabharana* is an anthology with double meaning, in 9 chapters, by Ramacandra Bhaṭṭa of Aṭṭaladeśa. The last verse interlaces the last Sutra of Panini अ अ with ingenuity. He was a great grammarian. There is a commentary on it by Govinda (Jyotirvit), son of Nilakanṭha, of the family of astrologers of Śivapuri on the banks of Godavari." Krishnamachariar does not give the probable date of our author. It will be seen that Aṭṭaladeśa is a mistake for Ambilaladesa unless it is so called now. Both Aufrecht and Krishnamachariar do not seem to know that the two works are by the same author.

The above two are the only works of Ramacandra now known to us. Aufrecht notices one *Āryavijnapti* of Viśvanatha suri. Viśvanatha is the father of Ramacandra. Is it the same as the present work? Here the author mentions his father's name at the end.

There are two MSS of the *Āryavijnapti* in the Anup Sanskrit Library, Nos 2970-71. It is a philosophical poem in two hundred and ten *Arjas*. The former MS has twelve closely written sheets. It is old. The last sheet is injured and worn. At the end the scribe is mentioned as धीमच्छंकरपुरस्थव्यंकटभट्टात्मजकोनेरिभट्ट. There is some random writing on the front page, of which the following referring to a samnyasin on the bank of the Kṛṣṇā is of

some interest. It is not possible to identify this ascetic without further information

श्रीकृष्णतटसनिधौ द्विजवरानानन्दसप्रेरकः
श्रीमत्पञ्चनदीतटे च करुणापूरेकपूर्णाम्बुधिः ।
श्रीमद्भक्तजनानुरञ्जन०० श्रीमान् चतुर्थोऽश्रमी
सर्वेषां प्रददातु श निवसितां लक्ष्मींश्च दण्डी यत ॥

The other MS has eleven sheets written in a medium hand. This belonged to Mapirama who was a contemporary of Mahārāja Anup Singhji of Bikaner and belonged to the seventeenth century. The MS bears his name on the front page. This gives a lower limit to the date of Ramacandra. But a more accurate lower limit is supplied by Govinda's commentary on his *Sabhyabharana*. Krishnamachariar tells us that this Govinda was the son of Nilakanṭha of the family of astrologers of Śivapurī. This Nilakanṭha was a great astronomer of the sixteenth century. He was honoured by Akbar and wrote the astronomical portion of the *Toḍarananda*. His *Tajikanilakanṭha* composed in śaka 1509 (A D 1587) is now very popular. His father Ananta who was also a great astronomer migrated to Benares from Dharmapurī in Behar, the original place of the family. Hence Śivapurī in Krishnamachariar's note must be understood as Benares. Govinda was born in śaka 1491, i.e., A D 1569. If he is the same as the commentator on the *Sabhyabharana*, Ramacandra cannot be later than the middle of the sixteenth century. The *Sabhyabharana* does not contain references to any author by name which would help us to fix an upper limit to his date.

The *Āryavijñapti* begins

(In some cases the metre is not correct owing to the corruption of the MSS.)

रघुपतिपदकमलविमलपरिमलमलसापहाय ते प्रीतिः ।
अतिविषमविषयतरसुमन सुमनो द्विरेफ नो घटते ॥ १ ॥
सत्य रामपदाम्बुजमानन्दामोदमन्दिर हित्वा ।
विषयगगनसुमसमूहमिच्छसि किं र मनोमधुप ॥ २ ॥
परिमलयहला रघुपतिचरेणनखमयूखमञ्जरीं हित्वा ।
हृदय मधुवत विरसे विषयकरीरे कथं रमसे ॥ ३ ॥

१ रघुराजभालभासितमलयजतिलकरुचिजहुकन्यायाम् ।
 श्रूयमुनामिलितायां स्नाहि मनो जहीहि विषयरथ्याम्बु ॥ ४ ॥
 तेषूचिता कथं वा प्रीतिर्घिषयेषु दुर्जनेष्विव ते ।
 उन्मीलयन्ति खेदं सततं ये सेविता एव ॥ ५ ॥
 न विषयभोगो (ग) भाग्यं योग्यं खलु यत्र जन्तुमात्रमपि ।
 ब्रह्मेन्द्ररुद्रमृग्यं भाग्यं विषयेषु वैराग्यम् ॥ ६ ॥
 विद्याविनयविशालैरिन्द्रियशिशवोऽपि हन्त विक्रीताः ।
 विषयविटेष्वपि यस्माद्विगतद्वैराग्यदारिद्र्यम् ॥ ७ ॥
 ईक्षन्त एव चेतोमित्रं दुःस्नेहपाशबद्धं ये ।
 अहह कदर्यनराणां धीधनमुपयुज्यते क्व वा तेषाम् ॥ ८ ॥
 दासीकृतामपि विटैर्बुद्धिं जननीमुपेक्षते विषयैः ।
 स कथं साधुसमाजे वदनं शक्नोति दर्शयितुम् ॥ ९ ॥
 धिक् तं मानुषभावं धिक् चातुर्यं धिक् च तद्विद्याम् ।
 उदरमेव्यनिवासात्कृमिरिव याति नोद्वेगम् ॥ १० ॥
 जानीहि तस्य सङ्गं संसृतिसिन्धुं तितीर्षितां हि सताम् ।
 सहसा विहितविघातं द्यपदाघातं विवेकपोतस्य ॥ ११ ॥
 मांसत्वगादिमय्यो वनिताः सुधयेव भित्तयो लिप्ताः ।
 त्वां वञ्चयन्ति चेतः स्फुरता बाह्येन रङ्गेन ॥ १२ ॥
 या ते चित्तं दुरात्मन् चर्मणि विण्मूत्रपूरितेऽपि रतिः ।
 सूचयति सैव नूनं यमपुरनरकेषु भाविर्नो प्रीतिम् ॥ १३ ॥
 स्नेहादिह यदि खेदो जन्मसु जातो न केषु तदयम् ।
 धिक् त्वां निह्नव यत्ते स्नेहादद्यापि नोद्वेगः ॥ १४ ॥
 त्वामात्मलाभलोभाद्बुचितं चेतोऽहमाश्रितो मित्रम् ।
 संकल्पजालकलनैर्भवता बद्धोऽस्मि हा किमिदम् ॥ १५ ॥

Ends :

कोऽपि मुनिवेषधारी चेतोनारी विरूपकारी मे ।
 अनुसारी कुरुते हा किं वा कर्तुं यथेच्छयाचारी ॥ २०४ ॥
 क्षोणीसुताविलासा दासीकुरुते यत्नादेव ।
 हा चित्तवृत्तिमेतां राजा राजीवलोचनः कोऽपि ॥ २०५ ॥

वल्कलपटीकटीकं कृतपञ्चवटीकुटीरवाटीकम् ।

निकटीभवतु महो मे प्रकटीकृतमानटीनृत्यम् ॥ २०६ ॥

प्रेमातिरेकरचिता कियदधिकशतद्वयी ममार्याणाम् ।

अम्भोजपुञ्जपूजा भवतात्सीतापतेः पदयोः ॥ २०७ ॥

आर्याशतद्वयीयं भक्तिविरक्तिप्रबोधमयी ।

विषयासक्तिविमुक्तेः शक्ता मुक्तं जगत्कर्तुम् ॥ २०८ ॥

आर्या श्रीविश्वनाथस्य नन्दने रघुनन्दने ।

रामचन्द्रो दधत्प्रेम सान्द्रं निर्मितवानिमाः ॥ २०९ ॥

न प्रीतिरीतिरेषा वाणी शक्नोति दुर्जने यदपि ।

तदपि रघूत्तभक्ता ननु रक्ता लीलया कुरुते ॥ २१० ॥

इति श्रीविश्वनाथसूरिवरतनयेन रामचन्द्रचरणोपासिनाअम्बिलालग्राम-
वासिरामचन्द्रेण रचितेयमार्याविघ्नसिः पूर्णा ॥

The *Sabhyābharana* is a work in verse in nine sections. Each verse in it has a double meaning, a didactic one and a grammatical one. The MS in the Anup Sanskrit Library contains the author's own commentary on it named *Mayukha-mālā* and *Sabhyābharana-pañjikā* where some grammatical rules are elaborately discussed. The MS has one hundred and fourteen sheets with eight lines per page and forty-five syllables per line of bold and large Devanāgarī. It is in good order and begins

श्रीगणेशाय नमः । अथोपकारप्रशसा प्रकाश्यते ।

द्वन्द्वस्यावयवैः परार्थपरतामध्यापिता ये चिरं

हन्तैतां स्तुतिगोचरं न गमयाम्येवं न निन्दामि च ।

ते जीवन्तु पर परार्थपरतास्वाचार्यकं स्वीकृतं

येषां तत्पुरुषस्य तैरवयवैः स्वार्थादरेणोत्थितैः ॥ १ ॥

इह प्लक्षन्त्यग्रोधवित्यादिषु द्वन्द्वपदेषु प्लक्षपदस्य स्वार्थमिलितपरार्थे सति न्यग्रोधपदस्य च स्वार्थमिलितप्लक्षार्थ इति वैयाकरणमतम् । साहित्ये लक्षणेति मीमांसकाः । तत्रेदमुच्यते—ये द्वन्द्वावयवैः परार्थपरता शिदिताः स्वार्थाविरोधेन परार्थं साधयन्तीति यावत् तान्न निन्दामो नापि स्तुमः यतः परार्थपरा न निन्दाः स्वार्थपरा न स्तुत्यास्तेषु चोभयं वर्तते इति नोभयं विषय इत्यर्थः ॥

Ends

आनन्दयेत्सुकृतिन कृतिरियमवधीरिता खलैर्यदपि ।
 विलसति नृपालमौलौ चम्पकमलिनावहेलित तदपि ॥ ८ ॥
 ग्रामे प्रकाशासविधेऽविलाले वि श (?) युक्तोऽस्ति मयेऽमरेश ।
 तस्याज्ञया मन्दधिया मयाय ग्रन्थ कृतस्तत्सुकृत पितुस्तत् ॥ ९ ॥
 प्राप्तप्रौढिरशेषशास्त्रविषये श्रीविश्वनाथ सुधी-
 र्य धीमन्तमसूत शोभनसमारम्भा च रम्भासुतम् ।
 श्रीसभ्याभरणस्य साधुविभूतौ श्रीरामचन्द्राभिर्या-
 भाजस्तस्य कृतौ समापदचिरादुल्लास एवोऽन्तिमः ॥ १० ॥

इति श्रीमदनेकविद्वदन्तेवासिवन्दितपादारविन्दस्य भट्टविश्वनाथस्य
 तनयेन श्रीरामचन्द्रचरणकमलोपासिना प्रकाशासनिहितांविलाग्रामवासिना
 रामचन्द्रेण निर्मितायां स्वकृतसभ्याभरणपाञ्जिकायां मयूखमालायामन्तिमो नवम
 उल्लासः समाप्तः ॥

In the colophon to *ullasa* 8 (fol 105 a) there is

इति श्रीमदनेकविद्वदन्तेवासिवन्दितपादारविन्दस्य महाराष्ट्रातिमण्डनः ॥

From this we know that he was a Maharashtra Brahmin We must, therefore, see if any more information can be gathered about this important author from Maharashtra sources

THE ORIGINAL GĪTĀ

By T M P MAHADEVAN

Dissatisfaction with the current *Bhagavad gītā* of 700 ślokaś has been expressed by several orientalistś of the West who feel that it is an inflated form of an original *Gītā* which knew nothing of the later incrustations of different strands of philosophical doctrines. Talboys Wheeler considers it unnatural that Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna on the morning of the first day of the war, when both armies are drawn out in battle array and hostilities are about to begin, should enter into a long and philosophical dialogue respecting the various forms of devotion which lead to the emancipation of the soul. Holtzmann's view is that the original *Gītā* was Vedantic in character and that subsequently the originally unorthodox doctrine of *bhakti* came to be grafted on to it. According to Hopkins, the song of the Blessed One is "at present a Kṛṣṇaite version of an older Viṣṇuite poem, and this in turn was at first an unsectarian work, perhaps a late Upaniśad". Keith thinks that the *Gītā* was originally an Upaniśad of the type of the *Śvetāśvatara*, but was later adapted to the cult of Kṛṣṇa. Barnett believes that different streams of tradition became confused in the mind of the teacher of the *Gītā*. In the view of Garbe, the original *Gītā* was a devotional and sectarian tract in which were later incorporated Vedantic ideas.

By far the most thorough dissection of the *Bhagavad gītā* has been made by Rudolf Otto. According to him, the present day guise of the *Bhagavad gītā* is not its original version. The *Original Gītā* was in no sense 'doctrinal writ', and therefore no '*Upaniśad*', but simply a fragment of a most magnificent epic narrative. It was essentially a *Kṛṣṇa Arjuna-samvada*, a dialogue between the Lord and the Pandava hero, and was in no sense a manual of instruction. The *viśada* of Arjuna, those words of Kṛṣṇa which were calculated to release him from his mood of despair, the Lord's sayings about the indestructibility of those whom Arjuna thought he was called

upon to destroy, Kṛṣṇa's appeal to Arjuna's martial valour, his 'supreme utterance' that the warrior was but his tool, and his demonstration of this truth by revealing his *ghora rūpa* with the conclusion drawn by Arjuna—these and only these, constituted the contents of the *Original Gita*¹ Into this splendid epic fragment, "doctrinal writ" subsequently became inserted, with the view of securing for it the authority of Kṛṣṇa's divine Form

Otto then proceeds to segregate the doctrinal treatises from the primitive text of the *Original Gita*. Of these he finds as many as eight in the *Gita* besides numerous minor glosses. The first treatise (vi 52 - xii 20) has for its theme pure *Prapatti Bhakti*, unspeculative and unsupported by philosophical theories. The second (xiv - xv) inculcates *Sa Samkhya Bhakti*. *Bhakti* theology utilizing the *Samkhya* doctrine of the soul. The third treatise consists of three tracts: the first (xvi - xvii 1) a plain and unsectarian moralistic Theism, with no specific *Bhakti* character, the second (xvii 2 - xviii 49) an exposition of the moralistic doctrine of three *gunas*, and the third (xviii 50 - 55) where the first two tracts are worked into a systematic and strict *Bhakti* doctrine. The fourth treatise (xiii) has for its basis *Sa Īśvara Samkhya*. In the fifth (v) *Samkhya* and *Yoga* are connected together. In the sixth treatise (vi - ix) there is typical *Sa Īśvara Yoga* which is utilized and intensified by *Bhakti* doctrine. The seventh treatise (ii 39 - iv 42) deals with what may be called untypical *Sa Īśvara Yoga*, i. e., character *Yoga* as distinguished from psycho-technical *Yoga*. The topic of the eighth treatise (x 12-42) is God as *optimum in omnibus*. It is a song of praise marked by its own specific conception of the divine and referring to neither *Adwaita* nor *Bhakti*, nor any other special scholastic doctrines, nor again to Arjuna's actual situation, but inserted here simply to glorify Kṛṣṇa.

That these eight treatises could not have been written by the author of the *Original Gita* is patent according to Otto, from the

1 Otto includes into the *Original Gita* only the following portions of the vulgate *Gita* —

Ch. I Ch. II 1 13 20 22 23 3 X 1 3

XI 1-6 8 12 14 17 19-26 41 51

XVIII 58-61 66 72 73.

fact that they bear no intelligible relation to the theme of the Epic. Even among themselves, there is no unity of purpose or unity of doctrine. They include obviously different types of doctrine and there is in them much of aimless repetition, and so, concludes Otto, more than one writer was concerned in the composition of the vulgate *Gītā*. He warns us that the occasional addresses to Arjuna found in these treatises should not deceive us. Otto believes that the treatises were either written with the explicit view to their incorporation in the *Original Gita*, or they had previously been composed, and were then modified for that purpose by slight adaptations.

We shall examine here in brief the opinions of the Indologists set forth above. As against Talboys Wheeler who considers the philosophical dialogue out of place on the first morning of the war when both armies had been drawn up in battle line and hostilities were about to begin, it will be pertinent to point out that there is nothing unnatural about the dialogue, taking into view the standard-of warfare that then prevailed. A few hours' delay in the commencement of the war could not have mattered in the least especially as the delay was due to one of the principal actors resolving not to fight. When the leaders of the contending forces could meet before the battle began and lay down the rules of warfare, it is not inconceivable that they could afford to wait and postpone the commencement of battle when the foremost among them became all on a sudden broken in body and mind and expressed his strong disinclination to fight. But then, it may be asked, why a long philosophical discourse dealing with forms of devotion leading to the emancipation of the soul in order to make Arjuna fight? The answer is that the final solution to every moral problem is to be found only in the philosophy of Spirit. Philosophy in India was never an intellectual game of logic, it was always a guide to better life. The explanation we have so far offered is on the assumption that the *Mahabharata* is a record of historical details. Though there must have been a historic feud which the Epic took as its theme, historical truth need not be read into every word of the *Mahabharata*. We value the *Gita* not for its warlike setting or the context in which it was taught, but for the teaching it contains—a teaching which has a universal appeal, and is for all time.

According to Holtzmann, Hopkins, Keith, Barnett, Garbe and Otto, the current version of the *Gīta* does not present a consistent doctrine. The medley of views alleged to be found in the *Gīta* Barnett attributes to the confusion of different streams of tradition in the mind of the author. The other critics favour the theory that the present *Gīta* is the result of a successive revision or adaptation of an original poem by several writers of different persuasions. Holtzmann's surmise is that the original *Gītā* was a Vedantic work on to which the unorthodox doctrine of *Bhakti* was subsequently grafted. Hopkins and Keith guess, as we have seen, that the original work must have been a late Upaniṣad, unsectarian in character, which was later on turned into a book of the Kṛṣṇa cult. Hopkins makes further refinement by interposing between the original Upaniṣadic form and the present Kṛṣṇaite version a Viṣṇuīte phase. Garbe reverses the process and says that the *Gīta* was at first a devotional and sectarian tract into which later on some Vedantin incorporated his own ideas. As if vexed with all this doctrinal business, Otto declares that the original *Gītā* was no philosophical tract at all. It was a simple unsophisticated portion of a grand epic, which was used by later philosophers as a convenient peg to hang their doctrines on and give them the air of divine authority.

The enchanting quest for the *Original Gīta* owes its inspiration, it must be remarked, to the apparently heterogeneous nature of Śrī Kṛṣṇa's teaching. The *Gīta* speaks of God and Brahman, of *Bhakti* and *Jñāna*, of Karma yoga and Karma samnyasa. Are these not contradictory concepts? How can one and the same author be responsible for such incompatible doctrines? And so, argue the critics, the vulgate *Gīta* is not the work of a single mind, it is a composite product of several thinkers who at different times made their own additions to and alterations in the original poem.

The operational base of these scholars, we submit, is an untenable one. That the *Gīta* is a hotchpotch of ill assorted doctrines is the foundation on which the criticisms are built. As to which doctrine was the earlier one and which doctrine or doctrines were interpolated, the critics differ among themselves, prompted by their own inclinations. To some the *Gīta* appears to have been

at first a treatise on Vedānta which later came to be adapted to their views by the followers of the *Bhakti* cult. To others it would seem that what had once been a gospel of devotion was turned into a Vedāntic work by some skilled Absolutist. Otto to whom these doctrines are anathema would believe that the simple aim of the *Original Gītā* was only to teach the imperious might of the Most Holy. No objective evidence, however, has been offered by the critics to show why they consider certain verses to be interpolated ones. Purely on *a priori* grounds they accept some portions of the *Gītā* and reject others with a view to effect formal consistency—and even in this they do not succeed. The classical commentators, whatever may be the differences among them, are agreed in viewing the *Gītā* as a consistent whole. The author of the *Gītā* has a genius for synthesis;¹ and his true purport will be missed by him who has only an analytical mind. The philosophical views then current were all utilised by the author and worked into a philosophy of the Spirit that included and surpassed them. The method of synthesis, then, accounts for the presence in the *Gītā* of apparently different doctrines; but the discerning eye will find a golden thread running through them all and binding them into a shining garland of exquisite beauty and splendour.

Unlike writers like Holtzmann and Hopkins, Richard Garbe claims to have adduced independent philological evidence for proving the interpolated character of about 170 verses. Belvalkar has examined these grounds in detail and has shown that they are not valid and do not warrant the rejection of the verses dubbed as interpolations by Garbe.² It is well worth pointing out that not in all cases does Garbe advance philological reasons. For instance,

1. Sri Aurobindo Ghose, *Essays on the Gītā*, pp. 7-8. "The language of the *Gītā*, the structure of thought, the combination and balancing of ideas belong neither to the temper of a sectarian teacher nor to the spirit of a vigorous analytical dialectics cutting off one angle of the truth to exclude all the others; but rather there is a wide, undulating, encircling movement of ideas which is the manifestation of a vast synthetic mind and a rich synthetic experience."

2. S. K. Belvalkar, *Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta Philosophy*, Part I, pp. 93-100.

many verses he rejects as spurious because they contain the terms *Brahman* or *Maya* or for no other reason than that they contain absolutist teaching. It looks as though the search for philological grounds was undertaken by Garbe to justify the branding of certain stanzas as interpolations which had already become 'suspect' on account of their 'Vedantic' content. Garbe's procedure is a glaring case of rationalisation—of finding reasons for a conclusion which had been reached on *a priori* considerations.

Rudolf Otto fares no better than his predecessors in his attempt at stratification of the *Bhagavad gita*.¹ While they see in the *Gītā* only two or three doctrines, he discovers, as we have seen already, as many as eight tracts besides the original poem and numerous other glosses. According to Otto's computation, there must have been at least eighteen authors at work, of course at different times, inflating the original out of all recognition and overweighing it with their own views. *Sēṣvara samkhya* and *Sēṣvara yoga*, different schools of *Bhakti*, *Dvaita*, *Vīṣṭadvaita*, and *Advaita* and the cult of Kṛṣṇa—all these and many minor views besides have each had a hand in the final shaping of the *Gita*. With a flair for making subtle differences, Otto shows which verses were added and by whom. He starts with the assumption that the single purpose of Kṛṣṇa was to convert into obedience the mood of one who had no desire to fight. Then he draws the conclusion quite easily that the doctrinal discussions have no bearing on Kṛṣṇa's task, and so must have been interpolated later on by sectarian scholars and partisans in philosophy. 'Be thou nought but my tool' is the *carama śloka*, according to Otto, it constitutes the central teaching of the Lord. All that led to it and all that followed from it, these alone should be regarded as the genuine *Gita*.

It is not difficult to recognise that Otto's analysis is based on a subjective bias and not on any objective evidence. If one were to disburden the *Gita* of verses which do not fit into a scheme one has apriorily drawn up, there would be no end to such a process, nor

¹ Dr S. K. Belvalkar has criticised Prof. R. Otto's theory in a paper entitled 'Unsuccessful Attempted Stratification of the *Bhagavadgītā*' published in the *Journal of the University of Bombay* Vol. V Part vi pp 63-133.

would any unanimity be achieved. Unless clear and unmistakable evidences are forthcoming, there is no justification for regarding any verse of the *Gita* as an interpolation. From the point of view of correct methodology it would be more proper to say with Barnett, if there is no other go, that there is a confusion in the mind of the *Gita*carya of different streams of tradition, than to agree with Otto and others that the *Gita* is a composite product of several minds.

Most of the critics labour under the thought that Vedanta is *Advaita*, that *Advaita* is pantheism, and that *bhakti* which is devotion to a personal god is incompatible with *Advaita*. And when they find in the *Gita* Vedantic verses intertwined with devotional poetry, they naturally postulate different authorship for the two sets of stanzas. But every one of the propositions which serve as the premises for the theories of interpolation may be challenged. *Advaita* is not the only school of Vedanta, there are other schools which are theistic. *Advaita* is not atheism. Nor is it pantheism, of either the 'all is God' type or the 'God is all' type. *Bhakti* is not inconsistent with *Advaita* metaphysics. There have been uncompromising *Advaitins* who have advocated *Bhakti* as a better means, because simpler, than even *Jnana*. As we remarked earlier, the author of the *Gita* has a genius for synthesis. He presses into service every doctrine and every mode of spiritual experience in order to lift man from the lower levels of selfishness and sensuality. The dialogue form of the *Gita* does not warrant our looking in the Scripture for an architectonic method or a finished philosophical construction. There are doubtless repetitions and variations of emphasis. But these are inevitable in a *samvada*. The central teaching however, cannot be missed. Śrī Kṛṣṇa returns to it again and again. It is this. The immortal self is to be distinguished from its apparent psycho physical abode. Man must do his part, knowing well that the self is unaffected by his actions. Not desiring the fruits of his deeds he must dedicate them to God who is the Life of his life, his real Self. God realisation or Self realisation is the goal. It can be reached by one who at first frees himself from attachment to the world of objects by selfless and dedicated work, and then renounces the sense of egoity and conceit in agency. True renunciation is not an external and formal process. A man of

renunciation may appear to act, his actions, or what seem to be his actions, redound to the benefit of society. But they do not bind him. Those who are far behind him on the road to perfection must follow his example and act without attachment. Freedom from attachment and attachment bred passions is what is insisted upon by Śrī Kṛṣṇa over and over again. This is essential for spiritual life, progress in which is to be measured by the degree of the freedom attained. All other philosophical teaching that is found in the *Gita* is directly related to the concept of non attachment. If one word will indicate the quintessence of the *Gita* teaching, it is *anasakti yoga*, the gospel of non attachment.

BEING AND NEGATION

By G R MALKANI

Being is the most fundamental concept. Ultimately, there must be some kind of being. The problem for philosophy is how to conceive this being. It may be the being at the beginning of things, from which things emerge and to which they ultimately return. It may be a primordial form of being which has determined the subsequent course, but to which things never return. It may be that absolute being, which does not evolve in time but which includes time as an element. Philosophy may be said to be the science of being in this larger sense. What is ultimate being?

We may answer this question by speculation. But that will lead to no definite result. The only right way to answer it is by analysing the being which we know. We distinguish "what is" from its counterpart "what is not". The being which we know is limited by non being. We can set a limit to all being, for all being is finite being. It is in time and in space, and it is distinguished by certain qualities. What has no such limitation does not appear before us and we do not know it as being. It would be for us indistinguishable from non being. Beyond this being which we know and which we can extend indefinitely in imagination, is non-being. We can set no limit to non being. It is really limitless, and contains all being even as the ocean contains a tiny island. Considered in this way non being is the very container of being. It is larger than being, and perhaps also more fundamental. It is arguable that we contribute certain subjective elements to the being which we know. It is not arguable that we contribute anything to non being.

It may now be said that non being cannot be more real than being. We do not know non being and if we knew it, it would be changed into some kind of being. How can non being be inclusive of being? Being is the one all inclusive category, not non being. We contend however that by our notion of being, we have made this conclusion impossible. If all being is determinate being, then the negation of this being is part of its meaning. The determinate

implies the indeterminate. The indeterminate has no kind of being. It is apprehended at the same time as the act of knowledge in which we apprehend the determinate. All knowledge is said to be of the determinate. But this knowledge does not exhaust the whole range of our awareness, which reveals knowledge of the determinate simultaneously with our ignorance which relates to the indeterminate.

Being and its correlate non being however both come under the category of objectivity. We can claim that we know non being as the negation of being. Non being has in this sense a positive character. All *abhava* is ultimately a kind of *bhava*. This positive character of non being is derived from being. There is no such thing as absolute non being or absolute negation, unrelated to being. The negation which is significant to us is the negation of being, and this is not absolute nothing.

We have said something about the correlation of being and the negation of being, which is non being. We shall now show that negation has an important function with regard to all being that we know. We find that nothing is purely positive. Nothing has *svarupa* so to say. The nature of everything is determined conceptually and all determination is negation. To say that something is x is implicitly to assert that it is distinct from the not x . We know through negation only. It is 'this' means that it is 'not that'. There is no such thing as the 'own' nature of a thing, not involving any conceptual determination or determination from the outside. All things involve in their own nature their own negation, which therefore is part of their meaning. And since nothing can be partly positive and partly negative, negation has universal scope. It enters into the meaning of everything that is said to be positive.

All our statements about reality have this negative element. In all cases something which is not asserted is implied by the assertion and supplies the background of the assertion. As a psychological fact, we never assert except when we want to correct, or to contradict or to draw pointed attention to an aspect of things which is opposed to some other aspect which is not to our purpose but which may easily be mistaken for it. It is through this

implied negative assertion that we determine the *tatparya* or the intended meaning of the speaker

Being that is determinate cannot be something purely positive. It cannot have a nature of its own. It is correlative to non-being. But is such being all that there is? Can we not go beyond it to the higher form of being? We have evidently an *awareness* of being. This awareness itself is not something determinate. Being and non-being are both simultaneously its objects. It is not an object to itself. Where we conceive it as object, we have already transcended it. The true awareness is never determinate and never an object. It is essentially non-conceptual and of the nature of pure intuition. Is it not the higher form of being we seek—the being which is purely positive and which has no negative element in it?

All real being is intuited being. There is no other being which we know. But the distinction between being and intuition which is commonly made in our sensible knowledge is due to the conceptualisation of being. When we have eliminated every conceptual element we may be said to have a pure intuition of being. We are face to face with reality as it is in itself. But this reality cannot appear distinct from the intuition. It will be the intuition itself. Thus there can be no intuition of being. Being must coincide with intuition.

This pure intuition is present whenever anything whatsoever is said to be known. But it should not be confused with this knowledge. The knowledge is a mental act and is quite determinate. It is as determinate as its subject. What reveals this knowledge is the pure intuition. The pure intuition reveals every object by revealing our knowledge of that object, and it reveals the knowledge by revealing at the same time the correlative ignorance which is dispelled by the knowledge. Thus pure intuition is at the back of all being and all our so-called knowledge of being. It reveals everything, both being and non-being. There is nothing to reveal it. It is a pure revelation. As such, it has a *svarupa*, or a nature of its own. It is unmixed with negation, and so the only reality that is absolutely positive. It is the true meaning of being, if by being we understand something that exists in itself and is not determined in its nature from the outside.

There is a view according to which there is no ultimate being or reality. All being can be thought away. We can negate all possible being. The ultimate is therefore absolute negation. It is neither being, nor that simple negation which relates to some definite being and derives its meaning from it. If we make negation absolute, that negation or non-being can be ultimate. In fact, it is the only alternative to being that is subjective. All being is affirmed being. When we say that something is there, we have affirmed that being and determined it in thought. This affirmation is a function of the will. Being that is affirmed is not only negatable, it is negated in being affirmed. No act of the will creates anything real which may *later* be cancelled or negated. The act of affirming or putting forth is *simultaneously* a retracting or a withdrawing act. It does not need a second act to withdraw what is put forth. It is admitted by all that what is *willed* has no real being and does not endure. But if it is a fact that it has being for the moment that it is put forth, why can it not endure beyond that moment? The reason is that the act of putting forth is itself a retracting act. What is put forth is retracted the very moment it is put forth. It has therefore no reality even for the moment that it appears to be there. In this way, all being can be negated, and we can conclude that non being is universal and ultimate.

It may be said against this, that the act of the will at least has some kind of being. When we have denied all being, we cannot deny the denial. All scepticism suffers from this fallacy. The sceptical attitude itself cannot be denied. This objection in our opinion is not formidable. We can argue against it that if the act of the will has any kind of being, then that too can be denied in the same way. We cannot speak of this act of the will as real without positing that act. The consistent sceptic affirms nothing, and takes up no position. Can he be answered? If our will experience alone can explain being, we have a practical ideal to achieve. We must purify the will of its initial appetite or desire which makes it restless, and so creative of being. When the will is passified, it is perfectly free. It creates being no longer. It has realised that *freedom* which is beyond being. Here one is naturally speechless. Here is nothing that one can affirm. *It is the religion of perfect freedom*

Our objection to this is two fold —

(a) Is the language of “negation” applicable to the absolute negation? That language is significant only in the case of limited negation. Something which is or can be, might *not* be. This “not” only refers to a possible assertion of being. Otherwise, there is nothing for us to negate, and there is no negation. When negation is made absolute, it becomes indistinguishable from that fullness of infinite being, which has no limit and which therefore cannot be negated. Absolute negation is qualitatively different from all finite negation. It does not *mean* the lack of anything, or the absence of anything. We simply cannot objectify it. It is the same thing as absolute being.

(b) It is not true to say that all being that we know can be explained in terms of our will experience. The world may be our idea. But when we ordinarily ideate or conceive, we are conscious that we initiate these acts. All acts of the will are conscious acts. The world is not consciously conceived or imagined. It appears to have being in itself. The world may be illusory, but it cannot be treated as purely imaginary. The illusory has real being behind it and this cannot be a matter of conception, but only of intuition. The world is accordingly declared by Vedanta to be *anirvacanya*, not *tuccha*. The question of being then cannot be resolved by analysing our experience of it in terms of our will experience alone. The illusory is conceived, but the real behind it which is known with the illusory is not conceived but intuited. The problem of being then is a real problem, and the solution of it can only be found in absolute being not in non being.

It may now be argued that it is possible to reach different conclusions which are both true, if we start from different stand-points. Approaching things through our knowing experience, we may get at absolute being which will satisfy the demands of knowledge. But if we universalise our will experience, our ideal cannot be being but freedom from being. We can legitimately describe the ultimate in terms of the appropriate stand point. This however cannot satisfy the philosophic mind. It is of the essence of philosophy to co ordinate and to correlate. It cannot rest satisfied with unrelated finalities. The ideal of knowledge and

the ideal of will can only be satisfied in that Self which cannot be negated, and which therefore has true being. This Self is also that freedom which is beyond all empirical being. *Mukti* is nothing but this freedom of the Self.

THE SAMHITĀS AND THE OLDER UPANIṢADS¹

By H. G. NARAHARI

Ancient Indian tradition has always believed in a continuity of thought from the Samhitās down to the Upaniṣads, and in a unity of perspective between these two texts. There have been some modern scholars who, however, hold a different view and these are those whose judgment is counter-balanced either by uncertain parallelisms in Western thought or by unsupportable prejudices against anything that is the work of a brahmin. Chief among those who belong to this class are Deussen and Garbe, and these two found enthusiastic following in Hertel and Winternitz and in a few other writers of minor importance.² "The Upaniṣads," Deussen³ felt, "are for the Veda what the New Testament is for the Bible." And, to Garbe,⁴ from the brahmin priest that he knew of to high philosophic enquiry it was indeed a far, far cry. If only for the fact that "the

1. In referring to books, I have made use of the following abbreviations.

<i>At.</i>	<i>Atareya</i>	<i>Phil. Up.</i>	<i>Philosophy of the</i>
<i>Ātman</i>	<i>Ātman in Pre-</i>		<i>Upanishads, trans-</i>
	<i>Upaniṣadic Vedic</i>		<i>lated by A. S. Geden,</i>
	<i>Literature, Adyar</i>		<i>Edinburgh, 1906</i>
	<i>Library, 1944</i>	<i>Pras</i>	<i>Prasna</i>
		<i>RV</i>	<i>R̥gveda</i>
		<i>SBE.</i>	<i>Sacred Books of the East</i>
<i>AV.</i>	<i>Atharvaveda</i>	<i>SV</i>	<i>Sāmaveda</i>
<i>Br.</i>	<i>Bṛhadāraṇyaka</i>	<i>Sys Ved</i>	<i>Das System des</i>
<i>Ch.</i>	<i>Chāndogya</i>		<i>Vedānta, Leipzig, 1906.</i>
<i>Ind. Phil</i>	<i>Indian Philosophy,</i>	<i>Taitt</i>	<i>Taittirīya</i>
	<i>London, 1928</i>	<i>TPU.</i>	<i>Thirteen Principal</i>
			<i>Upanishads, Oxford</i>
			<i>University Press, 1931.</i>
<i>Kaus.</i>	<i>Kauṣītaki</i>	<i>TS.</i>	<i>Taittirīya Saṃhita</i>
<i>KS.</i>	<i>Kaṭhaka Saṃhita</i>	<i>Up.</i>	<i>Upaniṣad</i>
<i>Mand</i>	<i>Manḍūkya</i>	<i>VS</i>	<i>Vajasaneyi Saṃhita</i>
<i>Mund</i>	<i>Mundaka</i>	<i>YV.</i>	<i>Yajurveda.</i>

2 For details, see H. G. Narahari, *Ātman*, pp. 162 ff.

3 *Phil. Up*, p. 46. 4. H. G. Narahari, *op cit.*, p. 163.

Vedic seers were aware of all those philosophic ideas which go to make up the thought of the Upanisads " ⁵ the untenability of these views is too obvious. The object of this paper is to consider another important evidence in this respect the evidence which the Upanisads themselves supply concerning their attitude towards the Samhitas

In the course of this process, it is not at all proposed to examine all the Upanisads which are known so far. That would really prove to be a worthless endeavour. A good number of the Upanisads belong to comparatively recent times, and these cannot possibly command the same authority as the older Upanisads which all have certain distinctive features of their own. Often these late Upanisads are known to contain material which is neither original nor of any significant value towards our knowledge of the philosophic activity during the Upanisadic period. For our purpose then it is enough to take up the old classical Upanisads on which are based all the orthodox philosophic systems of a later date. It is not also the aim here to make an exhaustive collection of all references to the Samhitas in the Upanisads. This is unnecessary in a place like this where the endeavour is to examine rather than to collect all such references.

Of the numerous allusions to the Samhitas in the Upanisads, a broad classification can easily be made under two main heads, into those that speak of them with approval and into those that do not, and underrate their value instead, the former of these two groups admits of a further sub division and accordingly, we can distinguish here passages which look upon the Samhitas and Upanisads as equal in status from those which make either of them superior in comparison. There are also many occasions in the Upanisads where the Vedas are extolled and stress is laid as a result, on the importance of their study.

In the *Br Up* ⁶ and the *Maitri Up* ⁷ there are a few passages where the endeavour is to expound the theory that the Soul (*Atman*) is the Prime cause, and is the source of everything else, and in the course of the exposition of this theory, we are told that the same great being (*bhuta*) who breathed forth the Upanisads, did so even

⁵ *Rev.* p. 229. ⁶ II 4 10, IV 5 11. ⁷ VI 32.

the four Vedas. From another context⁸ in the former of these two Upanisads, it is clear that speech reveals alike the four Vedas and the Upanisads. Quite a nice metaphor is used by the *Ch Up*⁹ when it seeks to describe the sun whom we are asked to look upon as the honey of the gods. His rays are the honey cells, and the Vedic verses and the Upanisads are the bees which hover around the flower made up of the four Vedas and Brahman.

It is the view of Deussen¹⁰ that, in these passages, the word *upanisad* "did not of necessity include an exposition of the highest questions." I, however, see no necessity to resort to such a strained interpretation here. Moreover, Deussen's explanation is, in the first place, against the view of traditional commentators like Śamkara who understand¹¹ by the word *upanisadah* here statements like *priyamity etadupasita*¹². In support of his position, Deussen¹³ has the following arguments. In *Br Up* 11.4.10 where a list of works is enumerated, the Upanisads are given the eighth place after *itihāsa*, *purāṇa* and *vidyā*, though King Janaka has listened to the Upanisads he is unable to describe Brahman as Yajñavalkya did, and even erroneous teaching like that which speaks of the essential being of man as consisting in the body, is called *upanisad* (*asuranam upanisad*). There is little that is weighty in this reasoning. To attach prominence to the order of enumeration in the Upanisadic passage mentioned above is to read too much of our modern ideas into an ancient text. The apparent difficulty concerning the other two passages loses all its force when it is borne in mind that, by *upanisad*, is meant any philosophic doctrine of the period, and not necessarily the particular view propounded by Yajñavalkya or any other prominent seer of the time whose view finally prevailed against the many that were offered by those of the opposite camp.

The many statements made in the Upanisads are not left to be taken at their own individual worth. They are all intended to be taken quite seriously, for they bear the stamp of authority. Here is

⁸ IV 1.2 ⁹ III 3.1

¹⁰ *Op cit* p. 56 ¹¹ *upanisadah priyamity etad upasita slyadayaḥ*
(Commentary on *Br Up* II 4.10)

¹² I have discovered this statement in the *Br Up* (IV 1.3) itself.

¹³ *loc cit*

brought forward no opinion which is entirely new and strange. Everything that we read in the Upanisads has the clear sanction of the Vedic Samhitas. This is made clear in many ways. It is not unoften¹⁴ that the Upanisads are seen to incorporate bodily philosophic hymns and stanzas whose original place is in the Samhitas. These are cited by the Upanisadic seers in support of their statements which, otherwise, they fear, may not meet with the same degree of approval. It is very likely the same feeling which makes each Upanisad or a group of them¹⁵ claim to be attached to one or the other of the four Vedic Samhitas. These are cases where the supremacy of the Samhitas is openly acknowledged by the Upanisads. There are also occasions where this is done in an indirect way. That is where the Upanisadic seer is content with borrowing ideas only, and is ready to clothe these ideas in his own way. Some of these borrowings are quite explicit,¹⁶ and sometimes it happens that, when a careful and attentive student of the Samhitas reads the Upanisads he finds in the latter clear echoes¹⁷ of what he has already seen in the former.

It is probably in vindication of such actions on their part that the Upanisads would like, it seems, to impress on those that read them that they exist only to continue the tradition handed down by the Samhitas. The *Bṛ Up* (I 5 17) thus defines 'knowledge' (*brahma*) as whatever that has been learned from a study of the Vedas (*Ṇad vai ku canūktam tasya sarvasya brahme ty ekata*). The

Mund Up (III 2 10) discusses the qualities required in the ideal student to whom the knowledge of Brahman can be imparted with advantage, and one of the conditions laid down here is that the aspirant must be learned in the Vedas (*śrotriya*). Of the same import must be the passages where the Vedas and their ancillary texts are spoken of as the true abode of the Upanisads (*vedas sarvaṅgaṁ satyam āśānaṁ*),¹⁸ or where both these are looked upon as the limbs of the body of the person consisting of mind (*manomaya puruṣa*)¹⁹

The value of the Vedic Samhitās for purposes of study is quite openly recognized by the Upanisads which do not hesitate to bestow a liberal meed of praise on these texts concerning their profound merits. The *Taitt Up* (I 10) puts in the mouth of Trīśanku one of the most glowing descriptions of the excellence of Vedic knowledge, of the very enlightening and exalting effects of its study. Of the three fold duty of the religious man, the study of the Veda is to the *Ch Up* (II 23 1), the very first (*trayo dharmaskandha adhyāyanam prathamah*). To the *Maitrī Up* (IV 3), the study of the Vedas is the first of the antidotes against the miserable condition of this elemental soul (*bhutatman*). Such is the implicit

18. *Kena Up* IV 8 the full sentence here is *tasyaḥ tapo damah karmetaḥ pratiṣṭhā vedas sarvaṅgaṁ satyam āśānaṁ*. According to Sankara there are three sentences here the first stops with the words *pratiṣṭhā* and in understanding the next *vedas sarvaṅgaṁ* we are asked to take the word *pratiṣṭhā* from the previous sentence (*pratiṣṭhētyanuvarīte*) the rest forms the third sentence. Max Muller (SBE I 153) also accepts these three sentences but not the interpretation given by Sankara to them. To him there is no necessity for understanding the word *pratiṣṭhā* while interpreting the second sentence which to him is self sufficient and means 'The Vedas are all its limbs'. If Sankara takes *sarvaṅga* in the sense of the Vedāṅgas it is to Max Muller because 'No Brahmin could help thinking of the Vedāṅgas'. R. E. Hume (TPU p 340) follows Max Muller's line of interpretation. To me however there are only two sentences here the first, no doubt ends with *pratiṣṭhā* but the rest should be one single sentence. I agree with Max Muller in feeling it unnecessary to make use of the word *pratiṣṭhā* for a second time. But his interpretation of *sarvaṅgaṁ* to mean 'are all its limbs' sounds very far fetched. Sankara's explanation of the word appears to me quite reasonable. I take *satyam* as the adjective of *āśānaṁ* as against both Sankara and Max Muller to whom it is an independent noun. I would render my second sentence thus. 'The Vedas and all their *āśās* are its true abode.'

19. *Taitt Up* II 3

faith which this Upanisad has in the Samhitas that it declares, in another place,²⁰ that true knowledge is what is set forth in the Vedas, and a brahmin consequently should not study what is non Vedic (*yaḍ vedeṣu abhithitam tat satyam tasmad brahmano na vidikam adhyaita*) The *Ch Up* and the *Br Up* seem to be specially inclined in favour of the Samaveda, the first two books of the former, and a good portion of the third section of the first book of the latter are devoted to the eulogy of the very great importance of this Veda

There are, however, passages in the Upanisads where the knowledge of the Samhitas is compared with the knowledge of the Upanisads and where the latter seems, to all apparent purposes, to be assigned a higher place In the *Ch Up* (VII 1 2) we thus read of the story of Narada seeking instruction at the hands of Sanatkumara The prospective teacher quite naturally desires to know what his aspiring pupil knows already Questioned accordingly, Narada goes on 'Sir, I know the Rgveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, the Atharva Veda as the fourth, Legend and Ancient Lore (*itihasa purana*) as the fifth, the Veda of the Vedas (i e Grammar), Propitiation of the Manes, Mathematics Augury (*daiva*), Chronology, Logic, Polity, the Science of the Gods (*devavidya*), the Science of Sacred Knowledge (*brahmaridya*), Demonology (*bhutaridya*), the Science of Rulership (*ksatraridya*) Astrology (*naksatraridya*), the Science of Snake charming and the Fine Arts (*sarpa devajanaridya*) This 'Sir, I know' "²¹ To Sanatkumara, however all this is a study in name (*namaiḥa etat*) And the *Mund Up* speaks of two kinds of knowledge, the higher (*para*) and the lower (*apara*), and while the four Vedas are relegated to the latter category, the former is considered to be that whereby the Imperishable (*aksara*) is apprehended More than once ²² the superiority of the sacred syllable "Om" over the three Vedas Rg, Yajus and Saman, is maintained by the Upanisads and the *Taitt Up* (I 5) openly declares that the Vedas are made greater by sacred knowledge (*brahmana rava sarve veda mahyanti*)

But to take all these utterances literally and to interpret them to

²⁰ *Maitri Up* VII 10.

²¹ R. E. Hume *op cit* p 204.

²² *Ch Up* I 4 II, *Pras Up* V 7 *Maitri Up* VI 5

²³ Deussen *op cit* p 60

mean that they reject the Vedas,²³ or show an attitude which is "not favourable to the sacredness of the Vedas,"²⁴ would be to do the utmost injustice to the spirit of the Upaniṣads. Having sought, in many passages, guidance and support from the Vedas, and having confessed unstinted admiration for this earlier literature in many other passages, the Upanisads cannot possibly condemn them elsewhere. If they did, they are liable to be penalized for a double crime, the crime of gross ingratitude and of glaring self-contradiction; of gross ingratitude because the support derived from the Vedas is forgotten; and of glaring self-contradiction, because elsewhere the inestimable value of the Samhitās has been too openly acknowledged.

A possible way of explanation here is perhaps to believe that the Upanisads record the views of two contemporary rival parties, of the ritualists and the intellectualists; and the very admiration of the Samhitās on the part of the former was enough to provoke the contempt of the latter group towards this literature. The basis of such an explanation is not at all sound. It takes for granted the unwarranted²⁵ assumption that the Samhitās are, by nature, only ritualistic in character, while the Upanisads deal essentially with intellectual matters. An examination of both these texts²⁶ shows that the Samhitās are as frequently seen to contain philosophic material as the Upaniṣads are found to discuss subjects of a ritualistic nature. Ritualism and Intellectualism have always thrived in India, side by side, without any mutual antagonism. Granting that some rivalry existed between these two parties, and the tirade in these passages is against only the ritualistic portion of the Samhitās, then again it is wrong to condemn the entire literature for whatever defect that may be attributed to only a part of it.

24 S. Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phil.*, I p. 149

25 Even Deussen (*Sys. Ved.*, p. 18) readily concedes that, in the RV., there are 'sparks of philosophic light,' though his very great enthusiasm for the Upaniṣads makes him feel that it is only in these texts that these sparks burst forth into that bright flame which lights and warms today (*wie die im Rigveda angeschlagenen Funken philosophischen Lichtes weiter und weiter fortglimmen, bis sie endlich in den Upanishad's zu jener hellen Flamme aufschlagen, die noch heute uns zu erleuchten und zu erwärmen vermag*).

26 H. G. Narahari., *op. cit.*, pp. 231 ff.

If, therefore, the Upanisads are to be absolved of the guilt referred to above, it is necessary to interpret in a different way all those passages which, to all outward purposes, seem to rail at the Samhitas. These statements ought to be understood as only hyperbolic in character (*arthavada*), as mere figures of speech employed in emphasizing the importance of the object in view at the time.

The real attitude of the Upanisads towards the Samhitas is thus only that of the devoted follower. They make statements, but claim no originality for their utterances. For whatever they say they hark back to the Samhitas for support so that, if they offer any opinions, these are either repetitions of older Vedic sayings or their explanation in a more elaborate form. From their enthusiastic admiration for the Samhitas, and from the reverent reassertion of their doctrines in which they are consequently engaged, the Upanisads only turn out to be mere exegetical treatises whose one and only purpose is to interpret the doctrine of the Samhitas. They are there to explain the Samhitas, not to examine them, to revive their doctrines, not to refute them.

**THE STORY OF THE COW PUNYAKOTI
AND THE TIGER ARBUTA
By P T NARASIMHACHAR**

“There lived a rich and pious cowherd called Kalinga who had made his home among the hills of Arunagiri and grazed his cows in the surrounding forests. In one of the caves of the hills a hungry tiger called Arbuta lay in wait for a prey.” Thus runs a ballad in our Kannada language. This ballad is known to every man, woman and child of the Karnataka country. It is an old folk song connected with the Samkranti festival in which we decorate and feast our cattle and give them a true holiday. The author of this poem is not known. In one version of the ballad it is dedicated to Sri Narasimha, the deity of Maddur. It may be that the man who put this ancient story into verse might have lived somewhere near that town. The language of this poem is so simple that there is hardly a word in it which a child or a peasant cannot understand. In fact an abridged and amended text of this poem is included in one of our Kannada Primers, thanks to the sagacity and taste of Sri M S Puttanna of revered memory. The poem is extremely simple, nevertheless its ethical import is profound and deserves our special study.

The story of this poem may be briefly stated thus

• One day while the cows were coming home in the dusk, Arbuta, the tiger, who had no food to eat for the past seven days, fell on the herd and caught hold of an unwary cow, Punyakoti by name, which tarried behind, but was hurrying home full of thought for her young calf. The cow asks the tiger to spare her life for a few moments, until she goes home to her child, fondles him and returns. The tiger is naturally reluctant to let go his prey on a mere promise which he is not prepared to trust. But the cow reassures him, “Look here, Tiger, I am a truthful animal. Do not be afraid that I will not return. Have no doubt about my words. I have only one tongue in my mouth, not two. I swear by Almighty God and my illustrious forbears that I will return and not fail you.” The tiger is impressed

by her earnestness, ventures to speculate on her promise of return and lets her go. Sister cows rejoice to see Punyakoti back again in their midst. But Punyakoti has no time to spare. She goes straight to her calf and invites him to suck from her as much milk as he can for the last time. She gives him practical advice concerning himself, his conduct with other cows in pen and forest, and requests her friends to take care of him as one of their own. "Do not go near that hill, my child, there the evil Tiger dwells", says she to her child. Then, despite the pleadings of the calf and other cows, she returns to the forest, enters the cave, stands before the tiger and addresses him in caressing words to make a feast of her and satiate his hunger. But the tiger is amazed at the behaviour of the cow, prefers to die than kill her who is like a sister to him, takes a spring up into the air, falls near the cow and dies. Gods above welcome him. The cow returns home, and Kalinga, the cowherd, initiates a festival on the day of Samkranti to celebrate her deliverance.

Such is the bare outline of the story as told in our Kannada poem. It is an incredible story, but credulous peasants and cowherds believe it as true. How did this fable become a legend and get embedded in the religious belief of our people? Has this lovely work of art a basic human experience, however crude it may be, or did it take its origin in the fancy of a teacher in popular ethics? My friend Sri D. L. Narasimhachar of the Mysore University who has made some research into the history of the fable states that the story itself is ancient but that its transference into a ballad in its present form could not have been done earlier than 1800 A.D. He also refers, as a possible Sanskrit source, to '*Bahulopakhyaṇa*' found in the 30th chapter of a work called '*Itihāsa-samuccaya*'. Here the cow is called Bahula, the tiger Kāmarupi; the incident of their meeting takes place in the hill of Rohana on the bank of the Yamuna. But the tiger Kāmarupi feels remorse for his past action and takes to penance at the end of which he dies. The story is, however, not connected with the Samkranti festival as in our Kannada poem. The swifter end of the tiger in the Kannada poem appears to me to be more artistic and aesthetically more satisfying than the end in the Sanskrit version. In fact the Kannada poem is an artistic triumph.

If art can be described as illusion carried to the power of truth, our poem stands up to this test magnificently. The story is so movingly told, incidents so truly related, basic emotions such as parental love and filial affection are so well portrayed that the reader while reading the story becomes as credulous as any villager who believes it as true*. But here we are not concerned so much with the history of this ballad, fascinating as it promises to be, or its aesthetic value as with the noble mind that conceived the poem now becoming the cow, now of the tiger, and completed a circuit as it were and flashed out a new light on the mystery of life and the spirit's struggle through it towards its own dominion.

At first sight it may appear to a casual reader that the eternal problem of the conflict between good and evil is presented in this poem in a telling manner—the good prevailing at the end, non-violence triumphing over violence—or that emphasis is laid on truthfulness. But on a closer examination one will find that the poem does not deal merely with these problems. In this tale one sees absolute non-resistance to evil in action. In fact it is neither non-resistance nor passive resistance, nor yet Satyagraha, i.e., neither indifference towards evil nor a passive nor an active although non-violent protest against evil. It is more than all these three modes of apprehension of and contention with evil. To name it is difficult. Perhaps we may call it active non-resistance to evil. It is an alchemical process in which evil is transmuted into good. It is non-violence working in its pure and nascent state—a state yet to be achieved by men, perhaps dreamt of by Gandhi. One sees here a supreme effort of the individual consciousness to rise to the level of cosmic consciousness overcoming the resistance of selfhood.

Let us examine a little more closely the behaviour of our *Punya-koti* and make a study of her character. She is a simple creature, one among the herd. She is neither a *Kamadhenu* nor a *Surabhi*, the cow of the sage *Vasistha*. She is fond of roaming in the forest with her sister cows. She has a weakness for the sweet grass grown on the hills. (Perhaps that is why she tarries behind and meets *Arbuta*.) She is sociable and no recluse. She is liked by all her neighbours, and

* For a fuller treatment of the poem refer to *Popular Culture in Karnataka* by Sri M. Venkatesa Iyengar.

is an affectionate mother. She has a love for life and does not consider existence a sin or a burden, and is afraid of the tiger as all other cows are. She is not a Yogin nor an Arhat nor a Bodhisatta. She is neither seer nor saint. No, not a prophet nor a hero nor a fanatic who is out to become a martyr in the propagation of a new faith. Her meeting with the tiger is accidental. She never sought him with any motive whatsoever. Having met him, she resigns herself to her ill luck, accepts the necessity to die without question. But poor little mother, she has a calf at home, hungry and eagerly awaiting her return to suck her teats (as hungry perhaps as the tiger whom God has so made as to depend on her flesh for his existence). She must go and comfort her child. To this irrepressible desire she yields like a true mother—and she dares to pray to the tiger to let her go if only for a few moments. While reading the stanzas dealing with this portion of the story, one feels as if the cow is pleading for the loan of her own life, from the tiger, like a poor man trying to borrow a small sum from a rich man to tide over an urgent need. The earnestness of the cow must have impressed the noble Arbuda and the fact that she had a hungry calf at home must have touched a tender chord in his heart as he himself was hungry and knew its pangs. The loan was lent and the cow came back to return it with the interest of gratitude added thereto.

The manner in which Punyakoti gave herself up to the tiger is unique in the history of all noble acts of self sacrifice.

Come Brother come O Royal Tiger
Really I have sinned by keeping you hungry
Now have your meal
And be content
Here is muscle here is meat
Here my heart & warm blood
Eat drink and rejoice,
And may you live long!
Do not be angry with me my friend
Forget all your sufferings
Eat to your fill!
May you be happy and live long!

Simple, but moving words. Martyrs have rarely such a graceful attitude towards their persecutors. There is not a trace of

bitterness or pride or consciousness of superiority or depression of spirit or despair or any kind of hectic feeling of achievement and triumph in Punyakoti. She sees no other good or end than that of satiation of the Tiger by her sacrifice. Her attitude towards life appears as if it is a pledge offered to God bound by an oath — “Never to disobey, never to accuse, never to blame aught that He has given, never unwillingly to do or suffer any necessary thing,” as said by sage Epictetus. She was able to keep her oath by conquering the greatest of all desires, the desire to live. Complete mastery over this most uncontrollable of all desires has given such a grace to her act of self surrender that one is lost in wonder at its contemplation. By this miraculous process, the evil has become good, the timid bold, the awesome loveable and deserving of compassion. The spirit has become triumphant and has upset the order of Nature. A mutation has occurred in her inexorable law. The cow is no more afraid of the Tiger, and instead of having the feeling of a victim she stands before him—like an elder sister before her ailing brother full of love and eagerness to help. No wonder she was able to set in motion another marvellous mutative process in the nature of the Tiger Arbuta. To each his desire, to God her soul, to this Royal Tiger her flesh and blood, and to her self the joy of being able to satisfy both.

Looking at this wondrous being, Arbuta must have for the first time felt a doubt whether flesh and blood were all that constituted his desire. He must have wondered how this gentle cow was able to overcome the fear of him and what made her feel that it was better for her to cast away her body which clothed her life before him than retain it. No, he would not touch a cow who is not afraid of him and whose heartbeat is not quickened to mad speed at his sight. He is accustomed to the flavour of fear in a cow, this one had rendered her meat tasteless by a process unheard of before. The whole world must have undergone a change for a cow to seek him out thus and plead for being eaten up, without calling him names, blaming God and her accursed life. Arbuta must have gazed at this Punyakoti in utter amazement, and at his own claws and teeth with profound self pity. These are now useless appendages. To think that his pride and his

very life depended on them! His dependence on animals like the cow for existence might have produced in him a sense of humiliation and a feeling of disgust for his wretched body which is to be fed on flesh and blood every day in wearisome monotony. Perhaps there may be a freer and more joyous existence unconditioned by such violent necessities elsewhere than here which this cow has discerned and covets. Why should he not also switch off his desire from this wretched body of the cow and have similar aspiration for a higher existence? Such swift thoughts must have passed through the mind of the tiger dispelling the mist of self and spiritualising him. It seems as if the divine impulse generated by Punyakoti through her faith in God and righteous living was able to transmute the nature of Arbuda from *bhoga* to *varāgya*.

“‘You are my sister born of the same womb,
What do I gain by killing thee’
Thus saying the Royal Tiger immediately
Freed his life from his self’

His is not an act of suicide, but a holy act acceptable to the Gods. Our venerable author says—“Brahma took his soul and Śiva his skin.” So did the Tiger die and the Cow live—a miraculous end for both, which, in the course of this strange drama neither of them had the least forethought of.

Thus ends the story of the cow Punyakoti and the Royal Tiger Arbuda. These creatures are rare creations of a rare and noble mind. Be true to your own nature and act in conformity with it at all times. Wear the veil of self with which you are endowed as a protective garment and which appears to divide you and the all-pervading spirit but ineffectively, as lightly and as thinly as possible. Be always prepared to throw it away without much ado at the call of your higher nature. Leave Destiny to work out its own end. Never look forward for achievement and results. These are the ethical lessons to learn from this lovely poem of our first great modern Kannada Poet. His simple narration reveals to us the remarkable truth that when a highly spiritualized soul comes into active contact with another soul, with whatever nature he may be endowed, the result is the spiritualization of the other—not its subjugation or humiliation.

THE OLD QUESTION ·

By M. NARAYANA RAO

Whence is that clear and distinct differentness and individuality fundamental to experience despite the akinness in each case, of the sensory and motor nerve mechanism purporting to operate on the same object matter, collecting impressions, forming concepts and resolutions—that strange something which undoubtedly appears to own, guide, and regulate the body contents and its psychic counterpart, to know, feel and will through the same and to imprint on it, and disclose through it, a before and an after? Its passions and aspirations far transcend the body and certainly the disparate and isolate reflex acts of the mental process in the dream state where, without the objective background, the mind purports to act on itself, its dreamless condition is bereft of content and of it one can say nothing, for one can know nothing except perhaps predicating that while it excludes the waking and the dream states, which in turn exclude it, yet behind these three together there remains a strange “Continuum” The awareness such as is in the waking and the dream states is the awareness of an object or its absence coupled always with the awareness that you are aware thereof. You always think and know that you think so and you cannot doubt that you think and must while thinking even of nothing or even doubting, exist to be aware that you are thinking or doubting, so that in the background of it all, awareness and existence coalesce and operate to constitute together a continuity wherein the spatial and temporal contents of the different states of experiences stand and are held. A great truth about this background is that it is not a nullity nor a void, but is rich and vital. Without it coherent experience perishes. Can we live at all, and for any duration, except at risk of reason and sanity, without dreamless sleep? The dreamless state is therefore the most potent source from which is drawn all that is essential and necessary to make one up. But it appears to us no more than a vague background of which we can have no “Knowledge”, for the organism, the sensory and the motor mechanism through which it acts, and the spatial and temporal objective sheet on which intellect operates are themselves all evolved,

in particular circumstances and limited to particular purposes. But the background does appear as an objective mother substance in and beyond form, space and perhaps time, as indeed a stuff from which opposites emerge and surprises come. We can "know" no more of it. Such is the background in which we fundamentally stand.

But besides the intellect, co-ordinated and operating jointly with it, appear other unities of experience being part of the willing and feeling aspects or zones of life and mind. Such are our pet intuitions, beliefs and aspirations. They certainly must bespeak something of our real self and its nature. Now everyone ever strives to achieve happiness and avoid pain. Psychologically this is the motive spring of all conduct. Everyone likewise abhors death, even a suggestion of it. Everyone hates all that fleets and aspires to secure that which makes for permanence in things and matters. Everybody wants to be happy and to be eternally cognisant of himself as happy and does not tolerate even a moment's lapse or forgetfulness in this behalf. Each one of us desires to be free and to be uncontrolled by another or by circumstance, himself to dominate and to control. These phenomena are essential and common in all human nature, and many times in animal and plant nature.

Whence are these? Not surely from the outside object, judging from the way in which the mind and its object interact. An object outside the mind creates an impression on the mind through its sensory and motor mechanism and occasions a desire, a desire being a state of tension or unrest of the mind. Satisfaction of desire by proximity, control and exploitation of the object desired operates to relieve the tension. Pleasure or happiness then appears, but only so long as another state of tension is not there or a new desire does not bring in a new state of tension. A new sense object brings in a new desire and so goes the mind caught in the whirl of objects and desires, let loose in their midst. But there is nothing in the object itself in the nature of an attribute or quality directly communicating or transferring pleasure from itself to the mind. Were it so, surely, all desires should cease with the possession, control and exploitation of a single desired object or thing, and this in the case of all men in all circumstances. Happiness therefore is but what appears in the self itself as such, and looking again at and

analysing the likes and dislikes, the proprietary instincts and experience of mankind,* it will be found that things and matters including our nearest and dearest belongings are liked, owned and exploited not for anything intrinsic in themselves but on account of the self claiming them, not indeed the nerve and bone mechanism or the matter composing it or the breath therein, but the transcendental unity appearing to experience in and through them and despite them but not engendered by them

The phenomena of individual experience, their contents in space and time, the before and after thereof postulate, presuppose and remain materially affiliated to and controlled and regulated by forces of nature, matter and energy and are subsumed in the ordered beauty and majesty of nature, which imply and carry with them an equal cause in potentiality power and sentience acting through space and time and other cosmic modes and cosmic matter. But in causation, as we know it to operate even if cosmic, in whatever form, the cause wholly or in part perishes with the effect which in turn is a modification thereof or an evolute therefrom. If as suggested above the fundamental in the individual is not in this sense an effect resulting from the interaction between it and the objective world, the law of causation in any form ceases to be explanatory of the unknowable substratum.

Our yearnings, aspirations, intuitions, beliefs and "Short Falls" impossible to ignore, suggest a state of eternity, an all pervading and exclusive existence and sentience, unconditioned happiness, and absolute freedom—"perfection". The foregoing cannot be attributes, for attributes condition the substance and limit each other. Nothing modified can really be eternally and alongside with perfection, since it encompasses its exclusiveness. Whatever is modified really ends and therefore is not and cannot be unbeginning for the unbeginning would not end unless its unbeginningness is equivalent to mere non cognition of absence thereof. Individuality such as is found beyond the individual in form, is not caused by anything known in the individual form or any thing outside it but is unapprehended except while and in so far as you purport to act as a unit against another and also think of yourself "in relatedness". Yet in reality the opposite thereof, viz, the unrelated, the self

cognized and the unlimited, etc , is the substratum, for we feel opposite of the ' Ought' How is this co existence of opposites possible ?

Can we reconcile them and only on foot of the argument from the postulated " perfection " which if it should prevail, as appears it must, individuality as such in the individual must be an obsession of the mind in the individual, while reflecting the substratum, falsely personating it and wrongfully fancying to itself what does not properly belong to it Can we predicate the same of what appears urged upon us as an individual in cosmic shape, force and sentience ?

MORAL PROGRESS AND THE IDEA OF NON-VIOLENCE

By N A NIKAM

The idea of Progress is derived from the biological sciences and the theory of evolution. In the theory of evolution, the evolution of a 'better' type means the evolution of a better 'adapted' type. Adaptation is adjustment, adjustment is a compromise—it is gaining something and losing something. It is compensation. Natural evolution, therefore, does not support a theory of downright absolute progress or 'development', but of change. And the endlessness of natural evolution is no guarantee of the continuity or perfection of the species, for, what has its origins in a natural process may again disappear by the same process. Huxley, at least, encouraged no hopes about perfectibility or continuity of the species in evolution. 'The theory of evolution' he said, "encourages no millennial anticipations. If for millions of years, our globe has taken the upward road, yet sometime the summit will be reached and the down route will be commenced!" (Collected Essays IX p 85)

Yet it must be conceded that the alteration in man's state, from primitive life to the complicated life of modern civilization, is a degree of improvement in which science has played a stupendous part. Science has enabled man to conquer Nature, it has equated knowledge with power, and has transformed man's outward estate. It has given him mastery over Nature. Mastery over himself he has yet to achieve. The *Mahabharata* says in the *Śantiparvan* "The secret of the Vedas is Truth—of Truth, self control, of self control, salvation. This is all comprehensive Law". So it is one thing to speak of historic and scientific progress and another to speak of moral progress. Lotze says in his *Philosophy of Religion* "The only sort of progress which incontestably takes place is in our knowledge of Nature and our command over it as a means to the realization of our desires. There is nothing in this progress however, to make us feel that it must have been won by spiritual effort" (p 147—148). The cosmic process has given shape and form to the physical world, and Nature has made man. Hereafter, if Man has

to live, he must make himself This is the clear lesson of the crisis in human destiny in which we now find ourselves, and the turning point in the evolution of the world which we have now reached

Nature made man, but it is not going to make a superman of him A superman he must make himself A loitering process of evolution is not going to lead man to his true destiny Hegel used to say "*Der Welt geist hat Zeith genug*" The world spirit is in no hurry True for it has all the immensity of Time before it, and in treating of Universal History, we must look upon, said James Ward, a thousand years as but one day. But the real problem is not one of time, it is one of agency and effort Belief in evolution (in any of its types), or in a world spirit, or in Fate, is against human effort and exertion "Son, always strive with exertion, without exertion, Fate will not achieve their purpose for kings I consider human endeavour as greater, by believing in Fate, one confounds oneself"—is the advice of Bhishma to Yudhishthira Man is a product of natural evolution, but must now bring about a *revolution* in his life The peaceful and leisurely growth of organic nature *must give place to a revolution wrought by his self effort* [⊙] And it must be a revolution different from any known either to Nature, or to History It must be Non violent [†] It must transform man's inner life, lay the foundations of a new social relationship, and bring a message of hope and deliverance to the world and not cast it into darkness and despair

In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel introduces the idea of Liberty as the purpose and goal and end of universal History, and of man's moral progress Hegel believed that the actual course of Universal History was a manifestation, and unfolding, and march, of the Absolute Spirit Its actual course, therefore, is its proper course 'The real is the rational and the rational is the real' This is a variation of Leibniz's doctrine of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, new in its application to the concrete process of History

* Verily God will not change the condition of men till they change what is in themselves. (The Quran)

† Unless some way out is found which renders war obsolete which will eliminate it from the course of human progress, the future is dark beyond measure General Smuts on the task before the San Francisco Conference.

It is an expression of Hegel's faith in the rationality of the historical process, and an acquiescence in the *status quo* of things. The historical process, according to Hegel, is no accidental expression of the relations of events, but of Necessity, not the necessity, however, of a cause being inevitably followed by effect, but the all-compelling necessity, which is *moral*. In his *Philosophy of Mind*, Hegel says "It is the spirit which not merely broods over History as over the waters but lives in it and is alone its principle of movement and the path of that spirit, liberty" (p 267 Lowenberg *Selections*)

I have no quarrel with Hegel over his historical pantheism or his characteristic faith in the rationality of the historical process and of the progressive realisation or development of liberty in History and Civilisation. I sincerely hope that it may be so. In some far off day, in the immensity of Time, may Liberty spread her beneficent wings like mellow and warm sunshine over the Universe, and on every thing great and small in it. What is however, revolting to me in his Philosophy of History, is the means by which the world spirit is supposed to achieve its end. Hegel says, in apparent admiration of the world spirit 'It is the cunning of reason that it uses passion in its service'. It is no doubt 'cunning' of reason, but not very noble of it. And, Hegel argues as nothing great is ever accomplished in History * without passion and self interest, so passion and self interest are the means of the world spirit. "The manifestations of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples, are, at the same time, the means and instruments of a higher and broader purpose of which they know nothing—which they realise unconsciously" (p 370, *Philosophy of History* Lowenberg—*Selections from Hegel*)

Why unconsciously? Is the relation between individuals and the world spirit after all negative? Is it impossible for man to enter into conscious relationship with the world spirit, which is, according to Hegel, a divine manifestation in the temporal order of things. And how is the higher and broader purpose of the world spirit realised through the baser passions of man? How does Universal Liberty

* Compare Mahatma Gandhi's view of History with that of Hegel. History then is a record of an interruption of the course of Nature. Soul force being natural is not noted in history. (p 170 Speeches and writings. Natesan & Co Fourth Edition.)

come to be established on earth through man's passions and conflicting self-interests as the inevitable means of the world-spirit? World peace and liberty cannot be established securely through world-passions, world passions have entailed cycles of wars and national tragedies. Violence has begotten only violence, nationalism is opposed by nationalism, racialism is embittered by racialism, poisoning the social relationship of men. Hegel was manifestly wrong when he said that nothing great is ever accomplished without self-interest. Perhaps nothing great, but nothing good ever is. This global war is a great thing, a great conflagration, awful like a tragedy, and sublime to contemplate, but good neither to the victors nor to the vanquished. If universal destruction is the broader and higher purpose of the world spirit, then it has achieved its purpose and has brought a peace, which is universal, because it is universal in destruction.

We must find a new ethics, a new philosophy of action, which will give direction to "the rolling wheels of this great world," which will bring deliverance and not throw it into despair. We need an awakening of the spirit, a new conception of the social relationship of man, a new weapon to fight for liberty, which is good for this world and a world hereafter. Nothing is achieved without toil, but there are toils and ways of toiling. "The unknowing toil wedded to sense, so let the enlightened toil, sense-freed, but set to bring the world deliverance, and its bliss, not sowing in those simple busy hearts, seed of despair" (*The Song Celestial*, Arnold Bk III). The world is struck with death, amidst death, let us contemplate life and how to live, universal is violence now, amidst violence, let us contemplate non-violence. "The world is strong, but what discerns it is stronger, and the mind strongest, and high over all the ruling soul, wherefore—put forth full force of soul in thy own soul" (*Ibid*).

II

In the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, Dharma is described as 'subtle'. So is Non violence. The doctrine of Non-violence is not new to the world, Buddha and Christ preached it. Its application to politics is, at least, Gandhi's. "Centuries of life make a little history, and centuries of history make a little tradition", says Sir S. Radhakrishnan. Non violence as a religion and as a way of life,

has been our tradition, our history, it is now our life I cannot go into all the aspects of a subtle and transcendental doctrine like Non-violence, which, in its application to international relations and the ethics of war, is controversial and difficult of treatment Non-violence is not a popular doctrine, although the World as a result of its suffering appears to me to be nearer to it than before I cannot even claim that, in making a few points on it, I shall have interpreted the doctrine correctly or satisfactorily I am not, moreover expounding, or defending a political doctrine, but a philosophy I seek to interpret an idea

Gokhale used to say Public life must be spiritualised We see the need to spiritualise international relations also And the doctrine of Non violence is Religion in its application to public life and international politics It has no institutional foundation as yet, or has had no successful institutional foundation But thought precedes action, and ideas precede practical policies So let us take care of our thoughts and our ideas It is a charge against philosophy that it only interprets the world, without changing it Of Non violence as a philosophy and as a doctrine I do not believe that that criticism would hold good, for, Non violence seeks to alter the world more radically than the Marxist philosophy of society But many things are possible, if man begins to conduct a new experiment upon himself

Mahatma Gandhi named his Auto biography *The Story of my Experiments with Truth* As Truth means to him non violence, so his auto biography is the story of his experiment or experiments in non violence Why did Mahatma Gandhi call it 'experiment'? Did he mean by it an experiment only needing verification and lacking conviction? No, he meant by experiment an experience, of the truth which was not borrowed from, or based upon, an external source or authority, however great and ancient To do so would have been easier, for, greater persons than he—the Buddha and Christ had preached it and Christ had died on the Cross for it Or he could have borrowed it from Jainism, of which *Ahimsa* is a cardinal doctrine But he did not do so He preferred to discover the truth of non violence in his own experience and believe or disbelieve in its efficacy on the ground of

his suffering and experience of it ¹ Non-violence was an adventure of his spirit. It was born in the travail of his experience, and only his experience to the contrary could refute it. In this, Gandhi is a Rationalist, and is in the unbroken line of Hindu Thought and tradition. So those who believe in the truth² and efficacy of Non violence cannot merely borrow it even on Mahatma Gandhi's authority, if their own experience does not bear witness to its truth. No one can be merely persuaded to accept a great doctrine, no doubt, it must be taught, but through meditation and experience, it must sink into one's soul and become part of one's own experience. "Thus hath been opened thee this Truth of Truths, the Mystery more hid than any secret mystery. Meditate! and as thou wilt—then act", must be the way of all teachers. It is the way of Gandhi. His experience may not be, or may not yet be, ours, but there seems no way of understanding him except sharing his experience, or, taking our experience to him. If Non violence were an intellectual theory, then it could perhaps be held or supported by logical arguments ³. As Mahatma Gandhi always speaks of his experience, so his statements have a directness and intuitive power and for the same reason, appear to others, unconvincing and also irrefutable. "If the road I have shown to lead to is very difficult, it can yet be discovered. And clearly it must be very hard when it is so seldom found. But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare" said Spinoza, and that may also be true of Gandhi.

Non violence is an experience of the human spirit, not merely the political programme of a political party. I am not interested in

1 But I have never presented to India that extreme form of non violence if only because I do not regard myself fit enough to deliver that ancient message. Though my intellect has fully understood and grasped it it has not as yet become part of my whole being. My strength lies in asking my people to do nothing that I have not tried repeatedly in my own life. *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* Natesan & Co IV Edn p 971

2 I have repeatedly stated that *Satyagraha* never fails and that one perfect Satyagraha is enough Truth. (*Speeches & Writings* p 200)

3 "Ahimsa is an ideal which we have to reach and it is an ideal to be reached even at this very moment if we are capable of doing so. But it is not a proposition in geometry to be learnt by heart, it is not even like solving a difficult problem in higher mathematics" (p 331 Ibid.)

Kalyan

the actual political programme, nor in defending its practical mistakes of policy. To-day it is non-co-operation with the Government, tomorrow it may be co-operation. ^① Non-violence has its basis in experience and so is 'empirical'. It is not a ready-made design ² like the constructed plot of a novel, not a deductive system of motives and consequences, but a movement of the human spirit, organic and growing, like life, and perhaps 'inconsistent' like life, now a tragic, 'Himalayan failure', now cancelling all failures with one stroke of success, now impossibly humble, now lion-hearted and full of spirit, essentially experimental, and therefore new in every situation, and full of the immense possibilities of the human spirit. Alfred Zimmern writing on *The Third British Empire* says "In attempting to describe the Third British Empire, I am reminded of the old Greek Philosopher Heraclitus, whose cardinal maxim was 'everything flows', or in other words, all life is flux. "No one" he said, "has ever crossed the same river twice." "No, nor even once", said one of his pupils, 'for it has become a different river by the time you have crossed it' " (P 4 *The Third British Empire*) And Mahatma Gandhi said the other day, after his release, that in the non-violent movement, "History can never repeat itself"

Non-violence has been taught at great intervals in World-History, and primarily as a religion which was individualistic in character. In Mahatma Gandhi's doctrine of Non-violence, its religious element is conserved but is extended to social and political spheres. It may be said of Gandhi, as was said of Socrates, that he brought Non-violence from heaven to earth. What was primarily an individualistic doctrine of salvation, is now applied to collective action. Religion is brought nearer to Society, in a new and significant way, it is made to vitalise a decaying society. Non violence is not the philosophy of a defeated nation, it is rather a philosophy, which if accepted and practised, may not defeat a nation. Non-violence is War, a 'war without violence'. In his Divine Comedy, Dante describes a fight—a furious and terrific fight between a human being

① 'A Satyagrahi sometimes appears to disobey laws and the constituted authority only to prove in the end his regard for both.' p. 302 Ibid.

2. 'A struggle which has to be previously planned is not a righteous struggle' p. 204. Ibid)

and a serpent. In the course of the combat, a remarkable transformation comes over the combatants. The human form of the human being gradually loses its features, and acquires those of the serpent, while the serpent loses its, and acquires the physical form of its opponent. This is Dante's way of illustrating, through his poetic imagination, the change which violence causes to combatants in a war of violence—the important and fearful transformation being the one which comes over the human being. In a war of violence, man loses his nature and becomes ruthless and brutal, and through his emotions ruthlessness and brutality sink into the 'secret places' of his soul. He becomes like a pilotless plane. Before he makes deadly weapons, man makes his emotions deadly. He becomes a slave. "Human lack of power in moderating and checking the emotions," says Spinoza, "I call servitude." And in all this display of ruthlessness of emotion, man loses the quality of courage, he becomes 'a wild beast or a slave'.

Non-violence is the philosophy of the soldier. It is not the philosophy of the weak, or the sentimental, or the despondent, or the stubborn, or the fanatical. There is a resolution in it not sicklied over with the pale cast of thought. It is a philosophy of 'sweet reasonableness' and of Courage. Non-violence is not a philosophy of power, nor the display of power. In the *Mahabharata*, Yudhishthira is described as 'mild in the display of power' (*Mrduparakram*). And in constructing his ideal State, Plato selects for his guardians natures which have in them a combination of two opposite qualities spirit and gentleness of nature. For, without this combination, instead of destroying their enemies they would destroy themselves, said Plato. While Plato prescribed the Lyre and the Harp as instruments of Music which were to be played to the exclusion of any others, he did not prescribe for his guardians, weapons light or heavy, for them to fight with. He was satisfied if their soul was full of spirit. "Did you never observe" asks Socrates in the *Republic*, "How the presence of spirit makes the soul of any creature absolutely fearless?" and in another passage asks "Is there any more important task than to be a good soldier?"

What makes a 'good soldier'? The superficial and ready answer is weapons, and the art of using them. If weapons are

taken away, does a soldier cease to be a soldier? There is the story of the Great Arjuna. Arjuna was a warrior to whom fighting was native to his soul. He was not a stranger to the sight of red, raw, human blood. He had fought many a battle, and won. On the battlefield of Kurukshetra he was not without weapons, nor were his weapons inferior to those of his enemies. Nor was he fighting for a lost cause. His cause was just, it was righteous, and all the ways of avoiding conflict by arms were tried and had failed. Arjuna *knew* that his cause was righteous, and he had allies too. He had even the guidance of a divine hand in the person of his charioteer to lead him on to battle. Yet, this Arjuna, the hero of many a battle, the man who had in him power to turn defeat into victory lost his nerve. He lost his will to resist. His resolution to fight *was* sicklied over with the pale cast of thought. And his steel frame became weak and wet with perspiration, and his mind confused and confounded, allowed his hand to let slip from its grasp his famous weapon, the Gāndīva Bow. Of what avail are weapons, then, if the will to resist is lost. Nonviolence is the Will to Resist. What about weapons? What about life? Is not human life a weapon? What is there dearer to oneself than one's life? So, if those who fight with no other weapons than with their lives, are they not brave, and are they fighting without weapons?

Non-violence, I said, is the philosophy of the soldier, it is truly the philosophy of the Hero. The Cross in the life of Christ, and the Fast in Gandhi's life symbolise this heroic struggle.

But the moral progress of man, in the international sphere, has not yet been such as to make resistance of aggression possible without bombs and weapons. Because it has not been as yet possible, it does not follow that, in civil life, we must settle our disputes with them. This is the little difference between Anarchy and non-violent struggle, and this is¹ also the little difference between Gandhian Revolution and any other Revolution in History.

I cannot say, however, that Non Violence may not undergo modification in its application to international relations. It may not be

1. Terrorism is the very worst thing for India in a special manner, because India is a foreign soil for terrorism to flourish in. (Ibid p. 870)

inconsistent with righteous war¹ After all, the world is imperfect although it is improving, as Radhakrishnan is fond of saying Non-violence is inconsistent with aggression but may not be inconsistent with a defensive, and righteous war It may undergo modification without being contrary to its central spirit and motive, like all transcendental doctrines which undergo an apparent modification in their application to practical problems And, like all transcendental doctrines, Non-violence must be consistent with Reason Non-violence is an all comprehensive law, and its absoluteness cannot be sacrificed to the exaltation of a particular something The preservation of life is not an absolute law,² though to do nothing wrong is absolute as law My non violence for example, would be considered absurd, if, seeing a child in the coils of a snake, I refuse to kill the snake on the sole ground that killing in itself is bad, or I adopt a policy of 'non intervention' and am content to say that so long as I am not attacked I shall not interfere If I did so then my non-violence is inconsistent with Reason, (it may not be non violence at all!), and I shall have sacrificed it for the exaltation of a particular thing Yet, what seems absurd in private life, did not seem absurd in international life A future historian may say that the foreign policies of the Great Powers was a kind of 'non violent non intervention' when Italy invaded Abyssinia, and Japan invaded Manchuria All these are things now of the past So, Non violence, in international relations, does not mean or may not mean, Non

(1) 'Literally speaking *Ahimsa* means non killing But to me it has a world of meaning and takes me into realms much higher infinitely higher than the realm to which I would go if I merely understood by *Ahimsa* non killing (p 380, Ibid)

(2) I do not say eschew violence in your dealing with robbers or with nations that may invade India But in order that we are better able to do so, we must learn to restrain ourselves My method of non violence can

never lead to loss of strength but it alone will make it possible if the nation

→wills it to offer disciplined and concerted violence in time of danger. p 93.

Speeches and Writings. (But this is an inconsequential passage This does not imply a straightforward advocacy of war I think Mahatma Gandhi would say, as Yudhishtira said Why should a man go to war? Who is so cursed by the Gods that he would select war? (Udoga Parva Section XXVI)

intervention Non-violence is not so much the absence of war, as the ethics of it. It is not just a question whether to have, or not to have 'standing armies', but having armies which only stand. Non-violence is not resignation to aggression, but resistance of it. It is not a question, solely, of fighting with weapons or without weapons, but an indiscriminate use of them, (including the weapon of Fasting). Non violence is not the saving of mere life, it is rather the fearlessness of death. 'Satara is the abandonment of the fear of death,' (Gandhi) If to save life were an absolute law, Christ would not have died on the Cross

III

The war is not yet over, but the end of it is happily in sight. Victory is sighted on the horizon. To have lived to see it is good fortune. But we must approach the end of the war, "with the realisation", as Sir William Beveridge says, "that military victory is not in itself the end, but only an opportunity". The victory which a righteous war may bring may be lost, were victory to bring vengeance in its train. A Peace of Vengeance may be more violent than even a War of Violence. The reconstruction of the world, which is a greater task than winning the war, must be undertaken in a sober, and humble, and thankful spirit. Let not victory send us into the delirium of wild emotions, which are as irrational as timidity or despair. Let victory sound the note of harmony of Peace and Freedom, 'expressive of entreaty, or persuasion, of prayer to God, or instruction of man, or again, of willingness to listen to persuasion or entreaty and advice, and which represents him (a brave man) when he has accomplished his aim, not carried away by success, but acting moderately and wisely, and acquiescing in the event' (Plato, *The Republic* Bk. III) And here is a parallel, from the epic of Mahabharata, the story of the greatest of wars in the ancient world, which is of application to contemporary international events, and warns us against the mood which victory brings. It relates to the fight between Duryodhana and Bhima.

"Flames arose out of the collision of the maces of Duryodhana and Bhima who made various circular movements"

"Jumping then like a lion and running up to Duryodhana Bhima aimed his mace with force at his thighs"

“Dhṛtarāṣṭra's son, Duryodhana, the best of men, fell.”

“Having thus struck Duryodhana down, the valorous Bhīma kicked the head of the great king, turning it with his foot this side and that.”

“Yudhiṣṭhira told this to the dancing Bhīma: You have cleared the debt of enmity; you have fulfilled your vow; do not kick his head with your foot; let not *Dharma* be transgressed by you; this Duryodhana who has been killed is a King and kinsman; you sinless soul, this is not proper for you.”

THE PLACE OF THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA IN THE LITERATURE OF INDIAN POLITY

BY K A NILAKANTA SASTRI

Kauṭilya's *Arthashastra* was a subject of keen controversy which lasted for nearly three decades from its discovery in 1909. It is not my aim to reopen the discussion and traverse the well-trodden ground once again. It is rather to take advantage of the present lull, and what we can make out in general about the meaning and significance of this unique work. I have nothing very new to offer, but I feel that it may not be altogether valueless to set forth briefly the results of study and reflection extending over some years and my debt to all the great scholars, Indian and European, who have contributed so richly to the elucidation of this difficult book will be evident to all students of the subject. I must, however, lay some stress on the method of approach developed by Breloer in his *Kauṭilya Studien*, particularly the first two studies, for in the third he has, alas! fallen a victim to Nazi prepossessions, and proceeded to interpret Kauṭilya in terms of Hitlerism. Breloer's approach by way of comparative study of contemporary political and administrative institutions of different lands has, it seems to me, been fruitful of valuable results, and gone far to correct the very doubtful conclusions reached by Otto Stein in his *Megasthenes and Kauṭilya*. I agree in substance with Mr. Breloer that Stein's comparisons of the data from the two authors were too superficial and mechanical to have led to trustworthy conclusions.

It would be well for me, before proceeding further, to state summarily my personal view of the date and authorship of the *Arthashastra*. Subject to certain reservations which are inevitable in the case of so old a text, I believe that the work has come down to us in the main as it left the hands of the great Mauryan Chancellor, some parts might have been revised, the *Śasanadhihara* for instance, as Stein has demonstrated, — and minor changes especially in geographical names might have crept in elsewhere owing to the ignorance of the copyists. But on the whole, in spite of everything that has

and apart from the usual Hindu view which denied to the king any legislative power, the statement of Kauṭilya about the superior validity of the royal edict before which all other sources of law give way *does* mark a great and significant departure from the view of royal power that had been general till his time

Its significance can be better understood by turning to a consideration of some other features in which the Kauṭilya differs from other works. It adumbrates a vast bureaucracy busying itself over the study, regulation and control of the entire field of the nation's social and economic activities, and of a degree of centralised control altogether unknown in India till we reach the period of British rule. The Adhyakshapracara (Book II) with its detailed description of town-planning, fortification, finance and financial administration, together with the duties of nearly thirty adhyakshas (superintendents, heads of departments), is altogether unique in our political literature, and may well stand comparison with a modern manual of administration. The volume of authentic and up to date information at the disposal of the State regarding each city and village, the number of its inhabitants and their occupations, its resources in land, cattle and so on, must have been very considerable if the precepts of Kauṭilya were followed, and *prima facie* there is little reason to doubt that they were followed in the best days of the Mauryan empire. Monumental strength, precision in detail, and a perfect finish have been hailed as the chief characteristics of Mauryan art by its students, and these characteristics have been generally traced by them to the study and adaptation of foreign models—Achaemenian and Hellenistic. Is it too far fetched to suggest that the elaborate organisation of the machinery of government and the unusual emphasis laid on the collection and collation of exact factual information on the resources of the empire also owe a good deal to the same sources of inspiration? In his scholarly and penetrating studies on the Hellenistic monarchies Rostovtzeff has shown that the imperial organisation of Alexander such as it was and the administrative systems of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic monarchies of Syria and Egypt took over many of the administrative principles and much of the practice that had prevailed in the Persian empire that had held sway in the whole of Western Asia and Egypt before the advent of Alexander. And

Kauṭilya declares at the end of his Śāsanādhikāra that he based his comprehensive work not only on all the pre-existing śāstras but on a study of prevailing practice as well—Sarvaśāstranyupakramya prayoga-nupalabhya ca. The scope of this reference to prayoga (practice) need not necessarily have been confined to India, but might well have extended to the Western lands with which there had always been some contact maintained by India. And this contact had increased considerably in consequence of the formation and break up of the Macedonian empire of Alexander.

Let us now turn to another large and significant fact. In the sphere of administration of justice Kauṭilya distinguishes two types of courts—the dharmasthiya and kaṇṭakaśodhana. The former are the ordinary law courts known from all Indian books on polity, they deal with vyavahara (litigation) schematically divided into eighteen heads. In some works, there justice is administered by royal officials assisted by the advice of learned Brahmins versed in law, and procedure is governed by strict rules relating to plea, counter-plea and rejoinder. The Kaṇṭakaśodhana courts were of quite a different character, the name means 'removal of thorns', and the commentators explain it as referring to wicked persons who were, as it were, thorns to the body politic. These courts were conducted only by the officials of the Central executive—three of them sitting as one court, and there was no consultation with jurists, the procedure would also appear to have been much more summary in character, and in some instances cases that had started in the dharma courts were transferred to the kaṇṭakaśodhana when it was not convenient to deal with the matter under the strict rules of procedure prevailing in the dharmasthiya. The types of cases that normally came before the kaṇṭakaśodhana courts comprised a great variety, merchants using short weights or false measures to defraud the public, corrupt officials who for a consideration refrained from enforcing the laws against their favourites, those who openly and of set purpose defied the rules of caste, society or religion, artisans who failed to keep their engagements with their employers, physicians who became responsible for the death of their patients owing to lack of skill on their part, those who committed rape on maidens, those who showed one girl as the bride and substituted another in her place at the time of the

marriage ceremony—all these find a place among the thorns the removal of which formed the main task of these courts. They were also to take steps to provide against national calamities due to the action of the elements, pests like rats and so on. They had power to elicit confessions by torture and they employed spies and *agents-prolocateurs* for the detection of crimes.

Thus the Kanṭakaśodhana was only a quasi-judicial department and its work had more in common with the functions of a modern police organisation than a judiciary. The other writers on polity like Manu do indeed mention Kanṭakaśodhana among the duties of the king, they do it, however, not in the forcible and full-blooded manner of Kauṭilya, but as a kind of half hearted afterthought. In fact, in their hands, the term points the way to the emergence of the familiar tag on king's duty to punish the wicked and protect the good—*dusta-nigraha śiṣṭa-paripālana*, and we know how this expression was much debased by too frequent use. With Kauṭilya, on the other hand, Kanṭakaśodhana is the cornerstone of the entire administrative system. Under his guidance, the Mauryan empire was attempting a new plan of administration, and the state was seeking to regulate by a mass of new rules and orders almost every department of social, economic and religious life of the nation. A vast and complicated bureaucratic machine invested with a wide range of discretionary powers was being set up. And there was no possibility at that time of enforcing responsibility on government officials by the force of public criticism or popular assemblies. But uncontrolled power was bound to lead to abuses in the long run. The need for protecting people from the tyrannical use of power by the officials and for keeping the officials on the strict path of duty by checks and controls was indeed great and real. And the Kanṭakasodhana organisation was meant to perform these very essential tasks. It comprised a net-work of administrative courts which followed methods of work partly of a police character and only in part judicial. Whether Kauṭilya borrowed the entire scheme from the contemporary foreign monarchies, or adapted to his purposes some institution known to them cannot now be decided with certainty.

We have now considered three aspects in which Kauṭilya's work stands unique—the exaltation of royal power, the elaboration of the

bureaucracy, and the provision of checks and controls over its activity. All these appear to fit into one another and support the idea that under Kautilya's guidance the Mauryan empire was attempting to evolve into a new type of State, more ubiquitous and far-reaching in its concern for the welfare of the people than anything known in India before, a State which we should now call the social welfare state. Unfortunately we are not in a position to say how far the effort succeeded. But we know that there was enough momentum in it to carry it through the reigns of Chandragupta and Bindusara, and to enable Asoka to make some alteration in it so as to bring into line with his new purpose of propagating Dharma among the people of India and the neighbouring countries. But after Asoka we hear little of the successful working of this administrative machine reared up with such thought and care and sustained by three successive generations of rulers. The Mauryan empire disappeared, and with it the efficient administration it had sponsored. *Mauryan administration*, like *Mauryan art*, was enriched by a deliberate borrowing and adaptation from foreign models, in a sense both were exotics on Indian soil, and both failed to strike root and attain permanence. The Mauryan Imperial system in all its aspects is a glorious parenthesis in the course of Indian history.

As for Kautilya's work, it too takes likewise a place apart in the literature of Indian polity. In later times only the bad side of the book seems to have been remembered and authors like Dandin, Bana and the writers of the *Manusmṛitilakṣaṇa* vied with one another in holding up Kautilya and his precepts to the moral derision of posterity. But we now see that there was another side to Kautilya's work and that both as Chancellor and Author he aimed at high purposes and achieved a signal measure of success in their attainment.

THE BRĀHMANA TRADITION AND THE KṢĀTRIYA TRADITION

BY A D PUSALKER

In his *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, Pargiter has postulated the existence, in ancient India, of two distinct traditions confined to the priestly class and the kings (and heroes), which he respectively designates the Brahmana and Kṣatriya tradition,¹ and following him, many European and Indian scholars have declared the *Puranas* to be the products of the Kṣatriya tradition.² The Kṣatriya tradition has been held to be more trustworthy as (it is argued) the Brahmanas had no historical sense. The theory of Pargiter is mainly based on these two assumptions: (1) that the heroes of the legends and stories in the *Puranas* are Kṣatriya kings who mostly do not figure in Vedic literature, which, according to Pargiter, constitutes the Brahmana tradition, and (2) that the transmission and preservation of the *Puranas* were entrusted to the Suta of Kṣatriya origin,³ thus indicating their forming a separate tradition. There is absolutely no foundation for these beliefs.

Before considering the problem of the existence of these two distinct traditions, it is necessary to make a few observations on the relative trustworthiness of the so-called Brahmana tradition. Pargiter, as already said, proclaims that the Vedic literature “lacks the historical sense”, and is “not always to be trusted”,⁴ and pronounces his judgment in favour of Puranic tradition in preference to the Vedic evidence. He even goes to the length of rejecting the testimony of Vedic literature when it runs counter to the Puranic accounts.⁵ Keith strikes just the opposite note, and refuses to

1 PP 4—14 58—77 (Ch V)

2 Rapson *Cam Hist. Ind.* I pp 297 302 Siddhanta *Heroic Age of India*, pp 41 ff. Winternitz, *Hist. Ind. Lit.* I pp 315 f 521

3 Pargiter *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.* pp 15—18 Rapson, *op. cit.*, p 297 Winternitz *op. cit.* p 528

4 *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.* pp 2 9f 14 61

5 *Anc. Ind. Hist. Trad.* pp 10 11, 165, 252

believe in the historicity of any event that does not find explicit mention in the Vedic literature, and dismisses the epic and Purana texts as "pseudo history" ⁶ None of these views can be accepted in its entirety It is true that the *Puranas*, in their present form, date from a comparatively late period, and have been subjected to various additions, modifications, omissions, etc but it cannot be denied that they record ancient tradition As the result of a closer study of the *Puranas*, modern scholarship, which at first accepted them as historical and later ignored them altogether in favour of epigraphy and numismatics, has now come to regard the *Puranas* as worthy of credence and of more serious attention than they have received hitherto especially as historical accounts in the *Puranas* have been found to be substantially correct and corroborated by independent evidence Modern historians and orientalists like Smith, Rapson, Jayaswal, Bhandarkar, Ray Chaudhury, Pradhan, Altekar, Rangacharya and Javachandra have employed Puranic materials in their historical works, monographs and articles This, however, does not mean that the *Puranas* are to be entirely trusted regarding historical accounts and Vedic references should be rejected in the light of the Puranic data The *Puranas* are "hardly an unpolluted source of history", ⁷ and even Pargiter had to reject epic and Puranic evidence when it was opposed to certain well established facts ⁸ The function of a modern historian should be to disentangle legendary, fictitious or mythological material from the purely historical and cultural data supplied by the *Puranas* "The traditional view" by which Gordon Childe means the Vedic literature, "is still perhaps the more convincing" ⁹ It is not correct to state that the Vedic literature alone lacked historical sense As rightly observed by Ray Chaudhury, "priority of date and comparative freedom from textual corruption are two strong points in favour of Vedic literature" ¹⁰ But one should not go so far as to draw historical

6 JRAS. 1914 p 1031 n 1 worthlessness of the supposed epic tradition
—*Ved Index* I, p 331

7. Gordon Childe, *Aryans* p. 32

8 *Cf Anc. Ind Hist Trad.* pp 71 L 82 93, 173 260 293

9 *Cf Aryans* pp. 31—2.

10 *Fol Hist Anc Ind*, 4th. Ed p 7

influences even from *argumentum ex silentio* as observed in Vedic literature, as the historical context in the Vedic texts is only incidental.¹¹ The correct attitude regarding the reconstruction of our ancient history should be to draw upon "both the Vedic, the Brahmanic and the Sautic [i.e. Puranic] sources,"¹² which should be critically studied and correlated without any pre-conceived notions or bias and the corrective of Vedic references be applied to the Puranic tradition.¹³

Now, turning to the main point, we find there have never been in India two such water tight compartments as the Brahmana tradition and the Ksatriya tradition. The Vedic literature, which Pargiter assigns to the Brahmana tradition, contains numerous references to Ksatriya heroes such as Yayati, Pururavas, Mandhatri, Viśvamitra, Hariścandra, etc., who are well known figures in the *Mahabharata* and the *Puranas* and some of these are reputed to be the authors of hymns in the *Rgveda*.¹⁴ The glorification of Brahmanism in the *Puranas*, on the contrary, may be ascribed to Brahmanic influence over these texts, according to Pargiter and others, after they fell into the hands of the Brahmanas from the so called non-Brahmana Sutas. The Ksatriya legends in the Vedas and the Ksatriya authorship of some of the Vedic hymns clearly invalidates the assumption of two distinct traditions.

In the past, there has always been a Ksatriya king and a Brahmana Purohita and "the attitude of kings to their purohitas does not appear to have been uniform through the ages."¹⁵ There are no doubt instances of stray quarrels between individual kings and their priests, but these do not warrant the inference of a rivalry between the Church and the State and an argument in favour of two distinct traditions. On the analogy of the almost continuous enmity between the Church and the State in their own country, European scholars have assumed a similar opposition between the Ksatriya king and his Brahmana priest from some instances recorded

11 Cf Pargiter *Anc Ind Hist Trad* pp 7 12—3

12 Ghurye *Proc Oriental Conference Trivandrum* p 954

13 Munshi *Early Aryans in Gujarat* pp 7—8

14 Cf *Ved Index* s. v these various names

15 Ghurye *Proc Or Conf*, Trivandrum p 942

in the *Puranas*. A healthy combination of the Kṣatriya king and his Brahmana minister has been taken by very ancient writers on polity to result in the progress of the state, and the existence of a distinct Kṣatriya tradition can be found at no period in ancient India.¹⁶

The *Puranas*, again, assign a comparatively small portion to genealogical accounts, which constitute the genuine Kṣatriya tradition according to Pargiter, and it is material to find that as many as six *Maha Puranas* entirely omit this feature. The main bulk of the *Puranas* deals with Vedic cosmogony, Vedānta Philosophy, rites and rituals, etc., which are entirely Brahmanical. The portion dealing with rites and rituals, gifts and pilgrimages, etc., is, no doubt, a later Brahmanical addition, but the classical definition of the *Puranas* allows cosmogony, cosmography, ages of Manu, etc., as characteristics of the *Puranas*. The earliest reference to a named *Purana*, as observed by Keith,¹⁷ is for a point of Brahmanical lore and not for a point of genealogy or history, which would have been the case had Pargiter's view regarding the *Puranas* been correct, the other early references also are of the same kind. Further, even according to Pargiter,¹⁸ the *Puranas*, as we have them now, are Brahmanic compilations, hence no portion from them can be partitioned as belonging to distinct Brahmana and Kṣatriya traditions.

The *Puranas* follow the Vedic religion, take pride in styling themselves as 'fifth Veda'¹⁹ and are even included among subjects of sacred study.²⁰ There is nothing in the *Puranas* to countenance the assumption of their coming out of a different stream of thought. The *Puranas* again, condemn as heretical the non-Vedic systems of Buddhism and Jainism. Viṣṇu himself is represented as appearing as Māyāmoha, who misguides the demons with the

16. Dikshitar *IEQ*, VIII, p. 753.

17. *JRAS*, 1914, p. 1027; also Bühler *SBE*, II, pp. xxix ff.

18. *JRAS*, 1913, p. 887.

19. *Vāyu* 1. 18. *Sat. Bra.* xiii. 4. 3. 12—3. *Chand. Up.* vii. 1. 4. Pargiter *E.R.E.* V, p. 443. Hazra *Puranic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs*, pp. 1—2.

20. *Sat. Bra.* xi. 7. 9. *Arthashastra* (Ed. Shama Sastri, Mysore, 1919) 1. 3 (p. 7); 1st *Smṛti*, I. 3.

philosophy of darkness and ignorance (Buddhism, Jainism and Carvaka system) ²¹

That the Suta entrusted with the preservation and transmission of tradition was a Brahmana and a venerable sage, well versed in the Vedic lore, has been stated by the *puranas* themselves and they allude to his mysterious birth ²². He is honoured by assigning a special seat at the assembly and is respectfully addressed as *medhati*, *ramakula*, *kalpaṛa*, *mahabhaga*, when the sages seek his advice on doubtful points ²³. There were three types of Sutas (i) the priest, (ii) military man, and (iii) professional court minstrel ²⁴. The *Mahabharata*, *Arthashastra* and *Suṅgita* refer to Suta as born of mixed caste, the son of a Brahmana female and a kṣatriya male ²⁵. The *Arthashastra*, however, clearly distinguishes between this Suta and the Suta mentioned in the *puranas*, who was a Brahmana ²⁶. That the Suta connected with the *puranas* was a Brahmana is also indicated by the fact that Balarama incurred the sin of Brahmanicide (killing a Brahmana) for killing the Suta ²⁷. It is also beyond the realm of possibility that the Suta born of mixed caste in the inverse order (*pratiloma*) and whose duty was driving chariots and tending horses, would be entrusted with the task of preserving the *Puranas*, and expounding it to the members of three higher castes, and that the Brahmanas and other castes studied the *puranas* from him. The Suta of the *puranas*, therefore, is a Brahmana, and does not lend support to the assumption of the *puranas* being designated as kṣatriya tradition.

It is thus clear that there is no such thing as a separate Brahmana and Ksatriya tradition. The most that can be said about the *puranas* as distinct from the Vedas is that they were the Vedas for the laity.

21 Cf. Abz. *Festgabe Jacobs* pp. 386—91.

22 *Vayu* 1. 33. 38, 62. 137. 48.

23 *Dakṣitar* IHQ, VIII p. 760.

24 *Siddhanta Heroic Age in India* pp. 63 f.

25 *Mbh.* xiii. 49. 10. *Arth.* III. 7 (p. 165). *Manu* X. 11. 17.

26. *Arth.* III. 7 (p. 165).

*Puranika*stvananyassuto māgadhasca bramha kṣatrad v. śeṣatah.

27 Cf. *Bhagavata* p. X. 78. 79. *Mārkaṇḍeya P.* 6. 29. 37.

THE SETUBANDHA
TEXTUAL CRITICISM—INTERPOLATIONS
BY DR V RAGHAVAN

Bhoja says in ch xi of his *Śrngara prakāśa* (Madras MS Vol II p 436) that one of the features of a Prabandha is the finishing of a canto in a different metre—‘bhinna vṛtta sarga antatvam’ Here the word ‘Vṛtta,’ adds Bhoja, means all varieties of metre and ‘Sarga’ stands to signify not merely the divisions called sargas that one finds in Mahakavyas, but any kind of division in any kind of kavya Parvabandha, Kandabandha, Sandhibandha, etc

A difficulty arises here Some critics hold that the feature of the end of a canto being in a different metre is met with only in Sarga bandhas, and in Āśvasakabandhas, Prakṛt kavyas, like the *Ravana vijaya*, the *Harivyaya* and the *Setubandha*, only one kind of metre, viz the Skandhaka, is employed all through But these critics are faced with contradictory reality, for they find in the current texts of the *Setubandha*, etc other kinds of metre too, *Galitaka* for instance The reply to this according to some, is that the Galitakas like the Gaṇeśa episode and so called obscure verses in the *Mahabharata*, are interpolations in the text made by misguided savants The original objectors who hold that the Āśvasakabandhas are in a single metre to the end explain this phenomenon in a different way they are not favourable to the view that Galitakas constitute interpolations, instead they explain that though they appear to be in a different metre they may really be some variety of the Skandhaka itself, and Prakṛt prosody speaks of numerous varieties of Skandhakas and other metres of the matraccandas class Bhoja himself does not reply to any of the issues created in the train of the initial objection, he seems to accept that surely some Āśvasakabandhas, like the *Setubandha*, are in a single metre all through, but there are also Āśvasakabandhas, says Bhoja, which vary the metre in the end for instance the *Hariprabodha* (yamaka kāvya) which changes to Puṣpāgra at the end of the canto Therefore Bhoja concludes that it really gives variety and interest if the metre is changed at the end of a canto

whether the poem is a Sargabandha, a Skandhakabandha or an Āśvāsabandha.

What is most interesting here is the free view of some old critics who considered certain verses in the three Prākṛt poems, *Rāvanavijaya*, *Harivijaya* and the *Setubandha* as interpolations.

Nanu cāśvāsakabandheṣu tatsamāptāvapi na cchando-
bheda upalabhyate | Tathā hi Rāvanavijaya—Harivijaya—
Setubandheṣu ādītaḥ samāptiparyantam ekam eva chando
bhavati | Galitakāni tu Vyāsakaṣṭavat kair api vidagdhamāni-
bhīr upakṣiptāniti tadvido bhāṣante |

Matvam, mātracchandasām skandhakādīnām cchando-
vicitīṣu ckaikasyāpi anantabhedavtvāt |

Śr Pra Mad MS. Vol. II. p. 436. See also *Kāvyañuśāsana*,
p 337, where Hemacandra reproduces from Bhoja

The *Setubandha* is available and can be examined in the light of the above passage. But we have an initial difficulty in the shape of the word 'Galitaka'. The context clearly implies that Galitaka is a *metre and that different from Skandhaka*. In reply to the theory of interpolation, some hold that Galitaka may not be a different metre, but may really be only one of the numerous varieties of Skandhaka. This reply is all too brief and vague, it does not make bold to point out what variety of Skandhaka this Galitaka is.

Hemacandra gives some help in understanding the word Galitaka. In the passage quoted above from the *Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa*, three Prākṛt poems are mentioned as having interpolated Galitakas, *Rāvanavijaya*, *Harivijaya* and *Setubandha*. Of the two unrecovered poems here, the position of *Harivijaya* is slightly better, as we are able to get some glimpses into that poem, and the observation made by Hemacandra, which we shall reproduce here below, has bearing on the point we are considering here, it is particularly with reference to these Galitakas in the *Harivijaya* that Hemacandra says

Angasya apradhānasya ativistarena varṇanam yathā
yathā va vipralambhaśṅgare nayakasya kasyacit varṇayitum
anukrante kaveḥ | *amakaḍyalamkāra-nibandharasikataja*
mahāprabandhena samudradeh | Tathā hi *Harivijaye* irsyā-
kupita Satyabhāmanunayanapravṛttasya Hareḥ parijataha-

rapavyapareṇa upakrantavipralambhasya varnanaprastave
galitaka nibandhanarasikataya kavina samudravarnanaman-
tara gaḍusthaniyam vistṛtam | *K A* p 121

It is exactly this context in the *Harivijaya* that the discussion in Bhoja refers to. Unlike the critics who hold these Galitakas as interpolations, Hemacandra holds them as genuine parts of the poet's own original work,¹ and from the point of view of *Rasa-aucitya*, Hemacandra criticises them as disproportionate and out of place. Taking the two words in the above passage 'yamakadyalamkara nibandha rasikataya' and 'Galitaka nibandhana rasikataya,' we have to suppose that Galitakas mean something like 'Citra kavya,' writing dominated by sound effects, chiefly the Śabdalanakara of Yamaka.

When we turn from Hemacandra to some works on prosody, we find the same relation of Galitaka to Yamaka emphasised at the same time some metrical peculiarities of Galitaka are also mentioned. Ch. iv of Virahanka's *Vṛttajalusanuccaya*² describes (verses 89-105) the following varieties of Galitaka (mentioned as Galita) Sampindita Galita Udgata Galita, Mukha Galita, Pada Galita Visama Galita and Mala Galita that Yamaka is an integral part of the Galita is seen not only from the final verse (iv 106),

Sarvasameva galitanam yamakabandham kurvanti
kavivrsabhah |

but from the definitions of the individual Galita varieties too, Udgata Galitā is the Samudgaka metre but with Yamaka in beginning of the first two Ardhas the Khandodgata metre gives Mukha Galita if the feet have Yamaka in the end, if the metre Vibhusana has Samudgaka-Yamaka it is one variety of Pada Galita.

In the *Kavīdarpana*³ also while reference is made to its metrical make up, emphasis is laid on Yamaka, in fact to begin with, all verses, barring Gatha Dandaka and the like are generally held to be Galitakas if they happen to have Yamaka in the feet.

1. There was a persistent view that these Galitaka verses were genuine so much so that Viśvanatha modifies the very definition of an Āstāsakabandha by including the condition that Galitakas may also be used in some places in it. *Prakṛitairnirmita tasmīn sargā āstāsasampannāḥ* |

Chandasa skandhakena tat kṛtā galitakairapi || *Sahitya darpana*, VL3 6

2. Prof. Velankar JBBRAS. N.S. V, VIII.

3. Ed. by Prof. H. D. Velankar ABORL. XVI. i—ii pp 44 ff

Iha hi gāthā daṇḍakādivarjam sarvacchandāmsi yama-
 kitāṅghriṇi sāmānyena galitakāni | sarvagalitakāni sūnuprāsāni
 yamakitāṅghriṇi sāmānyena khaṇjakāni | Sarvakhaṇjakāni
 ekena dvābhyām tribhir vā chandobhiḥ dīrghikṛtāni
 sāmānyena śiṣṭakāni | Sarvā api jātayaḥ sāmānyena rāsakam |
 • • • • • Viśeṣāttu dvau pañcamātrau, dvau
 caturmātrau, ekas trimātro galitakam | yamakitāṅghri-
 tvāmnānāt bhūribhedam cedam |

pp. 85-86.

Hemacandra, in his *Chandonuśāsana*, gives the same definition of Galitaka as is found in the *Katidarpaṇa*, but mentions a number of its varieties, only a few of which we learn from Virahāṅka's work¹. From Hemacandra's treatment again, we gather that Galitakas are distinguished not only by their mātrā-variations, but by the position and nature of Yamaka too.

The *Jānāśrayi Chandoviciti*, a much earlier treatise on prosody, mentions Galita under the Jātis; though in definition, this work speaks of its quantity, in illustration, Yamaka is found to be characteristic of it.

Idānīm anvāśca kāścijātayaḥ loka (ke) pracarantyo
 vakṣyante | Pratipadam pañcārdham galitam | Pañca gaṇāḥ,
 gaṇasya ardham ca pāde pāde bhavanti cet galitam nāma
 bhavati | Yathā—

Na smarasi kim tvadīritaśara bhāsuratānām

Aṭaviṣu cogra kesariśarabhāsuratānām |

Athavā vasantkasya dṛṣṭyā niśātadantasya

Prātarbādhāya śaranniśātadantasya² (P. 94, Madras MS.R. 5043)

In none of the above treatises is Galitaka dealt with as a variety of the Skandhaka; on the other hand, where its metrical character is

1. Hemacandra's Galita varieties are Upagalita, Antargalita, Vigalita, Sangalita, Subhagalita, Samagalita, Mukhagalita, Mālāgalita, Mugdhagalita, Ugragalita, Sundarāgalitaka, Bhūṣanāgalitaka, Vilambitāgalitaka, Khandodgatā, galitaka, Prasṛtāgalita, Lambitāgalita, Vicchittigalita, Lalitāgalita, Viṣamāgalita, Muktācaligalita, Rativallabhagalita and Hīrāvaligalita.

2. Each foot here has 22 mātrās. *Vikramorvasiya*, IV. 56, calls itself 'Galitakah', explained by Raṅganātha as a dance; many dances took their names after their songs, the songs in turn after their metres; here the verse has in its four feet 23, 26, 28, and 20 mātrās respectively; and it has no Yamaka.

described, it is found to be occasionally a separate and different metre, but generally a variety of another metre having its characteristic in Yamaka and in the nature and position of the Yamaka, Yamaka is an invariable characteristic of the Galita¹. With this in view, if we examine the *Setubandha*, we get the following analysis

- 1 Skandhakas forming the main metre and having no Yamaka
- 2 Verses of the same length as the Skandhaka but having Yamaka
- 3 A few verses shorter than the normal metre of the poem, Skandhaka, having Yamaka
- 4 Long verses (printed in four lines) having Yamaka. And
- 5 A few very long verses (also printed in four lines) having Yamaka

The following shows the analysis of the Yamaka verses (Kavyamalā edn.)

There are no Yamaka verses at all in Cantos IV, V and X-XV

Verses shorter than Skandhaka having Yamaka Cantos I III nil
VI-VIII nil Canto IX verses 43, 44, 47, 50

Verses like Skandhakas but with Yamaka Canto I 59, II 23, 26 29, 30, III 15, 20, VI and VII nil, VIII 4, IX 18, 40, 42, 46, 49, 72, 82, 88

Verses longer than Skandhakas having Yamaka I nil, II 24, 27, 31, 33, III 45, 46, 47, 48, VI 48, 53, 56, 59, 62, 68, VII 41, 43, 47, 49, 51, 60, 62, VIII 61, 63, 65, IX nil

Longest verses with yamaka I—III nil, VI 65, VII 59, 61, VIII, IX nil

In the above, except the verses of the same length as the Skandhaka, the rest cannot be taken as varieties of that metre. They appear to be in metres other than the Skandhaka, and the general reply of some of the critics, who do not accept the interpolation theory, that these Galitakas may be only Skandhaka varieties, is therefore not tenable. While on one side the commentator does not say anything of the metres of these verses, works on prosody, on the other, do not show such varieties of Skandhaka, according to the

¹ See also *Jour of the Uni of Bombay* 1933 Nov, *Apabhramśa metrea*.

Vyttaratnākara and Nārāyaṇa's commentary thereon. A skandhaka has sixty-four mātrās, and its varieties, Nandī, etc., are born, not by the increase or decrease of its mātrās, but only by the different disposition of the long or short.

If therefore Āśvāsakabandhas are only in a single metre, the skandhaka, these 47 yamaka verses in the *Setubandha* would, according to a school of critics mentioned by Bhoja, form interpolations. If along with these, the yamaka verses in the *Harizijaya* too, referred to more specifically by Hemacandra, are also interpolations, Sarvasena whom Kuntaka places with Kālidāsa would be saved from the criticism of lack of taste levelled at him by Hemacandra.

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF NEGATION

By P T RAJU

As rebels against orthodox religion, the Buddhists had to enter into long drawn controversies against it, and the rules of controversy gradually developed into systems of logic, which naturally differed from each other on account of their metaphysical presuppositions. Thus negation too had its different theories, and the Buddhist theory is interesting in that its solution of the problem has a peculiar likeness to some of the contemporary solutions in European logic, and, when compared with them, throws further light on them and points the way to a more satisfactory solution

The Buddhists, like all the Mīmāṃsakas, maintain that negation can never be an object of sense preception. Here they differ from the Naiyāyikas who maintain that negation can be perceived through our senses as a quality (*viśeṣana*) of its positive locus. But the Buddhists contend that this quality can only be an accident or property and as such it can be related to the positive locus either through contact (*samyoga*) or inherence (*samavaya*). But negation can have neither of these relations to objects¹. In answer, the Naiyāyikas point out that the relation of negation to the object on which it is seen is neither *samyoga* nor *samavaya* but *viśeṣana viśeṣyata* or the relation of quality qualified. But in fact this relation is an invention, and the tendency of the Naiyāyikas as realists is to invent new relations in order to defend the reality of many questionable realities. Even the relation between a rose and its colour must be that of the qualified and quality, and why the relation between negation and its locus only should be called by that name is not known. Conferring a name on a doubtful reality does not make it real.

The Vaiśeṣikas hold a peculiar position, according to which negation is a product of *buddhi* and is inferred though real. Praśasta-pada is of this opinion.

1. Jayanta *Nyāyamāñjarī* Part I p 61 (Haridas Gupta Benares)

All the Mimamsakas hold that negation is known only through mind. Knowledge of negation is only a mental cognition. This is the view of the Buddhists also. But while Prabhākara, like the Buddhists, holds that negation is inference, Kumarila maintains that it is not. There seem to be then two kinds of mental cognition believed in by the ancient philosophers, inference and a peculiar mental perception. Kumarila admits with the Buddhists that negation cannot be perceived by the senses, but does not accept that it is inference.¹ Inference is possible when there is a major premise, and the major premise is the statement of the relation between the absence of the cognition of the counterpart (*pratiyogi*) and the negation. For instance, the inference of absence of the cognition of the pen on my table. But such an inference would be valid, only if the relation of the two terms of the major premise or *vyapti*, namely the absence of the knowledge of the pen and the absence of the pen, is a necessary relation. There can be no necessary relation between absence and a thing. This objection does not seem to have been met successfully by the Buddhists. They seem to have been more intent upon showing that negation is the *negative perception of a positive thing* than the *positive perception of an absent thing*, the positive thing for the Buddhists being the imagined object negated and the absent thing for the Naiyāyikas being the real object negated.² Since, according to the Buddhists, there are only two kinds of knowledge, direct and indirect, perception and inference, and since negation is not direct perception, they relegate it to the sphere of inference. Stecherbatsky writes: "However, the unreal non-Ens imagined on a basis of a positive perception does not differ in principle from simple perception, which consists of a sensation followed by an image constructed through the understanding. It is not something to be deduced out of another fact, it is an ultimate fact itself, it is not an inference. The fact of not perceiving the hypothetically assumed object cannot be resorted to as a middle term from which its absence could be deduced, because its absence is nothing over and above its imagined presence on a place which is empty. However,

1 *Slokavartika* p. 486

2 Stecherbatsky *Buddhist Logic* Vol. I p. 265. See also Vol. II p. 83.

since Dinnaga and Dharmakīrti define sense perception as the purely sensuous element in the process of perception, and since negation *qua* negation is no sensation at all, they nevertheless refer negation to the domain of inference, as a source of knowledge in which the part of the constructive function of the understanding is prominent”¹

But if negation lacks the distinctive characteristics of inference, why should it be called an inference? Dharmottara says “the negative judgment immediately following on the perception of the bare place is perceptual judgment. However (the proper function of negation consists in the next following step) Objects might not be perceived, but this only gives rise to doubt, (the feeling arises as to which of them) might be present. So long as this doubt has not been removed, negation has no practical importance, (it cannot guide our purposive actions) (Imagination then steps in and) it is thus* that negation, (as a negative deduction, gives practical significance to the idea of a non Ens. Since the object which I imagine as present is not really perceived, just therefore do I judge that ‘it is not there’ Consequently this negation of an imagined presence (is an inference which) gives life to the ready concept of a non Ens, it does not merely create this concept itself. Thus it is that (the author maintains that the negative judgment receives its practical significance (through an inference) from challenged imagination, although it is really produced by sense perception and only applied in life (through the deductive sense perception whose logical reason consists in the fact of) a negative experience. A negative inference, therefore, guides our steps when we apply in life the idea of a non-Ens”² This passage is clear proof that the Buddhist idea of negation is not precise. They are giving in to their opponents when they admit that negation is a perceptual judgment, and seem to be bringing in a different consideration, namely guidance in practical life to prove that negation is an inference. Even here it is *anupalambha*³ or negative experience that is the reason or ground of inference, and the Buddhist is again playing into the hands of the

1 *Ibid* Vol I p 368.

2 *Nyāyabinduśikṣā* in Stecherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II p 85

3 *Ibid* p 82

opponent making absence of cognition or experience the reason for the absence of the thing

It is really ununderstandable how the Buddhists could think that they had reconciled the views that negation was perception and that it was inference. It is inference not by nature but as a guide to practical conduct. This much only have they proved. But the question is not about negation as a guide to conduct but about its nature. Even if it is said that reality for the Buddhists is *artha-kriyakarīn* and that the reality of negation can be taken into consideration only so far as it is a guide to conduct, it has to be noted that even positive entities possess the same nature for the Buddhists and so they too must be treated as objects of inference and that affirmation too must be an inference. In truth, constructive and cognitive processes are present even in affirmation. When I make the affirmative judgment, 'That is a horse', I do not see every part of the animal. I see only one side of it and after supplying the rest from imagination I recognise it to be a horse¹. This view may not agree fully with the Buddhist view of *apohavāda*, according to which everything is just itself and different from everything else. Yet the Buddhists have to admit that, if guiding practical conduct is the guide to reality, then both the affirmed object and negation can be known only through inference. And if they admit that negation is a perceptual judgment, why criticise the Naiyayikas for holding that negation is perceived through our senses?

Thus the discussion of the various syllogistic figures of negation, like existential negation, negation of effect, etc., by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others is due to a confusion of the issue. These think that existential negation, which is a perceptual judgment like "There is no pen on the table", and other negations like inferring the negation of effect from the negation of cause are different figures of negation, which is inference. True, the negation of effect is inferred from the negation of cause, but how is the negation of cause known? If it is inferred from the negation of the knowledge of cause, how is this latter negation, again known? As this is a negation of cognition and not cognition, the Buddhist cannot contend that it is

1 Stcherbatsky admits this. See his *Buddhist Logic* Vol I p 364

self-revealing Besides, it has already been said that the Buddhist himself is doubtful whether there is a full-fledged inference here while the Naiyāyikas and Kumārila say that there is no inference.

II

The discussion so far has shown that negation is neither simple perception nor inference What then is it? Can we get any light on the point from Western logic?

Almost all Western logicians treat negation as a judgment They have negative syllogisms, but they do not identify the two Even Bradley and Bosanquet treat negative judgment and negative reasoning as distinct And for the formal logicians, they are of course separate intellectual processes However, Bradley and Bosanquet tell us that the difference between judgment and inference is not clearly marked and absolute, but is only relative¹ And if we understand the Buddhist view in the light of their theories we shall get some interesting results

Of the two, Bradley is the more brilliant and Bosanquet the more consistent And however Bradley starts, he finally accepts Bosanquet's views For both, negation has a positive basis For instance, the judgment, "The rose is not green", is based upon the judgment, "The rose is red" Without the latter the former could not have been made To put the same symbolically, A is not B because of X Or, A is X, X is not B, therefore A is not B Still "A is not B" is a judgment This principle holds in all cases of negation, whether the negation is opposition as in "The rose is not green", or privation as in "There is no pen on the table"² Bradley was at first inclined towards the view that negation is only subjective, but later agreed with Bosanquet and maintained that it was objective Both admit that negation is more reflective than affirmation, and yet say that it is part of reality³ This is due to their fundamental position that reality is an identity in difference, and that every judgment is both affirmation and negation, and also

1 Bradley, *Principles of Logic* Vol II. p 623.

2. *Ibid.* Vol I p 117

3 *Ibid* Vol II p 665 Bosanquet *Logic* Vol I p 281 See also his *Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 223 foll

that assertion and the content of assertion are not two different things. This latter view is accepted by the Buddhists also, though they assert that negation does not have even that much of reality possessed by positive entities.

The view that every negation must have a positive basis seems to be unassailable, though one of the contemporary logicians, Johnson, opposes it¹. But he has no strong argument in his favour, for it is impossible to negate anything unless we see something else in its place. Instead of green we see red in the rose, and instead of the pen we see at least pure light in its place. Simple absence of cognition (*anupalabdhi*) cannot be a basis, as Kumārila and the Buddhists seem to think. The latter sometimes say that the ground, along with the non cognition of the pot, becomes the basis of the inference of the negation of the pot. But sometimes they omit the ground and take non cognition only as the middle term. But in either case what is wanted is the perception of something that repels the suggested thing and not merely the absence of the perception of the suggested thing. Absence of perception is a passive state and so cannot actively repel. Concerning this point, Bradley and Bosanquet are on a firmer ground than the Buddhists.

If now every negative judgment requires a positive basis, if I cannot make the negative judgment, "The rose is not green", unless I have made the affirmative, 'The rose is red', can negation be a simple judgment? Is not "A is not B because of X" a kind of inference? Of course, a fully developed inference like "Nothing that is X is B, A is X, therefore A is not B" is not made. For the opposition between X and B is immediately perceived. Indeed if one wants to treat it as a fully developed inference, one may do so. But it seems unnecessary. Yet it cannot be treated as a simple perception. Even when Bradley and Bosanquet say that negation is a quality of reality, they mean the reality of the highest knowledge². But as Bradley says, at that level of knowledge there would be no distinction between inference and judgment.

1 *Logic* Part I p 69

2 Bosanquet, *Logic* Vol I p 281

III

This consideration of both the Buddhist and European logicians leads us to think that negation should be given a place somewhere between perception and inference. Negation has something of the spontaneity of perception and something of the mediation of inference. No major premise need be invented, like "Red is not green", to prove that the rose is not green. Yet we have to acknowledge that the negative judgment, "The rose is not green", is mediated by an implicitly made affirmative judgment, "The rose is red". Hence we have to find place for an intellectual process that is neither a mere spontaneous perception nor a fully developed inference. We can here appreciate the Mīmāṃsaka contention that *abhava* or *anupalabdhi* is a distinct *pramāṇa* or source of knowledge. But what the Mīmāṃsakas fail to note is the affinity which this *pramāṇa* has with inference. So far as the Buddhists are concerned, they did not accept this *pramāṇa*, probably for two reasons, namely, because they recognised only two *pramāṇas* and because there is no difference between the objective *abhava*, which is the object of the *pramāṇa*, and the *pramāṇa*, which is the subjective *abhava* or *anupalabdhi*.¹ But both have failed to see that thought from simple perception to full inference shows gradual growth, in which various stages can be discovered one of which may be negation. The full significance of this fact has yet to be grasped. Hence we shall be unfair to our ancient logicians if we charge them with lack of understanding. But in spite of Newton's greatness physics has not remained where he left it. Similarly the theories our ancient logicians advocated require further development, and when brought into contact with those of the West point to a significant direction of development.

Bradley contends that there need be no major premise or *vyāpti* for every inference.² For instance, in the inference, "A is to the right of B, B is to the right of C, and so A is to the right of C", there is no major premise. If really there need be no major premise, the contention against the Buddhist that negation cannot

1. *Tattvasamgraha*, Vol. I. pp. 470 foll.

2. *Principles of Logic*, Vol. I. p. 247.

be an inference as no major premise can be established between the non cognition of a thing and its absence, loses its force. Inference need not always be syllogistic, and it is unnecessary for the Buddhists to seek to establish a *vijapti* by making non cognition a mark of negation. We need not go so far as the philosophical logic of Bradley and Bosanquet, though there only we find a most adequate solution available of the problem. Even in ordinary formal logic we have immediate inference coming between judgment and inference. In the immediate inferences there is really no major premise and no middle term as ordinarily understood. In the inference, "All men are mortal and so some mortals are men", our thought is moving just within the content of the premise according to a certain *a priori* law. This inference is called conversion. If we further convert the conclusion we get "Some men are mortal". That is, we have now inferred from "All men are mortal" "Some men are mortal". This is the *pramana* called *sambhava* by some Indian logicians.¹ Here too our ancients have seen a peculiarity. Without any mediation we are coming to a conclusion. And as there is no mediation by a third term, they do not like to call it inference. But this is really an inference without a major premise and the ordinary middle term. The Western logicians call it immediate inference. There is some spontaneity in this inference, yet the conclusion is obtained reflectively without a middle term as if by the spontaneous application of the laws of thought. Every intermediate student of logic is acquainted with the square of opposition, according to which, if any universal judgment is true, its subaltern which is the same judgment but with a limited subject is also true. This *sambhava*, we may therefore say, is based on this square of opposition. Contradiction is a law of thought and is one of the relations of this square of opposition. And it is interesting to note that Johnson, for instance, has no objection to treat the negative judgment as the assertion of the falsity of the judgment. The judgment "The rose is not green" is the assertion of the falsity of the judgment "The rose is green".² And between contraries, if one is true the other must be false.

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2 Johnson, *Logic* Part I. p. 66

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1. *Samkhyatattvakaumudī* p. 181 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series)

2. Johnson, *Logic* Part I. p. 66

Thus if "The rose is red" is true then "The rose is green" must be false

The ancient logicians in the West recognised only three laws of thought, but the modern logicians have shown that these laws are many. For instance, besides the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, they give some more like the principle of deduction (if p implies q and p is true, then q is true) and that of syllogism (if p implies q and q implies r , then p implies r)¹. These laws of thought are just the way by which the mind spontaneously passes to a different or a slightly different judgment in its intellectual operations. The negative judgment is obtained similarly. Even in the process of the affirmative judgment there may be some synthetic operation. But in this operation the mind does not proceed from one judgment to another. Hence negation is more reflective than affirmation, and may be treated as an immediate inference.

IV

This paper does not deal with all aspects of negation. It deals only with negation as an intellectual process. The discussion of the difference between negation as an intellectual process and negation as an object of cognition has been rendered superfluous by the Buddhist acceptance of their identity. The kinds of negation too are not treated as they are common to all Indian schools. The main contribution of the Buddhists to the doctrine of negation is their insistence that negation is inference in spite of acknowledging its spontaneity. The disfavour into which their theory has been thrown is due to the universal acceptance by all Indian logicians that every inference must have a major premise (*vijapti*). But a comparison of the Buddhist theory with the theories of modern logicians brings to light its true significance and points to the direction of a further important development.

¹ Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, pp. 472-3.

Forms with alternate *-al* or *-e* are prescribed before *-pad* by the 17th century *Ś*, and instances are available from documents of earlier periods inscriptional (incipient and *not* full fledged passives) *deṇadandadindericeppaduvorum*, *raṇadandamum eṇdeppaduvar*, and *peḷalvadegum* and *prayogiseṇadegum* of *Śmd*. Then again verbal forms with alternate *-al* or *-a* are laid down by *Śmd* for what it calls “*prayojanavastvasritahetukriye*” and for “*kriyārtha*” *Bh* and *Ś* besides prescribing this alternation also refer to instances like *nodal beda* and *nodabeda*.

The alternation of *-al* and *-e* on one side, and of *-al* or *-a* on the other, suggests some kind of relationship among the different forms, and Kittel has classified them all as “infinitives” following the terminology initiated by Beschi and accepted by Caldwell for this type of verbids. This kinship of the forms is confirmed by an examination of cognates in other south Dravidian speeches.

Tamil has the *vinai y-eccam* type with *-a*, which performs all the functions of Kannada forms with *-a*, *-al* and *-e*. Tamil has, besides, the verbal noun type of *ceyal*, used in *ceyarku* denoting purpose (cf. *peḷalke keldam* of Kann) and in expressions like *ceyal vendum*, *ceyalaridu*, etc.—Ubhayakarīḷa constructions (corresponding to the Kannada *satisaptami* type) were already numerous in Old Tamil.

Old Malayalam has the type with *-a* in all the contexts under reference. Late Old Mal and New Mal have *-e* for some infinitives (see below).

Verbids with *-an* in Telugu known as “*tumunnadyarthaka*” express all the significations in question.

So Kannada forms with *-a*, *-e*, *-al* correspond to Tamil ones with *-a* and *-al*, Malayalam *-a*, *-e* and Telugu *-an*.

The *-al* of Tamil and Kannada is related to *-an* of Telugu, both functional identity and phonetic analogies prove this. The exact nature of the relationship of *-al* and *-a* cannot be determined in the present state of our knowledge, although Nagavarma and Kesiraja would suggest *-a* forms to be *der vauve* (“*sandipud-algam lopam bandu*”, according to *Śmd*). Kittel’s view that these infinitives are formed with *-al*, *-e* and *-a* “annexed to the roots” is also without proof.

No satisfactory explanation has been offered so far for *-e* which occurs in Kannada from the earliest stages. Kittel suggested (*Grammar*, p. 125) somewhat hesitatingly that *-e* "reminds one of the *ɪ* of locative in singulars of neuter bases in *α*, as a final *ɪ* is occasionally used for *e*" Another opinion is that the satisaptami *-e* is the locative *-e* laid down by *Bhāṣabhuṣana* and *Śmd* for digvācaka words like *olage*, *kelage*, *porage* and by *Śmd.* for *munte*, *pinte*, *mele*.

The *-e* of *olage*, *kelage*, *mele*, etc. is, despite the ancient grammars, not a locative ending but a particle of emphasis which is associated with direction-denoters in Kannada and other Dravidian speeches. Indeed, it is most doubtful if Kannada has a locative *-e* at all. The inscriptional instances, *manade nenexorum*, *subhangade ghanam*, *pancapadade*, all of which Dr. Narasimhayya would explain as locatives with *-e* (derived according to him, from *ɪ*) are better interpreted as instrumentals (cf. *bhayaḍe*, *nayaḍe*, etc. pointed out by Kittel). A locative termination *-e* is far to seek in south Dravidian speeches.

I would suggest that the satisaptami *-e* of Kannada is fundamentally a particle of emphasis associated with Kannada forms from the earliest stages (cf. the dative *ge*, *-kke*, the optative *ge*, the verbal negative participle *tappade*, etc). Absolutes in ubhava-kartṛka constructions define the circumstances of the main verb, and so may appropriately carry with them a certain degree of emphasis (cf. the similar use of *-e* in Tamil *ceyya v e*, *poga v e* of absolutes). There is however, one difficulty here. If *e* is an emphatic particle, to what was it annexed? Not certainly to the verb-base, since infinitives should already have existed in the language. If the original ending was *α*, then the annexation of *-e* should have produced forms with both *α* and *e* separated by a glide between, or have brought about the elision of *α*. No evidence is available for the possible suggestion that an original *-a(y)e* was "contracted" to *e*, or that *-α* was elided.

In this connection, I may recall the short *-e* of New Malayalam infinitives like *valare*, *ere*. Old Malayalam in its earliest stages shows only *-α* like Tamil, but in later stages infinitives, particularly in absolute constructions, show *-e* with increasing frequency. In

New Mal. infinitives have *-e*, except in collocations like *ceyya t takka* and *ceyya p-pedum*

Infinitives in Tamil and Malayalam have a "neutral" vowel value for the final *-a*. This neutral vowel was dropped before the particle of emphasis *-e*, whenever this was annexed, as in Late Old Mal *kanē*, *eṛē*, etc. Under the influence of such forms with a final emphatic *-ē*, the "neutral" vowel in other infinitives (excepted in the types mentioned above) seems to have been fronted to short *-e*.

The analogy of Malayalam can, however, not be requisitioned for Kannada, in view of the wide gap in the time place circumstances of the Mal phonetic change.

A NOTE ON THE YOGĀCĀRA-SAUTRĀNTIKA THEORY OF ADHYĀSA

By SAILESWAR SEN

Of the four definitions of error given in the introductory portion of Śamkara's *Bhāṣya* on Br S I 1 1, the second, according to which error consists in *anyatranāyadharmādhyāsaḥ*¹ (superimposing an attribute of something elsewhere), is ascribed by Vacaspatimiśra to the Yogacara and Sautrantika schools. Notwithstanding their divergent metaphysics, we understand from the following comments in the *Bhāmati*² that in so far as the nature of error is concerned, both the schools subscribe to the theory known as the *jñānakarākhyatī* (cognition of the mental form)

i *Anyadharmasya jñānadharmasya rajatasya jñānakarasyeti yavat Adhyāso nyatra bahye* ii *Sautrantikanaye tavad bahyam asti vastusat, tatra jñānakarasyaropah* iii *Vijñānavadinam api yadyapi na bahyam vastusat tathāpyanādyavidyāvasānaropitam alīkam bahyam, tatra jñānakarasyaropah Upapattiś ca yad yadrśam anubhavasiddham rūpam tat tadṛśam evabhyupetaḥ ityutsargah, anyathatvam punar asya balavadbaddhakapratyayaśat* iv *Nedam rajatam iti ca badhasyedantamatrabadhenopapattau na rajatagocara tocita Rajatasya dharmīno badhe hi rajatam ca tasya ca dharmā idanta badhite bhavetam Tad varam idantaivasya dharmo badhyatam na puna rajatam api dharmī Tatha ca rajatam bahirbadhitam arthad antare jñāne vyavatiṣṭhata iti jñānakarasya bahiradhyāsaḥ sādhyatī*

i By 'an attribute of something' is meant an attribute of consciousness or a form of consciousness, as silver in the silver-*adhyāsa*. A form of consciousness is superimposed 'elsewhere', i.e. outside. ii According to the teaching of the Sautrantikas there is external reality, thereon a form of consciousness is superimposed. iii Also according to the Vijñānavādins, although there is no

1 *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* (with *Bhāmati*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimala*) ed. by Ananthakrishna Sastry, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1938, p. 18.

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external reality, nevertheless the unreal external is imagined as existent by the impressions of the beginningless nescience, there on the unreal external a form of consciousness is superimposed. And the explanation lies in the principle that a form is to be accepted even as it is established by cognition, its otherwiseness, however, results from a sublative cognition of greater force. iv Now, the sublative cognition, 'This is not silver', being intelligible as sublating thishood alone, its extension to silver is not consistent with reason, because if silver, which is the subject, were sublated, then not only silver but also its predicate 'thishood' would be sublated. Hence let only its predicate 'thishood' be sublated rather than the subject 'silver' in addition to its predicate. So then silver being sublated outward remains as a matter of course in inward consciousness. The theory that error consists in superimposing a form of consciousness outward is thus established.

From i, ii and iii, we understand that both the schools consider error as consisting in the external *aropa* of a mental form, and that whilst according to the Sautrantikas, the *aropa* has a real locus, error being of the nature of an illusion, according to the Yogacaras, error is of the nature of a hallucination, involving the *aropa* of a mental form on an external 'nothing'. In iv it is explained how according to both the schools the subjectivity of silver follows from the sublative judgment, 'This is not silver'. In the affirmative judgment, 'This is silver,' silver is the subject, and 'this' is the predicate, because the *aropa* of silver on external reality, which the judgment implies, is not possible without predicating thishood of silver or affirming that silver possesses thishood or externality. In the sublative judgment, 'This is not silver', it is the predicate, and not the subject, that is denied, and consequently silver being stripped of its predicate of thishood or externality is left merely as a mental form.

There can be thus no objection to the Sautrantika theory of error being called by the name *jñānakarakhyaṭi*, provided its difference from the *jñānakarakhyaṭi* of the Yogacaras be not lost sight of on the score of its bearing the same name. Of the two propositions, namely (a) that it is a form of the self that appears as external to the self, and (b) that it is a form in the self of a not self that appears as external to

the self, the first relates to the *jñanāśarakhyaṭi* of the Yogīcaras, and the second to that of the Sautrāntikas

Unlike the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntikas qualify their affirmation of external reality by the denial that it is accessible to direct cognition. According to them, what is directly cognized is the mental form, and external reality can only be inferred from it. Now, if consciousness be confined within its configurations, how can there be *bahyapratīti* in an individual? In reply to this question, which concerns both the Yogīcaras and the Sautrāntikas, the latter are made to say in the *Vijayakāṇḍa*¹ that like the Yogīcaras they too subscribe to the theory of external *aropa* of the mental form. *Svapratibhasasy abahyaḥ bheda-grahe bahya-samaropah. Tato bahye pratītiḥ.* Externalizing a mental image is the same as not judging that it is different from an external object. The decision to act so as to lay hold on an external object proceeds from such externalizing.

For the explanation of *bheda-graha* (non cognition of difference) referred to in the above passage, Dignāga and his followers, who belong to a syncretic school, resort to the principle of *anvāpoha* or *atadyavṛtti* (negation of others). The judgment, 'This is silver', would not be possible unless a characteristic possessed in common by external reality and the internal silver should blind us to their difference from one another. But what is that characteristic which is common to external reality and the internal silver? We are told that it consists in both of them being *arajata-vyavṛtta* (not non silver). *Atyantatīlakṣaṇanam śalakṣaṇyam anyavyavṛttikṛtam eva. Bahyam hi vidhūrupam apya-rajata-vyavṛttam. Vikalpa-viśayo pi ced arajata-vyavṛttas tataḥ śalakṣaṇyam*². Things that are extremely dissimilar are, indeed rendered similar by their common contrast with other things. Even though positive in its nature, external reality is indeed the negation of the non silver. If the ideally constructed object (i.e. silver) be also the negation of the non silver, there would be in consequence similarity between it and external reality.

1. Ed. (with *Vādhivṛṇḍa*) by Rama Sastrī. Medical Hall Press. Benares 1907. p. 258 ll. 11-12.

2. *Nyāyavṛttikāṭīkā* ed. by Rajeswara Sastrī. Vidyavilas Press. Benares 1925. p. 486 ll. 20-24-25. I i ll. 24-25 *agovyavṛtta* has been changed to *arajata-vyavṛtta* to suit the present context.

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1. Ed. (with *vidhūruka*) by Rama Sastrī. Medical Hall Press. Benares 1901. p. 253 ll. 11-12.

2. *Nyāyavṛttikāṭīkāparyāyikā* ed. by Rajeswara Sastrī. Vidyavilas Press. Benares 1925. p. 486 ll. 20-24-25. In ll. 24-25 *agavyavṛtta* has been changed to *arajataavyavṛtta* to suit the present context.

A detailed discussion of the *anyapoha* theory, according to which positing a thing means negating other things, is outside the scope of the present paper. We would, however, mention two of the main grounds on which it is rejected by the Advaitins and others. First the theory involves the fallacy of *anyonyasaya* (mutual dependence) *Anulavyavrttiḥ niḥapratitau niḥapratityā' nulavyavrttiḥ*¹. Whilst the cognition of the blue is dependent on the negation of the non blue, the negation of the non blue is dependent on the cognition of the blue. Secondly, the theory involves *anubhavarodha* (conflict with experience) *Gaur ityēva pratijate na tvasavagovyavrttiḥ*². It is experienced that this is a cow, and not that this is not non cow.

The principle of *bhēdagraha* is admitted not only by the Yoga-ara-Sautrantikas but also by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas and the Advaitins of the *Bhamati* school. It is, however, to be noted that *adhyasa* (superimposition) is equated by the Yogacara Sautrantikas with non cognition of difference, and not with the Advaitins *tadatmya-abhrama* (delusion of identity) of which non-cognition of difference forms the immediate antecedent³. The Yogacara Sautrantikas thus agree with the Prabhakaras in holding that *vyaakara* proceeds from non cognition of difference without the intervention of superimposition in the sense of delusion of identity.

Regarding the function of the sublative judgment there is disagreement among the Yogacara Sautrantikas, the Prabhakaras, and the Advaitins. We have already explained the Yogacara Sautrantika theory according to which silver being the subject, and 'this' being the predicate in the affirmative judgment, 'This is silver', this hood is denied of silver in the sublative judgment 'This is not silver'. As against the Yogacara Sautrantikas it is maintained by the Advaitins that 'this' (=reality) is the subject and silver is the predicate in the affirmative, and that it is silverhood that is denied of 'this' and not this hood of silver, in the sublative

1. *Upanishadbrahmasūtra* ed. by Anantakrishna Desai, Varanasi, 1917, p. 7, 130.

2. *Ibid.* p. 7, 11, 31, 32.

3. *Dhamatī*, p. 16, 161. *Upanishadbrahmasūtra* ed. by Anantakrishna Desai, Varanasi, 1917, p. 7, 130. *Upanishadbrahmasūtra* ed. by Anantakrishna Desai, Varanasi, 1917, p. 7, 130.

*Nedam rajatam iti pratipannopadhau rajatasya traikalyubharabodhakam badhakapratyayam*¹ The sublative cognition, 'This is not silver', indicates the tri temporal negation of silver in the reality in which it was cognized. Exception is taken by the Prabhakaras to both the theories. According to them, the sublative judgment, 'This is not silver', negates merely the *vyavahara* pertaining to silver. *Na caṣa rajatasya niṣedhaḥ, na cedantayah, kam tu vivekagrahāprasanyitasya rajatam idam iti rajatavyavaharasya*² It sublates neither silver nor this hood, but the use of silver in speech, such as 'This is silver', engendered by non cognition of the difference between a perception and a memory.

According to Stcherbatsky,³ the subject of the judgment, 'This is silver', is equated by Buddha logic with 'this', and not with silver, the element 'this' being 'pure sensation' or 'the sensational core' referring us to the incognizable Thing in-Itself, and the element 'silver' which forms the predicate, being a concept, or a 'mnemo verbal construction'. The question, however, arises, If 'this' were a sensation, how could it be expressed, by the word 'this'? The moment a sensation is verbally expressed, does it not lose its sensational character and become a construct? In so far as the Yogacara Sautrantikas are concerned, Stcherbatsky's interpretation of the Buddha theory of judgment derives no support from the *Bhāmati*, *Kalpataru*, and *Parimala*. In the *Parimala* it is explicitly stated that in the judgment, 'This is silver', 'this' is a construct in common with silver.

Referring to the Buddha theory that cognition has a twofold object, namely *grahya* (that which it merely apprehends), and *adhyavaseya* (that which it affirms or denies), Appayadiksita says *Tasyakarebhyo nikṛṣtam yad avikalpam svarupam asti tad grahyam svaviśayatvalaksanasvapraśaṅgikarat Tasya rajatakarasyoparjavaseyo bahyatvaśabdokta idantakaro uikalparupo dhyavaseyah*⁴ Its *grahya* object is its own indeterminate nature excluded from

1 *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* ed by S S S Sastry and S Ben Andhra University Waltair 1941 p 46 ll 4 5

2 *Bhāmati* p 26 ll 14 15

3 *Buddhist Logic* Vol I Leningrad 1932 pp 212 and 505

4 *Parimala* p 76 ll 10 12

images, it being admitted that it is self luminous in the sense that it is its own object. Its *adhyataseya* object is a construct in the form of this hood—it is called by the term 'externality'—affirmed of its silver-form. Thus both silver and this hood are constructs, this hood being affirmed of silver in the cognition, 'This is silver' *Tatha ca purovartinyadhisthane jñānakararupam rajatam idantī ena-ropyate*¹. And in this manner the mental form 'silver' by being qualified by this-hood is superimposed on a locus existing before the cognizer. According to the Yogacara-Sautrantika theory of *adhyasa* as interpreted in the works of Vacaspatiśra, Amalananda, and Appayadīkṣita, the external *aropa* of the internal silver, which is the same as non discriminating the internal silver from external reality (*bahyād bhedagraha*) is not possible without affirming this-hood of the internal silver, which again is not possible without non-discriminating the internal silver from external reality. Whether the *anyonyāśraya* in which the theory is involved by the interpretation of these writers represents an exceptionable type is a question upon which we refrain from pronouncing any opinion.

1 Ibid pp 26 27

THREE WORDS By A SANKARAN

An attempt is made in this paper to explain the meaning of three well known words differently from what they are usually understood or accepted to be and show if the meaning given here may not be nearer the truth. The three words are (1) *Chatra* (2) *Āścarya* in the *Yakṣapraśna* and (3) *Kapṛasa* in the *Chandogyaopaniṣad*

I CHĀTRA

Chatra means a pupil and it is derived by Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita in his *Siddhantakaumudī* and the *Śabdakaustubha* on Panini's *sutra* (4 + 62), *chatradibhyo nah*, as follows *guroḥ doṣanam avaranam chatram | tat śīlamasyeti chatrah* | *Chatra* is one whose habit is to conceal the defects of his teacher, and in this sense the suffix *na* is added to the stem *Chatra* and *Chatra* is formed. This etymology is very unedifying to both the teacher and the pupil, still it has gained currency. Further it derives its origin and support from the authorities of the *Kaśikatyīti*, the *Nyasa* and the *Padamanjari*

chadanad avaranacchatram | gurukaryesvavahitastacchid
ravarana pravṛttaśchatraśīlah śisyaśchatrah || *Kaśika*
acchadayati hi yat tacchatramityucyate | tena ś syo pi
gurukaryatatparo guroryani chidraṇi gopayati tesam avaranaya
pravṛttah tatra yuktaḥ sacchatrasahacaritam kriyam
acaramśchatraśīlo bhavati || *Nyasa tyīti*
chadayateḥ sṭraṇi ismantrankviṣu ceti brasvah | chatraśīlatam
śisyasya darśayitum aha — chadanad avaranacchatramiti ||

Padamanjari

However if we turn to the fountain source and indisputable authority of the *Mahabhasya* and its commentaries the *Pradīpa* and the *Uddyota* we find a refreshing and a heartening contrast

(*Bhasyam*) kim yasya cchatradharanam śīlam sa cchatrah ? kim
catah? rajapuruse prapnoti | evam tarhi uttarapadalopo tra draṣṭavyah
— chatramiva cchatram | guruśchatram | guruna śiśvaschatravat
chadyah | śisyena guruschatramiva paupalyah ||

(*Pradīpah*) uttarapadalopa iti | uttarapadasya vaśabdasya lopo draṣṭavya ityarthah | gaunī vṛttischatraśabdasya aśrayanīya | tatraiva pratyaṣya darśanadityuktaṁ bhavau | guruśchatram it | ajnanam śiṣyasya chadayaṭi nivartayaṭi yataḥ, tatra chatram śilamasya, guruviśayam palanam śilamasyetyarthah ||

(*Udṇotah*) ajnanamiti | yatha chatram uṣnadī nivartayaṭi evama-
jnanam gururnivartayaṭi— iti tatsadṛśatvat guruh chatram | vṛttau tadviśayapalanadau chatraśabdasya vṛttih | taduktaṁ bhasye—śiṣyeṇa guruśchatramiva paripalya iti | mukhyarthattu pratyayo nanabhi-
dhanaditi bodhyam ||

The word *Chatra* is taken in the ordinary sense of umbrella and the *Guru* is *Chatra* or like a *Chatra*. The pupil is to be protected by the teacher just as anyone is protected by an umbrella from sun and rain. The teacher should be held by the pupil just like the umbrella. The teacher is likened to the *Chatra* because even as the umbrella wards off the sun and rain, the teacher removes the ignorance of the pupil. In the *Vigraha vakya*, *chatram śilamarja* the word *Chatra* means through *lakṣana*, *Gururviśayapalana*, meaning holding the teacher with reverence and always looking up to him for advice and help with the care and attention that is bestowed on an umbrella to ward off weather conditions. As stated in the adage, *gurum prakāśayed dhūman*, the teacher should be made known to all, i.e., by the conduct and learning of the pupil, the teacher's name should be spread. In other words the pupil should prove by his ability and work that he is worthy of his master and should always sail under his banner.

He should never fancy or show, as Nīlakaṇṭhadikṣita has put it, that he has acquired his present status solely by his good fortune

kṛtvā papānyapi khalu mayā poṣitah śaiśave ye
nidraharavapi vijahatī śikṣita ye kalasu |
pradurbhūtaḥ svayam iva hi te praktanadr̥ṣṭalabdha-
prajñonmeva iva ca tanayā¹ na amarantyaatmano pi |

— *Śantirūpa*, 4

That it was a great honour for the pupil to wear the badge of his master is fully testified by the classic instance of Dāśarītha

1 Tanayā iti vā tanayā ityapyarthah.

the mighty king of the Solar race whom Valmiki describes as *Vasisthavyapadeśī*, meaning one whose name and fame are derived through his teacher, *Vasistha sadṛśam rajaśārdūla tavaitadbhuvā nānyatha | mahakulaprasūtasya vasisthavyapadeśinah || Bala 19 2.* From the *Mahabhasya* it should be clear that, if at all, one of the two—teacher and pupil—covers the other, being likened to the umbrella, it is the teacher that covers the pupil and it is not the pupil that covers the defects of the other—*guruna śisyah chatravat chadyah | śiṣyena guruh chatravat paripalyah ||*

II AŚCARYA

At the end of the *Vanaparvan* in the *Mahabharata* appears the *Yaksapraśna* (*Adh 314*), and among the questions which the Yaksha asks Yudhiṣṭhira to answer, are the following

ko modate kimaścaryam

kah panthah ka ca vartikā |

In reply to the question—*kimaścaryam*? What is wonder? Yudhiṣṭhira replies —

ahanyahani bhutani gacchantiha yamālayam |

śesah sthāvaram icchanti kim ascaryam atah param || (v 118)

This verse is ordinarily explained thus —Every day countless beings go to the abode of Death, but the others expect to live for ever. That is, though we are seeing before our eyes the evanescence of existence, we foolish folk imagine that we may live for ever and are planning accordingly.

The questions and answers in this section are highly ethical and philosophical, and their meaning is much more recondite than what it appears to be. In the *Kathopanishad*, Yama speaks of ‘*Aścarya*’ as he who teaches the nature of the soul, and the pupil, who learns the nature of the soul being taught by an able teacher

śravanayapī bahubhīryo na labhyah

śṛṇvanto’pī bahavo yam na vidyuh |

ascaryo vakta kuśalo’sya labdha

aścaryo jñata kuśalanuśiṣṭah || II 7

The *Bhagavadgita* also speaks in *aścaryazat paśyati kaścid enam*, etc (II 29) that it is a wonder that one is able to know the nature of the soul. Both the texts mean that the soul is difficult to understand and its teacher and knower are so rare as to be a wonder.

It is known from many Upaniṣadic texts that in sound sleep, when the senses do not function at all and are at rest, the self luminous consciousness, viz, the soul retires into itself and experiences itself alone. Though every one experiences the soul within himself every day he is unable to realise that it is the one reality in the world. The following texts may be cited —

1 yatrastat puruṣaḥ svapīti nama satā somya tada sampanno bhavati, svamapīto bhavati | tasmādenam svapītityacakṣate, svam hyapīto bhavati | *Ch Up VI 8 1*

2 somya imah sarvaḥ prajāḥ sati sampadya na viduh sau sampadyamāha iti || *Ch Up VI 9 2*

3 tadyathapi hiraṇyanidhīm nihitamakṣetrajña uparyupari samcaranto na vindeyurcāmevemaḥ sarvaḥ prajā aharahar gacchantya etam brahmalokam na vindantyanṛtena hi pratyudbhaḥ ||

Ch Up VIII 3 2

When questioned by Yama (yakṣa) about 'Ācārya', Yudhiṣṭhira, the super man and philosopher replies in terms of the teachings of Yama himself. The verse may be paraphrased as follows —

bhūtāni praṇināḥ ahanyahantī pratyaham susuptau yamālayam yam ālayam nīlayam brahmalokam gacchantī iha asmin śarīre hṛtpundarikē [svam hyapīto bhavati] tamālayam śeṣaḥ bhūtebhyo bhinnāḥ śiṣṭāḥ tattvajñāḥ sthāvaram sthīram kuṣastham avicālī anapayopajānavikarī nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhavam tattvam icchantī manyante | tadevaścāryam ||

The wise regard that abode to be the permanent reality to which all beings retire every day here. A realisation of this reality, viz, *svam atma* is the wonder, and what else is it? That Yudhiṣṭhira has this idea and these Upaniṣadic texts in his mind when he answers this question is further strengthened by the way in which he begins answering the next question *kah panthah?* What is the correct path?

tarko pratiṣṭhaḥ śrutayo vibhinnāḥ
naiko munīḥ yasya matam pramanam |
dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyam
mahajano yena gataḥ sa panthah ||

(v 119)

That reason has no finality as authority or means of knowledge is generally associated with the question of the nature of the soul,

and when the nature of the soul is the subject of the previous question, Yudhiṣṭhira is reminded of the *sūtra*, *tarkapratiṣṭhanat* (*Br. S* II 1) or more correctly of its source the Upanisadic *mantra* in the same *Kathavallī-naiṣa tarkean matirapaneyā*, etc (II 9) By the way it may be reminded that the purpose of Itihāsa and Purāṇa is only to expound the truths of the Vedas, and just as this verse *ahanyahantī*, etc, brings out an Upanisadic truth, it may be said that *mahajano yena gatah sa panthah* is only a restatement of the Upanisadic text—

atha yadī te karmavicikitsa va vṛttavicikitsa va syat ye tatra
brahmaṇah sammarśinah | yukta ayuktah | alūksā dharmakamah
syuh | yathā te tatra varteran | tathā tatra vartethah ||

Taitt Up I 11 3-4.

It is possible to find support for the popular and current meaning of the verse *ahanyahantī*, etc, from the *mantra* in the *Kathopanishad*—*na samparayah pratibhatī balam*, etc (II 6), but I believe that the meaning set forth above is nearer the truth

III KAPYĀSA

In the *Chandogyopanisad* occurs the following passage which is cited also as the *Visayavakya* to the *Brahmasutra*, I 1 20 —

ya eṣo'ntaradītye hīranmayah puruso drsyate apranakhat
sarva eva suvarṇah | tasya yathā kapyasam pundarikam evam aksinī. .

|| I 6 7
Śrī Śaṅkara R^{ṣi}'s *Bhāṣya* on this runs as follows —

tasya evam sarvatah varnavarnasyāpi aksorvīśah | katham?
asya yathā kapeh markatasya asah kapyasah, aserupaveśanarthasya
karane ghañ, kapiprṣṭhantah yenopaviśatī, kapyasa iva pundarikam
atyantatejasvī evam devasya aksinī, upamitopamanatvat na hino-
pama ||

In the Upanisadic text it is stated that the supreme Lord who is bright like gold is seen inside the sun and his eyes are like the lotus which are (like) *kapyasa* Śrī Śaṅkara explains the word *kapyāsa* as the hips of the monkey. The eyes of the Lord are like the lotus, and the lotus is bright like the hip of the monkey. As the eyes of the Lord are not compared to the hip directly, but only to the lotus, there is not the defect, called *hinopama*, i.e., the *upamana* being much inferior to the *upameya*. This explanation is direct and

clear and it also answers a possible objection to the Upanisadic seer comparing the eyes of the Lord to the hips of the monkey

Regarding this interpretation of this text a story is widely current among the followers of Śrī Rāmanuja and it is also recorded by them as follows — When the teacher of Śrī Ramanuja explained this Upanisadic text as given above, i.e., the eyes of the Lord were like the lotus which was like the hips of the monkey, Śrī Ramanuja shed hot tears, and when asked to explain why he was aggrieved he replied he was pained to hear this bad interpretation of the Śruti text when a proper interpretation could be made. And he explained to the teacher his own interpretation in three different ways not involving any trace of defective *upamā* (vide p. 3, Introduction to the *Śrī Bhāṣya*, Ananda Press, Madras)

- (1) kam pibatitī kapih sāryah, tenasyate vīkṣitam kriyate iti ;
- (2) kam udakam pyāśah āsanam udbhavo va yasyeti ,
- (3) kapih nālam, tasmin āśah āsanam yasyeti ca vyutpattya ravikaravīkṣita-gambhīrambhahsamudbhūtasumṛṣṭānalapundarīkadalāmalayate bhagavato ' kṣinī ||

In the *Śrutaprakāśika* on Br. S. 1. 1. 21, *antastadharmopadeśat*, and in the *Vedārthasamgraha-tatprayadīpika* (pages 245-46) and also in the *Upanisadbhāṣya* of Śrī Rangaramanuja, it is said that the Vākya-kara expounded all these three etymologies, and considering the appropriateness of all of them, as fully recorded and explained by Sudarśanasurī in his two works, the Bhasyakara gave the significant epithet to the lord

evamasyarthatrayasyopapannataya vakyakarena siddhantatayoktatvamabhipretya hi bhagavata bhasyakarena Vedārthasamgrahē' bhūṣitam — gambhīrambhahsamudbhūtasumṛṣṭānalaravikaravīkṣita-pundarīkadalāmalayatekṣanah iti || *Śrutaprakāśika*

This interpretation is no doubt strained and far fetched. *Kapī* meaning 'the sun' and 'lotus stalk' and *pyāśa* meaning 'seat' or 'rise' are very rare and unusual. Further *kam pibatitī* will give the finished form *kapah*, not *kapih* (*ato' nupatarge kah*), and *kapī* has to be formed by adding the *unadī* suffix 'in' to *pa* according to *sarva-dhatubhyo in*, but then the authority for dropping *a* of *pa* has yet to be traced. This is probably why Śrī Śaṅkara in his *Sahasra-*

namabhaṣya on verse 109 preferred on the basis of a *kośa* text to explain *kapi* as *varaha* instead of *surya*

It exhibits the extraordinary ingenuity of its author, and though this epithet *gamblurambhah*, etc., may be pleasing to any devotee it is no doubt obtained by straining and burdening the language by taking the word *kapyasa* in three different senses combined to mean 'pure and fully blossomed by the rays of the sun with the lotus-stalk well grown in deep water' It is born out of the unnecessary fear of accepting the simple but forceful earlier interpretation Sudarśanasuri says in the above cited place that the Vakyakāra considered and rejected three other interpretations of the word *kapyasa*, and the second of them takes the word as (1) a direct *upama* to the eyes and (2) as an indirect *upama* as explained by Śrī Śamkara The acceptability of this view is considered here

Śrī Śamkara was a great devotee especially of Viṣṇu and his interpretation can be supported consistently with the fundamental tenets of Śrī Ramanuja and his followers It is accepted by them that one of the ways of attaining salvation is by the worship or service of the Lord, and more than the service of the Lord directly, the shorter road to salvation is to serve the devotee of the Lord —

mañjanmanah phalamidam madhukaitābhare
matprarthaniyamadanugraha esa eva |
tvadbhṛtyabbhṛtyaparıcarakabhṛtyabbhṛtya
bhṛtyasya bhṛtya itı mam smara lokanatha ||

—*Mukundamala*, 27.

Among the devotees of the Lord, Hanuman, the leader of the monkeys, holds no mean place Even the fastidious critic may probably be satisfied with the following description taken from the *Sundarakanda* of the *Ramayana* When Hanuman, in search of the Mother, Sita, carrying out the unique errand of the Lord takes the classic leap in the sky and crosses the vast expanse of water below, he is described by the first poet as follows —

langulacakrena mahān śukladamstro nilatmajah |
vyarocata mahaprajnah parivesiva bhaskarah || 1 61
sphigdeśenabhūtamrena raraja sa mahakapıh |
mahata danteneva gurıgarıkadhatuna || 1 62

Here Hanuman is said to shine like the sun with his halo He shone with his hips, rosy red (*abhūtamrena*) just like a mountain

with its red mineral cut asunder Valmiki does not hesitate to describe in glowing terms the hind part of the monkey, and if he should be charged with indiscretion in having indulged in a description uncivilised and out of taste, I am afraid there is no appeal against it, and such a supercritic can never be satisfied I believe no follower of Śrī Ramanuja will be bold enough to take up that position against Valmiki Further when every being both animate and inanimate is a part or *saṁśā* of the all pervasive Lord (*cīdacidviśiṣṭasya brahmana ekatvam*, *yaḥ pṛthivyam tiṣṭhan*, etc *Bṛ Up III 7 3 23*), why should the reference to the limb of a devotee be considered offensive?

In the Upaniṣadic text in question, the Lord present in the sun is described to be of golden hue from top to toe (*a pranakhat suvarṇavarṇah*) and his eyes are compared to *kapyasam punḍarikam* The word *punḍarīka* more frequently means the white lotus, but here the Vedic poet desires to describe the eyes which are bright red and hence adds an epithet to 'lotus' to convey this idea Instead of saying bluntly 'red' lotus he has used the appropriate figurative language, 'lotus like the hip of the monkey' to convey forcibly the bright resplendent reddish hue of the Lord's eyes (*atyanta-tejasi*) When Valmiki has described in glowing terms the *sphigdeśa* or *kapyata* I believe there is no question of *hinopama* even if a direct comparison of the eyes to the hips of the monkey should have been made in the Upaniṣad Śrī Bhagavatpada finds that explaining it as a direct *upamāna* is open to the objection that the adjectival and substantive nature (*samanudbhikaranyān*) of the two words *kapyasam* and *punḍarikam* in the same gender and case required by syntax is violated, taking it as indirect *upamāna* removes this objection and also the objection of the supercritic regarding *Hinopama* and taking *kapyasam* in the sense of like *kapyasah* is quite natural and necessary in the context and acceptable to grammar and principles of sentence-construction He accordingly explains the plain and direct import of the Upaniṣadic text in his usual manner of interpretation with due regard to the genius and structure of the Sanskrit Language The upshot of this is that *kapyasam punḍarikam* as interpreted by Śrī Śaṅkara more than by any other conveys effectively the idea of the Lord as expressed in Tamil, *Centamarai kkanṇan* possessing eyes like the brilliant red lotus

THE SOLILOQUY OF PURŪRŪVAS

(A STUDY IN TEXTUAL CRITICISM)

By N SIVARAMA SASTRY

I

The King's soliloquy—or more properly his monologue—in Act IV of the *Vikramorvaṣīya* has all along puzzled students of Kalidasa. The play is found in two recensions—a longer and a shorter one. The longer may be said to belong to the North and the shorter to the South of India. Each has a commentary also preserved on it. The shorter recension was commented upon by Kaṭayavema, “minister of the Reddī prince, Kumaraḡiri of Kondavidu about A.D. 1400”,¹ and the longer in 1656 A.C. by Ranganatha of the Deccan, though he wrote his work in Kaśī. The most important difference, in Act IV however, consists in the longer recension having a number of extra stanzas in Apabhramśa Prakrit, some of which are put into the mouth of the king side by side with the Sanskrit stanzas in his speeches. These additional verses are almost all of them accompanied by stage directions suggestive of singing and dancing. The majority of the MSS consulted by S. P. Pandit for his edition do not contain these Prakrit passages nor do the Dravidian MSS consulted by Pischel in his edition of a recension based solely upon them, and one of the commentators, Kaṭayavema knows nothing of these Prakrit verses.² Pandit therefore has considered these passages spurious and has given the longer version containing these in an Appendix. He has also given other reasons for doing so. The King as an *uttamapatra* who otherwise speaks Sanskrit, is made to recite or chant Prakrit stanzas which are “mostly tautological” and many of which “are full of descriptions and vague allusions and references in the third person to some one in his situation rather than to him distinctly,” and lastly none of them are “required in their respective places, but several of them

1 Keith *Sanskrit Drama* p. 151.

2 *Vikramorvaṣīya*: Ed. S. P. Pandit (BSS. XVI) Preface to the first edition 1893. 3rd edition by Pandit and B. L. Arte 1901.

appear to interrupt the free and natural flow of the sentiments as expressed in the Sanskrit passages"¹ This view is shared generally by scholars,² but some still feel that the question is not settled,³ while a few others that the Prakrit verses are genuine Prof R D Karmarkar, for example, has argued at length and with some warmth on their genuineness, as against Pandit He answers his objections as follows. "Ranganatha notices these passages and comments upon them, if not Kaṭayavema. We cannot always go by the majority of the manuscripts consulted in the matter of settling the genuineness or otherwise of certain passages Though the king is an Uttamaputra and as such speaks Sanskrit in the rest of the play, we must remember that he has practically gone mad in the fourth Act and therefore there should be no objection if he utters some Prakrit verses, while being under the influence of madness The Prakrit passages considered by Pandit to be tautological are not really so, and even if they are tautological they can be attributed to the king's madness The last two objections raised by Pandit can be met by saying that the passages complained of, have to be sung behind the curtain and not by the king' He admits, however, that 'as a rule, the shorter text is the more reliable one', but adds "It must be borne in mind that the fourth Act is quite exceptional in the whole range of Sanskrit Literature Almost the whole of the Act is a soliloquy of the king who wanders about in the forest from one object to another Now it would be quite troublesome if not impossible for an actor to go on repeating all the passages without any break At the same time it would be too great a strain on the imagination of the audience if they are to believe that the king constantly moves from one place to another within a very short time by merely moving about the stage for half a minute or so' Some passages are intended therefore to give

1 *Ibid.* Preface pp 8f.

2 Keith *op cit* p 152.

3 S N Dasgupta and S. K. De, *A History of Sanskrit Literature* Classical Period Vol I. p 139 The whole scene is melodramatically conceived and if the Prakrit verses are genuine they are apparently meant to be sung behind the scenes So Dr De The general editor of the work Dr S. N Dasgupta however in his notes considers them genuine See p. 729

breathing time to the actor and also to allow sufficient time to pass so that the audience might comfortably believe that the actor has moved to another place. As regards certain passages that appear to be tautological it will be seen that the king is made to ask every object he meets, the question about his beloved twice. It is quite natural for the mad king to do so but to repeat the question in the same manner would have appeared to be quite tame. The poet therefore makes the whole thing romantic by putting certain songs containing the question in the mouth of the king.¹ Dr. A. N. Upadhye has argued in favour of the genuineness of these Apabhramśa verses.² 'Apabhramśa forms are traced in *Paumacariya* of Vimala (not later than 3rd cent. A.D.), we have an epigraphic record that Guhas-na of Valabhī (359-69 A.D.) composed poems in Apabhramśa, and lastly by the last quarter of the 8th century Apa is already recognised as a popular and forceful medium of poetry. In the light of these facts it is not in any way improbable that Kalidasa (circa 400 A.D.) whose Maharashtra songs are some of the best specimens might have composed some Apa verses to be sung by the mad King.' He follows Prof. Karmarkar's arguments and adds 'Students of Kalidasa's works will agree that the imagery projected by these verses is worthy of the genius of Kalidasa.' Prof. R. V. Jagirdar declares the passages to be genuine and explains their purpose, but he does not give any arguments. His remarks are really in the nature of suggestions for a successful staging in his opinion.³

II

Now it must be admitted at the outset that this Act is unique in classical Sanskrit drama. We find many later dramatists imitating this bold experiment of Kalidasa.⁴ The theme is indeed a favourite of his, though very probably he took the idea from Valmiki. Pururavas is distracted with grief at the sudden disappearance of Urvaśī refusing to be reconciled to him in spite of his protestations and explanations. For days and nights he has been wandering like

1 R. D. Karmarkar *Vikrāt urvaśīya* 2d edn. Poona 1932 pp. xv-xvii

2 *Paramatīya prakāśa* Introduction p. 56 note 1

3 *Drama in Sanskrit Literature* pp. 91-2

4 See ib. pp. 101 f.

a mad man. His grief has reached its climax today. The skies are clouded, there has been also some rain and the season makes the separation still more poignant, and like the Yakṣa in the *Meghaduta* he is *prakṛtyāpanah cetaracetareṣu*. He imagines the cloud is a demon who is carrying away his beloved—reminded probably of a former event that led to his first meeting with Urvaśī. Even the beauty of nature gives him no peace. Everything in the forest reminds him of some aspect or other of Urvaśī's own beauty. He supplicates the peacock who merely dances in answer, displaying his rich plumage like Urvaśī's tresses. The cuckoo—that messenger of love—shows only indifference to his sorrows. But he forgives her, for her voice is as sweet as his beloved's. He accuses the swan as a thief who has stolen his wife's gait but he only flies away, afraid probably, he fancies, of royal punishment. The sheldrake does not even recognise him—though he is a descendant of the Sun and the Moon. He pities the bee that never knew the balmy breath of his celestial beloved, otherwise he would not cling to the lotus like this. He waits for the elephant who is feeding on the tender branches brought to him by his mate and after he has had his meal, he approaches him with his question. His mellow trumpeting obviously means he saw her go that way. That is enough he must not intrude on the king of the forest any more. He wishes him well. 'You are in every way like me, but may you never know the pangs of separation!' ¹ He draws near the mountain and shouts his prayer to it. But alas, what he thought was a favourable answer was only an echo ². The turbid mountain stream strongly reminds him of his angry beloved running away from him, and indeed it must be she, transformed. He begs her to stop and come to him. Even the antelope is indifferent to his entreaties, he only looks in the direction of his approaching mate and young. The king goes on like this till he finds the magic gem that will unite separated lovers. What is more natural than that the king in this demented state should be singing and dancing, crying and laughing, fainting, shedding tears, and addressing—

1 Cf *Meghaduta* 11 last verse

2 We have to assume that the *prasnakāḥ* of his request was modified in the echo to a statement or that he did not at once realise it was an echo and therefore mistook its import.

according to Ranganatha's version—in Sanskrit and Prakrit indiscriminately every object he comes across in the lonely forest and entreating it to give him news of his beloved? The whole monologue seems quite natural and convincing and we cannot lightly brush aside the evidence of Ranganatha. Even single Mss may outweigh the evidence of hosts of others—as we have found in the case of the *Mahabharata*. Here we have not only a longer version but even a commentary preserved on it, which indicates that the version was equally widespread and popular.

III

Before we proceed further certain facts must be noted. The Act itself may be conveniently divided into three sections for our purpose.

- i The *Pravēśaka*
- ii The *anka* proper till Pururavas meets Urvaśi (i.e., to the end of stanza 30) ¹
- iii The rest of the *anka*, i.e., the meeting of the separated lovers

In section i appear two Apsarases, Sahajanya and Citralekha, the friend and confidante of Urvaśi. Sahajanya learns from the dejected Citralekha why she is so sad. While Pururavas and Urvaśi were having a second honeymoon as it were in the Gandhamadana forest near Kaulasa, Urvaśi ran away in a pet from her husband and entered the grove of Kumara forbidden for women and was instantly transformed into a creeper and Pururavas has been wandering in the woods like a madman for days and nights in search of her. But they must go now and wait on the Sun as it is their turn and the Sun is about to rise. So they leave us, Sahajanya hoping that fate may not keep such a loving couple miserable for too long a time ².

1 The references to the Prakrit stanzas are all to the Appendix in Pandit's edition. He numbers the genuine and spurious stanzas separately—giving them Devanagari and Indian numerals respectively.

2 The two celestial nymphs cannot be therefore stopping to sing the Prakrit melodies as Prof. Jagirdar thinks.

Section II is the Soliloquy of Pururavas, towards the end of which he comes across the magic gem and continues his search. At the sight of a creeper he is irresistibly attracted towards it, though it is without flowers. It reminds him so much of Urvashi, as if she were repentant of her rashness and was now relenting, that he embraces it and finds Urvashi in his arms.

Section III Urvashi explains her long absence to the complaining King and the united lovers go back to the capital riding on a cloud across the sky.

A careful examination of the Sanskrit cum Prakrit version of this Act yields the following results. Leaving aside minor differences in the readings of the prose passages, this version differs from the shorter only in having 32 stanzas extra—31 in Prakrit and 1 in Sanskrit. Sts I-4 occur in Section I. They allude indirectly to the condition of Sahajanya and Citralekha by referring to them as *vyakula hamsi* and *tamyati hamsiyugalam*. In Section II occur eleven verses which are actually part of the King's soliloquy side by side with the Sanskrit. They are all in the nature of addresses to the different objects he meets with in the forest. And it may be noted that all these occur as parallel to the Sanskrit stanzas. Ten more verses describe the condition of a mighty Elephant—once even identified with Airavata in the lonely Sanskrit verse (27)—pining away for his beloved and wandering about the forest, and these may all be taken to allude symbolically—and appropriately too—to the person of the King himself and his pitiable state. St 6 similarly describes a 'youthful Swan'—*hamsayuva*—and could be explained in the same manner. These *anyoktis*—or what might be described as 'oblique verses' for want of a better expression—are on a par with the four stanzas in section I. They seem to have been conventional songs where the 'youthful Swan' may be said to stand for the merely romantic type of lover (say) like Carudatta and the 'mighty Elephant' for the heroic type like Pururavas—friend of Indra and rescuer of Urvashi. St 20 however, describing also a 'youthful Swan' seems obviously to allude to the lover Bee sucking the honey and may very well be part of the King's speech. But it is quite inappropriate to consider all these 'oblique' verses also as uttered by the king himself, as Ranganatha does, when there are

clapping his hands in accompaniment¹ The imagery is grandly conceived, though the expression is a little conventional and obscure, if not also faulty The King approached the mountain and got only an echo for an answer He was so dejected and tired that he now stands on the bank of a mountain stream to take the cool breeze. The mountain stream is rushing along, turbid and foamy, and reminds him of his angry beloved He supplicates her Here occurs st 26 A description of the rainy season, we may say, that aggravated his sorrows is here inserted to create the proper atmosphere But how the Sea came to be there must remain a mystery, for in the previous stanza which also is Prakrit and in the following which is Sanskrit he is only addressing the Stream. Ranganatha as usual makes this also part of the King's soliloquy and suggests that in his madness the King mistook the Stream for the Sea It is probable that this again is a conventional description of a dancer like the one about the Kalpa Tree Both these might again be favourite 'texts' for dances

In Section II the King enumerates to Urvashi in st 31 all the objects he besought for tidings of her St 32 is 'oblique' and alludes to the now happy King as *tiharati hamsayuta*

It will be seen that taken in this way the Prakrit verses serve a useful and artistic purpose The longer version seems therefore to fit in very well with the dramatist's design Then could we say that it was this version that Kalidasa wrote and the shorter version is only an abridgement of the longer made by the conservative South? The *Sakuntala* is also preserved in two recensions and the longer again belongs to the North or at least to the East of India We may possibly apply the same arguments there also Or did Kalidasa write both the versions? There has been a general tendency among scholars to assume that all changes in reading and variation in text are due only to VĪS tradition Is it not possible that authors

1. This stanza is misunderstood both by Paddit and Karmakar who take the first five lines to form a unit The suggestion of the former that the last line may be spurious is not acceptable for then the stanza would consist only of five lines, with nothing to rhyme with the last line.

revised and rewrote their texts sometimes? Could we not say in this case that Kalidasa wrote both? Or did a later writer add these Prakrit verses—in other words, song and dance? These are the possibilities that face us now. To solve this problem a further examination of the version is necessary.

Taking the Prakrit verses to be uttered by the King to begin with, we find that all the eleven in Section II are no more than repetitions of what is found in the corresponding Sanskrit verses. They are practically 'doublets' of the Sanskrit. In other words all his questions addressed to the different objects in Sanskrit have, each of them, a Prakrit parallel.¹ They all occur in pairs. Besides they do not add anything whatsoever to what is said in the Sanskrit stanzas. They are mere reflexes. Thus they seem even unnecessary. Is it not strange that Kalidasa should write such redundant stanzas—parallel with each Sanskrit stanza, and every time so? To explain these lapses into Prakrit on the part of the King, as due to his madness, as is done by Prof. Karmarkar, would make the madness much too methodical and consistent. There is, as a matter of fact, no madness in any of the stanzas as such—Sanskrit or Prakrit. Each speech is as sensible or mad as the other. Besides the King is made to utter Prakrit stanza 31 even after he has met Urvashi and all his madness is gone! Then again why should Kalidasa alternately change to Prakrit and Sanskrit? Curiously enough there is no Prakrit prose at all in the King's speeches and only Prakrit verse. Strange madness this, that the King if he should speak Prakrit at all, should speak Prakrit verse! Incidentally this rules out the possibility of a purely Prakrit version, because by themselves the Prakrit verses make no sense and lack continuity, whereas the shorter Sanskrit version makes perfect reading and is quite intelligible without them. The conclusion therefore is irresistible that these stanzas in the King's soliloquy were merely meant to be sung and danced to also sometimes—unlike the Sanskrit ones which were only recited—and as is the usual custom, the songs are in Prakrit. What applies to these applies also to the 'oblique' verses. Only they

1 Except when he addresses the Bee in the first line of a Sanskrit stanza and proceeds to the next line without further worrying it.

were sung by others. The actor playing the part of King may be said to recite the Sanskrit verses and sing the Prakrit ones in his speeches and sometimes dance also to their accompaniment. Probably he danced also to the music of the 'oblique' songs sung away from the stage. By making madness the *raison d'être* for this change of dialect, Prof. Karmarkar would be virtually condemning Kalidasa as inartistic and by implication it would follow that the shorter and purely Sanskrit version is unconvincing and unrealistic if not altogether absurd in itself. By his theory he has proved too much.

Now, did Kalidasa actually write these verses—these song-dance counterparts? He is known to be a lover of music and dance and shows intimate knowledge of them throughout his works. He might have written a longer version for the opera stage, after the manner of other obviously Prakrit operas, full of dances and music and presumably more popular than the *natakas* and even the *natikas*. There is also some truth in Prof. Karmarkar's contention that these verses would help the audience in imagining the passing of time and frequent change of place, while allowing the actor occasional rest. One need not underrate the artistic effect of the songs and the dances in an anxiety to disprove their authenticity. Many of the stanzas are conventional and wooden, no doubt. But, it may be contended, they are all song structures and some of them are meant only for background music and at least a few of them are even good poetry (e.g., 5, 13, 17, 24 and 26). But why does the King consistently repeat himself? The Prakrit counterparts seem mere appendages. This mechanical doubling, it must be admitted is highly suspicious—unless we suppose that Kalidasa himself composed some Prakrit songs as *substitutes* for some of the Sanskrit verses and *added* other conventional songs in the manner of folk drama, and these have got mixed up with the Sanskrit in the course of time. But then would Kalidasa write such Prakrit verses as these, *same and without any significance at all—even if they were meant only to be sung*? Only two verses (8 and 17) in the King's soliloquy have any significance. Or would he descend to those merely conventional 'oblique' songs which are still worse? How different is his practice in the *Malatikagumitra* where he makes the

heroine sing a song, which is at once applicable both to herself and the *nayika* of the song itself? or where Hamsapadikā is practising a *varna* which is also a veiled rebuke to Dusyanta? or that song overture of the Nāṭi, which at once captivates the audience and puts them in the proper mood to witness the coming play—dumbly suggestive as it is of Śakuntala's fate to an audience already conversant with a version of the story? Could not Kalidasa make these songs a little more artistic than they are? Why is he satisfied here with mere convention? Even if the King now spoke Sanskrit and now sang rhyming Apabhramśa verses and someone from somewhere sang introductory and explanatory songs, if only the Prakrit stanzas were always as good poetry as the Sanskrit or at least were significant and not pale reflections of the Sanskrit, nor tame and tepid conventions, they would have formed an artistic whole. If Kalidasa wrote the longer version he would surely have made the Sanskrit and the Prakrit fuse and form one unit—and not two parallel versions like this, one a shadow of the other. He might have made, for example, the King descend to the colloquial dialect when he was particularly affected and speak the standard dialect when he was less so—never of course repeating the speeches, song or recitation. Elsewhere we see in Kalidasa a certain appropriateness in the choice of dialects and even in the use of Sanskrit prose and verse. But this tasteless mixture of Sanskrit and Prakrit and their rigid distribution without adequate justification seems most unconvincing. What we have here is something that is both dignified and pedestrian, refined and vulgar, at the same time.

Then again these Prakrit verses sometimes impede the action unnecessarily and sometimes make the scene actually less realistic and dramatic than otherwise. St 24 is an instance in point. The mountain does not answer the King's question. 'I am afraid he cannot hear me, for he is too far away, let me go near and ask him again,' he says. But then he sings a Prakrit song (st 24) pleading, "Show me, oh mountain, my beloved." After this Prakrit parenthesis follows a Sanskrit verse again asking the mountain if he saw his beloved. This second Sanskrit verse alone is echoed and not also the Prakrit verse—which means that he had not approached the moun-

tain when he uttered it. But why did he utter it at all when he knew he could not be heard unless he went near? St 28 again is a pompous request addressed to the antelope inserted between two Sanskrit verses destroying their charming unity. St 30 breaks the illusion of Urvaśī created by the previous stanza. And what a terrible anticlimax is st 6? The king is rushing to strike the cloud in his rage for carrying away his beloved, when follows this tame verse about a 'languishing Swan' 1 and not even the 'Elephant'! What a splendid performance for this Prince of Propriety (*aucitya*)! The vaunted realism and superior art of the longer version is thus largely imaginary.

The present version therefore looks too much like music and dance—even if both are made exceedingly good—being foisted upon an original unique as it already was 2.

And why does Kalidasa choose Apabhramśa in preference to Maharaṣṭrī? This is the only place where he may be said to have used it. Elsewhere he has Maharaṣṭrī for his songs and only once Magadhī. This is really inexplicable. Even if Apabhramśa of the type used here was current in the time of Kalidasa, it does not necessarily follow that he must have used it. Do we find dramatists of the time using it? The author of the *Mṛcchakatika* who uses many types of Prakrit has left Apabhramśa alone. Other dramatists like Bhavabhūti who have imitated this scene, omit this particular feature. Even Rājaśekhara who had a partiality for Prakrit and boasted of his proficiency in all languages omits it in his imitation. Why, he does not use Apabhramśa even in his purely Prakrit play. Was this unique experiment so unsuccessful that all dramatists consistently avoided only this particular feature when they imitated it—

1 A further possibility that Kālidāsa wrote only the Prakrit doublets in the King's soliloquy and not also the oblique songs, would be ruled out for the same reasons.

2 Cf. *Sarvaśaṣṭīcākṣaṇa* (*Balarāmaṇya* I 10) and *sarvaśaṣṭīcākṣaṇa* (*Karpuramañjarī* I 71). Balar I 11 he mentions the different languages used in literary compositions. Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramśa and Bhūṭabhaṣā. As far as we know he himself wrote only in Sanskrit and Prakrit. Konow & Ed. of the latter (HOS) p. 199.

including the second-rate dramatists like Rājaśekhara? It is exceedingly doubtful, therefore, that Kālidāsa should have used this dialect in his play, writing rhyming stanzas of doubtful poetic quality in it.

If Kālidāsa did write these tame songs he would in addition be changing his dramatic technique and introducing a popular type of drama into a part of his play, which would be strange indeed and unprecedented. In what Sanskrit play do we find this technique of the folk drama? Not even in the *Mahānāṭaka* which contains elements of popular drama, do we find this feature, though its author has imitated this scene in it. Kālidāsa's experiment does not seem to have tempted even him. And literary critics do not seem to have taken to it kindly either. At least they ignore it, even if they knew it to be by Kālidāsa. The whole experiment is thus unparalleled in classical Sanskrit drama. Is it not more likely that the theme of Kālidāsa was elaborated by a later writer and a longer version of it was made to satisfy some royal or more probably popular demand, with dance and song added on the model of folk drama?

It is important to remember that the shorter version though all in Sanskrit is in the best traditions of the classical drama and Kālidāsa's own manner and is a perfect artistic composition in itself. Bhavabhūti paid his tribute to Kālidāsa by considering it worth while imitating. Whether it had already elements of the opera in it, it is difficult to say. The longer operatic dance version, however, though late and by a different hand must have found favour with the people because of its elaborate music and dances—features redolent of the folk stage added to their already favourite piece of their favourite author. It really brought Kālidāsa nearer the people in a later age—the age of the vernaculars. The author of this inflated version, whoever he was, it must be remembered, only added on his own, leaving the links loose, and did not tamper with Kālidāsa's text, for he had too much respect for Kālidāsa to do so—unlike Dryden impertinently arrogating to himself a better

1. In Karnāṭaka we have such 'oblique' songs as are found here, in the popular type of play called *yakṣagana* or *bayalaṭa* ('open air show').

taste than that of Shakespeare and giving to the world a revised and improved version of the *Tempest*. The inflated version is in other words the homage paid by folk drama to the genius of Kālidāsa.

A FEW UNRECOGNIZED STANZAS OF AŚVAGHOSA

By T. N. SREEKANTAIYA

Aśvaghōṣa's great classic, the *Buddhacarita*, survives only in a mutilated form in Sanskrit. E. H. Johnston's edition¹ of the Sanskrit text, prepared with great care and diligence, breaks off at the 31st stanza of the XIV canto,² while the complete poem is known to have comprised 28 cantos. For a knowledge of the other half of the poem one has to turn to its Tibetan and Chinese translations; and persons who, like the present writer, know neither Tibetan nor Chinese, have to depend upon two English renderings: (1) by Samuel Beal,³ of the Chinese translation, and (2) by Johnston whose object was "not to give a translation of either the Tibetan or the Chinese alone, but to handle the two together critically, so as to arrive as near as may be at the meaning of Aśvaghōṣa's original text." Johnston points out that the Tibetan translation "renders the original more or less *verbatim*, but.....is not capable by itself of communicating Aśvaghōṣa's intentions to us with precision," since it is "full of corruptions and has a number of lacunae." The Chinese is "on the other hand only a very free paraphrase, omitting to explain many phrases and difficult words, and often contracting or expanding the original for no obvious reasons."⁴ But if one is

1. The *Buddhacarita*, Part I—Sanskrit Text, Part II—cantos 1 to xiv translated from the original Sanskrit supplemented by the Tibetan version; editor and translator: E. H. Johnston, D. Litt. (Panjab University Oriental Publications, Nos 31 and 32)

2. Johnston has shown that the first seven stanzas of the first canto are also not available now in Sanskrit.

3. *Fo Sho-Hing Tsen-King*, A life of Buddha by Aśvaghōṣa Bodhisattva, translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa, A.D. 420 and from Chinese into English by Samuel Beal (The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XIX).

4. E. H. Johnston: *The Buddha's Mission and Last Journey: The Buddhacarita* to (xxxviii, Acta Orientalia, Vol. XV), p. 26.

eager to know how *Āśvaghoṣa's* great poem continued and concluded one has perforce to rely upon these valuable but imperfect aids

The XXII canto of the *Buddhacarita* depicts the visit of the courtesan *Amrapālī* to the Buddha who was staying in a grove (situated in her domain) in the city of *Vaiśālī*. When this courtesan, with flashing eyes and a lovely form, alighted from her chariot and entered the grove, the Buddha saw her and addressed his disciples as follows

21 “ This is *Amrapālī* approaching, the mental fever of those whose strength is little, do you take your stand on knowledge, controlling your minds with the elixir of awareness

22 ‘ Better is the neighbourhood of a snake or of an enemy with drawn sword, than that of a woman for the man who is devoid of awareness and wisdom

23 ‘ Whether sitting or lying down, whether walking or standing, or even when portrayed in a picture, woman carries away men’s hearts

24 ‘ Even if they be afflicted by disaster (*vyasana*), or fling their arms about weeping, or be burnt with dishevelled hair, yet women are pre eminent in power ¹

For purposes of comparison, the corresponding passage from Beal’s rendering of the Chinese is given below. It occurs in *Kiōuen IV Varga 22*

‘ This woman is indeed exceedingly beautiful, able to fascinate the minds (feelings) of the religious, 1753

‘ Now then keep your recollection straight! Let wisdom keep your mind in subjection! Better fall into the fierce tiger’s mouth, or under the sharp knife of the executioner, 1754

‘ Than to dwell with a woman and excite in yourselves lustful thoughts. A woman is anxious to exhibit her form and shape, whether walking, standing, sitting or sleeping. 1755

‘ Even when represented as a picture, she desires most of all to set off the blandishments of her beauty, and thus to rob men of their steadfast heart! How then ought you to guard yourselves! 1756

‘ By regarding her tears and her smiles as enemies, her stooping form, her hanging arms, and all her disentangled hair as toils designed to entrap man’s heart 1757 ’¹

When I read this passage for the first time, there was a familiar ring in stanza 23 (of Johnston’s rendering), especially in the phrase, ‘ even when portrayed in a picture I was sure I had met with it in Sanskrit, in one of the Anthologies And I was lucky in being able to trace it to the *Subhastatāḥ* of Vallabhadeva ’ The Sanskrit stanza runs as follows

Sthitāsanastha śayita parānmukhā
svalamkṛta vapy analamkṛtatha va |
nirīkṣamāna pramada sudurbalam
manuṣyam alekhyagatapi karṣatī ||

(No 3382, p 553)

Vallabhadeva’s practice is to give the name of the author also, if it is known, after the selected stanza He has left this one anonymous But even a cursory comparison shows that this Sanskrit stanza represented substantially, if not in its entirety, the original of the Tibetan and the Chinese translations It is only for the second line (“ svalamkṛta vapy analamkṛtatha va ”) that we do not find any corresponding expression in the Tibetan or the Chinese Though we cannot rule out the possibility of the original Sanskrit of Aśvaghoṣa being found here in a corrupt form, it is not unlikely that the Tibetan and the Chinese versions are themselves not quite faithful to the original Sanskrit Anyhow there can be no reasonable doubt that Vallabhadeva has preserved for us in a very large measure the authentic words of Aśvaghoṣa, albeit under the veil of anonymity We must particularly be grateful to him because, as far as one is aware, none of the other Anthologies in Sanskrit, like *Kaṇḍavacanasaṃuccaya*, *Saduktikāṇāmṛta*, *Suktimuktavali*, *Śaṅgadhara-paddhati* *Padjāvalī*, etc give this stanza with or without the author’s name

1 *Fo Shō Hing Tsan King* p 253.

2 Edited by Peter Peterson B A and Pandit Durgaprasada

The next stanza (No 3383) in Vallabhadeva's Anthology is even more interesting from the standpoint of our problem

Smitena havena ca lajjaya bhīya
 paranmukhair ardhakṛṣṇakṣaṇīkṣitāḥ |
 vacoparīṣṭyakalāhena līlaya
 samastabhavāḥ khalu bandhanam strīyāḥ ||

This stanza, unlike the preceeding one, is well known to students of Sanskrit since it is usually met with as the second stanza of Bhartṛhari's *Srngarasataka*. In Prof D D Kosambi's critical and exhaustive edition¹ it finds a place (as no 79) in Group I ("Stanzas generally found in all versions"); from his 'Synoptic Chart of Major Versions' we gather that it occurs in all the versions without any exception in the early part of the *Srngarasataka*². It is also interesting to note that though there are, as usual, variant readings, none except *bhālena* for *havena* and *dhyā* for *bhīya* is of much importance³.

This stanza roughly corresponds to No 24 in Johnston's English rendering and No 1757 in Beal's. But there are differences. For one thing, the 'dishevelled [or disentangled] hair' is missing in Sanskrit⁴. There are again certain other features here not found in the Tibetan or the Chinese. But this need not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the Sanskrit stanza has again suffered from corruption and interpolation. For, as observed above, the textual tradition in regard to this stanza is both ancient and uniform⁵.

1. *Bhartṛharīsubhāṣitasamgraha* Singhī Jain Series No. 23 Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Bombay. This work bears also the titles *Mahakavi Bhartṛharī viracita Satakatrayadīsubhāṣitasamgraha* and *The Epigrams attributed to Bhartṛharī*.

2. Ibid., Introduction p. 55.

3. Ibid., Text p. 31.

4. One wonders whether Johnston's 'be burnt with dishevelled hair' correctly represents the sense of the original. There is no corresponding word in Beal.

5. One has to raise, in this connection, the question whether the Tibetan Version of the *Buddhacarita* is always as faithful to the original as it is reputed to be. This has to remain open until Sanskrit scholars possessing a thorough command of Tibetan examine it in the light of the present discussion.

Further, there is luckily independent evidence to show that this stanza was definitely regarded as Aśvaghosa's. In the Notes to the *Subhāṣitavalī* (p. 101) we find with reference to this stanza the editors' remark "C has the signature *Aśvaghosaṣya*" (C here denotes one of the manuscripts of the Anthology, secured in Kashmir). This illuminating fact indicates that at least in Kashmir there were scholars who ascribed this stanza to Aśvaghosa. No doubt anthologists (and their copyists) are notorious for their inexact memory and the faulty tradition followed by them.¹ All the same, their statements cannot be brushed aside, especially when corroboration is forthcoming.

It is surprising, therefore, that among the stanzas listed under Aśvaghosa's name as occurring in the *Subhāṣitavalī* by its editors there is no mention of the stanza we are now considering ("*Smitena havena* ")² It is probable that since the MS. C (along with the MS. D) came into the hands of the editors only after the text was "already formed and written out" (Preface, p. 11), they either forgot to insert this crucial word, "*Aśvaghosaṣya*," in the constituted text or else did not consider the manuscript authority sufficiently weighty to warrant their doing so. Anyhow this ascription failed to be noted even in their Introduction, and that has continued to be its fate at the hands of other scholars too. It has escaped the vigilant eye of F. W. Thomas who has entered under Aśvaghosa's name, in his exhaustive Introduction to the *Kaṇḍavacanāsamuccaya*, only the five stanzas of the *Subhāṣitavalī* listed already by Peterson and Durgaprasada, and one other ascribed to Aśvaghosa in the *Kaṇḍavacanāsamuccaya* itself. E. H. Johnston, the indefatigable editor and translator of Aśvaghosa's kavyas, has somehow failed to recognize this stanza (and also the stanza, "*Stūṭisanastha* ") as Aśvaghosa's.³

1 See the Note at the end of this article.

2 *Subhāṣitavalī*, Introduction, p. 8.

3 Johnston remarks: "A few verses not one of which occurs in his works as brought to light so far are also attributed to Aśvaghosa in the Anthologies that in the *Kaṇḍavacanāsamuccaya* is certainly not by him but shows some likeness to the *Gaṇḍistotra* though more elaborate than

D.D. Kosambi in his critical notes under his stanza in his *Bhartṛhari-subhāṣitasamgraha* notes that it occurs in a number of Anthologies including the *Subhāṣitāvalī*, but does not mention that it is ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa.

The idea that women captivate men's hearts by every act, pose, and gesture of theirs appears to have haunted Aśvaghoṣa's mind. For it occurs in his *Saundarananda* too:

Bhāvena garveṇa gatena lakṣmyā
Smitena kopeṇa madena vāgbhiḥ |
jabruḥ striyo devaṇṇpārsisamghān
kasmād dhi nāsmadvidham āksipeyuḥ ||
(vii. 24)

It will be noticed that in addition to the general correspondence in the central idea, the first halves of this stanza and the one we are at present considering have in common a few expressions too.

We may note now that both "*Sthitāsanasthā...*" and "*Smitena hāvena...*" are in the vamsastha metre. That means that vamsastha was, one can reasonably be sure, the main metre used by Aśvaghoṣa in this canto. Now stanza 3381 of the *Subhāṣitāvalī* (which just precedes our "*Sthitāsanasthā...*" there) is also in the same metre; it is given without the author's name:

Yad eva te lāghavaḥetur arthitā
patanti yaṇ mūrdhni nikārapāmsavaḥ |

anything found there. Of the five in the *Subhāṣitāvalī* none definitely bear his sign manual or need even be by a Buddhist, but if the attribution is improbable it cannot be pronounced absolutely impossible. (The *Buddhacarita*, Part II, p. xiii.)

It is interesting to note that of the five stanzas listed in the *Subhāṣitāvalī* two (Nos. 528 and 8100) occur in the *Nīlśalākā* of Bhartṛhari II, as we have seen, "*Smitena hatena*" which now forms part of the *Syngarāśālākā* can be Aśvaghoṣa's, there is nothing inherently improbable in the other two also being Aśvaghoṣa's composition. . . Again, is it impossible that the stanza given as Aśvaghoṣa's in the *Karīṇḍararacanasaṃuccaya* (No. 2 "*Ābhūḍgatamanjā laṅgarucayaḥ* .." was perhaps the benedictory stanza of one of Aśvaghoṣa's plays? This stanza is quoted by Vāmana (c. 800 A. C.) in his *Kaṭyaśāstra-sūtratīkṣa* (under iv. 3.7) anonymously and it occurs in the *Subhāṣitāvalī* (No. 74) again anonymously. There are variant readings.

spr̥santy adbhikṣepasarāś ca yaṁ manas
tad anganabhīḥ kriyate śarīrinam ||

This stanza depicts the indignity that men have to suffer on account of women and is thoroughly in keeping with the theme and the mood of the section of the *Buddhacarita* we are at present considering. But one does not find any corresponding stanza in the Tibetan or the Chinese version. Hence we are not in a position to say whether this anonymous stanza originally formed a part of the *Buddhacarita* or even whether it was written by Aśvaghosa.

It is only Vallabhadeva and the compiler of the *Kaṇḍarvacanasamuccaya* among all the Anthologists in Sanskrit, that, as so far known, ascribe any stanzas specifically to Aśvaghosa. Hence their testimony is particularly valuable though it has of course to be verified with care. It was believed that the *Kaṇḍarvacanasamuccaya* had survived only in part. F. W. Thomas's edition of it gives only 525 stanzas. But D. D. Kosambi's remarks with reference to an unpublished and not generally available Anthology called the *Subhāṣṭaratnakōṣa*, compiled by Bhīmarjunasoma, are very interesting. 'About a third of this is the fragment published by F. W. Thomas as the *Kaṇḍarvacanasamuccaya*. The identification is mine, from the description of the original palm leaf MS. at the Ngor monastery in Tibet, as supplied by Rahula Sankṛtyayana.'¹⁶ This is a very welcome identification. Since this Anthology has Buddhist leanings quite an old one as Anthologies go (going back probably to the 11th Century, A. C., if not to an even earlier date), it is possible that a few stanzas of Aśvaghosa, with or without any ascription, may be found in its unpublished portions. Lovers of Aśvaghosa will be grateful if scholars who are fortunate enough to have access to the MS. of the *Subhāṣṭaratnakōṣa* or its copies can undertake this investigation.

NOTE

An instance of the faulty ascription of stanzas by Anthologists pertinent to the present discussion, has been pointed out by F. W. Thomas. Of the stanza,

Madhu tisthatı vacı yositam
 hrđı halahalam eva kevalam |
 ata eva nıpiyate'dharo
 hrđayam mustıbhır eva tadyate||,

which occurs in the *Subhasıtavali* (No 3383), a little above the stanzas we have considered in this paper, and is cited as 'Kalidasa Magha yoh", the first two lines are actually the last two lines of a stanza of Asvaghosa, with slight variants (F W Thomas *Saundaranandu Kavya*, VIII 35 JRAS 1911, pp 1125 6) This stanza is known to occur in some other Anthologies as well as in the *Pancatantra* and the Southern Recension of Bhartıhari's *Śrngarasataka*. In one place it is ascribed jointly to Vikramaditya and Kalidasa (*Vide* D D Kosambi *Bhartıharısubhasıtasamgraha* p 117 Critical Notes under this stanza, No 298)

It may be of some interest to observe in this connection that in the *Subhasıtaratnabhandagara* a modern Anthology compiled by Kasınath Pandurang Parab (Nirnaya Sagar Press) the following two stanzas occur

Sumukhena vadantı valguna
 praharanty eva sitena cetasa |
 madhu tisthatı vacı yositam
 hrđaye halahalam mahadvısam ||
 Ata eva nıpiyate 'dharo
 hrđayam mustıbhır eva tadyate |
 purusaih sukhalesavañcitaih
 madhulubdhaih kamalam yathalıbbıh

It is to be noted that the first of these two stanzas is the same as *Saundarananda*, VIII 35, with a few variant readings, the second one, however, is not found in that *kavya*. One is led to conjecture that the juxtaposition of these two stanzas represents an earlier phase of the problem discussed by F W Thomas. The stanza *Ata eva* appears to have been composed by a later poet as a witty complement to Asvaghosa's stanza. Then the first two lines and the last two lines respectively of this pair of stanzas were dropped, and the middle four lines—which are so to say their essence—were rolled together into a single stanza and came to be regarded as a kind of

samasyāpūṛana. It is not difficult to understand that the poet Aśvaghosa, a Buddhist, was forgotten and the stanza was ascribed to two other famous poets. It is this stage of the tradition that appears to be recorded in the *Subhāṣitāvalī*.

One would very much like to know from which older Anthology or *kāvya* Parab took these two stanzas. But he does not indicate their source.

SOME RIDDLES IN THE “KUMĀRASAMBHAVA

By P S SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI

I

Yam sarvaśailaḥ parikalpya vatsam
merau sthite dogdharī dohadakṣe |
bhasvanti ratnāni mahauṣadhiśca
pṛthupadīṣṭam duduhur dharitṛm || 12

Is Himalaya great on account of his having precious gems and medicinal herbs or on account of his having been instrumental in enabling all the other mountains possess them?

How does this doubt arise?

It arises from the expression—*etena asya saragrahitvam gamyate* of Mallinatha, and the statement—

macchasanam samasthava dharmayuktam vasundhare |
umāḥ prajā ajñāya me samjivaya sadāiva hi ||
dhenurūpeṇa sâ devī bāṇāñcitakalevara |
uvacedam pṛthum vaimvam dharmatmanam mahamatim |
parvataiśca mahapunyaḥ dugdha ceyam vasundhara |
ratnāni vividhānyeva cauṣadhiścamṛtopamāḥ ||
vatsaścaiva mahabhago himavan parikalpitāḥ |
merur dogdha ca samjataḥ paṇam kṛtvā susanu ca ||
tena ksīreṇa samvṛddhāḥ śailāḥ sarve mahocchrayāḥ ||

found in the *Padmapurana* (II 28 11, 13 65—67) and practical experience in life

From the *Padmapurana* which is the nearest source to the *Kumarasambhava*, it is evident that all the mountains got precious gems and medicinal herbs through the agency of Himalaya. Of the owner of a cow milk man and calf, in the world, it is the owner of the cow that gets the lion's share of the milk. Hence the greatness of the calf does not lie in getting the choicest milk of the mother but lies in being solely instrumental in enabling others get the greatest share of the same.

This tells us that the greatness of Himalaya lies more in his *sacrifice* than in his *possession* of gems and herbs.

II

Anantaratnaprabhazasya yasya himam na saubhagya vilopi jatam

The riddle here is whether *hima* is *saubhagya vilopi* or *saubhagya pariposi*

The expression *saundarya vighatakam na jatam* of Mallinatha and *kimiva hi madhuranam mandanam nakṣatram* of the Śakuntala are responsible for creating this *samśaya*. Generally the former view is held by scholars, for they seem to think that Kalidasa in his early life thought that it was not *saubhagya vilopi* and in his later life he found from experience that it was not only *na saubhagya vilopi* but also *saubhagya pariposi*. But the verse—

vatha prasiddham madhuraṁ śiroṣṭhaḥ
jaṭabhīr apyevam abhūt tadānamam |
na śatpadaśreṇibhireva paṅkajam
saśaivalasangamapi prakāśate || V 9

clearly indicates that the latter idea was predominant in the mind of the author even when he composed the *Kumarasambhava*. Hence after *saundarya vighatakam na jatam* we should add *api tu saundarya pariposakam jatam*. It may further suggest through *arthasakti* that *hima* does not only add beauty to the form of Himalaya but also when melted, it becomes a source of life to the inhabitants of the Gangetic plain.

III

Sa manasīm merusakhāḥ pīṭṇam
kānyam kulasya sthūṭaye sthūṭiññāḥ |
menam muninam api mananiyam
atmanurupam vidhinopayame || I 18

When there is the word *atmanurupam*, what is the need for *pīṭṇam manasīm kānyam*?

If the author had used only the word *atmanurupam* the readers may be led to think that *Mena* was the daughter of a *devata* living in *svarga*, since Himalaya is described as a *devata* in the first verse. But the following extracts from the *Rgveda* and the *Valmiki Ramayana* will solve the riddle.

na hi vo asty arbhako devaso na kumarakah |
viśve sato mahanta it || RV VIII 30 1

atha sailasuta rama tridaśanīdamabravit |
yasman nivarita caiva saṃgatih putrakamyaya ||
apatyam svesu daresu tasman notpadaḥ syatha |
adya prabhṛti yusmakam aprajasstantu patnyah ||

Ram I 36 20-22

A similar statement is found in the *Mahabharata* also

From this it is clear that Himalaya could not get any *deva* girl for him to marry. Hence *pitṛdevatas* who are inferior in rank and who are free from Parvatī's curse thought of creating a girl for him. But they had no wives.

Cf *Akrodhanah śaucaparāḥ satatam brahmacarīnāḥ |*
Manusmṛti, III 192

Hence they had to create a girl through their mind. How appropriate is it for Menā the mother of Parvatī to be an *ajomya*?

IV

Athavamanena puuh prayukta
dakṣasya kanya bhavapurvapatnī |
satī satī vogavisṛṣṭā deha
tam janmane śailavadhum prapade || I 21

What a fine śloka this is! It gives room for five problems to be solved. They are as follows —

1 Of the three *aramanas* which Parvatī was put to which *aramana* is referred to here?

2 Is the use of the word *kanya* which means an unmarried woman appropriate here?

3 Was she *bhavapatnī* or *bhavapurvapatnī*?

4 Why should there be two *satīs*?

5 What is the significance of the expression *tam janmane śailavadhum prapade*?

(1) The three *aramanas* which Parvatī was put to are —

(a) No invitation was sent to her husband by her father Dakṣa with reference to the *yajña*. (b) when she entered Dakṣa's house, she was not welcomed by him, and (c) oblation to Rudra

her husband, was not offered in the *yajna*. It is evident that she did not mind the first *atamana* since she attended the sacrifice. She did not attach much importance to the second *avamana* since, otherwise, she would not have entered his house, but would have returned home. It is the third *avamana* that touched her to the quick, since she was *sati* which means *pativrata*. The appropriateness of the word *prayuktā* derived from the root *yuj* (to join) with the preposition *pra* suggesting *prakarṣa* deserves to be noted. Hence the solutions for the problems 1 and 4 go together.

(2) How appropriate is the use of the word *kanyā*? From the moment Dakṣ gave *Sati* in marriage to Lord Śiva he began to consider her only as the wife of Śiva and not as his daughter, since he did not like Śiva or rather hated Śiva. Hence whenever he unconsciously thought of her, her form in the unmarried state stood before him. This one word *kanyā* in this verse tells us how keen *Kalidasa* was in perceiving the inner working of the human mind.

(3) She was *bhavapatni* before she left the physical body of *sati* and she was *bhātapurvapatni* after she left it. Hence if the *anvaya* is taken as *bhavapurvapatni sati sati yogavivṛtadeha*, the use of *bhavapurvapatni* is undoubtedly wrong.

But if the *anvaya* is taken as *sati sati yogavivṛtadeha bhavapurvapatni*, the word *bhavapurvapatni* is very appropriately used.

(4) One *sati* tells her name and the other tells us that she was a *pativrata* and the second *sati* helps to solve the first riddle.

(5) The significance of the expression *tam janmane śailavadhūm prapade* can be easily understood if it is contrasted with the expression *garbhō' bhavat bhudhararajapatnyuh* in the 19th verse. It suggests that she, of her own accord, allowed her *atman* with the *sukṣma śarīra* enter the womb of Mena and Himavan had nothing to do with her birth. Her capacity to do so is suggested by the word *yogavivṛtadehā* which immediately precedes *tam janmane śailavadhūm prapade*. She who had the capacity to extricate her *atman* with *sukṣmaśarīra* from one physical body must evidently have had the capacity to create another physical body for herself.

Such riddles in the *Kumarasambhava* are found in plenty and *sahydayas* should feel it their duty to enunciate them and solve them to the students of Samskṛt Literature.

GHANAŚYĀMA AND HIS 'ĀNANDASUNDARI'

BY A N UPADHYE

The poet Ghanasyama,¹ who calls himself *maharashtra cudama* and who possessed epithets like Kanṭhīrava, was the son of Mahadeva and Kasi and a grand son of Caundaji Balaji. Isa was his elder brother, Śakambari, his sister, Sundari and Kamala, his wives, and Candrasekhara and Govardhana, his two sons. He was born in 1700 A.D., and lived as far as 1750. At the age of 29 he became the minister of Tukkoji I (1729-1735) of Tanjore. He was a voluminous writer, starting his literary career at the age of 18. As he himself reports, he composed 64 works in Sanskrit, 20 in Prakrit and 25 in his vernacular. A detailed list of his compositions is already prepared by Prof. Chaudhuri in his paper, and he covers various branches of literature—plays, poems, anthologies, campus, commentaries and treatises on technical subjects like grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, etc. Ghanasyama was offensively self-conceited, and he paraded his learning in various quarters. He looked down upon earlier authors, even of established eminence, and he held a poor opinion about their literary achievements. He styled himself *sarvabhāṣa kavi*, with a mastery over seven or eight languages and scripts. He felt himself quite competent almost equal if not superior, to Rajaekhara, in composing a Saṭṭaka which is entirely in Prakrit. His attitude towards Prakrits is well expressed in the conversation between Viḍuṣaka and Sutrādharma. In his opinion an eminent poet need not be ashamed of composing works in Prakrit. A heretic shuns a sacrifice a voluptuary virtues a block head learning one vainly condemns whatever is impossible for oneself. Those who are skilled in only one language are part poets, while he who can compose in many languages is a full blown poet of renown. According to Prof. Chaudhuri's list Ghanasyama appears to have composed three Saṭṭakas (1) *Vaikuṇṭha carita* (2) *Ānanda sundari* and (3) an

1 For the life and works of this poet see Prof. J. B. Chaudhuri's paper Sanskrit Poet Ghanasyāma Indian H. Quarterly Vol. XIX 3 pp. 237-61

anonymous one.² Two MSS.³ of *Ānand-sundarī*, have been accessible to me; and its contents are summarised below.

I. After benedictory verses invoking Viṣṇu, Lakṣmī, etc., Sthāpaka or Sūtradhāra and Vidūsaka discuss a letter from an Association (*tāmājika-lekhaḥ*) for staging an interesting play; and it is decided to enact a Saṭṭaka, the *Ānanda-sundarī*, composed at the age of 22, by Ghanaśyāma (described) who is as competent as Rājaśekhara, who has won a title Kaṇṭhīrava and who can compose works in various languages. Sūtradhāra, who is wishing for a son, suggests the plot by a simile: Śikhaṇḍacandra marries the daughter of Caṇḍavega; he has a son from her; and he becomes a universal monarch.

The king reflects on his fortune and discloses certain details: the minister Dīṇḍiraka has been sent out to subdue Vibhāṇḍaka of Sindhudurga who refused to pay the tribute; and he is expected to come back victorious. The king hopes that his anxiety for a son would soon disappear: the king of Aṅgas has sent his daughter Ānanda-sundarī to win his affection; fearing that the queen might know this, Ānanda-sundarī has been dressed as a man, with a name Pingalaka, and given in charge of the chamberlain Mandāraka; and as foretold by an astrologer she might have a son. Bards greet the king with morning prayers by describing the advancing day. Vidūsaka has offended unwittingly another Brāhmana Maṇḍūraka; and the king settles the quarrel by a present to the latter. The king wishes to see a Nāṭaka staging how Ānandasundarī was brought etc. composed by Pārijāta-kavi. Pingalaka and Mandāraka are also invited, and a *garbha-nāṭka* is introduced. It depicts how Ānanda-sundarī was dressed as a man and brought to the harem. As the

2. It has to be seen whether this anonymous play can be the *Navagraha-carita* which, though put by Keith under Nāṭaka (*Sanskrit Drama*, p. 345) is described by M. Krishnamachariar (*History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, p. 248) as a Saṭṭaka in Prākṛit. It is necessary that MSS. of *Vaikunṭhacarita* and *Navagrahacarita* should be inspected and seen whether they are Saṭṭakas.

3. One complete Ms containing Prākṛit text and Bhattanātha's Sanskrit commentary belongs to the Government Collection at the Bhandarkar Oriental R. Institute, Poona, No. 492 of 1899-1915, and another a transcript of a Ms. No. 683/4681 from The Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library, Tanjore. The latter is wanting in some portion at the beginning.

characters of the spectators are there in the *garbha natika*, a good deal of fun is created by Vidusaka who often misunderstands the situation. The king broods over Anandasundari's beauty while the play is going on. The time for the midday meal is announced, and all get up for a bath.

II The king tells Vidusaka that Hemavati divulged their secret to the queen with the result that Mandaraka has been chained and Anandasundari is confined in the ornament box by her. He reflects over the miserable lot which has befallen that beautiful girl on account of the queen's jealousy. Vidusaka blesses him with good luck. Then to divert the king's mind, there enters the poet Parijata, alias Kapthirava, vaunting his poetic abilities. In a high flown style, full of long compounds, subtle allusions and mythological references, he praises the metropolis Sṅkhalavati and its specialities, the palace Damaruka, and the king Śikhaṇḍacandra of great glory and his virtues. The king is highly pleased and is ready to give any present, even his kingdom, to the poet who declines the offer by saying that he already possesses the *karita mahā asamraya*. To divert himself the king proposes to Vidusaka that they should describe the various limbs of the heroine Anandasundari, and they do so by singing the lines of a verse alternately. The king is suffering acute pangs of separation which are heightened by midday announcements of bards. He realizes that the real remedy is to win the queen's favour.

III The king feels happy now, because he has been able to win the queen's favour. With sly interpellations Vidusaka wants to know how this could be achieved. The king narrates the details of how he met her in the bed room, how she was angry with him, how he lay prostrate at her feet like a servant, and how thus finally her heart was won over and she promised to celebrate his marriage with the heroine Anandasundari. The queen enters with the heroine and attendants, the former in wedding dress. The king must have an issue, so the marriage is approved by all. The queen bestows the heroine on the king, and the wedding ceremony is celebrated. The couple is blessed and greeted by all and Vidusaka exchanges a few bitter jokes with maid-servants. The king, heroine, Vidusaka, etc come to the Śṅgāra vana where the heroine is made acquainted with various trees etc. The evening and rising moon are announced by bards, the king and heroine retire to the bed chamber.

IV Viḍuṣaka finds the king anxious about the heroine's worries whether the king's love for her would remain firm, whether she would have a meritorious son, and whether she would be safely delivered. The king has assured her duly. Viḍuṣaka cuts a few jokes with him, and getting the necessary details he assures him that the period of pregnancy is full and that she would certainly be delivered of a son. The victorious minister Dīṇḍiraka arrives. A *garbha nataka* composed by Parijata-kavi is staged. It is shown how Dīṇḍiraka leads a fleet, how the demon Vibhandaka is overpowered and made to run away by a sudden terrific uproar, and thus the victory was won. The king is highly pleased with this triumph, and is almost ready to give his kingdom to the brave minister. Just at that moment the report of the birth of the prince is conveyed to the king. By eating a miraculous herb sent by her father Caṇḍavega, Ānandasundarī is quite hale and hearty. The queen enters accompanied by the heroine with the child and attendants, and congratulates the king on the birth of a prince. The queen names the prince Ānanda candra and puts him on the king's lap. Bards greet the king, and the play ends with a significant Bharata-vakya.

Ghanaśyāma almost vies with Rajaśekhara in composing a Saṭṭaka, it must be said to his credit that he has a sufficiently independent plot, and excepting a few echoes of expression, he borrows very little from the *Karpuramanyarī*. The introduction of two *garbha natakas* is a peculiarity of the *Ānandasundarī*, especially because they represent episodes which are a part and parcel of the theme of the play itself. It appears from a casual remark of Viḍuṣaka that Ghanaśyāma believed that a Saṭṭaka without a *garbha nataka* is positively faulty (*apahusa bhajana*). Ghanaśyāma is more a Sanskrit poet, and some of his forms and expressions are so artificial in Prakrit that at times his verses become intelligible only after they are rendered into Sanskrit. That only shows that later authors lacked close touch with the genuine style of early Prakrit works, and still finished their compositions mainly by studying Prakrit grammars. In this respect Viśveśvara's⁴ expressions are more natural in Prakrit than those of

4 He has composed a Saṭṭaka *Sṛṅgara mañjarī* by name. He flourished in the first quarter of the 18th century.

Ghanasyama Rajasekhara and other authors do use certain Deśī words. In a way the same tendency is carried to its logical extreme when Ghanasyama freely and studiously uses a number of Marathi nouns and roots. Some of his usages are current even in present day Marathi. To a great extent, the interest of the reader or spectator of this play is sustained by the light humour with which many of the conversations and remarks, especially of Vidusaka, are replete. The author creates humour by words of double meaning, stray prickly remarks, caricature of holy things, exaggeration, innocent tricks and slips, sly jokes, somewhat vulgar references, outspoken frankness and by light remarks on serious occasions. Ghanasyama is well known for his pride and show of learning, and it is not surprising that the poet Parijata, alias Kanṭhirava, is only his own replica. The entire play, in four Javanikantaras, is in Prakrit. Sutradhara, however, once quotes a Sanskrit verse which brought to Ghanasyama the title Kanṭhirava, and a second time repeats the request of the Association in Sanskrit. The king also speaks in Prakrit, only once in the fourth Javanikantara, he sings a verse in Sanskrit (*Sanskrtam asritya*). This sporadic use, I think, has nothing to do with the view of some theorists that the king is to speak in Sanskrit.⁵

5 The present writer is studying some other Sattakas such as the *Rambha maṭhari* of Nayacandara (15th century A.D.) *Sṛṅgara-maṭhari* of Viśveśvara (16th century A.D.) etc. in his Introduction to the critical edition of *Caṇḍalakaḥ Saṭṭaka* of Rudradāsa (17th century A.D.) on which he is working at present.

MAITREYI'S CHOICE

By D VENKATARAMIAH

One of the most arresting Upaniṣadic episodes is the one narrated in the *Bṛhadaranyaka* relating to the leave taking by Yajñavalkya from his two wives Mītreṃyī and Kātyāyanī before he entered on the ascetic order of life. King Janaka of Videha summoned to his court the most distinguished philosophers of the time wishing to test their worth. He offered a rich gift of a thousand head of cattle with golden coins tied to their horns to be appropriated by any one among them, who claimed to possess the knowledge of the Supreme Brahman. When others hesitated, Yajñavalkya commanded his pupil to drive home the cattle. Then ensued a most heated controversy between Yajñavalkya and his compeers who disputed his claim to the possession of Brahmanlore. He was subjected to a battery of questions by each one in the assembly, but Yajñavalkya by his superior dialectical skill silenced them all. It is interesting to note that of the nine interlocutors, the lady philosopher Gargī was held by common consent to be more astute than others and was allowed a second chance to confront the redoubted philosopher. Yajñavalkya had already found her a tough disputant. Her array of questions on the origins of things in an infinite regressive series was so exasperating to Yajñavalkya that he had to curb her curiosity by portending death if she persisted (*Gargī, matipraksiḥ mate mūdha vyapaptat*, III 6 1). What Yajñavalkya meant was that *Brahman* the ground of all existence could not be reached by any process of argument. It was an intuited truth, an ineffable experience. The wise Gargī told the learned men that none could surpass Yajñavalkya in disputation about *Brahman*. The last of the opponents was Śakalya the most importunate and self opinionated critic. In spite of Yajñavalkya's patiently answering the many questions put to him, he did not accept his discomfiture but attempted to confound him by irrelevant discussion. Yajñavalkya, the mighty sage turned round and proposed a problem to him which, he said, if he failed to solve would render him liable to a terrible curse. Śakalya having failed to find a solution had to pay the penalty for his obstinacy and per-

verseness by laying down his life. It is said that his bones even were spirited away by robbers (III 9 27) There was a lull in the assembly of the learned wherein Yajñavalkya had been engaged so long in what might be called a philosophical bout

It was now his turn to interrogate his opponents No answer came to his challenge—which is it, he wished to know, if any one among them could tell, that is the cause of the rebirth of the person that is dead? Yajnavalkya thus stood victorious and none dared question his action in having appropriated the king's gift

Now follows the exposition of the true nature of the source—*Brahman*, from which creation proceeds The *Śruti* itself answers the question proposed by Yajñavalkya *Brahman* is Knowledge and Bliss (*Vijnanamandam Brahma*) That which is supreme Knowledge is supreme Bliss also Hence *Brahman* may be defined as supreme Bliss That *ananda* however is not to be likened to the one derived from the objects of sense since the latter is never free from an admixture of pain, all pleasures of sense are tainted—‘Our sincerest laughter with some pain is fraught’ On the contrary *Brahmananda* is peace, joy, abundance, does not satiate and is homogeneous Says Śamkara, ‘Here is a point for consideration’ The word *ananda* as commonly understood connotes joy and in the phrase ‘*Anandam Brahma*’, it seems to be used as a qualifying adjunct Its attributive character is vouched for in passages like ‘He who knows its bliss’, ‘Know that *Brahman* is *ananda*’ ‘*Ananda*’ therefore refers to pleasure that is actually experienced and it must be a distinctive cognition (*samvedya*) Since *Śrutis* are congruent in this respect, one might say, there is no occasion for inquiry But it must be noted that there are certain other texts to the contrary, as witness—‘When the soul of the liberated person is transformed into the supreme *Ātman* and becomes all, what else is there to be seen by him?’, ‘When one sees none other, hears none other, and knows none other, that is the realisation of the Universal Here the distinctive cognition is denied of *Brahman* on the realization of unity Another reason why inquiry is needed may be stated There is no unanimity of opinion among the different philosophical schools on this question The Samkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas hold that in *mokṣa* there is no such thing as the experience of pleasure by the self—It is

mere privation of misery. Another school maintains that the ineffable joy is a positive experience by the self

Śaṅkara controverts the view that joy in mokṣa is an objective experience. Experience implies action and action necessitates the co-existence of sense organs which however are absent in the state of absolute union.

Again we have to note that the cognizance of bliss is either casual or not casual. If the former no cognizance is possible without the instrumentality of the body and the senses. Consciousness of bliss cannot arise in a disembodied state. If the latter, i.e., if cognition is eternal, the unity of *Brahman* is destroyed, and we have to admit the subject-object relation between one and the same object. The liberated person loses his individuality in *mokṣa* and does not stand apart to be able to experience the bliss of *Brahman*. The statement therefore is meaningless, that the man that has transcended *samsara*, stands over against the blissful *Ātman* which serves as the object of experience.

The liberated soul must be either different from the supreme soul or one with it and not both or in other words it cannot partake of the nature of both duality and non-duality (*Ved. S. I. 4*). Yet another point is to be noted. If the consciousness of bliss is constant in regard to *Ātmananda* (*Brahmananda*), the question of consciousness cannot possibly arise. If the permanency of the consciousness of bliss in *Brahman* is admitted such consciousness becomes its very nature and it is illogical to use the expression 'he knows the bliss of *Ātman*'. Release means the state of non-distinction, the absence of the triad—the knower, knowing and the known. Hence the scriptural text "*Vijñānamanandam*", it must be understood, has set out to declare the true nature of *Brahman* and not its cognizability. In fact all the Śrutiis relating to *Brahmananda* should be construed as denoting the essence of *Brahman*. *Ananda* constitutes its very being.

That *Ātman* is bliss is further emphasised in the dialogue that ensues between Janaka and Yajñavalkya. Eminent philosophers have discoursed to Janaka on the nature of the Supreme but Yajñavalkya points out their conception is lacking in completion and that he has received only a truncated notion of Reality. He himself undertakes to show the superlative excellence and wholeness of the

blissful nature of *Ātman* by analysing the three states (*avasthā traya*) of waking, dream and profound sleep. It is no dogmatic assertion what Yājñavalkya is expounding but a closely reasoned out thesis. Further elucidation is sought by Janaka of this abstruse problem. He asks, "Which is the guiding light of man?" No doubt man is guided by the light of the sun or when it fails by the light of the moon and in its absence by the light of the fire. But when all these fail, in utter darkness he can exchange his thoughts with another by speech which then serves him as his guide. When in the event of every one of these guides withdrawing, the only light left is that of *Ātman*, which never forsakes us, for it is light itself, self-luminous. Other lights are inconstant, evanescent, but *Ātmanyotis* is perennial. It is from this source of light that the sun and moon derive their light-giving power (*Tasya bhasa sarvamīdam vibhati—Katha. V. 15*).

It has already been shown that *Brahman* is bliss. To sum up, *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity—"*Satyam, Jñānam, Ānantam* (*ānandam*—bliss), *Brahma*". Each one implies the other and it is therefore quite relevant that the Śruti defines *Brahman* as bliss—"Ānandam *Brahma*", and this *ananda* is constitutive of *Brahman* and not its attribute. The highest Reality is in its essence universal existence, thought and bliss.

His spiritual mission having been accomplished Yājñavalkya resolved upon embracing the life of an ascetic and summoned his two wives Maitreyī and Katyayani to apprise them of this intention. He told them that he would renounce the house-holder's life and devote the evening tide of his days to the contemplation of *Brahman*, but that before taking such a step he wished to make an equitable distribution of his property between them so that they might live in peace. Katyayani, the younger raised no objection but Maitreyī being of a spiritual turn of mind asked her husband if by the possession of wealth she could obtain that for which he was forsaking the world. Yājñavalkya returned the answer that wealth could only enable her to live in opulence but by no means was it the means of attaining to the supreme end of man. Then Maitreyī told him that she too aspired to know that for which he himself was giving up his worldly possessions and begged him to instruct her in the mysteries

is made the central motive for all acts of love. At first sight Yajñavalkya's doctrine of love appears to be not different from the Epicurean Hedonism. If the bare sensuous pleasures were the inspiring principle of human action then philanthropy and altruism would certainly be emptied of their content. It may however be noted that 'self-interest' need not necessarily mean egoism in its sinister sense. In the examples given the phrase 'for the sake of self' (*atmanastu kamaya*) should be taken to convey the sense of 'self satisfaction'. And it is common knowledge that in every act of love the subjective element is implicit. In fact it is for the peace and happiness of self that all acts of public good are undertaken. Even the most seemingly unselfish deeds do consolation to one's self and the man feels happy when he undertakes a kindly act whatever self-sacrifice it may involve.

Objection need not be taken to this view on the ground that no idea of self is involved when, moved by sympathy a kind hearted man volunteers to give relief to one in distress. For even here it has a negative value since there is the feeling of relief from pain that would otherwise ensue by an act of omission (*Ratnaprabha* on *Śaṅkara Bhasya V S II 1 32*). An extreme case of the positively subjective character of *ananda* is given in *Pancadaśī*, xv 19—"A father for his own pleasure lavishes his kisses on his child though it may be crying, hurt by his prickly beard." The satisfaction of self is sufficient incentive to all ethical endeavour. We may conclude therefore that all love is for self, be it of husband, children or strangers. It may be of the purest and the most detached nature but yet the subjective factor is ever present, the assertion of self being unmistakable.

We have hitherto regarded 'self' as meaning the cognitional self (the individual soul), but Yajñavalkya's object was to expound the nature of the supreme self. The means that he adopts is one that has a direct appeal to our experience. His aim is to impress the fact that pleasure finds its source as well as its end in the Transcendent Bliss of *Ātman*. In all deeds of loving kindness the happiness that is derived is but a reflection of the bliss of *Brahman*. In loving another we love ourselves which in essence implies that the joy we experience in individual acts of love is akin to the joy of the Supreme,

A VEDIC STUDY IN SOCIAL CULTURE

By VISHVA BANDHU SHASTRI

The essence of the Vedic system of life lay in practice and not in theory, in realisation and not in belief, in transformation and not in profession. In other words, instead of evolving an ecclesiastical mentality and bequeathing to posterity an organised church religion, the Vedic seers fostered broad-based intellectual progress and set up a tradition of philosophical quest and honest effort to know oneself. There was a system not of creed-bound religion but of self culture, leading straight on to the social ideal of mutual concord and adjustment.

Some of the basic concepts of that system may be gathered from a study of what follows, being a pithy parable from the *Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad*—

- 1 Three classes of Prajapati's progeny—Devas (gods), Manusṣyas (men) and Asuras (demons)—lived a life of discipline under their father, Prajapati. On the completion of the course, Devas said unto him, 'Be pleased to instruct us.' He uttered the syllable, Da unto them (and asked) 'Have you understood?' They said, 'We have. You tell us.' 'Control yourselves'". 'Yes', said He, 'You have understood.'
- 2 Then Manusṣyas said unto Him, 'Be pleased to instruct us.' He uttered the same syllable, Da unto them (and asked), 'Have you understood?' They said, 'We have. You tell us.' "Be charitable"". 'Yes,' said He, 'You have understood.'
3. Then Asuras said unto Him, 'Be pleased to instruct us.' He uttered the same syllable, Da unto them (and asked), 'Have you understood?' They said 'We have. You tell us.' "Be merciful."". 'Yes', said He, 'You have understood'.

(V 2 1—3)

The three classes of the recipients of the instruction represent the three orders of one and the same humanity. Neither Devas are any heavenly beings nor Asuras are any subterranean evil spirits. There are men who by the mere act of their existence press hard against their environment. Their mode of living is oppressive and their machinating mentality highly harmful. Mischief is of the very essence of their inner being and they are always after hunting others down for their personal aggrandisement. The wails and cries of their poor, unfortunate victims are of no avail; for, the more they suffer and exhibit the signs of suffering, the more they infuriate their oppressors so that they may inflict fresh wounds and injuries on them.

While addressing this class, Prajāpati indicated the real use of power and prowess. It will be recognised that unless a man has acquired by dint of his laborious efforts a sufficient store of strength, there can hardly be any scope for exercising the divine virtue of mercy. When one is actually mighty, then and then alone, one is in a position to understand the right use of this newly acquired might. So, merciful behaviour is the first upward step in the moral evolution of a man who has become entitled to a rightful and equal status among his normally functioning fellow beings. He must needs know the due application of his attainments with reference to those who surround him lest he should receive a set-back in his onward march. He should feel that others also like himself are marching onwards and he should therefore march alongside of them and not stand in their way.

Prajāpati's teaching presupposes the acquisition of a proper measure of *Śakti* which denotes the capacity to depend upon one's own strength to hold one's ground. Every attractive and properly functioning object in nature is an embodiment and expression of this *Śakti*. To attain its normal growth and achieve self-expression by bearing its characteristic fruit is the basic principle which every form of life in the world is pursuing and struggling hard to realise. Weakness as such is not desired by nature. Beauty, symmetry, harmony, attraction and enjoyment are the outward signs of the internal existence of *Śakti*. It comes as a sweet reward to him who has continuously and successfully fought against the rigours of heat and cold,

satisfactorily exercised and trained his physical and mental potentialities, put upon himself the armour of a well regulated diet, physical culture and balanced mind and stood firm against the onslaught of disease and decrepitude. The seed of *Śakti* lies in every being, but it has to undergo a cultural process before it can shine forth as the beautiful blossom of life.

An individual without his proper share of this all-important *Śakti* is like a battery which has not been charged properly. One incapable of right reaction is a non-entity, worse than a dead person. For, the dead never create any hopes in others, whereas appearances being often misleading, these no-characters sometimes do have a false glamour of hope about them. Prajāpati simply ignores these shadowy specimens of humanity. They cannot be his proper audience. They have no ears to hear and, even if they hear, they do not possess the capacity to respond and the tenacity to react.

Asuras are the people who have rather become surcharged with *Śakti* but lack its proper control and co ordination. This defect is responsible for the presence in them of morbid lust and inordinate avarice. They seldom think of others, far less of their right to live in this world. They are intemperate in their social behaviour. Anything that they may be after is their god, their religion and their everything. Anybody who dares stand in their way ceases to have any right to live in the world which, according to their mode of thinking, is solely meant for their use and enjoyment. They are embodiments of selfishness, ambition, sensuality, avarice and infatuation. They are presumptuous and merciless. Compassion is not known to them. Fellow-feeling and sympathy are foreign to their nature. In fact, they have not a word to say in praise of the pious and the learned. Praise is meant for themselves alone, all else is detestable.

Śakti, no doubt, they do possess, but it is being misused. With their undesirable mental attitude, they are a menace to life and have a deadening effect on all that goes to electrify life and beautify its varied expression. They require a chastening influence, maybe, a purgatory process. Now that, as the parable goes, they have of their own accord resorted to Prajāpati for guidance, He utilises the opportunity towards setting them right and, thereby, saving their surplus

energy from being misused And, what does He teach them? "Be merciful, my children!" says he unto them, "Live and let others live, for they have as good a right to it as yourselves" This is the bed rock of all evolutionary processes in our lives as human beings All that we can pride ourselves upon—our domestic welfare and social development our educational progress and moral ascent—is due to the salutary effect of the working of this principle

All individuals should have an equal right to live and live happily The sun shines for all and the moon sheds her mellow light on all Showers of rain make no distinction between man and man Air accords no preferential treatment to anybody The mother earth is the common cradle for all her children But how sad it is that these children should always be trying to jostle one another out of the field? And, sadder still, that they should be exercising their ingenuity inventing strange arguments in defence of this foul play. As human beings, it does not behove us to arrogate to ourselves the sole right of deciding the fate of our fellow beings who may in any respect be weaker than ourselves The Vedic culture finds in these cases the objects of our sympathy and goodwill For, proper manifestation of these sovereign qualities in the human heart can be the strongest guarantee for a well ordered social progress based on a mutually confident and co operative effort

Wealth of expression and power of impression on one's surroundings are indications of the possession of *Śakti* To be strong enough to keep it unadulterated with arrogance and infatuation is the essence of true manliness To be just toward oneself and others is the light on the path of valour It is bitter humiliation to be cowed down by others, but it is doubly so to try unjustly to overawe others Man is said to have been created by God in his own image And, what else is the image of God, if not love and law together? Look wherever you may, your attentive gaze will ever and ever inform you that love and law are responsible for the presence of all real sweetness and strength in life It is by realising the presence of these twin virtues in every movement of every particle of this limitless universe, that one can attain supreme bliss and beatitude Let humanity, then, be a synonym for love and law Let us love all that is good and virtuous and let us be law abiding and orderly in the performance of our duties

To make every honest effort to become economically independent is desirable, but there is hardly any need of amassing wealth. For it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. It is required for securing various amenities of life, and that can be done by spending it in the right way and not by hoarding or worshipping it. Mammon worship is a worship of the worst type. It makes its votary cowardly and callous. No tender feeling, no elevating sentiment, no high emotion ever gets a foothold in his barren heart. Day and night, he lives in wealth, counting it when awake and dreaming of it when asleep. Prajapati does not relish the sight of those who love money for its own sake. What a pity—one labouring all day long and not enjoying and ennobling one's life in any way! Earn hard and spend well is, then, the first lesson that man should learn. If misuse of wealth generate evil influences for the dread and dismay of the world, not to use it is equally responsible for cowardice, avarice, selfishness and hardness in those who possess it and for jealousy, injustice, cruelty and lawlessness in those who do not.

An Asura will be cured of the evil that is in him if he desist from snatching from others their well earned possessions. Let him be satisfied with the result of his own efforts which he makes as a peaceful citizen and not as a robber. When he has settled down to a life of real contentment and merited enjoyment let him now extend the horizon of his vision. Let him ponder how his life would be meaningless, fruitless and even impossible if the varied universal forces did not help him in every moment of his life. It is as the result of their working that he has emerged and become endowed with the faculties and facilities which make him capable of using and enjoying his life. Does anything really belong to him? Does he know how things come and pass away? Does he know anything about his own real self? If the reply to these questions is in the negative, as it is bound to be, then why should he not exert himself to see things in their real perspective? His parents, his friends and society in general have been helping him in every way. Does he not owe anything to them? Now that his parents are disabled, should he ignore them or try to make the burden of their old age as light as possible? He cannot sufficiently repay his relatives and friends, but he can surely stand by their side when they need his help. He

cannot address himself to the whole of society, but he can certainly find out those who deserve help at his hands

So, wealth should be neither uselessly hoarded up nor mercilessly squandered away. It should be rightly used. But this use should not be confined to one's personal comforts and enjoyments alone. Old relatives and children depend upon us and so they naturally should have their proper claim on our purse. To help them and look to their comforts and satisfaction is the beginning of charity. It should however be remembered that by doing this much, we only reach its borderland, and do not enter its proper sphere. That we owe much to our parents and relatives is quite clear to us. If we help them, we only give them much less than what is their due. In our children are stored up our future hopes and so we have to look to their satisfaction at all costs. This aspect of charity, however, is very useful in consolidating our domestic life. For, the satisfied looks of elders and the smiling faces of young ones are due to its charming influence, and whenever it becomes absent in a family, the sting is at once felt.

Charity proper begins when we help those who are not bound to us by any ties of relationship and whom we know to be not in a position to return the good done to them. It is the never failing antidote to poverty, disease and suffering. It cures people of wounds inflicted by sorrow and separation. It ennobles those who rightly and dutifully exercise it. It is the greatest sweetening influence in our social life. There could be no enduring fabric of society if it were absent. It produces a noble feeling of spiritual satisfaction in the hearts of those who get used to its righteous practice. The more they get, the more they spend towards alleviating pain and suffering. The more they give, the more meek and humble they become. Weakness is the mother of humiliation and abuse of power produces false pride and arrogance, but silent and unassuming charity gives birth to true humility, which first binds man to man and then leads him on to the realisation of the divinity within him.

In order that charity should be a strong pillar to support the superstructure of social life it must needs be of the right type. If it is true that every individual should feel it incumbent upon himself to help the needy, it is doubly true that he should by nature be

against receiving anything in charity. Dependence upon others is not a good thing. It removes the last vestige of self-assertion. So, independence should be the aim of life and only they whose unfitness, physical or otherwise, precludes the possibility of self relief, may accept any offers of help from others. As a rule, a thing which cannot be got by self-effort, should not be worth having at all. Misplaced charity has a very poisonous effect on the donor as well as on the receiver. The donor loses his fine sense of the right use of what he earns and, also, becomes responsible for the presence of many heinous crimes and misdeeds in the world. The receiver loses his very self and ceases any more to be manly enough to scale the ladder of moral and spiritual evolution. He is no more a living being, he is only a living thing, a mere caricature of what he might have been. He probably does not feel the depth of his fall, but it is owing to the sad fact that he has lost the very sense of rise and fall. He is pity and dejection incarnate, unfit either to make any progress himself or inspire others in any way.

Gradual evolution of corporate life in human society has led to the foundation and development of innumerable institutions run on the basis of public charity. They provide an impersonal and, therefore, excellent medium through which one could attend to one's twofold duty of increasing the happiness and decreasing the suffering of those among whom one is born. While boundless is the good that humanity still aspires after let every man make it his duty to see that he is doing his utmost to further some good cause. Rather than wait for anybody else to persuade him to move in this direction, it ought to be his own concern to be constantly watchful of the real needs of the society and the suitable agencies, through which he could do something to supply the same.

On the mental plane also, charitability of disposition and goodwill constitute the basic principles of social solidarity. Co ordination of effort and concerted action presuppose mutual confidence and fellow feeling. Life in society is a game of 'give' and 'take' both and not 'take' alone. To err being human a liberal view should be taken of the actions of others and no apathetic contempt shown in respect of their shortcomings. To attribute bad motives to others is a hotbed of bickerings and quarrels. Thus social interests demand

that besides directing one's charity towards seeing to nobody suffering from material want, one should also develop the habit of being charitably disposed in adjudging things pertaining to the mind. One so disposed will always be on his guard not to say or do anything that severs man from man. Society owes its strength to the presence of men who may not be able to discourse upon the meanings of charity and charitability but who do possess these virtues in their actual conduct. In the light of the above, it is they alone who deserve to be called men. Their mercy and justice will form the foundation stone of society and their charity and charitability will cement and consolidate it.

To gods, as already indicated, the heavenly sound *Da* signified self-restraint and self sacrifice. To embody these in one's life would be the culmination of the human cultural process. The demons are used to 'take' only, the men get accustomed to 'give' and 'take' both, but the gods are those super men, who are always busy doing good to others. They are flowers whose fragrance gives freshness to all who approach them. They are the centres of psychic currents of love, goodwill, purity and piety, which constantly purify the whole social atmosphere. To them the sun shines forth, not as an ordinary luminary, but as a divine sacrificer who is constantly burning himself up in order that countless beings should receive life and light from him. A glance at the star lit firmament reminds them every night of the presence of other innumerable sacrificers of the same nature. The fire in the hearth and the lightning flash in the clouds convey the same message to them. The wind blows, now hot and now cold, not for any object of its own, but for the good of the world. The showers of rain and flowing rivers tell the same tale. And, when they extend their attentive gaze to things around them, every stalk and every blade teach them the same lesson over and over again. The whole world is a huge altar of sacrifice and every object in nature is offering at it its personal oblation during every moment of its existence.

To sacrifice oneself and all one's worldly interests for the good of others is the great pivot on which the life divine revolves. It is always in motion and action and knows no stagnation. Its constant activity is a guarantee for its own health and its health generating

capacity for those around it. The consummation of its evolution consists in self-realisation, namely, the living recognition that the transitory, flitting things that are and are not, are to be used and left behind as steps in a staircase and not to be treated as our permanent abodes. Its inner complacency depends on its own establishment as a permanent transformation in human character and not on any other external circumstance. Expectation and despondency both become foreign to it. In the midst of universal change it knows of one constant factor and that is ceaseless functioning in the right direction. It has an inexhaustible store of sympathy, good advice and helpfulness to distribute freely among the suffering and struggling mankind, but its own sufferings and personal struggles have come to an end. Free from the last vestige of personal ambition and worldly anxiety, it is far from even the dreams of exploiting others for its own glorification and praise. It is always conscious of one thing and that is the divine duty of thinking of good and of doing good to others under all circumstances. And, finally, this attitude itself comes quite naturally to it, unmixed with any feeling that anything is being done to oblige others.

The saintly souls that enrich themselves with this divine life are the salt of human society. It grows, evolves and prospers under their benign supervision. There can be no injustice and no vicious exploitation in their presence. Their integrity and uprightness inspire awe and respect in the minds of their fellow men. Their spirit of service and sympathetic attention set the stream of pure love flowing all round. They are brotherly towards the sick and the sorrowful and fatherly towards the breadless and the shelterless. All may look to them for help, but they look to none for anything. Their heart is ever bubbling with new life full of vigour and inspiration. They are humble but know no humiliation. They never allow themselves to be over ridden by any sad reminiscences of the past, nor do they ever feel over anxious and perturbed with what may be in store for them. They live in the living present and also, in accordance with the highest ideals of austere devotion to duty and unsullied goodness of thought and deed. They have nothing to grumble at. Morbid passions and weaknesses of the flesh dare not torment them any longer. But, in spite of this achievement, they are

always up and doing. They live in the world and yet are not of the world. Like a lotus in a pond, they hold their own in the midst of adverse circumstances. They remain unscathed in the midst of devouring flames of greed and avarice. The whirlwind of power and ambition, pomp and show, presumption and arrogance, jealousy and hatred and attachment and infatuation passes by them without touching them in the least. They have their own clear mode of thinking and straight forward line of action. They never compromise with themselves nor swerve from their path to pander to the whims of others. They are never after cheap notoriety, nor have they anything to fear from being in the bad books of those who surround them. They always refrain from coming into the limelight. They are a non marketable commodity and none can buy them. They have no worldly ends to gain, and so never hanker after winning favours at the hands of anybody. They propitiate the divinity within them by rendering true service to all around them and, in return, are quite content if they can thereby be at peace with themselves. They are at their happiest when their inner self finds real solace in the temple of their heart. Like flowers, they are light in their carriage and ornamental to the place where they happen to be. While ordinary men are able to part with a portion of their possessions and earnings for the benefit of others, these supermen never feel anything as belonging to them. Everything pertains to the ultimate reality beyond human ken and is useful in direct proportion to the measure of its serviceability to all beings. When men take a leaf out of the book of the sun, the moon and other countless objects in nature and like unto them regard themselves in duty bound to get enkindled and consumed up for giving light and life to the world, they become gods. They forget themselves, lose themselves and merge themselves in the ocean of humble, unassuming service and emerge on the wings of divinity as full fledged immortals. They live on the nectar begotten of self control and self sacrifice which leads them to the fountain head of this essence of their being and it was to this end that Prajapati inculcated in them the supreme need of practising and developing the aforesaid virtues as denoted by the word, *Dama*.

In terms of this parable, the ancient seers conceived of men who would respect justice, possess a charitable turn of mind and put

reasonable restraints upon themselves as representing the normal standard of humanity. Weaklings, if any, must mend their mode of living so that they might attain to their full share of strength of body and character. Society would offer them facilities to raise themselves in every way. The development of the virtues of mercy and charity on the part of every individual would be a safe-guard against any setback being given to those who were trying to regain what they had lost or attain to a new status in life higher than the one held by them before. These two virtues would befit individuals to form themselves into a good, cultured society. The Asuras would not be liked because they would be guilty of considered misdirection and abuse of their attainments. Of strength they would have more than their normal share, but it would be more for the destruction of the world than for its protection and progress. The Devas would be respected and adored on account of their serviceable existence, every breath of their precious life being dedicated to the good of society.

Judged from this point of view, mad, imperialistic tendencies, whether of ancient despots or of modern states, shall have to be called inhuman. National solidarity for rightful self-expression and characteristic contribution to the world culture has its own justification. As in the case of an individual, in that of communities and nations as well, *to be weak and impotent should be despicable*. But it must be candidly confessed that big, organised and pooled monopolisations are the bane of the world of to day. They are seriously hampering humanity from scaling the due and clearly visualised social heights. Capital and labour organise themselves not in self-defence or for internal self-consolidation but for crushing each other. Leagues and pacts are, in fact, alliances of those who are in possession of power, howsoever ill earned, and do not want to part with it, even though not to do so may be against the dictates of right and justice. Individuals and nations clutch at anything they come across and want to usurp it. High-sounding euphemisms are invented to conceal the worst types of crimes and ill dealings. It is no exaggeration to say that fear and hatred are at the root of modern co operation movements. They thwart individual progress and stand in the way of the backward classes of people ever being able to come to their own.

In the world of religion, also, organised sectarian movements

TRADITION IN PHILOSOPHY

BY A R WADIA

To be asked to contribute a paper to the Professor M Hirianna Commemoration Volume is an honour. To accede to the request is for me both a pleasure and a duty. Few can claim that intimacy which I enjoyed as Professor Hirianna's colleague in the Department of Philosophy of the University of Mysore, and though it is now nearly two decades since he retired only to give himself more whole heartedly to the worship of Sarasvati in the only way in which this Goddess should be worshipped, I have had the good fortune to retain his goodwill and friendship. Time has not dulled my friendship for him, on the contrary it has added to my admiration for him both as a scholar and as a gentleman, and I cannot be too thankful that I have had an opportunity now to give him his meed of praise and to say what I have always felt. I have not come across a more modest or a more unassuming man than Professor Hirianna. But behind his mild exterior I have noted with admiration a courageous spirit that would brook no insult or humiliation. His devotion to philosophy is worthy of the Indian traditions of what a philosopher should be. His will to help others in their studies or in their research marks him out as a born guru. His numerous *celas* who now honour him by sponsoring this volume are but honouring themselves as worthy *celas* of a good and noble *guru*.

I well remember the days nearly forty years ago when a student of philosophy in our universities studied only the western philosophers, and there was only Max Muller's *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* to introduce him even to the bare elements of Indian Philosophy. Since then we have had quite a plethora of books on the subject, even double deckers like Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, a brilliant paraphrase of Indian thought in the more familiar garb of western philosophy, and Das Gupta's massive History of Indian Philosophy. But not till the advent of Professor Hirianna's Outlines of Indian Philosophy did we get a brief, but lucid and authoritative, presentation of Indian thought in English language. This in itself was no mean service to the student struggling

with the intricacies of systems of philosophy dead and living in India, and even to the general reader both in the East and the West who wished to be acquainted with Indian philosophy as a matter of culture

I have no claim to speak or write as an authority on Indian philosophy, but as a student and teacher of philosophy I have learned a good deal of philosophy, eastern and western, and it may be of some interest if I venture to express my reaction to systems of thought, which still constitute the living philosophical inheritance of the cultured Hindus of to day, and of the masses as well, though in a very diluted form, where the spirit of philosophy has been sacrificed to the letter. No wonder if in these circumstances the question has been seriously raised whether India has produced genuine philosophy at all. It has been claimed that religion has swamped philosophy in India, and that not till philosophy has been freed from the shackles of religion can there be a resurrection of philosophy in our country. It is to this basic question that I should like to address myself, and that reduces itself to the question to what extent philosophy in India is dominated by tradition and to what extent it is free to reflect on the variegated problems of life. Life is ever-changing and in every age it presents itself in different shapes, and yet it has a basic continuity. Life always presents a challenge to thought and that is why a live philosophy is always new. Creative epochs of life bring out the freshness of philosophic thought while philosophy itself becomes cramped when life loses its zest. This is abundantly proved by the history of philosophy both in the East and in the West.

European philosophy finds its original home in Greece. Even the pre Socratic thinkers, naive though they were in many respects, insisted on their own right to think for themselves, and if they quoted their predecessors it was both to agree and to criticise as they chose. This tendency was carried much further by the Sophists, when they reduced all thought to terms of relativity and made man the measure of all things. If in terms of their thought the position of truth in its objectivity became precarious, they gave a filip to social philosophy by enthroning man as the central subject of thought. Perhaps their greatest service to philosophy was that their subjectivism roused the contempt of Socrates, and the Socratic dialectic marks

are equally unjust exploitation-grounds for the supposed benefit of the few who have the knack or the means to come in the forefront and canvass votes in their favour. The dumb masses are led by clever people who work up religious fanaticism and sectarian bigotry in their minds and use them at the time of polling for their own personal ends. To be on a committee or a council is not at all bad, but the way in which these seats are secured and false professions of various kinds made, make the whole thing extremely farcical and demoralising. Of all advertisements, self advertisement pays the most. Sycophancy, presumption and corruption hold the ground whereas real worth is at a discount. Public service has become another name for majestic living, tempting declarations seldom translated into action, and, often, atrocious persecution of the many by the few who get organised by ties of self interest into a so-called cabinet, council, congress or whatever other name it may adopt, which is, in reality, a mere clique of adventurers. The so called religious organisations are mostly manned and controlled by persons who seldom feel called to those high offices by any spiritual indications in their own experience. These are more often than not used as vantage grounds for the advancement of the worldly ends of certain individuals as well as groups of individuals.

Differences of worldly position and ways of living may constitute reasonable ground for classifying people, but the so-called religious differences should not be any justifiable basis for dividing them. Real religious life can and does evolve in the human heart everywhere and at all times a uniformity in its general aspect, even though it may vary in the degree of its intensity or outward expression. It should under favourable circumstances function as being the greatest unifying potentiality. As regards the dogmas and doctrines ninety nine out of every hundred persons are mentally unfit to think rightly about them. External rituals and ceremonial observances, mostly symbolical as they are, represent the preparatory, non essential aspect of real religion. But it is these that offer the fruitful soil to the exploiter to come and sow the seed of dissension and jealousy and set man against man in the very name of God Himself. Dreadful engines of destruction are in this way called into service and the learned and the foolish alike are mercilessly victimised.

If the triple ideal of mercy, charity and self-sacrifice begins to be widely and rightly understood and sincerely and consistently followed in daily practice, it should help a good deal in creating an atmosphere in which it may be possible to advance the course of social equity and equality as a step towards the realisation by every individual of his real self. For, then, the extent of an individual's service and utility from the public point of view on the one hand and limitations and restraints which he imposes upon himself on the other should form the basis for assigning to him his proper place in society. The learned and capable alone should be sent to the legislative bodies and the system of election and voting should be thoroughly revised and overhauled towards that end. To go to a council should not be a self-sought honour but should rather be a duty imposed upon an individual who has been fairly tried and found to be public-spirited and devoted to the good of society, to serve his motherland to the best of his lights. In a word, it is the record of individual evolution and public service at one's back, which should be the deciding factor in the award and distribution of social prestige and power.

the beginning of the great philosophic tradition of ancient Greece. If, however, Socrates tried to lay the foundations of an objective universal ethics, and tried to make it secure against the mere conventions of this or that human society, he did so on the ground of pure reason and not on the authority of some previous thinker, nor did he speak as God like Krishna in the *Gita*, nor as a prophet of God like the long line of Jewish prophets from Moses to Malachi, but as a rational human being. His reasoning was purely logical, and in the *Dialogues* of Plato we find the logic of Socrates unanswerable by the Sophists, while his irony brought out the charm of his personality. To his generation and to the succeeding generations right down till our own times, Socrates has stood as a pure embodiment of Philosophy, the philosopher who wrote nothing, but created a tradition of philosophic thought and inspired others to write. It was a tribute to his greatness that rival schools of philosophy in later times looked up to him as their inspirer, whether it be the Academy of Plato or the Lyceum of Aristotle, the Porch of the Stoics or the Garden of Epicurus, or even the light hearted Sceptics of Pyrrho's school. Socrates stood like a huge mountain of thought, from whose heights flowed down great rivers of thought, crystallising ultimately as schools of philosophy. They differed from one another. They criticised one another. But in Socrates they found the fountain of pure thought, and they flourished on thought.

Plato is a unique figure in the history of European philosophy. In spite of the titanic proportions of his world embracing thought, he chose to keep his own personality in the background and was content to make Socrates his teacher and inspirer, the centre of his pictorial dialogues. He presumably wanted his own pupils to believe that he was nothing but a mouth piece of his own teacher. But he was too great a thinker to be taken by the posterity as a mere mouth-piece of somebody else, however eminent he may have been. His teaching came to be known as Platonism, but it remained a conundrum as to how much of it was Plato's own and how much was derived from Socrates. Perhaps that problem will never be completely solved, but the labours of scholars like Burnet and Stewart Ritter and Taylor, have gone to show how the outlines of thought, as given by Socrates, have been filled in by a master hand and given a shape which might have come as a surprise to Socrates.

deep religious feeling, would not be attracted by Plato, and feel repelled by the hard matter-of fact cold and calculating analytical style of Aristotle, and feel impatient with the poetic flights of Plato's imagination? Who dare say with a dogmatic confidence that one or the other must be preferred? It is a matter of temperament, but no student of philosophy can afford to belittle either of them, for they represent the very foundations and the very heights of philosophic thinking in Europe, and no one can say he knows European philosophy who has not soaked himself in Plato and Aristotle

The thousand years that preceded the advent of Descartes, who was responsible for the renaissance of real philosophy, are usually known as the Dark Ages in Europe, dark because they saw the domineering sway of Christianity, not the soft human God-like Christianity of Jesus, but a dogmatic, harsh, intolerant and cruel and profligate Christianity of the Churches. Music and art were saved, for they served the cause of religion. The sororous Latin masses and hymns filled the high vaults of cathedrals and churches. Beautiful Madonnas with the exquisite light of motherhood shining in their eyes looked down with smiling lips from the walls of churches and palaces of kings, and relieved the dull harshness of those ages. But philosophy died and science was martyred. When truth was said to be enshrined ready made within the covers of the Bible and the unchallengeable canons of infallible pontiffs and ecclesiastical councils, how could any man dare to raise his head and say anything that was not in harmony with, or a pale echo of, the Bible itself or at best of a Biblified Aristotle? Philosophy, if it is to justify its existence, must be free in its thought. It has a right to assume the right to think. It must be free to urge on rational grounds that there is no such thing as truth. But as soon as philosophy begins with dogmas and assumptions it signs its own death warrant and the philosophy that results can at best be called only pseudo philosophy.

Pseudo philosophy starts with dogmatic assertions, whose truth is not to be challenged. It begins in the spirit of *Thus saith the Lord*, and one is expected to bow down his head in abject humility and say I listen, Lord, and I accept what Thou sayest. Starting with such an attitude and with such assumptions, it is possible to draw a good many conclusions on the strictly deductive principles of Logic, and that is what comes to be paraded as philosophy. Keen logical

thought is possible and that constitutes the greatness of the Scholastics who in an unphilosophical world sought to keep the flame of philosophy burning. They forged the philosophical terminology, they displayed a marvellous acumen in splitting hairs, they developed a keen logic. But rooted as it all was in mere tradition it was not philosophy in its own right. It was a hand maid of religion, a good servant of the Church, but not a search for truth. Albert the Great and Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Occam, were indeed great in their way but hide bound as they were within the four corners of the creed of the Church, they had to adapt their thought to the creed, and not their creed to their thought. If philosophy is a search for truth and not a mere attempt to find some sort of rational justification of accepted dogmas, Scholasticism even at its greatest heights, fell far short of the requirements of a genuine philosophy.

With Descartes philosophy had a rebirth in Europe. Though professing to be a sincere son of the Church, whether sincerely or expediently, he kept clear of the authority of the Bible or of Aristotle and sought to rear a fresh philosophical structure on some clear self-evident truth, and this he found in *Cogito, ergo sum*. That his philosophy did not prove so unchallengeable as he thought is a matter of history, but his greatness rests on the fact that every subsequent philosopher had to take note of him whether to modify or to criticise. Logically his thought culminated in the mysticism of Malebranche on the one hand, and in the pantheism of Spinoza and in the Monadism of Leibnitz on the other, according as these thinkers picked out particular ideas from the philosophy of Descartes. Locke started with a criticism of Descartes' innate ideas, and laid the foundations of an empiricism, which with characteristic changes is by no means a spent force even to-day. Locke in his turn inspired Berkeley's idealism, while Hume's scepticism proved to be the logical nemesis of Locke's emphasis on sensation.

In Kant, who has been rightly characterised as the great watershed of European philosophy, we have the two streams of Rationalism and Empiricism meeting in his Transcendentalism. Far from relying on any dogmas, however ancient their age, he sought to attack even the foundations of metaphysics. No department of human thought escaped his critical reflections, and whether he is

praised or abused his influence has been supreme. Hegel evolved his Absolutism out of Kant's transcendentalism. Herbart evolved his pluralism out of Kant's phenomenalism. Schopenhauer evolved his philosophy of the Will out of Kant's doctrine of will in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. The Agnosticism of Herbert Spencer though he had very little direct knowledge of Kant, was rooted in Kant's onslaught on metaphysics in his Transcendental Dialectic.

What is worth while noting is that in spite of almost universal recognition of the greatness of Kant by philosophers of diverse schools, no one made a fetish of him except his direct disciples who were content just to popularise his ideas, but they can hardly claim to be leaders of philosophic thought.

Hegel, who in some respects was greater, if less original, than Kant, had numerous followers and succeeded in creating a school of thinkers even more than Kant himself. But within the school there was a great vitality of thought so that Hegelianism gradually passed into neo Hegelianism, quite distinguishable from its parent.

During the 19th century the idealism of the philosophers and the scientific doctrine of evolution seemed to be at war with each other, and in this the philosophers and the theologians came much nearer one another than they had ever done in the previous centuries since the days of Socrates and even of Xenophanes. As a result of this alliance against science the philosophy of religion has come to have greater and greater importance. Science, however, cannot be perpetually assigned a lower rank in the hierarchy of knowledge, and the tremendously important implications of the discovery of evolution could not be kept out of the purview of philosophers, and that is why the twentieth century has seen the birth of new philosophies as in Bergson, Croce and Gentile and most of all in Whitehead.

The continuity of philosophic thought in Europe has been remarkable. Not even the greatest thinkers could boast of standing by themselves. Socrates is unintelligible apart from the vogue of the Sophists, and Plato and Aristotle were the direct heirs to Socrates. Descartes seems to open a new era of thought, but his very importance becomes unintelligible apart from the dead-weight of Scholastic philosophy. Since his time the continuity of thought has been even more marked than before. All this goes to show the importance of tradition in philosophy for tradition goes to make history, and there

cannot be philosophy apart from the history of philosophy But all-pervading as tradition is, it has not been allowed to serve as a dead-weight on the freshness of philosophic outlook Tradition itself has become an instrument of progress, proceeding step by step, serving as a check on the mere exuberance of novelty, serving as a ballast tending to make philosophic growth a certain harmony With the modern emphasis on evolution and the allied concepts of change and progress, it has become impossible to expect that philosophy will ever be a closed system of thought, rounded and perfected, that will serve the purpose of centuries yet unborn From this standpoint philosophy will never be the attainment of Truth as conceived as an ultimate entity by itself resting in its own immaculate perfection, having nothing to do with the joys and sorrows of an evolving world. Such a conception is indeed possible, and history of human thought is not without illustrious examples of it, but it inevitably, even if unconsciously, introduces a dualism in our thought, as if the living world of change has no meaning for Truth, whether called Brahman or the Absolute or God, and hence our world of change which is so near us and so dear to us comes to have no philosophic worth No wonder if such a philosophy on its Olympic pedestal becomes a dance of bloodless categories, a thing to be admired or laughed at according as our temperaments dictate

If philosophy is not a discovery of truth, complete and final, it is at least a search for truth, and the joy of searching cannot be less than the sense of contentment which is the reward of attaining truth. This is no disparagement of philosophy, for if our changing world is rooted in some ultimate principle which itself does not change we cannot abstract this ultimate principle from its rich manifestations throbbing with life, and we are forced to the view that the ultimate principle plus its manifestations fall within the purview of philosophy, and so philosophy cannot be complete, when its very subject matter is incomplete Hence the burden is thrown on each generation to seek truth and catch it in its varied manifestations From this standpoint tradition itself becomes the living subject matter of philosophy, explaining the past and the present and throwing light on the trend of future events It does not and cannot bind the future, but it helps each individual to make the future From this standpoint again philosophy is not merely a study of *being* in the Hegelian sense

but rather of *becoming*. It helps us to understand the forces of life and to the extent we understand them we get the power of making them serve the purpose of life. Thought without purpose is unintelligible. Hence philosophy rightly conceived is not merely thought, but it is also an instrument of action.

I have thought it necessary to dwell at some length on the place of tradition in European philosophy, for it would help us in understanding some of the anomalies and paradoxes of Indian philosophy. It is an odd paradox that while Indians and particularly Hindus, sincerely believe that no soul on earth is so congenial to philosophy as India, there are many westerners who do not hesitate to assert that what passes as philosophy in India is more in the nature of poetry and religion than strict logical thinking. It is also asserted that so long as the authority of the Upanisads and the *Gita* is taken to be final and infallible, there cannot be that independence and freedom of thought which are the *sine qua non* of all genuine philosophy. It is also noted by the critics of Indian thought that it has become intellectual gymnastics and that the unity which the Hindu intellect so much emphasises and the cosmopolitanism which its ethical teaching seems to exalt so much are not to be found in the pattern of life which is so meticulously based on *Varnasrama Dharma* which reduced to plain language just implies caste exclusiveness in its most exclusive form. Lastly it is asserted that the connection between philosophy and religion is so close in Hindu culture that philosophy has literally become just a hand maid to religion, and as a result no thought will be tolerated which is not in strict conformity with the accepted traditional authorities whether these be the original scriptures or the later commentaries of the Acaryas who have been the founders of the three schools of Vedanta.

These are charges which cannot be simply brushed aside. They need to be controverted or established for on our answer to these charges depends the main question whether Indian thought is really philosophical. It would be convenient to consider this question from the four standpoints noted above. But a preliminary point will have to be conceded that the history of Indian philosophy does show a marked divergence from the history of European philosophy.

is the strongest support of pure morality, is the greatest consolation in the sufferings of life and death. Indians keep to it!" So the Indians have on the whole, but his reference to the "unfalsified form" of Vedanta is truly significant. In an age so early at the very dawn of human culture, when writing was apparently unknown, it was a distinct advantage to have deep thoughts so significant for life in the form of poetry so that they could be handed down orally from generation to generation. But it has had this disadvantage: it has become so deep rooted a tradition that it has become a mental habit which has generated a certain stupor of thought even in the learned, and to this extent philosophy conveyed through poetry ultimately ceased to fulfil its mission as an invigorator of thought.

2) No philosophers in the tradition of European philosophy have been looked upon with greater reverence than Plato and Aristotle, but except during the Middle Ages no one has taken them to be infallible. In the history of Indian philosophy however, the Upanisads and the *Gita* have been taken to be infallible. If there are palpable discrepancies or inconsistencies or anything apparently unintelligible, they have to be made coherent through interpretation. This zest for interpretation constitutes the most conspicuous feature of Indian thought, for even the most original and creative geniuses like Samkara and Ramanuja and Madhva have been content to appear as mere annotators, even while they have developed most conflicting systems of thought, all claiming to be the only correct interpretation of the old sacred texts. This has led to the charge that the so called philosophers in India are mere interpreters, mere theologians and not philosophers at all. This charge has been very ably refuted by Mr V. Subrahmanya Iyer in his very able article in the pages of the *Philosophical Review* (Vol I No 4 April 1918) *Is Vedanta Philosophy or Theology?* In this article he practically confines himself to Samkara's Advaita and shows how this system of thought has been developed purely on rational grounds and that his references to Scriptural authority are merely by way of supporting his own conclusions, which have been arrived at independently of the Scriptures. As an Advaitin himself Mr Subrahmanya Iyer is inclined to let the charge of theology stand against Ramanuja and Madhva. But even accepting the thesis of Mr Subrahmanya Iyer about Samkara, it is certainly suggestive that Samkara's main writings take the form of com-

mentaries on the main scriptures instead of straightforward independent works like those of European philosophers. It implies a definite consciousness on the part of Śaṅkara that unless he could show that his own thought was not inconsistent with the authority of the scriptures it would not be acceptable to the Indian head or heart. All this goes to show that even so titanic a genius as Śaṅkara felt himself tied down by a tradition that looked upon the scriptures as infallible. If Śaṅkara could be original even as an interpreter of ancient thoughts, the same claim could be made on behalf of Ramanuja and Madhva by their followers, and I am not concerned to deny their right to do so.

In short, so long as these great Ācāryas show a remarkable genius in their logical acumen and metaphysical thinking, their claim to be considered philosophers cannot be disputed. But the very greatness of these philosophers confirms the fact that all Indian thought is rooted in the infallibility of the Scriptures. If a further proof of this fact were needed it is to be found in Gandhiji's interpretation of the *Gīta*. How the virile teaching of the *Gīta* could be interpreted to yield the Gandhian variety of *Ahimsa* is as much a tribute to the interpretative powers of Gandhiji as a testimony to the fact that nothing will go into the heads of Indian masses, unless even the strangest and most novel thoughts could be manipulated as interpretations of the old texts. The vogue of *Śabda Pramāṇa* is writ large right across the whole of Indian thought through centuries.

3. Philosophy in Europe has always been frankly intellectual. It is the child of wonder, and the philosopher in the west has been content to know the world and its problems and to solve them to the best of his abilities. While the philosophers are expected to be good men, and most of them have lived up to this expectation, there is no direct connection between philosophy and life. It is left as a tacit assumption that a complete philosophy will include ethics, and a right understanding of ethics will automatically lead to the presumption that the ethical principles developed by a philosopher will be duly respected by him. In India on the other hand philosophy has not been looked upon as a mere study to satisfy the intellectual thirst, it is rather a way to overcome the ills of life, a means to attain *mokṣa*, deliverance from the cycle of births and deaths. The pragmatic value of Indian philosophy *prima facie* saves it from being a mere specula-

tive luxury and gives it an honoured place in the very centre of life. And yet the fact remains that in actual practice philosophy has become divorced from life. The life of a Hindu is rigidly controlled by the rules of *Varnāśrama Dharma* to the minutest details, and since caste is the basic Hindu institution it has tended to give the Hindu society a rigidity which has made it the most conservative society on the face of the earth. The sublime unity emphasised in the Upanisads has disappeared before the tyranny of caste. The subtle Hindu intellect has sought to give this duality a respectability by drawing a distinction between the *vyavaharika* (the phenomenal) and the *paramarthika* (relating to the ultimate). In practice it has meant that caste rules are binding on all except the few *sannyāsins* and *jñānins*, men who have renounced the world, including the caste, and have attained the knowledge of the Ultimate. These are but a handful among the teeming millions of India, and even this handful who can hope to be *jñānins* can be only of the highest caste, for the others by caste rules are precluded from even hearing the Upanisads, leave aside studying them, and yet without the Upanisads *jñāna* or the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality becomes an impossibility. Thus has it come about that philosophy which is supposed to be the peculiar forte of India has become, or rather was till the advent of universities in India in the 19th century, a close preserve of a microscopic minority among the teeming millions, and a dualism has grown up between philosophy and life which is alien to the real spirit of Indian philosophy.

4 This dualism between thought and life has accentuated the distinction between philosophy and religion. Hindus claim that Hindu thought has succeeded in reconciling philosophy and religion, but this reconciliation is more apparent than real. I have tried to show elsewhere¹ how this claim is unjustifiable. The apparent reconciliation has only been achieved by a rigid exclusion of the demands of thought on life. A Hindu is welcome to think as he likes, but woe to him and to his if he dare defy a single rule of *Varnāśrama Dharma*. It would be a mistake to think that this *Varnāśrama Dharma* is even a unified body of doctrines. It neces-

¹ The Menist, October, 1927 *Philosophy and Religion*

SARVAJÑA

By M YAMUNACHARYA

Socrates has been called the "Vagabond Saint" Unattached to home and the things of this world he wandered about in search of Truth and telling people certain home truths by which they could rectify their ways of life He brought Philosophy from the clouds to the earth and left the people his message, "Know Thyself" Similar has been the mission of Sarvajña, "The Vagabond Saint" of the Kannada Country His name is a household word in all the land where Kannada is spoken and his sayings known as the "*Vacanas*" are on the lips of peasant, priest, prince and pauper.

Little is known of the biographical details of his life. From internal evidence scholars ascribe him to the beginning of the 17th century as the time of his birth and activities. 1600 A. D is considered to be the approximate date of his birth by Sri R Narasimhacharya in his *History of Kannada Literature* The names of his hamlet and parents are culled from the *Vacanas* ascribed to Sarvajña But how far all that goes under the name *Sarvajña Vacanas* is the composition of Sarvajña himself, how many of them are genuine and how many are spurious is a matter for critical scholarship to decide There are thousands of sayings ascribed to Sarvajña and doubtless to say many of them may have been interpolated by later writers for love of vicarious fame There is a reference in Sarvajña's *Vacanas* to a village called Ambalūru as his place of birth, to Masura Basavarasa as his father and to Maḷave of the potter's caste as his mother But Sarvajña however spoke of himself as the "Son of Śiva" (14) Evidently his parents did not relish this and turned him out of their house into the street Sarvajña spent the rest of his life as a wanderer learning many lessons from the school of life

1. This and other ensuing numbers refer to the *vacanas* numbered by Sri Channappa Uttangi in his critical collection of *Sarvajña Vacanas* (1937 Edition)

There is an interesting reference in his *vacanas* probably to his own life and appearance as an ascetic

"Shaven is his head : wrapped is he in a shred of wool, lone is he like an elephant parted from its herd, when you see such an one, have faith in him, Sarvajña " (456)

Austerity, simplicity, abandonment of earthly possessions must have been the keynote of this man's life. He has parted from his forbears, the herd of teachers and prophets and is wandering like the lonely elephant always longing to join the herd of those who laboured for the good of the world and became gathered to their fathers with their mission fulfilled. Such a sense of loneliness has frequently haunted great souls in this unheeding world.

His name "Sarvajña" which means the "All knowing" is intriguing. Whether this was the name given to him by his parents or was a title conferred on him by the people in admiration and reverence for his wisdom, it is difficult to say. As is the custom of Kannada poets, the poet usually cites his name at the end of each of his compositions. It is also the custom to invoke the poet's own favourite deity, as for example Basava who invokes Kudala Sangama Deva, Akka Mahadevi who names Mallikarjuna and Purandara Dasa who closes the final refrain of his songs with the name of Purandara Viṭṭhala. It is possible that "Sarvajña" may merely signify the general wisdom of the wise of the ages. Whatever it is, scholars are of the opinion that most of the *vacanas* are the composition of a single poet philosopher, a man of the people who hid his personality behind an anonymity difficult to penetrate but nevertheless significant of the deep humility of their author. He may have been firmly convinced that whatever good words poured out of him owed their inspiration to the Omniscient One. Says Sarvajña 'Knowledge have I none and utterance is not of me. I speak as but a servitor of Him with the eye on the brow.'

We owe a deep debt of gratitude to Sri Channappa Uttangi of Dharwar who has devoted a life-time to the study of Sarvajña and who has been able to give us a collection of the genuine sayings of Sarvajña as could be judged internally by the matter and manner of

fully repeated by generations of Hindus who have existed rather than lived. It goes to the credit of the great Swami that like a modern Buddha he should have uttered this sublime wish : "May I be born and reborn again and suffer a thousand miseries if only I am able to worship the only God in Whom I believe, the sum total of all souls, and above all my God the wicked, my God the afflicted, my God the poor of all races ! " This is a note new to India since the days of Buddha. Hinduism, apart from its lip homage to the Upanishads as a religion has done nothing to raise the economic or moral stature of the masses and done nothing to draw the masses out of the soul-killing routine of rites and ceremonies. Baha'u'llah's words, though written in another context, are as much pertinent to Hinduism as to any other religion :

"So great, alas, is the ignorance of men, that they accept the will and desire of priests, while turning away from the will and the desire of God... .When the light of the stars disappears, it is because the sun is rising, in like manner the light of the doctors and the priests is dimmed when the sun of reality swings into the sky. . . .By the Creator's orders, the waves of fecund seas break on the shores of paradise : and yet, like dogs round a carcase, men assemble round their priests, content with a bitter draught of brackish water !"

Religion has played a great part in the life of men all over the world, and it is doubtful if the world will ever be able to do without religion. But if it is not to continue to play the role of a racial opium, it must be something that is born out of the deepest instincts of men, and not imposed on them by the superstitious fear of the priest or the anger of God. To judge from the fact that even in our own times after a century of western education divorced from moral or spiritual training of any sort, men like Swami Vivekananda and Gandhiji have found a new inspiration in ages-old Upanishads and the *Gita*, it would be but fair to conclude that there is something very great in them which could be used as a dynamo to stir the souls of men. But this could be done only if they are taken away from the secrecy of the priests and made a possession of the world to be shared by the Brahmin and the Harijan alike. Instead of being

looked upon as intellectual treasures to be closely guarded from the profane gaze of the masses the truth in them has to be democratised. The reign and rule of the *Puranas* must end to give place to deeper religious insight. The profound words of Romain Rolland have to enter the soul of India. "Error struggling on towards the living truth is more fruitful and more blessed than dead truth." The ancient lore has become a dead mass of learning. It has to be transformed into a living instrument of progress. In spite of its palpable shortcomings modern education has left loose a mass of political feeling. And what centuries of religion did not succeed in doing modern politics whether of the democratic or socialistic brand has done. It has set up a stage where the masses are to inherit in the India of the future not poverty and their down-troddenness in the name of religion, but a new sense of self respect and a new sense of human dignity and a new sense of social responsibility. With these new forces playing all around us philosophy has a responsible part to play not by way of handling dead truths but by concentrating on living problems so that the great seers of the past can shed light on the path that takes us 'towards the living truth'.

these sayings. The counterfeit sayings tell their own tale and betray their bastard birth whereas Sarvajña's own ring like true coin, strike them where you will. It, of course, needs an eye of discernment such as the one possessed by Sri Channappa Uttangi or Professor A R Krishna Sastri to be able, almost at a glance, to separate the grain from the chaff.

In the composition of every religion, however sectarian it may be in its wrappings, we are able to discern three elements intertwined. They are the tribal, the national and the universal elements. The universal element runs like a vein of gold through all the ore of custom, tradition and other local elements. It is the predominance of the universal element that raises Sarvajña above the level of sect or creed and makes him a prophet of universal truths that know no boundaries of caste, creed or colour. It is to this aspect of Sarvajña that we now address ourselves.

Sarvajña considers that the freedom to wander unattached to possessions is his greatest wealth. 'Who is there richer than a vagrant?' (441) he asks. He goes in quest of truth, speaks the truth as has seen it and is not moved to swerve from the path of truth by fear or favour. He does not allow any local attachments to grow on him lest he become parochial, local or sectarian in his outlook. He clinches the whole matter in one line which sums up the manner of his life. 'Do not forsake truth. do not speak in order to please others, do not trust yourself to stay for long in one and the same place. Only so shall Śiva be with you as you wish' (1146).

This anchorite however is not one who lives in an ivory tower. He is not a misanthrope like Fimon of Athens. He loves humanity in the raw and knows intimately its ups and downs, elations and depressions, hopes and despair, sins and holiness. He listens to the still sad music of humanity in the midst of raucous voices and raving maniacs. He knows the ways of the world too well to feign the childlike innocence of an unworldly ignorant sage. His knowledge of men and affairs is surprising. It would be a mistake for anyone to think that Sarvajña was preoccupied with religion and had no thought for anything more mundane. His *racanas* about food and health, marriage and morals, and such other concerns of the work a-day world are sufficient to give the lie to any such notion of him.

Sri Channappa Uttangi has classified the *Vacanas* of Sarvajña under three groups *Paramārthika*, *Naitika* and *Laukika*. The first group has a bearing on the spiritual life, the second group on the moral life and the third group on the life of the world in general. These groups naturally overlap for the reason that Sarvajña's teachings are a synthesis of these three aspects of life. In our passion for analysis we must take particular care not to miss the synthetic vision of this master.

Sarvajña was a practical mystic. He had the mystic's ardent longing for union with God and his abhorrence of doctrinal logomachies. He set great store by mystic experience. Ultimate Reality to Sarvajña was something that transcended the six systems of philosophy and the three embodiments of Brabma, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara. The real *guru* is he who can lead him to this ultimate vision. All others are spurious counterfeits of a *guru*. External marks of a *guru* he may have, but they do not make him a real one. Says Sarvajña

' Shave he may his head , a staff he may hold
in hand , desert he may his wife , merely
by these he does not become a *guru* ' (30)

It is not a parrot like repetition of what is heard but what is realized in his own person that constitutes the teaching of a real *guru*. The utterance of a *guru* is something apart from what one commonly hears. The real *guru* is one who enkindleth his pupil by the light of his own soul. The meeting of a real teacher and an apt pupil is likened by him to the rubbing of two twigs in such a way that they emit a spark. Merely tethering twigs together is inconsequential but the two must be rubbed against each other to emit a spark of fire (67). The coming together of a *guru* and a *śiṣya* must lead to a clash of two minds with a view to produce enlightenment. It is an active relationship far from the passivity of doing nothing on his part by the *śiṣya*.

What the *guru* teaches the *śiṣya* is a life saving lesson, the salvage of his soul from *samsara* or worldliness. Knowledge of God is the cream of all knowledge. This is knowledge attainable only by the cultivation of inward purity. The inward side of religion is

stressed by Sarvajña without which we have to face the death of religion. The riches of inner life must be evident in the graces of exterior life. Else, external forms of piety are but 'Sounding brass and tinkling cymbal' Says Sarvajña.

"Deep piety one may simulate, ascetic deshabille one may pose, but without sincere devotion within, he is like a high-sounding bell all hollow within" (214)

God has no temple bound in time and space. He is boundless and infinite and the vast universe itself is His abode. Sarvajña says.

"There is neither then nor now, here nor there
There is no bound nor boundary to the Linga, no
temple is there for it" (122)

God is timeless, spaceless and no temple walls can confine Him.
Such is the teaching of the mystic Sarvajña

How about rites and rituals? His attitude is the same as that of the mystics all the world over. Rites and rituals devoid of devotion and purity of heart lead one nowhere. Sarvajña says

"What avails it if one worships in eight different
modes? Such worship devoid of devotion is
barren of result, behold!" (131)

God is all pervading

"He is in stone, on the tip of a thorn, He is there
where you think of Him, He is there where you
are" (276)

"He could dwell in the tiniest particle of sand
and pervade the softest stone, He could live in a
framed picture etched by a painter. Can he not
then live in thee?" (280)

"Though huge, an elephant mirrors itself in the
smallest mirror. The Highest Being likewise
can mirror Himself in the heart of a *Jnani*" (281)

He must be worshipped in spirit. Mere repetition of God's

names, telling of beads, going to the temples are of no worth without love in the heart

“What avails it if one goes round and round a temple with no devotion in him? He is like the ox returning to its stall after doing its daily rounds at the oil mill. It goes round and round but has no heart in what it does” (216)

“If one has God in his mind, what matters it whether he is in a mansion or a monastery? If he has no God in his heart what matters it even if he lives in the temple courtyard?” (217)

Sarvajña is of the view that everything will be added unto man if he has love of God in him. Without that love all other gifts that he may possess are vain and worthless

“What good is there in much reading, what good in being gifted with beauty of form, what good in excellence won among family compeers, if love of God does not reside in thee?” (1165)

The God that is worshipped is one and the same for all the world. One must seek him with single minded devotion. A distracted worship of multifarious deities is born of the ignorance of this one saving truth. Sarvajña is vehement in his denunciation of superstitious veneration of ghosts and goblins, stocks and stones

“Only one God can there be for this world – two Gods there can never be. He is the Omniscient One. He is the Maker of all. He is the only God for all the Universe!” (150)

‘Do not then prate of this God, that God and the other. He is the God of gods the sole refuge of all that lives in this world’ (151)

This one God to whom we all bow reveals His wisdom and beauty in things of this variegated world. The patterns of beauty,

lines of colour, harmonies of sound, sweetness of taste are all the diverse manifestations of the creative art of God

“Who painted the peacock and studded the sky with wonder, who tinted the leaves and the flowers with diverse paint? (152)

“Who put the flavour in the spice and the sweet water in the cocoanut, who put the hum in the bee and filled the throat of the cuckoo with music?” (154)

A true philosopher (*Jnani*) according to Sarvajña, is one who has realized the truth and lives in accordance with it. He has known the Self in its true nature. He has realized the depth of words. He has transcended the barriers of caste and creed. He has attained the highest that is within the reach of man. He looks upon all with an equal eye. He is a *Samadarśi*.

“He does not need a row of books nor spells and incantations. He holds the key of truth in his hands, there is neither high nor low to him.” (397)

“Caste is no consideration to him, he is never churlish. There are no poles to support the sky and there is no colony of untouchables in heaven.” (863)

“Hunger, thirst, sleep and sex are common to beast, bird and man. Whence then the pride of superior birth?” (877)

Sarvajña says further of the *Jnani*:

“He is the *Jnani* who knows the true hue of his soul, the inward meaning of words, the how, the whence and the whither of his being and thus has attained to the highest.” (295)

Once he has known this, there is no lapse into ignorance in which he was born.

“The pearl is born in water but does not sink again into it, so the man who knows the truth does not sink into worldliness again.” (298)

Having known God he cares not what the ignorant folk speak nor does he retort. Here are a few passages from Sarvajña pointing to the silent testimony of the *Jñani* to the knowledge of the highest that is vouchsafed to him. His silence is more eloquent than speech.

“ There is no lie greater than ‘ I know ’. He who knows that he knows, knows it only in silence and only he it is that knows ” (321)

‘ He who knows Brahman must keep his lips sealed. If he breaks his vow of silence it is like a thief betraying himself by coughing in the silence of the night ’ (324)

The *Jñani* lives his life and sets himself in tune with the Infinite. And the rest is done. The light of his soul will draw the world to him. He is not eager to be looked at and listened to.

“ No mirror says ‘ Come and look at me ’.
The great souled one is like the mirror ’ (326)

Eternal vigilance is the characteristic of the seeker. His soul does not slumber needing to be awakened afresh.

‘ The daylight of his soul has broken on him.
To one like him who ever enjoys bright day
where is the need to say ‘ Get busy, for the day
has dawned ’ ? ’ (313)

The *vacanas* cited above tell their own story of the mind and spirit of Sarvajña: his power of vivid imagery and popular appeal. It must be remembered here that as E. P. Rice says, ‘ The terseness of Sarvajña’s verses can scarcely be reproduced in a western language except at the cost of clearness ’.

The common round and the daily task become hallowed when they are gone through in the spirit of consecrated service to God. No duty is too low to be performed by the *Jñani*. He becomes a lesson in this for the others to follow.

Such men are the salt of the earth. To see them is to become purified. It is like dipping oneself in a sacred river and rising purified out of it. This is the true sacred bath for the pilgrim.

"Is any running water a sacred stream? The word of those who walk in the light of truth is the real sacred river and dwelling with these blessed ones is the real sacred river " (715)

The good and the gentle living among the wicked ones of the world are compared to the soft tongue that has to dwell between rows of sharp edged teeth. Sarvajña says that they remain scornfully silent when fools arraign them and the wicked taunt them (359-360)

Sarvajña's lessons for the conduct of life are animated by a sense of practicality and ethical earnestness. He is a moral Philosopher *par excellence*. His moral maxims are frequently quoted by the common folk. They provide them with their daily moral fare. Man's moral struggle is a struggle against his propensity to sin. He has in him the capacity to rise to the highest heights of holiness or to descend to the deepest depths of degradation. He can grow into a deity or swell into a demon. Amidst the evil temptations of the world man can hold himself straight only by the exercise of constant vigilance over himself. Self conquest is the greatest of all conquests. Moral life is a life of incessant endeavour after righteousness. He in whom the sense of discrimination of what is righteous and what is unrighteous is blurred is on the road to moral annihilation. When morality is lost all is lost according to Sarvajña. The moral law is inexorable. He says

"The division of right and wrong it is that has made the world run smooth or else the world would run down into nothing in no time " (1058)

Those who walk in the path of righteousness are honoured by the whole world. No real harm shall befall them. They will shine like beacon lights to those who are lost in shipwreck. The good are the deities moving on earth.

"The incense emits fragrance while it burns
So the good grow more patient and sweet the more
they suffer the pains of life " (341)

The good do not pay heed to those who seek to do evil to them. They do not retaliate. They allow them to eat the consequences of the evil they seek to do.

“He who wishes ill of others can never escape it himself ; it is like a man who hurls live coal at another and has his own palm singed ” (1136)

Sarvajña may have suffered for plain speaking. He speaks of people often hurling stones at him. But yet he is full of compassion for them

“ Do not meet hate with hate and wrath with wrath. You shall be steady with this by the grace of God who shall not be forgotten ever by you. Then will nobleness enkindle nobleness ” (1133)

Sarvajña was a prophet of Universalism. He knew no differences of caste or colour or creed. His appeal was to all humanity. He rules the hearts of those who have known his teachings by his power of forthright speech. He takes all humanity as his province. How broad was his human sympathy is pithily expressed in the following lines so truly his own

“ The whole town is my kindred, the whole street is my neighbour, the whole world is my family deity, whom shall I then not own as mine ? ” (1427)

Unlike many other mystics, Sarvajña kept himself in close touch with the work a day world. He possessed robust common sense in dealing out practical advice to all and sundry in the management of human affairs. None of these affairs was beneath his advice. Marriage and morals, diet and disease claimed his attention. Personal happiness and social well-being were the twin objects of his practical philosophy.

The following few *vacanas* speak of domestic felicity and the elements that go to make it

“ Pudding filled with good kernel and curds of thick buffalo milk churned by a dear wife who is full of graceful movement and who keeps the home tidy and cheerful, what more is needed for happiness ? ” (1481)

“ A wife of soft speech, graceful modesty, and wise discrimination is the special gift of providence ” (1531)

"Betel without lime, wedding without colour, a home without a woman are irredeemable like oil poured in sand (1536)

Life of woman without man is equally dreary.

"A country without a ruler, a bed without a pillow and a maid without a mate are like script limned on water" (1538)

Sarvajña, though himself an anchorite appreciates the importance of woman in a man's life. It is perhaps the lack of tender maternal care in the home from which he was cast out in his childhood that makes him long keenly for this kind of comfort. He says

"It is good to have a woman at home, be she daughter or sister, daughter in law or sister in law, wife or mother" (1503)

Sarvajña is not unaware of the joy and tranquillity that comes of true love between man and woman

"A lassie after your heart, in true love pledged to you, if thou couldst live with her in concord it is like tasting the nectar of life" (1545)

"Wedded life with a wise woman is sweeter than sugarcane fresh from the field, than honey fresh drawn from the hive, than milk milked fresh from a cow" (1546)

No better picture of domestic happiness can be had than the one depicted by him in the following verse

"A virtuous wife, a courtyard bathed in moonlight, a gentle breeze wearing away weariness—a summer with these, may it last for ever!" (1557)

"A warm home, a well filled purse, a wife heedful of your desires— if you have these, fie on heaven!" (1558)

A miserable home is also pictured by him thus

“ A country without a ruler,
a year which is rainless,
a home with a joyless woman—
these are hybrid like a hermaphrodite ” (1564)
“ A meal without curry, a garden without the champak,
a wife with no laughter in her, is like
smoking the smoke of dung ” (1565)

Sarvajña is a social reformer. He has many words of shrewd worldly wisdom which warn people of the evils of prostitution. He says

“ It is a fool who trusts the love of one who sells her body to him. He is like a moth which pounces on a lamp imagining it to be fruit and scorching itself in the flame ” (1769)

He has something to say of the alchemists who deceive the world by claiming that they can convert base metal into gold. He is aware of how credulously people are taken in by such charlatans

“ The alchemists hold out their doctrine of transmutation and then they blow and blow into the fire until the smoke beclouds them. Their throats become parched and they go away in despair ” (1812)

“ The people give away their preserved gold for love of more gold to these alchemists. A whiff of smoke is all they get in return ” (1813)

Sarvajña was not a philosopher who swept the skies while losing his foothold on earth. His philosophy is mostly anthropocentric like that of Socrates. Man is the most intimate subject of his study. No aspect of human life is ignored by him. He knows the ups and downs of life, the good and the evil of it and has a realistic attitude towards problems of man's day to day existence. It is a philosophy of robust common sense that we come across in Sarvajña while he treats of mundane matters.

He unhesitatingly recognizes the materialistic basis of existence. Food is a matter of the greatest importance to him. He devotes nearly fifty *vacanas* for this purpose. A few characteristic ones are quoted here.

“A morsel of kneaded flour can make a man gambol about, arraying himself in gay attire and make him laugh and laugh until the sides begin to ache” (1822)

“It is this that makes him polish his nails, that lights up his face with a radiant smile, and makes him speak the language of love” (1823)

Lack of food makes us lose all zest for life. All culture and art become then a mockery

“Eyes begin to grow dim, ears cease to hear, the body begins to droop—all this happens if one misses the meal of a night” (1830)

‘The feet of a hungry man grow limp, words spoken fall on a deaf ear, even the words of his sweetheart would lack all charm, if food comes tardy to a hungering person.’ (1831)

The hungry man recognizes God only when He comes to him in the form of food. So, says Sarvajña

“There is no God then other than food, life lasts as long as food lasts, on earth the only God is food” (1842)

Sarvajña has very instructive things to say about one's diatetic regimen leading to perfect health

“Never eat when you are not hungry, never eat more than you just need, never eat food which is either too hot or too cold—thus shall you keep the doctor away” (1847)

Sarvajña says that the elixir of life and the secret of perpetual youth lie in observing the golden rule of health, namely, eating only when one is hungry and never eating to satisfy the craving of the

palate He particularly warns the aged not to yield to the pleasures of the palate if they wish to remain young even though old in years

"He who has a hold over his palate is farther off from death He who panders to the palate is only hastening his end" (1850)

"Give food to the needy, speak sweetly to all, love others as thyself—with these, paradise is here and now" (527)

"Only what you have given away shall be thine, what you have secreted shall be for others to snatch. What has been given in due charity is never lost, it is a treasure that you have laid up with God" (540)

Disinterested charity is the best charity and is true worship of God.

"Charity given with no desire for recognition, eyes kept open which do not see any evil, gift given without asking anything in return—no worship of God is of greater excellence than these" (527)

Sarvajña has also his own ideas of statecraft He loved liberty as a poet who enjoyed a certain freedom from conventions which hamper the development of human personality

"Freedom is the best of things in this world" (618), he says But this freedom is not the freedom to do what one likes but freedom which is consistent with order Freedom without order leads human society to a terrific state (619) He believed in a stable monarchic state Untold benefits accrue to a state when it is ruled by a strong and wise monarch He says that the people of a dominion are like the body with the monarch as its soul (620) The strength of the state does not lie in huge armies or armaments but in the goodwill and loyalty of the people The king rules the people effectively only when he rules over their hearts It is not the power of the army but power of the soul that really reigns (620) The safety of the kingdom lies as much on a good minister as on a good

King. A dominion devoid of a good minister is like a creaking machine which will soon run down (623). He expresses the keen sense of frustration that results in the event of a ruler becoming heedless of the grievances of his subjects (690). The world becomes enveloped in ruin when the rulers abandon the ways of justice (701).

There is no side of life that remains unnoticed and uncommenced upon by Sarvajña. His experience is as wide as the world. His mental horizon is as broad. His sympathies are broader still. As a philosopher, Sarvajña has discharged to perfection his supreme task of the criticism of life. He is, however, no cynic. There is no trace of bitterness in him. He holds the mirror to life, laughs at things to be laughed at, rails at things to be railed at, and commends in a bountiful measure things that are commendable.

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